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Barely twenty years after the end of the Cold War, the international political system 
has experienced an unanticipated shift from a United States (US) led unipolar global 
order to a new order marked by its fresh wave of multiple competitors (Prys 
2009:137). The global burden on the US had reciprocally inspired the appearance of a 
range of actors: regional (middle) powers such as Brazil, China, India and Russia; 
European Union (EU); South Africa and Nigeria. Consequently, an increasing level of 
expectation has been imposed on regional powers to provide the right leadership 
direction capable of promoting international stability and paving the way for 
development in these regions.  
In the light of the above, this thesis examines the implication of the hegemonic 
stability theory in understanding the power dynamics within Africa. In essence, the 
study specifically seeks to operationalize the concept of regional hegemony by 
drawing on insights from a comparative foreign policy study of African regional 
powers with emphasis on Nigeria and South Africa. Using largely qualitative and 
secondary data supplemented with primary data, the study examines the underlying 
assertions of a possible hegemonic influence of both countries and, thus, addresses the 
dearth of literature on regional power and leadership dynamics - particularly in 
Africa.  
Since the celebrated entry of South Africa into the African democratic arena, the 
resultant implication of this has been a change in the power, leadership and economic 
equations in Africa. From a theoretical projection of hegemonic stability theory, this 
study concludes that there is undeniable linkage between the foreign policies of 
Nigeria and South Africa and their hegemonic ambitions in the continent. However, 
by extrapolating the hegemonic stability theory at a regional level of analysis, the 
study finds very little empirical evidence to suggest the application of the theory at the 
regional level. While Nigeria and South Africa have been called upon repeatedly to 
play hegemonic roles within the continent, the study shows that both countries lack 
the conditions to effectively play such roles within a continent with major historical, 
internal and external constraints that puncture the possibility of a hegemonic 
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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
1.1 Background and outline of the research problem 
Barely twenty years after the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin wall, the 
international political system had experienced an unanticipated and remarkable shift 
from a United States (US) led unipolar global order to a fresh wave or emergence of 
multiple competitors (Prys 2009:137). The global burden on the US had reciprocally 
inspired the appearance of a range of actors: regional middle powers
1
 such as Brazil, 
China, India and Russia; regional blocs like the European Union (EU); and regional 
powers like Argentina, Iran, Nigeria and South Africa. This changed global context 
has led to continuing interest in (and increasing research focus on) regions, regional 
order and regional powers in terms of their roles (with other regional/state actors) in 
the international system (see Prys 2008; 2010; Fawcett and Hurrell 2007; Katzenstein 
2005; Flemes et al. 2009). This interest has also paved way for new research trends 
into comparative regional politics and comparative foreign policy studies especially at 
the regional level as distinct from the myriad of intellectual works that earlier 
concentrated on the global super powers.  
Expectedly, an increasing and greater level of expectation has been imposed on 
regional powers to provide the right impetus and leadership direction in order to 
promote international (regional) stability and inspire growth and development in these 
regions. The mounting reluctance and increasing lack of interest of Western countries 
to intervene in civil and political conflicts particularly in Africa and many parts of the 
developing world have further invoked enormous pressure on these regional actors. In 
other words, regional powers have now come to take a dominant role in addressing 
conflicts, economic deprivation and political instabilities in their region (Pry 2010:1-
2; Bush 2002; Chase 1999; IDRC 2001). Rising pressure and expectation are 
therefore invoked upon regional powers, for instance, to deal with the political 
conflicts, instabilities and economic challenges taking place in their backyards. 
                                                          
1
 Pastor’s (1999) list of regional powers includes: Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, 
Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan and South Africa Germany, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Japan, Malaysia, 





Particularly, countries like Brazil, India, South Africa, Nigeria, and Australia are 
repeatedly called on by the Western world to rescue their regions from total collapse 
(Alden and le Pere 2003; Obiora 2011; Adebajo 2007; Schirm 2006). 
Studies have therefore been conducted on regional power actors as both facilitators 
(Hurrell 2005; Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990; Singh 2000) and obstacles to regional 
integration (Pedersen 2002). Scholars have similarly examined regional actors at the 
level of the emergence and maintenance of “regional security complexes” under the 
control of one state (Buzan and Waever 2003). Other studies on regional leadership 
focus essentially on the role of a regional power as a middle power or/and emerging 
power in global governance (Pedersen 2002). However, there seems to be a dearth of 
literature on a comparative study of regional leadership, particularly in Africa, 
resulting in a lack of empirically verifiable conclusions. Drawing on insights from a 
comparative foreign policy study of Nigeria and South Africa, this study explores the 
capacities for regional leadership of both countries on the one hand and on the other 
hand explicates the implications of both countries’ foreign policy behaviours on their 
regional hegemonic ambition within the African regional space. Contemporary 
research on regions in a comparative approach is therefore crucial in order to build 
deeper empirical nexus between regional cases. 
While countries like Nigeria and South Africa have been called upon repeatedly to 
take up leadership positions within the continent, it is unclear whether both countries 
are well prepared beyond official rhetoric to effectively play such roles. In the past 
few years, there have been repeated claims by scholars -- particularly among the 
South African intelligentsia -- of a South African “hegemonic” status (comparative to 
other potential regional power blocs) without advancing clear empirical evidence to 
support such claims. It therefore becomes questionable to reach such a conclusion 
without drawing from clear substantive evidence where South Africa, for instance, 
has extended its unrivalled and unchallenged hegemonic or leadership capacity 
particularly beyond its Southern African stronghold through the active engagement of 
its foreign policy towards Africa. In essence, can we also legitimately speak of an 
acceptance of Nigeria and/or South Africa’s continental hegemonic position among 





Therefore, the study is critical in its attempt to intellectually deepen the rhetorical 
debate on the use or misuse of hegemony to ‘flaunt’ Nigerian or South African Pan-
African role or status based on both countries’ preponderant material power within the 
continent. From a theoretical position of hegemonic stability theory, this study 
addresses the question of establishing the linkage between the foreign policies of 
Nigeria and South Africa and their hegemonic ambitions to regional stability, security 
and order in Africa? The purpose is to extrapolate the hegemonic stability theory at a 
regional level of analysis with specific focus on two major regional powers in Africa 
(Nigeria and South Africa). It equally presents fresh understanding and insight into 
the role of external powers (such as non-continental powers, the UN and international 
financial institutions etc.) on the foreign policy trajectories of both countries and their 
implications for regional hegemony. For this and other related reasons, the study 
interrogates the widely held assumption of Nigerian or South African hegemony in 
Africa. It focuses on these two dominant regional leaders within the African continent 
by exploring not just their leadership potential or role but also, and more importantly, 
their leadership capabilities or capacities in a comparative context.  
Nigeria and South Africa have been carefully selected for comparative analysis on the 
basis of their evident potentials as African leaders and also on the strength of each 
country’s respective claim to being the giant of Africa and Africa’s big brother. Since 
the celebrated entry of South Africa into the African democratic space, the resultant 
implication of this has been a change in the contours of power and leadership 
equations in Africa. Thus, we draw largely from both countries’ foreign policy role 
conception, perceptions, constellation of interests, successes and failures and their 
implications in advancing regional hegemony and international stability within the 
context of the hegemonic stability theory. 
1.2 Nigeria and South Africa in comparative context 
Nigeria and South Africa are uniquely placed as countries that both emerged from an 
amalgamation of two or more previously distinct territories (Kaba 2005). Nigeria was 
the manifestation of the unification of the Northern and Southern British colonial 
protectorates while for South Africa, the merger was between the Afrikaner controlled 
Republics of Transvaal and the Orange Free State on the one hand and the British 





As also rightly noted by Kaba (2005), the annus mirabilis of Nigeria’s independence 
in 1960 coincidentally marked a watershed for South Africa’s political history. While 
Nigeria joined over 15 other countries to secure her independence in 1960, this period 
was signatured by the Sharpeville massacre which resulted in the killing of harmless 
South African protesters by the South African apartheid police. Thus with the 
acceptance of Nigeria’s membership into the Commonwealth of Nations during this 
period, South Africa, on the other hand, was forced to withdraw its membership from 
the Commonwealth – a body it joined as a founding member in 1931 following the 
Statute of Westminster. 
In the area of religious diversity, Nigeria and South Africa share strong similarities of 
a multi-religious community. According to the 2001 census, South Africa’s 
population accounts for 11% Zion Christians, 8.2% Pentecostal/Charismatic, 7.1% 
Catholics, 6.8% Methodists, 6.7% Dutch Reformers, 3.8% Anglicans, 36% other 
Christians, 1.5% Muslim, others 2.3%, unspecified 1.4%, and none 15.1%
2
. On the 
other hand, according to the 2006 population census, Muslims consist of 48.8%, 
Christians 50.8%
3
 (Catholic - 24.8%; Protestant - 74.1%; Other Christian and 
Orthodox denominations - 0.9%) while the rest accounts for 0.4% (Pew Research 
2011; Kaba 2005). 
In terms of economic capacity, Nigeria is enriched with a lot of mineral and natural 
resources including hides and skins, cement, coal, columbite, cotton, crude oil, palm 
oil, natural gas, peanuts, rubber, textiles, tin, and wood.  Its Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) purchasing power parity is put at $478.5 billion (2013 est.) while its real 
growth rate is at 6.2% (2013 est.). Its per capita purchasing power parity stands at 
$2,800 (2013 est.) (CIA Fact Book 2014). The size of Lagos economy according to 
The Economist (2011) at $45bn is equivalent to the entire Kenyan economy and larger 
than Ethiopia’s. On the other hand, South Africa GDP: purchasing power parity is put 
at $595.7 billion (2013 est.) while its real growth rate is recorded as 2% (2013 est.) 
(CIA Fact Book 2014). Also, its per capita purchasing power parity stands at $11,500 
(2013 est.) (CIA Fact Book 2014). South Africa’s industries include automobile 
                                                          
2
 The 2011 Census did not include questions about religion due to low priority Census (statssa.gov.za).  
3
 Accordign to the Pew Forum on Religion (2013), Nigeria’s Christian population of 80,510,000 
accounts for 3.7% of world’s Christian population. Nigeria has more Christian population than in any 
single nation in Western Europe in states that are traditionally Christian. Nigeria’s Christian 





assembly, commercial ship repair, iron, machinery, metalworking, mining, steel, 
textile etc.  
Table 1.1: Nigeria and South Africa: Key Population Statistics 
POPULATION NIGERIA SOUTH AFRICA 
174,507,539 (July 2013 est.) 48,601,098 (July 2013 est.) 
 Hausa/ 
Falani 
29% Ibibio 3.5% Black 79.2% 
Yoruba 21% Tiv 2.5% White 8.9% 
Igbo  18% Other 12% Coloured 8.9% 
Ijaw 10%   Indian/Asian 2.5% 
 Kanuri 4%   Other 0.5% 




0-14 Yrs 43.8 39,127,615 37,334,281 28.3 6,909,066 6,866,163 
15-24 Yrs  19.3 17,201,067 16,451,357 20.6 5,041,412 4,960,190 
25-54 Yrs 30.1 25,842,967 26,699,432 38.1 9,561,452 8,948,398 
55-64 Yrs  3.8 3,016,896   3,603,048 6.9 1,450,420 1,916,960 
65 Yrs -over  3 2,390,154   2,840,722 6.1 1,177,999 1,769,038 
Sub-total 100 87, 578, 699 86,928,840 100 24,140,349 24,460,749 
Average Life 
Expectancy 
52.46 years  49.48 years 
Male Life 
Expectancy 
49.35 years 50.43 years 
Female Life 
Expectancy 
55.77 years 48.51 years 
Median Age 17.9 years 25.5 years 
Median Male Age 17.4 years 25.2 years 
Median Female 
Age 
18.4 years 25.8 years 
Literacy Rate 61.3% 93% 
 Source: Author’s compilation; See CIA Fact Book (2014) 
The study has deliberately and selectively chosen Sub-Saharan Africa as its focus area 
and also deliberately excluded some countries that may equally have ambitions or 
potential for African regional hegemony. For example, Egypt is excluded from this 
study due largely to its acknowledged pan-Arabism and inconsistent foreign policy 
sentiment and posture resulting in its failure to sometimes see itself as part of the 
African continent (Brown 2001:97). Moreover, historically, its concern for Africa has 
often oscilated and guided by the interest of its leadership per time. Also, Libya’s 
dwindling political position both within the continent and beyond coupled with its 
recent political turmoil justify its exclusion even though it also cannot clearly boast of 





perhaps cements this exclusion. Other countries such as Senegal, Ethiopia, Kenya and 
Ghana equally cannot claim to have much foreign policy effect beyond their sub-
regions, hence their exclusion.  
The main themes of this study would be addressed variously: first by an in-depth 
assessment of Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign policy roles and capacity in Africa; 
and second, by using specific cases to investigate the active engagement of these 
capacities in terms of its successes and failures, costs and benefits. Also, the study 
will examine the implication of the presence or absence of regional hegemony or 
leadership for Africa’s geo-political space.  
1.2.1 Nigeria: Key statistics and history 
As figure 1.1 demonstrates, Nigeria is located between Longitudes 3° and 14° East 
and Latitudes 4° and 14° north and bounded by the Republic of Benin and Niger to 
the West; on the East by the Republic of Cameroon; on the North by Niger and Chad 
Republics and on the South by the Gulf of Guinea. After over 50 years of colonial 
subjugation, Nigeria (officially known as Federal Republic of Nigeria) gained 
independence from the United Kingdom on the 1
st
 of October, 1960. With an official 
estimated population of over 170 million; a landmass of 923,768 square kilometers, 




state in the world and 
the 10
th
 largest in the African continent (Bach 2007; World Bank 2012).  
                    Figure 1.1: Map showing Nigeria and its contiguous neighbours 
        






The country also has one of the highest rates of urbanization in the world (Bach 2007) 
and holds over 50% of West Africa’s potential for industrial and manufacturing sector 
(Bach 2007). Comprising of 36 states and a Federal Capital Territory (FCT), the 
country is divided into 774 local government areas with Abuja as its capital. In terms 
of ethnic and cultural diversity, Nigeria is also made up of over 250 ethnic 
nationalities stratified across geographical boundaries with each ethnic group 
occupying a contiguous geographical area. Specifically, there are 3 major ethnic 
nationalities; Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba. The ethnic cleavages of the Nigerian 
state is also reflected in its religious spread with Igbos and Yorubas being 
predominantly Christians and located in the South, while the Hausa-Fulani Muslims 
are predominantly located in the North. Its political and historical experiences include 
colonization, decolonization, democratisation, constitutionalism, regime change from 
civilian to military; unitary and federal, parliamentary and presidential systems, 
endless transition to democratic rule and more recently a return to popular rule and the 
first civilian to civilian democratic transition (see Table 1.2 below). 
Nigeria is also the largest African country in terms of population and widely 
acknowledged as the most populous Black country in the world with over 60% of 
West Africa’s population (Bach 2007). By implication, 6 out of every 10 West 
Africans are Nigerians. 




Independence. Nigeria at the time made up of three regions under a 
Westminster parliamentary model. Abubakar  
 
Tafawa Balewa became the first Prime Minister from the North and Dr. 
Nnamdi Azikiwe as President from the South 
1963 Declaration as a Republic 
1966 
 
Nigeria’s first military coup d’état led by Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu but 
Gen. Aguyi Ironsi emerged the Head of the ruling military Council.  
 
Civilian government is overthrown in a coup General Aguiyi Ironsi (an Igbo) 




Secession of the Eastern region from Nigeria and the declaration of Biafra 
 






Division of the country from four regions in twelve states 
 
End of the civil war with a government pronouncement of “No victor no 
vanquished”. 
 
Division of the country from four into regions into twelve states 




Nigeria spearheads the formation of the Economic Community of West 
African States. 
 
General Gowon is toppled by a military coup led by General Murtala 
Muhammed from the North  
1976 General Mohammed increases the number of states from 12 to 19. 
 
General Olusegun Obasanjo assumes power after General Murtala is killed in 
an attempted coup led by Col. Dimka 
1977 Nigeria hosts African Festival of Arts and culture [FESTAC] in Lagos. 
October 
1979 
First military to civilian handover with Alhaji Shehu Shagari elected as the 
first Executive president  
1980 Nigeria’s Green Eagles hosts and wins the African Nations Cup Tournament 
for the first time since inception. 
1983 General Muhamadu Buhari from the north leads a military coup  
1985 General Ibrahim B. Babangida, a middle belt muslim, overthrows General 
Buhari in another military coup.     
 
Nigeria wins the inaugural U-16 FIFA-KODAK World Cup. 
1987 A failed military Coup led by Maj-Gen. Mamman Vatsa in which Vatsa and 
colleagues lost their lives. 
 
Gen. Babangida creates new more states and increases the number of states 
to 21. 
1990 Another failed Coup led by Maj. Gideon Orkar in which Orkar and number 
of officers lost their lives. 
 
Nigeria organizes and spearheads the formation of the ECOWAS monitoring 
group in Liberia – ECOMOG. 
1991 Gen. Babangida creates nine more states further increasing the number of 
states to thirty. 
June 1993 Moshood Abiola wins the first elections since the start of military rule, but 
the elections are annulled by Babangida  
Gen. Babangida inaugurates an interim Government headed by Ernest 
Shonekan. 





1993 years later he manipulates the democratic process such that he is nominated 
for president  
1994 Nigeria wins the African Cup of Nations for the second time 
1995 Commonwealth imposes sanctions against Nigeria. 
1996 Gen. Abacha increases the number of states to thirty-six. 
June 1998 General Abacha collapse and dies and is succeeded by General Abdulsalami 
Abubakar, a muslim from middle belt. Parties are allowed to operate 
relatively freely and political prisoners are released  
1999 Abubakar successfully and peacefully transfers power to Obasabjo under his 
party – Peoples’ Democratic Party. 
Olusegun Obasanjo’s PDP wins the Presidential and National Assembly 
elections, adding to their majority control of state and local government seats. 
There are now 36 states in Nigeria. 
Nigeria hosts the World Youth Soccer Championship. 
November 
1999 
Zamfara state in the north installs sharia criminal code.  
The army is deployed to Niger delta to root out militias, especially in the 
town of Odi.  
2000 Nigeria co-hosts African Nations Cup Tournament with Ghana 
Intensification of communal conflicts in several cities  
Nigeria begins Liquefied Natural Gas Production. 
2002 The Supreme Court overturns a biased electoral law and later opens the door 
for more parties to be registered  
2002 The National Assembly attempts to impeach President Obasanjo over 
budgetary issues. Later the president apologises and the matter ends. 
2003 National elections as President Obasanjo begin his second term in office 
under his ruling party [PDP]. 
2007 Marked the first transfer of power from one civilian government to another 
through elections, despite the fact that the process is mired in corruption   
2010 Death of former President Musa Yar’ Adua  
Emergence of Boko Haram insurgency group  
Election of Goodluck Jonathan from the minority Niger delta region as 
president 
2013 Nigeria wins the Orange All Africa Nations Cup in South Africa for the third 
time 
Source: Adapted from McDonald (2005) 
In the economic realm, aside being the first oil producing state in Africa, which dates 
back to 1958, Nigeria is also the largest producer of oil on the continent. Nigeria’s 
total military population spanning over 70,000 plays a prominent role in African and 
global affairs while its poorly developed and integrated economic structure is largely 
dependent on the export of raw materials especially crude oil, most of which comes 
from the Niger Delta area. In the early years of its independence, agricultural and 





reliance of its revenue on the sale of crude oil. Nigeria’s GDP is estimated at $478.5 
billion. It is the combination of all of these factors that arguably place Nigeria as a 
dominant regional power within the West African sub-region in particular and the 
African continent in general. 
At the international political front, Nigeria is a founding member of the Organization 
of African Unity (OAU) and equally played an instrumental role in its eventual 
transformation into the African Union (AU) in 2002 (Adebajo and Mustapha 2008). 
At the sub-regional level, it no doubt played an important and leading role in the 
formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975 
(Ojo 1980) while also using these institutional platforms as launch pads for the 
prominent role it played in the liberation of Southern Africa. Its withdrawal of troops 
from oil-rich Bakassi peninsula to settle border dispute with Cameroon was indicative 
of its willingness to play a mediatory role in conflict resolution in Africa among many 
other instances (Uzodike et al. 2013). 
Aside its economic and political landscape, the character of the post-independent 
Nigerian state is also influenced by a number of factors including its geographical and 
religious makeup among others. Osaghae (1998:19) sums up the character of the 
Nigerian state into three elements; colonial nature of the state, its lack of relative 
autonomy, and the federal system of government. Nigeria has been ravaged by long 
years of military rule and ethno-religious conflict while it also experienced a civil war 
that almost tore apart the entire fabrics of the nation. Corruption and gross 
mismanagement in the public sphere, ethnocentrism, mismanagement and failure of 
the national economy, incessant regime change, institutional, structural and policy 
inconsistencies, geographical fragmentation (regionalism) and political violence has 
been a major cancer of the Nigerian state. 
All of these factors nevertheless do not foreclose the circumstance of Nigeria as the 
most populous country in the black world. In fact this reality has further sharpened the 
international perception of Nigeria particularly in the post-independence era informed 
by a conviction of its ‘manifests destiny’ emphasizing “the country’s responsibility 
for the liberation and development of Africans and the entire black race” (Osaghae 
1998:29). On the strength of the above assessment Nigeria is no doubt a major 





1.2.2 South Africa: Key statistics and history 
Perhaps no other state has such intriguing political history in the modern world as 
South Africa’s. Situated at the southernmost tip of Africa, South Africa has a 
population of approximately 50 million people and has the largest economy in Africa. 
It is also a country with one of the most ambitious constitutions in the world, 
particularly noted for its Bill of Rights. However, the country still faces challenges in 
areas such as poverty, HIV/AIDS, unequalled wealth distribution, xenophobia, 
inequality and unemployment. With its capitals city in Pretoria, geographically, the 
country is slightly less than twice the size of Texas. Officially, there are 11 recognized 
languages even though there are considerably more languages being spoken in South 
Africa. Its GDP (Purchasing Power Parity) is estimated to be around $595.7 billion 
(2013 est.) (See CIA Report 2014).   
The political and governance landscape of the post-apartheid South Africa is 
significantly shaped by its apartheid experiences; often reflecting an attempt to 
redress the imbalances of the past and the imperative to build a ‘Rainbow’ nation, 
united in spite of its diversity and multiracial composition to ensure that the 
oppression of one race over another never happens again. In terms of political 
organization, even though there are elements of federalism ad presidential system, 
South Africa is fundamentally and constitutionally a unitary state and operates 
essentially a parliamentary system under a bicameral legislative arrangement 
(National Assembly and National Council of Provinces). In other words, as prescribed 
by the constitution, members of the executive cabinet are also members of parliament 
while the business of governance is presided over by the President who also doubles 
as both the head of state and head of government. However, upon election, the 
President is exempted from the parliament whereas the executive cabinet is 
accountable to parliament, which can ultimately impeach the President and/or even 
the cabinet from office. Representing the nine provinces of the country, the National 
Council of Provinces consists of 90 members while the National Assembly consists of 






Figure 1.2: Map showing South Africa and its contiguous neighbours 
 
Source: Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook (2013) 
Table 1.3 Critical periods of South Africa’s history 
Date Event 
1652  The arrival of the settler community (white people) from Europe, which began 
the 
long periods of war and colonization 
1902  The end of the Anglo-Boer War  
1906  The defeat of the Bhambatha Rebellion, which was the last armed resistance 
against colonialism   
1910  The Union of South Africa is founded 
1912  The founding of the South African Native National Congress, later called the 
African National Congress 
1913  The enactment of the Land Act which allocated about 87% of land in South 
Africa 
to the white people, and the rest to the black people who were the majority. 
1931 South Africa joins the Commonwealth of Nations following the Statutes of 
Westminster 
1948  The coming into power of the National Party and the beginning of the 
Apartheid policy   
1955  The adoption of the Freedom Charter at the Congress of the People  
1960  The banning of all liberation movements and the start of the armed struggle 
against apartheid  





1990    The unbanning of the liberation movements and the release of political 
prisoners 
1993  The adoption of the Interim Constitution, which provided for general elections 
based on universal franchise  
1994  The holding of the first democratic elections and the installation of Nelson 
Mandela as the first democratically elected black president   
1996  The adoption of the Constitution which was hailed as one of the most liberal 
with a very progressive Bill of Rights.   
1999 The second democratic elections with Thabo Mbeki as new President 
2008 Mbeki is recalled from office and Motlathe is sworn-in as the interim president 
to complete Mbeki’s term of office 
2009 President Jacob Zuma is installed as the new president 
Source: Author’s compilation 
1.3 Statement of the problem: Broader issues to be investigated. 
As explained earlier, literatures on regional or middle power status have continually 
surfaced within academic works, particularly since the end of the Cold War. Even 
though many of these publications have limitedly and intrinsically focused on Europe, 
Asia and the Americas, few of them have been directed at a comparative regional 
power interaction and dynamics among regional actors; and this is particularly true for 
Africa (see Prys 2009). Studies have also been conducted focusing on the domestic 
forces that inspire or determine the foreign policy of regional powers. According to 
Mistry (2009: 139), these studies focused on “how developments on the domestic 
front have configured policy options and behaviour”. Clearly ignored has been the 
need to thoroughly investigate regional leadership effectiveness in strengthening 
regional stability and promoting public goods. For this reason, this study aims to 
probe the intricacies of regional power actors’ leadership capabilities to address 
endemic African issues and challenges. Also, existing literatures have often 
essentially focused on a moderate study of potentials, roles and responsibilities of the 
power actors without clearly exploring the actual effectiveness of the regional actors 
within their geo-political space and the implication of this status for stability and 
security within the region studied.  
Literatures on regional or middle power status have continually surfaced within 
academic works, particularly since the end of the Cold War (Katzenstein 2005; 
Lemke 2002; Acharya 2007; Destradi 2010; Detlef 2010; Hurrell 2007; Kappel 2011 
Lake 2009). Even though many of these publications have limitedly and intrinsically 





comparative regional power interaction and dynamics among regional actors; and this 
is particularly true for Africa (see Prys 2009).  
A fundamental and sacrosanct value to international relations theory and practice is 
the need to establish how the theoretical foundations of international relations theories 
find empirical realities and relevance in contemporary global order, particularly at the 
regional level of analysis. Critical to this study, therefore, is the need to interrogate 
thoroughly how the leadership positions or capabilities of these key regional players 
translate to political (in)stability or regional (dis)order. This is crucial in determining 
the reality of any hegemonic order within the region. The paucity of scholarly work in 
this dimension remains enormous and this study is devoted to filling this gap. Again, 
Prys (2010) rightly observes the absence in theoretical and empirical literature of a 
conceptual and theoretical framework of analysis that specifically deals with 
hierarchical power relations at the regional level. The implication of this has been the 
implicit reliance on grand theories that are originally meant for global application to 
regional based assumptions. 
Previous studies have focused extensively on single country analyses of South Africa 
or Nigeria (Adebayo and Landsberg 2003; Schoeman 2003). Other studies have also 
attempted to establish roles and responsibilities that these regional powers play within 
their region. However, hardly any study exists that comprehensively and 
systematically interrogates not only the roles and capacities of regional powers but 
also more importantly, comparatively explores the effectiveness of these roles and 
capacities and their implication for African continental renewal with respect to 
regional stability, development, security and order. Therefore, this study is justified 
and validated given its potential to contribute to efforts aimed at filling the intellectual 
void in the area of comparative analysis of regional powers in Africa. Given this 
reality, the crux of this research is the imperative to establish how Nigeria and South 
Africa have effectively engaged their leadership positions and capabilities for the 
stability, security and order of the continent, its sub-regions and its people (public 
goods). 
1.4 Research objectives 
Fundamentally, the study specifically seeks first to evaluate critically the capabilities 





leadership responsibilities within the continent given their acknowledged vast 
potentials. Secondly, it particularly aims to assess the efficacy of these capabilities to 
establish regional stability in Africa. Generally, the objectives of the study are: 
(i) To account for the foreign policy principles, perspectives and prerogatives 
of Nigeria and South Africa towards Africa and explore the extent to 
which these foreign policy perspectives have been drivers for regional 
hegemony; 
(ii) To identify and comparatively examine the national power advantages of 
Nigeria and South Africa and the implication this has for regional 
hegemonic status; 
(iii) To demonstrate and comparatively explore the constellation of interests 
that have advanced or restrained the capacity or willingness of Nigeria 
or/and South Africa in the direction of hegemonic ambition; 
(iv) To draw valid deductive and empirical inferences of the lessons of the 
study and its implications for comparative, theoretical and empirical 
literature on regional powers and hegemonic stability theory. 
1.5 Research questions 
The thesis seeks to address the following questions: 
(i)  What are the foreign policy principles, perspectives and prerogatives of 
 Nigeria and South Africa towards Africa and to what extent have these 
 foreign policy perspectives been drivers of regional cooperation or 
 confrontation? 
(ii) What are the elements of Nigeria and South Africa’s national power and 
 what implication does this have for regional hegemonic ambition? 
(iii) In what ways have external and internal systemic factors advanced or 
 constrained Nigeria or/and South Africa’s ability to effectively  provide 
 legitimate leadership or hegemonic control in Africa? 
 
(iv) What empirical conclusions can be drawn from the study particularly for 





1.6 Research proposition 
The main proposition for this thesis is that; effective hegemonic presence can be 
currently determined within the African regional space. I therefore further propose the 
following support propositions: 
(i) There is a significant relationship between Nigeria’s power resources and 
her effective hegemonic influence in Africa.  
(ii) There is a significant relationship between South Africa’s power resources 
and her effective hegemonic influence in Africa.  
(iii) The hegemonic capacities of both Nigeria and South Africa are more 
successfully utilized when both countries work cooperatively and 
collaboratively to address issues of African security and stability. 
1.7 Scope of the study 
This study covers the period between 1960 and 2012 for both Nigeria and South 
Africa as significant eras in both countries’ foreign policies. The selected study period 
is important as it captures two shades of regime type and political dispensation of 
military and democratic eras for Nigeria and apartheid and post-apartheid in the case 
of South Africa. Again, for both countries, the periods under study accounts for over 
50 years of foreign policy foray particularly into Africa and the West African and 
Southern African sub-regions respectively under two different regime types and an 
equally substantial period of regime change. The period under review therefore allows 
for a clear analysis of the foreign policy trajectories of both countries with the aim to 
evince how Nigeria and South Africa has projected their power status through the 
decades to advance any kind of hegemonic aspiration for itself in the formulation and 
implementation of its Africa centred foreign policy. In doing this, the study on one 
hand seeks to correlate the common denominator of successive Nigerian and South 
African leadership in their foreign policy incursion into Africa through the lenses of 
their Pan-African and Afrocentric role conceptions and foreign policy implementation 
under successive leaderships. 
The period chosen, further underscores a critical analysis of the foreign policy 
vagaries in terms of changes on regime change and regime type and the different 
regime behaviours on foreign policy. The period also affords the opportunity for a 





African foreign policy. This is particularly important given the variation in leadership 
style and diffferent political agenda as far as African foreign policy articulation is 
concerned. The study thus particularly limits its focus on the African continent 
informed on one hand by the general description of Nigeria’s post-independent 
foreign policy as Afrocentric while on the other hand understands that South Africa’s 
foreign policy has been one that has been intrinsically tied to the African continent as 
well.  
Therefore, this study explores comparatively the effectiveness of Nigeria and South 
Africa’s capabilities to adequately take up hegemonic positions in Africa. This is done 
by examining their power influences on each state’s actions within the continent in 
the context of the hegemonic stability theory. The study therefore primarily attempts 
to answer the questions of hegemonic presence in Africa; and the patterns that typify 
regional power relations within the continent. The findings would be useful for 
analyses of regional power dimension across regions. 
This study also specifically focuses on both the post-apartheid era and the post-
military political dispensation of Nigeria and South Africa respectively from 1994 to 
2012. Coincidentally, these periods (1994 and 1999) highlight a remarkable and albeit 
incredible period for both countries. Particularly, it marked a time of active 
disengagement from the globally unacceptable non-democratic totalitarian regimes of 
both countries to a more gratifying and internationally recognized democratic 
experience. It is also noteworthy to state that both countries have since then enjoyed 
unbroken democratic leadership and have equally changed political leadership three 
times.  
Relevant to this research will be the examination of Nigeria and South Africa’s 
leadership behaviour within the African continent with the view to establish the 
conditions that make for the presence of a hegemonic regime in Africa and 
fundamentally the implication this reality holds for the continent’s stability during the 
period under study. 
1.8 Research methodology and methods 
This section discusses the methods adopted for the study’s data collection and 





collection and technique for data analysis.  
The study draws largely from a triangulation of approaches and methods. It adopts 
mainly the qualitative approach while also making use of the comparative case study 
method of analysis. The qualitative research method aims to provide “an in-depth 
understanding of the world as seen through the eyes of the people being studied” 
(Wilmot 2011:1). Therefore, by generating hypothesis, it moves away from the 
attempt to impose preordained concepts.   
The two selected cases proposed in this study are Nigeria and South Africa 
particularly in the post-military and post-apartheid epochs respectively. The historical 
background of both countries’ foreign policies is also discussed extensively. In-depth 
Interviews (IDIs) and Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) will be conducted for data 
collection. This is to establish greater precision as detailed information emerges (see 
Jegede 2006; Ulin 2002). As Wilmot (2011:1) points out, “a well-defined sampling 
strategy that utilises an unbiased and robust frame can provide unbiased and robust 
results”. The qualitative approach involves collection of narrative data in a natural 
setting in order to gain insights into phenomena of interest. The results of qualitative 
research are descriptive rather than prescriptive. According to Mason (2002:1), the 
qualitative research methodology celebrates richness, depth, nuance, context, multi-
dimensionality and complexity. According to Fawole et al; (2006:8), the potency of 
qualitative research lies in identifying strengths and weaknesses of a phenomenon. 
1.8.1 Research population 
In this study, the research population is underscored by the number of relevant 
stakeholders that are connected in many ways to the cycle of foreign policy making, 
implementation and evaluation. The study takes advantage of personal, oral and semi-
structured in-depth interviews which were conducted with a carefully selected group 
of “strategic informants” directly related to the thematic issues of the research. 
Through purposive sampling, samples were taken from individuals within the network 
of foreign policy decision making of both countries including the Executive and 
Legislative arms of governments, research institutes, intelligentsia, diplomatic and the 
fifth estate (civil society). In all, four clusters/groups of interviewees were 
interviewed (see appendix A). The first cluster targets scholar analysts/academics 





issues under study. The second cluster of interviewees consists of 
diplomats/bureaucrats/officials/Policy makers/politicians of the governments of 
Nigeria and South Africa. The third cluster is drawn from non-governmental 
organizations, editors, opinion leaders and other stakeholders both from Nigeria and 
South Africa. The fourth and final cluster consisted of diplomats/envoys/officials of 
the Africa Union, ECOWAS and SADC etc.   
In most cases, selection of the most productive sample to answer the research question 
was ensured. The motivation for this cross-section of samples is driven by the fact 
that the complexity of foreign policy making and implementation is situated by both 
traditional institutional frameworks as well as non-official or non-institutional 
platforms. 
1.8.2 Data collection and analysis  
This study draws its data from both primary and secondary sources.  
1.8.2.1 Primary sources and methods of data collection 
A combination of research methods or techniques is employed for data collection. As 
pointed out by Marshall (1996:522), “the choice between quantitative and qualitative 
research methods should be determined by the research question, not by the 
preference of the researcher”. For this reason and in line with the inductive and 
holistic philosophical foundation of the study, the primary sources for this research 
are drawn from purposive sampling method also known as judgmental research 
method. The choice of qualitative sampling methods adopted for this research 
therefore takes into account the “spatial, temporal and situational influences and 
context” of the study (Marshall 1996:524). These factors are important elements in 
ensuring the trustworthiness of the conclusions of the research. And as remarked by 
Alagoa (1985) and Afigbo (1990), primary sources are seen as reliable because the 
data generated present direct information from the participants or key witnesses thus 
limiting the possibility of distortion or exaggeration. 
1.8.2.2 Secondary source and methods of data collection 
The secondary sources for this study was derived from books, journal articles, 
magazines and newspaper articles, government gazettes, legislations, constitutions, 





materials, related audio and video collections and other relevant internet sources. 
These sources of data are particularly crucial in their ability to strengthen and 
complement the quality of the primary data gathered. Aside the rich and extensive 
information that these secondary sources will provide, they will shed more light on, 
and validate, the substance of the primary data gathered.                   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
1.8.2.3 Data analysis 
Data obtained were all subjected to substantive and extensive qualitative analysis 
through the instrumentality of content analysis, descriptive-historical analysis method 
and textual criticism. Analysis will be situated within specific contexts of research 
questions and structured hypotheses for the study. According to Nueman (2000:292), 
“content analysis involves gathering and analyzing of the context of the text; 
language, words, phrases, themes and symbols”. Holsti (I969:23) defines it as “any 
technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying 
specified characteristics of messages”. It involves the “examining of the presence of 
words or phrases in a text in order to identify the specified characteristics of messages 
and to make meaning of them”. Textual criticism on the other hand, is the study of 
literature works in order to determine their originality and authenticity. This involves 
the reading, critique and drawing of inferences from the discussion of every relevant 
information gathered from the category of sources mentioned above (Folarin 2010). In 
essence, the approach makes use of a critical reflection and analysis of the primary 
and secondary data collected. However, as Folarin (2010) suggests, the danger of 
content analysis is that interpreting human communication might prove a difficult task 
which may often lead to wrong conclusions and the interjection of values in the 
analysis. Hence, the imperative for cross-examination of evidence from a wide array 
of sources in order to avoid this common error becomes necessary. 
Furthermore, the study employs the use of historical method of data analysis 
involving the descriptive-analytical and narrative approach. According to Gberevbie 
(2008) and Alagoa (1985), the historical method involves investigation, recording, 
analysis and interpretation of facts leading to the reconstruction of the past (See 
Folarin 2010:13). In the case of Nigeria, the study examines in a chronological order, 
five civilian administrations: Tafawa Balewa (1960-1966); Shehu Shagari (1979-





Jonathan, (2010-to date); and six military regimes of Yakubu Gowon (1966-1975); 
Murtala Mohammed/Obasanjo (1975-1979); Mohammed Buhari (1983-1985); 
Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1993); Sani Abacha (1993-1998); and finally Abdulsalami 
Abubakar (1998-1999)
4
. For South Africa, the study examines histocumthematically 
and chronologically two distinct regime administrations of both the apartheid rule 
including Verwoerd, H.F., (1958-1966); Vorster, B.J. (1966-78); Botha, P.W. (1978-
89); de Klerk, F.W. (1989-1994) and the post-apartheid administrations of Mandela, 
N. (1994-1999); Mbeki, T. (1999-2008) and Zuma, J. (2009-to date). 
1.9 Justification for the study 
The motivation for the choice of topic is driven by the fundamental argument that an 
exploration of existing literatures on regional power dynamics and comparative 
foreign policy in Africa reveal a dearth in comparative studies on regional powers 
particularly focusing on Africa. Often, analysis are reduced to single country case 
studies which in many instances are not sufficient in providing verifiable explanation 
of empirically locating hegemonic attributes or tendencies of regional powers within 
the African continent. The task of this study is therefore that of extrapolating the 
hegemonic stability theory at the regional level of analysis. What is not in doubt is 
that researches focusing on a comparative study of the foreign policy study of 
regional powers in Africa particularly on Nigeria and South Africa are still very much 
missing in existing literatures.  
A comparative exploration of roles, capabilities and efficacies of these two ‘giants’ of 
Africa will add appropriate and anticipated value to academic discourse thus filling 
the intellectual lacuna on literatures regarding regional power conceptualization 
particularly in Africa, which hithetho have focused on a fractional, albeit restricted, 
single country studies of regional leadership status. In essence, the leitmotif of this 
study is fundamentally a comparative application of the hegemonic stability theory to 
selected regional cases in Africa (Nigeria and South Africa). The aim is to examine 
not only both countries’ foreign policy directions but also to extend this comparison 
to the implication of their leadership styles and the composition of different regimes 
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to foreign policy disposition for the continent. In short, this study is thus justified in 
its attempts to fill a gap in comparative study of regional leadership. 
1.10 Limitations of the study 
A major limitation that the researcher encountered in the course of this study was that 
of inadequate primary sources of data particularly with respect to Nigeria’s foreign 
policy in the post-military era compared to South Africa’s. Here, the unwillingness 
and unavailability of Nigerian officials and diplomats to adequately give the expected 
attention and urgency is a snag to the study. To cushion this apprehension, the 
researcher has therefore had to rely on already granted interviews by these officials 
retrievable from such platforms as Youtube, Facebok and othr social media platforms 
particularly in cases where interviewee proved difficult to reach. Also, as anticipated, 
the researcher in some cases was confronted with the attempt by some government 
officials to blow their trumpet for nationalistic patriotism given the perceptive and 
subjective nature of the subject matter. To guide against this, responses from 
respondents were subjected to a critical evaluation in line with general inductive and 
deductive logic in order to reduce the element of bias or subjectivity. This therefore 
informs the decision to concurrently interview other non-governmental personalities, 
scholar-technocrats, stakeholders or academics in order to attain a high level of 
precision and objectivity. 
1.11 Conceptual clarifications 
Any meaningful conceptualization of a concept must begin from a context based 
approach which cannot be independent of each other (Osaghae; 2009). It is therefore 
necessary to clarify the following concepts in this discourse in order to enable an in-
depth understanding of the relationship between these concepts (Creswell: 1994). In 
the following, we attempt a conceptual discourse of some concepts central to this 
thesis: Sub-Saharan Africa; hegemony; hegemon; leadership; foreign policy with the 
intention to bring clarity to the researcher’s use of the particular term.  
1.11.1 Sub-Saharan Africa 
A number of debates have surfaced in literature about what the term Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) exactly refers to. In general, the term SSA has got geographic and 
political connotations. In geographic terms, SSA is a term used to refer to that part of 





includes all countries of Africa with the exception of North Africa (Algeria, Egypt, 
Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Western Sahara and and sometimes Sudan
5
) which are 
classified as part of the Arab world. For the purpose of clarity for this study, SSA is 
used in a political-economic, demographic and geographic sense to refer to Black 
Africa and all of the African continent and its people excluding North Africa 
(considered part of the Arab world) located to the South of Europe bordered to the 
East by the Indian and to the West by the South Atlantic Ocean
6
 (See appendix B). 
1.11.2 Foreign Policy 
Foreign policy is the deliberate and rational pursuit of a state’s national objectives 
reflected in  specific actions, steps, roles, that define the behaviour of that state in the 
conduct of its external relations (Folarin 2010:29). Holsti (1967) argues that foreign 
policy constitutes the intended and direct actions of a state toward its external 
environment and the domestic conditions under which such actions are constructed. 
As Goldstein (2001) puts it, foreign policy is similar to a wedding ring with which the 
domestic context of a nation solemnizes its union with the international community. 
In Folarin’s (2010) argument, such political ‘marriage’ is underlined by the ambitions 
and desires of state. In essence, foreign policy can be regarded as means to achieve 
state the end of state objectives (see Folarin (2010:29). According to Akindele 
(1998:94), foreign policy can be construed as a set of; carefully articulated goals and 
objectives which a nation-state seeks to realize and actualize in the conduct of its 
relationships with other states. These according to him can be in form of decisions 
made and actions taken by a state in its interactions with other states or a series of 
demands which a nation-state makes on other states in the international system. It can 
also refer to a series of responses which nation-states offer to the demands which 
other states put before it, and continuously redefined attitudes and dispositions which 
a state brings to the external environment in which it has to operate. 
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Henderson (2005) submits that foreign policy is a pattern of behaviour that one state 
adopts in relating with other states while Waltz (2005) considers it as the strategy and 
tactics employed by the state in its relation with other states in the international 
system. Idang (1973) regards foreign policy as a plan or programme of actions of a 
state which determines the sum-total of the state’s objectives in the international 
system. This seems to agree with Kissinger’s (1994) often quoted submission that in 
foreign policy analysis, the domestic structure is taken as given; foreign policy begins 
where domestic policy ends. Simply, foreign policy could mean external attitude amd 
activities of a state. The ultimate goal is to maximize greater advantage for the 
country. To this end, we agree with Nwolise’s (1999) position that the foreign policy 
of a developing country like Nigeria should be geared towards national economic 
development so as to have a better leverage in international politics.  
1.11.3 Power, Hegemony and Leadership 
In the light of the thematic issues of this study, a need therefore exists to clarify three 
major relevant concepts that have repeatedly surfaced in major academic literatures 
on regional power– power, leadership and hegemony. These concepts are very much 
related and discussed in relation to regional power and have not only been subjected 
to extensive intellectual debates but have also been used interchangeably in literatures 
or loosely referred to mean the same thing. It is significant to therefore explore their 
meanings and how they relate with the idea or understanding of regional power. As 
Destradi (2010) rightly notes, power, hegemony and leadership are highly contested 
in IR literature and are often used in a confusing and often inconsistent manner. 
Raptin (1990), for instance, in discussing the concept of hegemony emphasized that 
there is no distinction between hegemony and leadership as both mean virtually the 
same thing. The word hegemony was also used synonymously with leadership by 
Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin.   
1.11.3.1 Power  
At the centre of international politics and interaction is the issue of power (Baldwin 
2012). The concept of power has therefore received extensive attention from scholars 
of international relations about its form, nature and role in international relations 
albeit without any unanimity. According to Morgenthau (1964:27), the “concept of 





science”. There is a lack of scholarly unanimity regarding the nature and dimension of 
the role of power in international relations. Already we have pointed to this 
conceptual dilemma of power in relation with other concepts such as coercion, 
compellence, control, deterrence, force, inducement, influence, persuasion etc. (see 
Balwin 2012:1). In international politics, power is seen as the general capacity to 
influence the behavior of other actors in international interactions and essentially two 
variants exists; hard (command/relational/objective) or soft (ideational/co-
optive/structural/subjective) power. Weber (1947:152) conceives power as “the 
probability that one actor within a social relationship will in a position to carry out his 
own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rest”.  
 
For Dahl (1957:202-3): “A has power over B to the extent that we can get B to do 
something that B would not otherwise do”. Goldhamer and Shils (1939:103) contend 
that “[a] person may be said to have power to the extent that he influences the 
behaviour of others in accordance with his own intentions”. Power is thus the major 
ingredient of political relationships- defined in terms of who gets what, when, where, 
and how on the stage of world politics. In international consideration, Holsti (1983: 
114-5) sees it as: “the general capacity of a state to control the bahaviour of others”. 
Power is seen as the ability to influence others to do what they otherwise would not 
do manifested in force, influence and authority.  
1.11.3.1.1 Conceptualizing Hard and Soft Power 
Traditionally, hard power is understood to mean the allusion to the mobilization of 
tangible instruments of a state’s resources like military and economic means. The 
importance of hard power in international politics cannot be underestimated. The 
power of individual states have continued to be measured in the context of 
well‐defined factors such as population, territory, wealth, armies and navies often 
referred to as the ‘elements of national power' or ‘power resources’  (Gulick 1955:24). 
At the minimum, states therefore seek to optimize their power coefficient relative to 
the power of other states and thus aspire to produce a 'balance of power' (Claude 
1962; Gulick 1955; Haas 1953; Morgenthau 1948).  
Conversely, the concept of soft power as different from the traditional meaning of 





soft power as the “ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion 
or payment” (Nye 1990:2004). Soft power is conceived as a means of power that uses 
strategies such as diplomacy, culture and history. Soft power is used here to make 
reference to anything essentially antonymous in meaning to hard power. Nye (2004) 
explains that soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others. It is a 
state’s capacity to influence others through persuasion and attraction, instead of 
coercion.  
According to him, it is the “ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants 
through attraction rather than coercion or payment” (Nye 2008:94). Bates and 
Yanzhong (2006:17) added that it is a “directing, attracting and imitating force 
derived mainly from intangible resources such as national cohesion, culture, ideology 
and influence on international institutions”. Soft power therefore is deployed when 
other nations are inspired by certain values and civilization of another nation to the 
point that they are driven to imbibe such standards (Lam Pin Foo 1996). If power is 
the ability to influence the behavior of others to act in a way they would otherwise not 
have acted in order to obtain an intended outcome, then powerful states can affect the 
behavior of others either by coercion (with threats), inducement (with payments) or 
attraction and co-option (with attraction of ideas) (Hackbarth 2009; Nye 2004). Soft 
power hinges on the capacity to shape the preferences of others and in simple terms is 
getting others to willingly choose your own preference through co-option rather than 
coercion (Nye 2004). According to Nye (2008), it is “the ability to entice and attract” 
others without having to deploy hard power threats because “if I can get you to want 
to do what I want, then I do not have to force you to do what you do not want to do” 
(Nye 2002:549). It therefore requires being able to determine and shape the agenda 
and preferences of actors with the ultimate objective to make others see the sensibility 
in cooperation rather than confrontation thus reducing the requirement and necessity 
for the mobilization and cost of hard power (Hackbarth 2009).  
States mobilize this non-physical, abstract, subjective and often intangible attribute of 
power in three dimensions which in Nye’s words include culture (in places where it is 
attractive to others), political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), 
and foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority) 





norms and practices that give meaning to a society coupled in such forms as literature, 
art, music, entertainment, tourism and hospitality, popular media, indigenous products 
etc. These articles more importantly represent the societal accomplishments, values 
and standards of a people as they “symbolize a greater society built on personal 
freedom” (Hackbarth 2009). Political values on the other hand are values and ideals 
such as respect for fundamental human rights, freedom of the press and popular 
participation in government. These values have the capacity to inspire confidence and 
build attraction from others (Nye; 2008). Thirdly, the projection of well-designed 
foreign policies also serves as an important aspect of a country’s soft power as it is 
able to use its foreign policy to set international moral standards for all to emulate.  
   Table 1.4: Dimensions of Soft Power 
Attractive Culture Political Values (ideology)  Foreign Policies 
(diplomacy) 
Popular culture in 
literature, art, music, 
entertainment, 
education, tourism and 
hospitality, media, 
indigenous products etc.; 
hosting of media-








political goodwill and 
international status of 
political leaders; transition 
process and national struggle 
history; domestic policies; 
constitutionally enshrined 
values of human rights 
equality of all people etc.  
Immigration; peace 
diplomacy (peacekeeping 
and peace making); 
environmental technology; 
influx of multinational 
corporations; poverty 
alleviation; bilateral and 
multilateral treaties,; rule 
based multilateralism; 
good-neighborliness; norm 
entrepreneur; provision of 
public goods; post-conflict 
reconstruction; foreign aid; 
debt relief and forgivement; 
armnesty etc.  
   Source: Author’s Compilation; See Smith 2012:73 
By the same token, Honghua (2007:15-26) argues that there are five fundamental 
elements that makes up soft power. They are: culture, ideas, development model, 
international institutions and international image. Soft power may therefore include:  
thoughts, ideas and principles, that may be advocated by the 
state, and that may also be accepted and identified by people 
[or] institutions, especially those that are engaged in the 
building of international regimes, but not confined to that 
because domestic institutions could be relevant as well [and] 
strategies and policies, that are apparently established and 





Chiroro (2012:2) on the other hand equally classifies soft power in terms of 
international sources (foreign policy and actions) and domestic sources (domestic 
policies and actions). 
There are a number of ‘attractive’ tools which states can use to project these forms of 
power in what Nye (2008:95) termed as “assets that produce such attraction” as 
means to achieve certain strategic external objectives. In essence, soft or (ideational) 
power is centered on “resources such as the culture of a nation; its norms and values; 
and its foreign policy, which reflects these (Flemes and Nolte 2010). These may 
include movies, products, educational system, humanitarian aid, development 
assistance, bilateral or multi-lateral relations, as well as public diplomacy programs 
such as broadcasting, cultural exports, and putting together exchanges programs (Nye 
2006:3). States thus needs to creatively find the means of converting these soft power 
resources into political advantages and influence. According to Chiroro (2012:2) “[a] 
positive image in world affairs that endears a nation to other nations generates respect 
and admiration, which in turn renders nations that have soft power more endearing to 
the eyes of other nations”. 
There is a shared assumption that the power distribution of major powers can be 
possible by a calculation of the various elements of national power. We conceive 
power in this sense in its various dimensions as a resource; potential; relationship 
(overt or covert communication and process that evolves over time); an unintended 
effect, capacity (to mobilize physical or psychological resources including persuasion, 
threats, rewards, and punishment); quantity (in the sense that some states have more 
of it than other states); a means (used primarily in an instrumental fashion to secure 
desirable objectives) and an end (territory, prestige, honour, security) connected to the 
interaction among states and other actors in the international arena (Uzodike n:d). In 
the context of this study, it is therefore imperative to identify, account for and 
comparatively analyze the power capabilities and profiles of both Nigeria and South 
Africa in these distinct realms (see chapter 7).  
1.11.3.2 Hegemony 
As a concept, hegemony has enjoyed expansive scholarly interpretation by different 
authors although it commonly invokes negative images of a bully and domineering 





Adebajo 2007:214). In the field of international relations, the concept of hegemony is 
perhaps one of the most extremely difficult to define. Destradi (2010:912) attributes 
this complexity of meaning to the fact that hegemony is often used interchangeably 
with both leadership and empire and secondly that it is “employed by authors 
belonging to extremely different schools of thought with sometimes radically 
divergent research interests”. He also notes the normative application of the term 
particularly in its application to the US as cooperative or benevolent hegemon.  
On the origin of the concept, the most celebrated work on hegemony can be attributed 
to the works of Italian Marxist Antonio Gamsci (1975) in his series on Prison 
Notebooks written between 1929 and 1935. His analysis of hegemony draws on the 
context of social relations. Gramsci opines that ideas that drive the world are so 
powerful as to render silent the agitation against power struggles. The core of his 
piece-meal prison notes, from which his adherents gathered his thought, is that the 
world is not marshaled by power alone; it is also led by ideas. The link that these 
ideas have with power is that any age has been dominated by the ideas of illustrious 
and powerful individuals. In the words of Karl Marx, “the ideas of any age have been 
the ideas of the powerful, the ruling class” (Marx 1959:26). The Marxist theory – as 
can be inferred from the previous sentence – was intimately linked to economic 
power; the rich decided what ideas are going to drive a particular epoch and 
ultimately have the power to even dictate what knowledge is. Another twentieth 
century figure to ever argue in this vein was the French philosopher Michel Foucault 
who toyed with Francis Bacon’s assertion that knowledge is power to state that power 
is knowledge (Lemert and Gillan 1982:35).  
Gramsci divided society and ipso facto the world into two realms; civil society and 
political society. The latter is replete with apolitical sectors like churches, schools and 
academics. In the civil service are found intellectuals who mull over ideas that can 
promote better lives in society. These intellectuals then offer their ideas to the 
political individuals who can decide whether or not to implement these ideas. If 
intellectual ideas are espoused by the political sphere – which comprises government, 
courts, police and the army – then the political society employs its coercive power to 
solicit adherence from people. This inevitably led Gramsci to accept that hegemony 





It was this potency of ideas that kept colonialism afloat for a long time even though it 
was patently classist and oppressive. Gramsci, in his build up to the hegemonic theory 
parted from Marx who was wont to say that every society is a tyrannical one with 
powerfully positioned individuals lording over those who are economically enfeebled. 
Gramsci concedes the fact that society can be transmuted into a dictatorship when 
threatened by fierce opposition from within or without. However, his contention was 
that despotism or tyranny was not the only mode of political leadership. At this stage, 
Gramsci introduces an alternative mode of political rule. This he calls hegemony. 
According to him, “[t]he concept of hegemony…means political leadership based on 
the consent of the led, a consent which is secured by the diffusion and popularization 
of the worldview of the ruling class” (Bates 1975:352). Therefore, as Gramsci notes, 
“hegemony implies the ability of the hegemon to let subordinates believe that power 
rests upon the consensus of the majority” (Destradi 2010:913; Gramsci 1975:1638). A 
hegemon can be endorsed (similar to Gramsci’ consent) because it proffers certain 
goods and services that benefit states that are less powerful (Gilpin 1981:145; Taylor 
2011:1240). 
Triepel on the other hand considers hegemony as a restrained form of power where 
the hegemon exercises a measure of self-restraint. In every sense, he views hegemony 
as a type of leadership and a continuum in power transition from influence to 
domination. He however is quick to note that such hegemon does not necessarily 
enjoy voluntary followership but rather on cost-benefit analysis of the weaker states 
as well as the acknowledgment of their weaknesses. Destradi (2010:913-914) 
summing up the hegemonic prescription of Gramsci and Triepel argues that the debate 
on hegemony in international relations are centered on both the nature of hegemony 
[benevolent or coercive] and the means adopted in the exercise of hegemony [material 
(sanctions, rewards, incentives) or persuasion (to accept norms and values)].  
Nye (1990), on the other hand, viewed hegemony as being able to dictate or at least 
dominate the rules and arrangement by which international relations politics and 
economics are conducted. Because of their military and economic superiority, 
hegemons are in most cases able to control natural resources, markets, capital, 
technological advantage as well as prestige and moral supremacy. However, 





control) with respect to both military and non-military resources (Rapkin 1990). 
Therefore, to suggest that a preponderant power must necessarily be animated with 
moral credentials is quite a stretch since that only occurs when the hegemon’s control 
is based on authority or influence rather than fear. This is often represented as the 
non-material bases (ideology and norm) usually referred to as ideational value by 
some scholars (see Pry 2010). The hegemon is thus strategically positioned to 
promote and inspire sets of principles, ideas and values that authenticate its status as a 
dominant power (see Gilpin 1987). 
In the dictionary of World Politics published in 1990, Evans and Newnham described 
hegemony as “primacy or leadership. In an international system this leadership would 
be exercised by a ‘hegemon’, a state possessing sufficient capability to fulfill this 
role” (p.153). Again, Mansfield (1992:3-24) defined hegemony as “the holding by one 
state of a preponderance of power in the international system or a regional subsystem, 
so that it can single-handedly dominate the rules and arrangement by which 
international and regional political and economic relations are conducted”. 
Kegley and Wittkoft (2001:256) define hegemony as the “ability of one state to 
dominate rules and arrangement governing international economics and politics”. To 
them a hegemon is a “single dominant military and economic state that uses its 
unrivalled power to create and enforce rules aimed at preserving the existing world 
order and its own position in that order (Kegley and Wittkoft 2001:432).  
Habib and Selinyane (2006) offer a neutral understanding of a hegemon also called a 
‘pivotal state’ in regionalism scope. Far from maintaining that a hegemon is 
impervious to the contribution of other countries in the region, they (Habib and 
Selinyane, 2006) aver that: 
[e]very hegemon is a pivotal state. But it has to be more. 
Hegemons not only aspire to leadership, and are not only 
endowed with military, economic, and other resources. They 
also have—necessarily—a political and socio-economic 
vision of their transnational environments, and a political 
willingness to implement such a vision. If that vision is one 
of security, stability, and development, as is often the case, 
then the hegemon undertakes to underwrite the 
implementation of these goals. Again, that does not mean 
that a hegemon does not have partners in this enterprise. It 





ensure that the features of its vision are operationalized in the 
region it sees as its sphere of influence (Habib and Selinyane 
2006:181) 
Bach further notes that during the era of the ancient Greek states, “respect for the 
autonomy of coalition partners distinguished hegemonia from imperial domination 
based on the use of coercive method and, ultimately, territorial control….Hegemonia 
represents a system of leadership where power is based on domination as much as 
cooptation” (cited in Adebajo and Landsberg 2003:173). Daniel, Lutchman and Naidu 
(2005:564) also admit that hegemony refers to a “power relationship of domination 
and subordination between two or more parties; on which, if not intentionally crafted, 
is deliberately perpetuated”.  
In his PhD thesis cited in Adebajo and Landsberg (2003), Patrick Stewards’ 
conceived hegemony as the “legitimate single-power domination and coordination of 
the foreign security, political, and economic relations of sovereign states international 
society”. Adebajo et al (2003:173) puts their argument thus “hegemony rests on a 
combination of preponderant power, a participatory ideology, and, very importantly, 
willing associates”. Thus in line with Gramscian original conception, hegemonic 
presence is hinged upon the ability to exercise power in subtle ways with the 
approval, accession or consent of other states coupled with the ability to pay 
calculated or uncalculated military and economic costs (Gramsci 1959; Adebajo et al 
2003). Geldenhuys on the other hand notes the correlation between the original Greek 
meaning of hegemony and leader(ship) by pointing out that hegemony could mean 
“the national role conception of a leading power that has the resources and the will to 
influence the substance of international politics” (International Workshop 2007:3).  
Daniel, Lutchman and Naidu (2005:564), conceptualizes hegemony as referring to 
“power relationship of domination and subordination between two or more parties; 
one which, if not intentionally crafted, is deliberately perpetuated”. Their argument 
presupposes that hegemony signifies a deliberate plan to perpetuate dominance by a 
superior power. In essence, economic and military superiority does not necessarily 
transpose into hegemony. The hegemon in this case seeks to exploit, protect and 





Destradi (2010) in drawing a distinction between hegemony, empire and leadership 
argues that even though hegemony is in most times used synonymously with the two 
other concepts, it can nonetheless be differentiated on the context of the means 
through which power is exercised and the end result of the hegemonic behavior. He 
considers hegemony as “a form of power exercised through strategies which are more 
subtle than those employed by states behaving like imperial powers” (Destradi 
2010:912). His distinction places emphasis on the means through which power is 
exercised and the end (objective) of this exercise of power. According to him, the 
means may vary from “the exertion of pressure to the provision of material incentives, 
up to the discursive propagation of the hegemon’s norms and values” while the “end 
of hegemonic behavior is primarily the realization of the hegemon’s own goals” 
(p.912-913).  
1.11.3.3 Leadership 
Like hegemony, the concept of leadership is equally contentious and hard to attach a 
particular meaning especially when theoretically or empirically applied from different 
disciplines and more specifically to international relations (Destradi 2010). Generally, 
literatures on leadership in international affairs are pitched within an interdisciplinary 
approach. In order to understand the concept of leadership one must first search for 
answers to the following: How is leadership differentiated from power and 
hegemony? What qualities does one (or a state) require to be a leader and what kind 
of relationship exists between leaders and followers? Generally, leadership could be 
seen as the art of “influencing people, organizations, and institutions to accomplish 
specific purposes, such as missions that serve public and national interests” (Cerami: 
n:d). The concept of leadership has been severally constructed and deconstructed 
particularly from a social psychology and political science perspective (Destradi 
2010). Early studies on leadership were focused on identifying the attributes and 
character traits of great public personalities. For instance, Northouse (1997), drawing 
from a social psychological perspective on leadership advances four contexts in which 
leadership is conceptualized. He argues that leadership is a process that involves 
influence and occurs within a group context. More importantly, it also involves the 
attainment of a specific goal. On the basis of the above contexts, he defines leadership 





common goal”. Much of these definitions have focused on leadership as an interaction 
between the leader and follower to achieve commonly identified goals.  
However, we would focus especially on the conceptualization of leadership within the 
discipline of international relations. Knorr underlines the basic features of leadership 
in international relations as the absence of coercion and the mutual or reciprocal flow 
of rewards or gains of this relationship where one “one actor gives something of value 
to another without condition, without stipulated payment, now or later”. He cites 
examples of mutual exchange of benefit such as the establishment of a common 
custom union in which all members of the economic union would mutually benefit 
from commonly shared values. Also, an actor acts to successfully mediate a conflict 
between two actors to a resolution that is acceptable to the conflict parties. According 
to Young (1991:285), leadership can be conceptualized as “the action of individuals 
who endeavor to solve or circumvent the collective action problems that plague the 
efforts of parties seeking to reap joint gains in a process of institutional bargaining”. 
Leadership in this circumstance can therefore be perceived from an institutional 
perspective focusing largely on commonality of goals and the calculated actions of 
individuals geared towards concerted engagements for finding common solutions to 
collective problems. Cole (1990:213) conceives leadership as a “dynamic process in a 
group, whereby one individual influences other to contribute voluntarily to the 
achievement of group tasks in a given situation”. 
Again, in distinguishing between hegemony and leadership, Destradi (2010:921) 
argues that the leader “guides –‘leads’ – a group of states in order to realize or 
facilitate the realization of their common objectives”. Destradi further attempts to 
draw a distinction between ‘transactional’ and transformational leadership’ by arguing 
that leadership is “characterized by the pursuit of common objectives and therefore, 
by a commonality of interest between leader and followers”. He argues [in line with 
Ikenberry and Kupchan’s (1990) models of hegemonic order] that two kinds of 
leadership are exercised in the international system depending largely on the initiator 
of the relationship; ‘normative persuasion’ and ‘emulation’ models. In the case of the 
former, the legitimacy of power (leadership) emerges through a strategy of 
socialization and ideological persuasion where the endogenous and commonly shared 





acceptance of followers. This kind of leadership is leader-initiated where leadership is 
activated as a direct initiative of the leader. Lake (2006; 2007) argues that such 
relationships are motivated by legitimacy and moral obligation on the part of the 
follower. On the other hand, emulation model focuses on leadership initiated by the 
followers through the adoption of the dominant state’s norms, policies and standards 
in a bid to reproduce or recalibrate its success. In this case, there is no deliberate 
attempt by the leader to influence this orientation and decision by others.  
Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990:285) identify two distinct ways in which leadership is 
exercised; through external inducement of material incentives
7
 and the modification 
of the beliefs of leaders in other nations. They argue that these two strands for the 
exercise of leadership are interrelated, interwoven and are reinforced by each other. 
According to Kindleberger, leadership is a function of both material capabilities and 
the willingness. What is certain is that over the years, the assumption of leadership 
role in the contemporary international system has often been conditioned by a state’s 
superior or greater military or economic strength (GIGA 2010). Material power 
preponderance is therefore seen as a major precondition for leadership and this is 
echoed in such theories like the hegemonic stability theory which holds a materialist 
perception of leadership driven by the leader’s capacity to provide public goods and 
mutual benefits in the exercise of leadership. 
Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal (2007) in contrast however submit that at the heart of 
any meaningful conceptualization of leadership is the centrality of the interest and 
enthusiasm of followers and any attempt to overlook this may prove misleading. In 
this sense therefore, leadership has little to do with the strict exercise of power by the 
leader since the “followers’ participation is voluntary and in their own interest” 
(Destradi 2010:923). Hence, for leadership to have any clear meaning, a leader exist 
where there is the presence of willing followers who accept the broader mandate of 
collective goals articulated by the leader. It is on the basis of this that the leader 
derives his legitimacy and acceptance of leadership: 
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[t]he leader may have to consult, explain, to persuade, even 
on occasion to cajole. But because followership involves 
followers intertwining their own interests with those of a 
leader in whom they place confidence and trust, these 
followers are likely not simply to defer and acquiesce to the 
leader, but to willingly follow that leader (Cooper, Higgott, 
and Nossal [2007] cited in Destradi 2010:924). 
Burns (1978:18) conceptualizes leadership as a form of power relationship with 
mutual benefits between leaders and followers involving persuasion, exchange and 
transformation: 
[l]eadership over human beings is exercised when persons 
with certain motives and purposes mobilize, in competition 
or conflict with others, institutional, political, psychological 
and other resources so as to arouse, engage, and satisfy the 
motives of followers. This is done in order to realize goals 
mutually held by both leaders and followers. 
Nabers (2010:56) in line with Burns’ argument makes a distinction of leadership from 
power (coercion and domination) by viewing leadership as competitive where 





Table 1.5 Main features of hegemony and leadership (See Destradi 2010:926-927) 
 Hegemony Leadership  
 Hard Intermediate Soft Leader-initiated Follower-initiated 
Brief Definition Establishment of an 
order for the realization 
of the hegemon’s goals 
through coercion, but 
without recourse to 
military power 
Establishment of an 
order for the 
realization of the 
hegemon’s goals 
through the 
provision of material 
benefits 
Establishment of an 
order for the 





Pursuit of common goals 
through a socialization  
process launched by the 
leader 
Pursuit of already existing common 
goals through the conferring upon 
the leader of a directive or 
managerial function 
Ends Means Self-interested sanctions, 












joint working groups 





Common acceptance of directive 
or managerial function 
Self-representation Cooperative  Cooperative Cooperative Cooperative Cooperative 
Discrepancy between 
self-representation 
and actual behavior 
High Middle Low Low Low 






based on rational 
calculations about the 




compliance based on 
rational cost-benefit 
calculations 
Compliance based on 
redefinition of norms 
and values 
Willing followership Initiation of leadership as reaction 





due to dominant 
state’s policy 





1.12 Structure of the dissertation 
The study is divided into nine chapters. The current chapter introduces the main 
essence of the work, identifying the problem and enunciating the objectives. It also 
identifies the methodology of investigation and report/analysis of findings, and 
justifies the study by clearly stating its importance/contributions to the knowledge. 
Chapter two situates the study within contemporary literature and proposes the 
theoretical framework that foregrounds the study. The third chapter attempts an 
account of the fundamental and ideological principles that foreground Nigeria’s 
foreign policy towards Africa while chapter four discusses and explores the 
trajectories of Nigeria’s foreign policy incursion in Africa since its independence.  
Similiarly, chapters five and six attempts to review the principles and foundations of 
South Africa’s foreign policy under the two political dispensations of apartheid and 
post-apartheid periods while also unearthing the foreign policy ambitions and efforts 
of the country within the continent respectively. Chapters seven and eight both 
constitute major and critical component of the study as it reports and analyses the data 
gathered from both primary and secondary sources in relation to the study. While 
chapter seven examines the elements of national power of both Nigeria and South 
Africa in the context of its role in Africa, chapter seven considers the paradox of 
hegemonic influence of Nigeria and South Africa within sub-Saharan Africa. Both 
chapters complement the earlier chapters in that they allow for the examination of the 
role types and role challenges Nigeria and South Africa encountered in the course of 
the assumption of its conceived African leadership roles. Hence, while the other 
chapters examine the theoretical aspects of hegemonic stability and explores the 
foreign policy experiences of both countries in relation to their involvement and 
influence in Africa, these two chapters deal particularly with the practical dimension 
of Nigeria and South Africa’s influence in Africa. 
Of course, chapter nine offers a summation of the study and goes on to lay bare the 
conclusion arising from the thesis. It ends the study by proffering certain 














This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section is a review of relevant 
literatures and contributions from scholars related directly to the study. It aims to 
summarise key points already covered and to identify the existing gaps which this 
thesis intends to fill. The review of literature covers the works of scholars on the 
following issue areas: What makes a regional power?; conceptualizing regional 
powers; regional power and foreign policy; comparing regional powers; sources of 
regional leadership/power; regional power and (in)stability; role of regional powers; 
hegemonic order and international stability; regional powers and secondary powers 
and external influences on regional powers/leadership. The chapter also reviews 
existing trends of literatures on Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign policy while also 
reviewing a number of literatures on the hegemonic status of both countries. The 
second section explores the theoretical framework underpinning this thesis; 
Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) and articulates the justification for the choice of 
the theory as a framework for the analysis of this study. 
2.2 Review of the literature 
2.2.1 What makes a regional power? 
The attention on regional power has provoked debates on the categorization and merit 
for the appellation of states as regional powers. Scholars have therefore attempted to 
make a distinction between regional powers and other classifications of international 
power status such as global powers, super powers, middle powers, pivotal powers, 
pivotal-regional powers etc. (Prys 2008). There are also a considerable number of 
intellectual debates as to the geographic context in which the concept of regional 
powers or regional hegemons is used in contemporary analysis of regional 
interactions and for any meaningful theoretical explanation (Prys 2008; 2010; 
Destradi 2010). Going through relevant literature, it is clear that there is no general 
consensus about what makes a regional power as there are numerous approaches to 





the term regional power has been used in several contexts and explained in as many 
ways leading to a confusion and misuse of the term. Nolte points out the inherent 
confusion and intersections between countries deemed as regional, middle or 
emergent powers. There has been a paucity of uniformly applicable criteria to 
succinctly categorize countries as belonging to these classes. Nolte states that the 
difficulty in coming up with a clear classification of regional power resides in the fact 
that it combines two concepts – region (a geographic concept)  and power – a basic 
concept in international relations studies (Nolte 2010:883-884).  
Nolte (2007:883) in his publication in the Review of International Studies for instance 
acknowledges the “general lack of analytical instruments to identify and to compare 
regional powers, and to differentiate regional powers from great powers and middle 
powers”. Destradi (2010:904) while conceding that there are a number of uncontested 
assumptions on regional powers however agrees with Nolte that the salient features of 
what constitute a regional power are still largely contested and under scrutiny by 
many scholars (see Flemes and Nolte 2010). 
One of the very first attempts to define regional powers was made by Osterud 
(1992:12) who referred to the notion of ‘ regional great power’ defined as a state 
which according to him is (1) geographically part of a delineated region; (2) able to 
stand up against any coalition of other states in the region; (3) is highly influential in 
regional affairs and (4) contrary to a middle power, might also be a great power on the 
world scale in addition to its regional standing (see GIGA 2010:1). Neumann (1992) 
in his edited publication defined regional power as: a state which is geographically 
part of the delineated region; a state which is able to stand up against any coalition of 
other states in the region; a state which is highly influential in regional affairs; and a 
state, which is contrary to a “middle power”, might also be a great power on a world 
scale in addition to its regional standing. 
Lemke (2002:49) in applying the power transition theory at the regional level of 
analysis equally conceptualizes regional powers as “local dominant states supervising 
local relations by establishing and striving to preserve a local status quo”. Schoeman 
(2003:352-353) in her application of regional power to South Africa adds that 
regional powers can be identified by the assumption of a stabilizing and leading and 





powers can also be considered as role models and leaders within a particular region by 
carrying out leading activities which are generally accepted by neighbouring states 
(Schirm 2005:110-112).  
Nolte (2006) conceives regional powers or what he termed ‘regional leading powers’ 
as states which are influential and powerful enough in certain geographic regions or 
sub-regions (especially in Asia, Africa, Latin America and in the Middle East) (see 
also Destradi 2010). He goes on to mention the following criteria for the identification 
of a regional power. According to him, a regional power is a state that is (1) part of a 
region, which is geographically, economically and political-ideationally delimited; (2) 
articulates the pretension of a leading position in the region; (3) influences the 
geopolitical delimitation and the political-ideational construction of the region; (4) 
displays the material, organizational and ideological resources for regional power 
projection; (5) is economically, politically and culturally interconnected within the 
region; (6) truly has the great influence on regional affairs; (7) exerts this influence by 
means of regional governance structures; (8) defines the regional security agenda in a 
significant way; (9) is recognized as a leading state or at least respected by other 
states inside and outside of the region; and (10) is integrated in international and 
global forums and institutions where it acts, at least rudimentary , as a representative 
of regional interests (Nolte 2007:15; 2010:893). In his estimation therefore, regional 
leading powers are not only possessing of superior power capabilities and exercising 
leadership within the region but are also able to convince other states both within and 
outside the region to accept their leadership (Destradi 2010:906).  
Flemes (2007:11) equally submits that regional power can be recognized through the 
following indicators; their claim to leadership; possession of the necessary power 
resources; employment of foreign policy instruments, and the acceptance of its 
leadership by third states. He distinguishes regional powers by using four vital 
gauges: “claim to leadership, power resources, employment of foreign policy 
instruments and acceptance of leadership” (Flemes 2007:3). Accepting the role of 
regional leadership means that the state in question has taken upon itself the 
responsibility of entrenching peace and stability and crafting polices for economic 
initiatives (Flemes 2007:12). The constructivist paradigm for global or in this case 





their own as a fitting leading power (Flemes 2007:8). This is also in consonance with 
Gramsci’s idea of hegemony discussed previously. 
Borrowing from the conceptualizations of Chase, Hill & Kennedy (1996), Schoeman 
(2003), Ozkan (2006), Flemes (2007) and Prys (2008), Geldenhuys (2008:2-3) draws 
a list of the features of a regional power: material preponderance (based mainly on its 
economic, military and demographic weight) makes it a giant in its region; close 
interconnectivity with other states in the region in political, economic and cultural 
terms; decisive impact of its economic development on the economic fortunes of other 
countries in the region; having various instruments of foreign policy (both material, 
institutional and discursive) at their disposal to assert their interests and equip it for a 
pre-eminent role in and on behalf of its region; expresses an ambition, claim or 
willingness to play these dual leadership roles; has predominant influence in regional 
affairs, inter alia in setting security, political and economic agendas; recognition and 
respect of the regional power by other states within and beyond as a leading state in 
and on behalf of the region. According to him, the leadership role others expect of 
regional powers typically includes such tasks as making and keeping peace in the 
region, promoting rules of acceptable conduct in the area, exercising moral authority 
and promoting regional interests at the global level and finally multilateral institutions 
within the region and globally serve as major forums within which a regional power 
exercises its leadership role. 
Geldenhuys (2010:151) describes a regional power as a giant and paramount state 
possessing material preponderance and non-material resources
8
 (economic and 
military) within a region defined in geographical, political or economic terms. 
According to him, the state in question also expresses claim, ambition and willingness 
to assume responsibilities for regional leadership within the region, while other 
countries in the same region equally acknowledges and accepts the regional power’s 
leading role. He further adds that a number of regional powers also qualify to be 
ranked as middle power in the international state system in general because the 
regional power is able to “use the region as a springboard for a global role by, for 
example, portraying itself as the representative of its particular region in global 
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forums, including the UN Security Council” (Geldenhuys; 2008:3; Flemes 2007:7-
18).  
Lake predicts that having a single country as a regional power often foments conflict. 
His reasoning is that the only way a regional power can maintain its status is through 
domineering means. This also resonates with Mares’ idea of ‘intra-alliance’ 
(exclusive agreement) hegemony where a dominant power arbitrates security 
measures causing non-hegemons to pugnaciously oppose this authoritative move 
(Mares 1988:454). Lake also argues against multipolar powers as they are also 
conflict prone through the struggle to balance power and the lack of effective and 
uniform conflict resolutions methods. Instead, he argues for the establishment of 
regional order where responsibilities are shared by different states according to their 
different potentials and capabilities (Lake 2009:2; Mares 1988:456). 
Flemes claims that a nation can be a regional power if it passes four benchmarks: 
“claim to leadership, power resources, employment of foreign policy instruments, and 
acceptance of leadership” (Flemes 2009:135). Destradi (2010) asserts that among the 
uncontested qualifications of regional power in literature is the fact that the country 
under discussion should belong to the region it is thought to lead. She also mentions 
that such a country should indubitably possess the highest power in the region and 
should exert its influence (Destradi 2010:905). Prys (2010:1-2) adds that in many 
cases, regional powers have been increasingly depended upon their capacity to “take 
care of conflicts, economic deprivation and political instabilities in their regions”. To 
give an example of Africa, natural resources like rivers run from one country to 
another and so tempering with these can affect more than one country and threaten 
conflict. Regional leaders ought to initiate regional integration and security 
mechanisms that could foil the threat of these probable conflicts (Amoako 2005:3). 
Furthermore, Destradi pokes holes in what has come to be taken as traditional 
understandings of regionalism which have enjoyed unquestioned and unwarranted 
adherence and are not rigid or predetermined.  
In an attempt to distinguish regional powers from other states, Nolte defines regional 
power as a “state generally displaying large population in the regional context and 
high GDP… possess’ strong conventional armed forces and in some cases nuclear 





the study of power hierarchies in international politics pointing to the absence of 
consensus regarding the defining characteristics of a regional power. Again, Flemes 
and Nolte (2010) conceptualized regional powers by the following characteristics: (1) 
states that exist within a geographically delimited region with cultural, economic and 
political links; (2) willing and prepared to undertake the role regional leadership; (3) 
armed with the necessary material and ideational capacities and as a result highly 
influential in their region; (4) the provision of collective public goods for the region, 
(5) the acceptance of its leadership by other states in the region.  
Schirm (2010: 197-221) on the other hand advances the following criteria for the 
classification of a state as a regional power: (1) The articulated claim for leadership as 
a rule maker which is part of the state’s own definition and is communicated to other 
actors/states; (2) the material and organizational resources for regional and 
international power projection (power over resources); (3) activities to honor the 
claim of leadership and to mobilize power resources; (4) the recognition and 
acceptance of leadership status by other actors/states in the region and outside of the 
region; and (5) real political influence in the region (power over outcomes).  
Similarly, in a related article on the variability of regional power published in 2010, 
Prys, in recognizing the lack of comparative studies of regional systems (leading to 
what she termed a “conceptualization” problem) identifies three P’s of a regional 
power as fundamental criteria peculiar to a regional hegemonic system or regional 
power namely; Provision, Projection and Perception. In her explanation, she 
summarizes these triad dimensions as: firstly, the provision of public good; secondly, 
the projection of the regional power’s values and interests; and lastly, the perception 
of the regional power as a state both internally and externally with a special 
responsibility and capacity to impact on behavior and outcomes in its sphere of 
influence. Prys (2010:4) argues that regional powers operate within a regional 
hegemonic system as an outcome of a “certain foreign policy strategy”. Her main 
thesis is that these three criteria must necessarily be blended with a fourth factor 
(material preponderance) for a regional power to be recognized as one. The 
leadership and preponderant power status occupied by a regional power can be 
depicted as regional hegemony (Prys 2008:8). Furthermore, she notes that a “regional 





of strategies and motivation rather than outcomes only as regional hegemon do not by 
definition always get their way” (Morten 1988). 
In another related article, Prys argued that in explaining regional power dynamics, 
empirical evidence challenges fundamental theoretical and empirical literatures on 
regional powers. This is because  the presence of material preponderance does not 
necessarily translate to “hegemonic behaviour” or outcomes such as public good 
provision or a relative absence of conflict as claimed by such scholars as Buzan and 
Weaver (2003) and Lemke 2002 (Prys 2010:2-7). This aligns with Flemes and Nolte’s 
(2010:6) argument that regional powers combine both leadership and power over 
resources and “have to bear a special responsibility for regional security and for the 
maintenance of regional order”. 
Destradi (2010:929) attempts a broader conceptualization of regional power when he 
notes that regional powers are states which “belongs to a region, disposes of superior 
power capabilities, and exercises an influence on regional neighbours”. He stresses 
further that, a regional power is a “regionally predominant state exercising an 
influence on the region to which it belongs by pursuing, in relation to its neighbours, 
strategies which can be imperial, hegemonic, or leading.” 
Kappel (2011:275) drawing from an analysis of the economies of regional powers 
conceptualizes the term as:  
an economic power (in a given region) that has influence and 
possesses the capacity for regional and global action. It has a 
relatively large population and convers a relatively large 
area. The regional power achieves high economic growth, 
above the regional average, over a long period of time and 
thus provides a growing market for the region. It plays an 
important role in trade within the region. It develops 
industrially and technologically; the state expenditure for 
R&D increases and come close to the level in the OECD 
world. The regional power has regionally and globally active 
businesses that are getting stronger and will lead to fierce 
competition for business from the OECD world within the 
regional-global value chains. The regional power 
increasingly provides public goods in the form of a stable 
currency, a reliable monetary policy and development aid. It 
takes on growing role in the governance of the region, 





And it uses economic network power to influence 
development on a global and regional scale. 
Kappel (2011) describes a regional power as a country that has unrivalled economic 
strength ‘in a given region’ and has influence extending from regional to global 
proportions. This country should also have a ‘a relatively large population…, covers a 
relatively large area (and) achieves high economic growth, above the regional 
average, over a longer period of time and thus provides a growing market for the 
region. It plays an important role in trade within the region’ (Kappel 2011:275).  
What strategies do regional powers adopt in their engagement with their neighbours 
or regional followers/neighbours? Scholars on the study of regional powers have 
attempted to gain an understanding of the strategies ‘leading’ regional powers adopt 
in dealing with their neighbours in the region. Pedersen for instance points to four 
different strategies that regional powers adopt; unilateral hegemony; cooperative 
hegemony; empire and concert. Regional powers employ foreign policy instrument, 
deploy material and ideational resources particularly with reference to its military and 
economic advantages. What is the foreign policy character of regional power? 
In a nutshell, at the basic level, it is possible to intellectually distil a clearer meaning 
of regional powers as states belonging to a region having superior power advantages 
and capabilities and being able to exercise considerable influence on its regional 
neighbours and enjoy a form of acceptance of regional leadership (Destradi 
2010:908). Regional powers therefore are conceptualized on the basis of their superior 
power capabilities, political, economic and ideational membership of a particular 
region and the exercise of a measure of influence within the same region. A regional 
power therefore exist in a regional hegemonic system where it is considered as 
powerful actors that wield a superior level of influence within a delimited region 
which they belong to. 
2.2.2 Regionalism and regional power dynamics  
Regions are socially and politically constructed, according to Prys (2010), and within 
what are taken as regions, further regions can be further deduced. A region is taken as 
conglomeration of two or more states that share geographic proximity and whose 
political, social and economic policies easily impinge on one another (Prys 2010:7). 





obvious cases for regionalism. To these obvious requirements, regional powers do not 
only claim to be authoritative in their regions but are also able to attract 
acknowledgement of their leadership from within and without their region. 
Furthermore regional powers should be conduits through which their regions can be 
represented on a global scale. Conversely, a regional power can also be a channel 
through which world decisions percolate to less powerful states (Destradi 2010:906). 
These conditions, as echoed earlier, implicitly mean that a regional power or leader 
should have a voice that can command global attention.  
While the global system has historically been dominated by world-renowned powers, 
there has been a gradual shift and attention of international power configuration to an 
emphasis on regionalism. In 1999, Huntington for instance described the international 
system as uni-multipolar arguing that with the ebb of US provision of public goods 
and the end of the Cold War, there was a realization of the importance of regional 
auxiliaries in taking up this role of provision of public goods. The idea behind a uni-
multipolar typology as prescribed by Huntington is that the US will continue to 
dominate global politics but with the increasing help of regional powers before the 
world is completely overtaken by twenty-first century multipolar systems. The 
cessation of the Cold War is seen as the main springboard in these refocus on 
regionalism (Destradi 2010:903; Lehmann and Steinhilber 2006:2). This aftermath 
gave birth to new globalization (Amoako 2005:2). The protracted rivalry between the 
capitalist Western Bloc and the Communist Eastern Bloc (Soviet Union or USSR) 
precluded the development of less powers, middle powers and regional powers 
(Essuman-Johnson 2009:409; Prys 2010:1). The end of this rivalry beckoned a chance 
for regionalism to take root. 
In essence, the global preponderance and dominance of the US particularly in the 
1990s has regressed sharply and an attempt to fill the power vacuum has resulted in 
the emphasis on regionalism. This has come with high expectations invoked on 
regional powers to show effective and dynamic leadership within their regional 
(sphere) of influence. This has invariably inspired an avalanche of reciprocal studies 
focusing on regional powers/politics or blocs like the EU, BRICS, China, Russia, 
Canada, Brazil, India, Nigeria, South Africa etc. Studies have also been conducted 





configuration (Archaya 2007; Breslin et al. 2002; Fawn 2009; Hurrell 2007; Flemes 
2009; Habib 2009). 
By extension therefore, in investigating the nature of the current post Cold-War global 
order, there is a mix blend of great powers; middle powers; regional powers as well as 
pivotal powers who wield significant influence within the international system. 
Huntington (1999), for instance postulates that a multipolar twenty-first century will 
not unfold until global politics had passed through one or two uni-multipolar decades 
(see Nolte 2010). By implication, the world is witnessing a shift of power and a 
reconfiguration of global order to reflect the increasing significance of regional power 
actors in the international system.  
More importantly, within the African continent, regional powers face multiple 
challenges at the global, regional and domestic levels ranging from internal conflicts 
and domestic instability in neighboring states; the resistance and lack of acceptance of 
small countries to the ‘perceived’ hegemonic policies of the regional powers; the 
difficulties in managing security and building peace at the regional level and gaining 
acceptance for their status as emerging powers at the regional level (GIGA 2012).  
The European Union (EU) serves as the most successful attempt at regionalism to 
spring up in the post-Cold War era. After the Maastricht Treaty was formally adopted 
on 1 November 1993, the EU was formally instituted and has gradually grown from 
strength to strength. Because of its success, the EU template has usually been taken as 
a prototype for emerging efforts at regionalisms. Using the European Commission 
(EC), the EU has prescribed certain economic policies and modes of integration as 
better drivers for growth. To other regions, the EU has promoted neo-liberal reforms 
(Taylor 2011:1233-1234). 
During the reign of the Cold War, the rest of the world was either conscripted in 
either one of the ideologies; communism or capitalism, or confined to the oblivion of 
global politics. The world was sharply divided into the core and the periphery – and to 
some it still is. However, with the passage of time, the cliché of the division of the 
world into the core and the periphery or the developed and the underdeveloped has 
become scarcely applicable “because many developing countries are catching up” 





to as emerging powers or regional unipolar leaders have been gradually increasing 
their influence on world affairs (Flemes 2007:6). These countries do not only 
challenge unipolar political outcomes, they also participate in conjuring new 
initiatives and alternative platform for global discourse. The countries mentioned 
form the BRICS; an association of newly industrializing nations (with the exception 
of Russia). The concept of BRIC was mooted at the turn of this (twenty-first) century 
by investment bankers who saw in Brazil, Russia, India and China the latent potential 
of future investors. This concept materialized when in 2009 BRIC held its maiden 
presidential election and the following year added South Africa as its latest member 
thus forming BRICS (Nolte 2010:881). Much research by investment banks had 
forecasted that in the fourth decade of this century, China will outstrip the “US as the 
largest economy, and India may follow suit in the second half of the century” (Nolte 
2010:881).  
Scholars who approach regionalism from a structuralist perspective are concerned 
with how the region is structured in terms of the economy, security and politics. They 
also consider the Regional Security Complex (RSC) and how this brings out the 
underlying collaborations and coalition nations encounter by sharing the same 
geographic region (Buzan and Wæver in Destradi 2010:905). Among the members of 
a specific RSC, their security concerns are so intimately connected in which case 
tinkering with the security of one member will inevitably have an implication on other 
members within that region. If there is a major security concern there ought to be 
swift response before the whole region becomes overwhelmed (Lake 2009:35-36). In 
this vein, a regional power is judged on which country holds sway in these regions 
and has its authority adhered to. This is akin to the realist argument which maintains 
that regional leadership should be claimed by a state whose military power is 
unchallenged in a given region (Flemes 2007:12).  
Mares (1988), for instance argues that when countries form a security alliance among 
themselves, they automatically relinquish any possibility of a regional hegemon. His 
rationale is that the concept of a hegemon usurps the possibility of input from less 
powerful states. In other words, Mares seems to conclude that having a power– not a 
hegemon - is useful and realistic in that it is improbable for countries in a given region 





called a regional power. A hegemon, on the other hand, implies authoritarian 
inclination, whereby one power can guide security without paying attention to the 
concerns and contributions of its regional neighbours.  In this case, a regional 
hegemon constitutes a menace to the sovereignty and security of other states (Mares 
1988:453-454). 
Mares, as explained above, argues that a regional power is a state whose strength is 
recognized, but is not authoritarian. A hegemon, on the other hand, is loathed by its 
neighbours for its despotic demeanour. In his Middle Powers Under Regional 
Hegemon, Mares sets for himself the task to explain the dynamics of regionalism by 
using what he calls the ‘game-theoretic model’. With this model- and the use of 
structural realist theory- he answers the question: “when will a middle power 
acquiesce in or challenge the policing actions of the regional hegemon?” (Mares 
1988:454). This argument thus presupposes that there is a difference between middle 
powers and regional powers. 
Apart from those who use RSC to theorize about regional power dynamics, other 
writers are nonchalant about the security signature of regionalism. To these writers, 
regional consensus is motivated by economic advancement rather than security 
concerns. Taylor (2011) – using the demand and supply framework of Mattli (1999), 
claims that regionalism is supported by non-state economic actors who are convinced 
that they could salvage tangible dividends or economic advantages from interstate or 
regional markets. This demand is thus gorged by influential politicians who supply 
institutional support with the hope that they too may gain from regional economies 
(Taylor 2011:1235). Taking cognizance of this propensity for economics, it remains 
questionable whether or not regional bodies would have ample security muscle and 
prowess to foil the many challenges that bedevil them (Lehmann and Steinhilber 
2006:3). In West Africa for example, ECOWAS started as an economic coalition, but 
had to venture into security enforcement because of coup d’état, illicit arms trade and 
electoral malpractice which threatened West Africa and the realization that these are 
inimical to economic integration, the innate motive of ECOWAS (Lehmann and 
Steinhilber 2006:3). 
As will be seen in the ensuing arguments, classification of powers is not an easy 





The international system is headed by a super power which enjoys both material and 
soft power and can intervene anywhere on the planet where stability is in peril 
(Flemes 2007:7). The United Kingdom– with its numerable colonies scattered on the 
globe- was a superpower before being supplanted by the Soviet Union and the United 
States during the period of the Cold War. Presently the United States fits this frame. 
Flemes considers this superpower to be greater than a global power. Mares use global 
power and superpower synonymously. According to him, global powers are so 
influential that global stability orbits around them. They have the power to change the 
international system. These can be multipolar, bipolar powers or hegemonic powers 
as was the case with the United States America. Flemes (2007:8) adds Germany and 
Japan to the list of the United Nations five permanent members as global or major 
powers.  
The other type of power is a secondary power which has the sufficient muscle to 
disrupt the rhythm of international system but not enough to provoke its 
transformation. Secondary powers can cause some influence even when acting in 
isolation. Secondary powers are middle powers endowed with ample resources that 
only require the collaboration of a few other states to influence the international 
system. Despite ranking below super powers and global powers, middle powers have 
military muscle which can cause considerable ruin in its foes. With its military 
strength and prowess, middle powers easily capture the admiration and invitations of 
support by great powers (Wright 1978:65). Obviously, middle powers enjoy 
unrivalled influence in their respective regions. Small powers on the other hand are so 
powerless that they need to merge with many other states in order to register their 
influence in the international system. This in turn means that a small power acting 
independently cannot influence this huge coalition (Mares 1988:456).   
Regionalism has been necessitated because the world is experiencing threats of a 
transnational nature like environmental depletion, global terrorism, portable arms 
trade, drug and human trafficking (Shaw 2012:846; Wood 1988:1). The spread of 
communicable diseases, especially in Africa merits international contribution. 
HIV/AIDS, malaria and polio are diseases which are wont to affect many countries 
provided there are people crossing from one border to another (Amoako 2005:3). The 





International institutions could be the ideal animators of this leadership, but most of 
them have not enjoyed widespread confidence while some are basically impotent. The 
next obvious option could be states which can pool resources and try to stem these 
global threats. However, not all countries have the reputation or the credentials 
needed to make any meaningful contribution to world problems (Solomon n:d: 1-2). 
Naturally, this eventuates into a situation where certain states that are more prominent 
and up to the task of making visible contribution to global threats come into play. 
These nations fall into the category called the middle power category. A global power 
would not be present to certain or particular needs because it looks at a general 
picture. To another extreme, a poor nation cannot afford to tackle big problems. In 
this case, “it is the middle powers... who occupy about the right position on the scale 
of influence” (Ward 1970:46). South Africa was deemed a middle power in that it 
represented a link between a “developing and [gradually] democratizing South and 
the developed and democratic North” (Bischoff 2009:1). 
The need for the involvement of lesser powers in managing affairs at a regional level 
was implicitly encased in the Agenda for Peace (1992) delivered by the then UN 
General Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Boutros-Ghali explained in depth how the 
responsibility of quelling conflict can be devolved from global institutions like the 
United Nations to lesser ones like the ECOWAS and Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) (Lehmann and Steinhilber 2006:2). The advantages of regional 
responsibility as envisioned by Boutros-Ghali, especially vis-à-vis regional conflict is 
that regional states would be more committed to stifling conflict in their region 
because of  “physical proximity to the conflicts, greater motivation to resolve them, 
and sometimes more legitimacy” (Lehmann and Steinhilber 2006:2). It is within these 
regions that certain nations emerge as regional leaders. Regional leaders have an edge 
over global institutions because they may have more profound knowledge of 
dynamics of the countries surrounding them. In the event of conflict resolution efforts, 
they may be privy to the ultimate causes of conflicts than would general or distant 
institutions not contiguous to the region. In any case, general bodies may not have 
vested interest in particular conflicts in certain regions that they deem of no 
consequence to global interest. Another reason could simply be that they are 
overwhelmed by the enormous resources needed to deal with problems that encumber 





Some policy experts and academics assert that “regional organizations not only have a 
role to play but have emerged as a viable framework for the maintenance of regional 
peace and security” (Francis nd: 87). These regions have come to challenge the 
previous international system that was impervious to regional initiatives. In the 
aftermath of the 2008 global economic crisis, the surprising recovery made by 
countries outside of Europe and North America indicated that the global economy is 
no longer solely dependent on the US. According to Nolte (2010:882; UNECA in 
Shaw 2012:838), this favourable recovery by emerging powers gives them more clout 
in the emerging international political economy of the twenty-first century. In Shaw 
(2012) Africa’s ‘lion’ economies and Asia’s ‘tigers’ have proved their economic 
resilience through their awed performance during the episode of the economic crisis. 
Their performance lends credence to the opinion that regionalism seems to be the 
plausible way to go in contemporary geo-economic politics particularly for 
developing countries. The prominence of regionalism has therefore come as a 
response to the growing observation that the United States is incapable of providing 
international public goods to the world. From a neoliberal perspective, a true hegemon 
should be capable of proffering public goods like free trade, a steady flow of capital to 
offer financial and any necessary aid during crises (Kindleberger 1973:292).  There 
has thus been an evident and gradual waning in US’s role as an international hegemon 
or provider. 
Simultaneously, there has been a rising prominence of countries like Brazil, China 
and India as contenders for global economic and political power. Writing from an 
earlier context Okolo (1985), claims that regionalism paid dividends in the developed 
world but portrayed a lacklustre performance in the Third World. He gives a number 
of reasons that hampered regional progress in the Third World. First is the lack of a 
conducive climate on which a formidable regional edifice can be erected. Secondly, 
members of regions are usually unwilling to give custody of leadership to a 
transnational body. This sentiment was also shared by Mkandawire (2012) who posits 
that despite the new improvements in regionalism, there is a constant refusal by 
certain rulers to let a more superior power in a regional body to prescribe policies. 
This also borders on the third explanation for the unsuccessfulness on regionalism; 
Okolo mentions ‘bickering’ among regional countries based on the perceived or real 





Okolo was setting up his arguments, the spirit of nationalism especially in Africa was 
still at full throttle. Newly independent countries were indisposed to surrender their 
immediate priorities to another vanguard (Okolo 1985:122). With the passage of time, 
however, regionalism has gained considerable currency and in all regions. There has 
been certain nations which, by consent or otherwise, have emerged as de facto or de 
jure regional leaders or powers.    
In Africa, the major impetus to regionalism was the Lagos Plan of Action (1980) at 
which African leaders prioritized the need for internal trade in Africa (Ndayi 2011:80-
81). One of the rationales behind the Plan was the acknowledgement that global trade 
often leaves African states worse off. To this effect, African states had to develop 
trade links amongst themselves before they can launch their trade on a global 
platform. Apart from economic or trade concerns, Africans wanted to chart their own 
destiny, to construct their own values and policies. This was mostly vivid in Thabo 
Mbeki’s African Renaissance plan (Bohler-Muller 2012:8; Kagwanja 2009:2). This 
aspiration needed motivation from countries of influence among African states. 
Nigeria and South Africa have been tipped as the leading powerhouses of West Africa 
and Southern Africa respectively and Africa at large. This opinion has been backed 
and challenged according to historical factors and the current state of these two 
countries.  
Needless to say, the mere mention of these countries as leaders corroborates the fact 
that there has been wide acceptance of how Nigeria and South Africa have emerged 
somewhat above other African nations. These countries have thus been expected to be 
frontrunners in promoting African agendas. In a continent that has been awash with 
conflict, Nigeria and South Africa have been expected to deal with intractable and 
protracted African conflicts. This means that these countries ought to have remedial 
foreign policies which would guarantee peace and integration at the national and 
regional levels. In terms of defusing conflict, however, Dokubo and Joseph argue that 
African efforts of “conflict mitigation and resolution initiatives are at best yielding 
modest success” (Dokubo and Joseph 2011:554). African foreign policies that sponsor 
integration in the African region have come with the reiteration that African states 





Many writers who offer what Brown (2006) calls ‘Africanist critique’ have stated that 
studies in international relations have been deliberately blind and deaf to the African 
situation. These writers have often decried the dictatorial way with which the Western 
world has applied IR concepts to Africa and the Third World in general even though it 
is axiomatic that these concepts are ill fitting in the targeted contexts. Neuman argues 
that ideas touted in international relations are Eurocentric and so inappropriate to 
Africa. Adeniji further criticizes the dominance of the United Nations against the 
Third World, not just Africa and opines:  
a few powerful states which designed (the United Nations) 
ab initio have shown a determination to preserve the status 
quo, which historically has been in their favour, the vast 
majority of member-states, largely concentrated in the 
southern hemisphere, poor, underdeveloped and at the 
periphery of high global politics, would prefer the UN to 
metamorphose into an instrument of change; an instrument 
for bridging the economic and technological gap between the 
rich North and the poor South (Adeniji 2005:1). 
In this case, Nigeria and South Africa – as emerging leaders of Africa - are expected 
to play a seminal role in ending the ‘pseudo absence’ of Africa from mainstream 
international relations (Brown 2006). These are the countries on whose shoulders rest 
the hope of Africa; a continent which despite its formal detachment from the 
stronghold of colonialism several decades ago has continued to clamour for economic 
independence and regrettably lag behind the rest of the world. It is the continent 
which holds no hope of meeting the Millennium Development Goals by 2015 
(Amoako 2005:2). The dismal performance of regionalism in Africa put the countries 
perceived as regional leaders in a precarious situation. Poverty levels have soared to 
alarming levels, with half of Africans living on one dollar or less a day since the 
inception of the MDGs (48% in 2000 and 50% by 2005) (Amoako 2005:2). This is 
starkly contrasted by East Asia which – by 2005 - reached the target for poverty 
eduction with South Asia also makings considerable and swiftly progress (Amoako 
2005:2). These staggering realities lend credibility to the opinion that by 2015, the 
other parts of the world would have deepened development gaps with Africa.  
Shaw (2012) argues that Africa is developing, as evidenced after the global decline of 
2008. The increase in poverty levels could only be explained, then, by the 





the expense of the poor majority. Despite the distribution of wealth within regions, 
regional integration and benefits seem to receive more support. Amoako (2005:2) 
argues that regional integration is the only viable option that Africa has if it is to keep 
up with the more advanced regions. The call by Kwame Nkrumah in his 1960 speech 
at the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) – for a consolidated 
African approach to the challenges of economic development and political unity, is 
more applicable today. Countries that are viewed as Africa’s leaders should be the 
linchpin of this endeavour.  
More importantly, within the African continent, regional powers face multiple 
challenges at the global, regional and domestic levels ranging from internal conflicts 
and domestic instability in neighbouring states; the resistance and lack of acceptance 
of small countries to the ‘perceived’ hegemonic policies of the regional powers; the 
difficulties in managing security and building peace at the regional level and gaining 
acceptance for their status as emerging powers at the regional level (GIGA 2012).  
More than a decade after the 21
st
 century was declared as Africa’s century, the 
African continent is still plagued with massive poverty, epidemic diseases, 
unemployment, incessant military intervention, intra-state conflict, debt crisis, 
economic downturn, infrastructural decay, and increasing retrogressive authoritarian 
and undemocratic institutions to name but a few. As aptly captured by Fawole 
(2003:297), “the history of post colonial Africa has been characterized by intra-state 
conflicts, violent crises, political instability and state failure”. All of these factors 
have collectively helped to swing backwards the wheel of progress of the African 
continent. For instance, while some other countries that were equally colonized like 
South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, India, Indonesia etc. as well as many of the former 
colonies in Asia have moved towards development, Africa is still stuck with the 
dilemma of trying to grapple with many issues that these countries have long 
conquered. To be sure, more than 80% of the world’s poorest countries in the world 
are found in Africa. Regrettably, many of the countries in Africa have not been able to 
maintain the strides of economic progress made during the first two decades of 
independence (1960s and 1970s). In the next section we explore the theoretical 





2.2.3 Theoretical debates on the role, status and strategies of regional powers 
Literatures on the role and status of regional, pivotal or middle power status have 
continually surfaced within academic works, particularly since the end of the Cold 
War. On the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1989, scholars envisaged a collapse of the bipolar power arrangement that 
had hitherto existed and an inevitable unipolar world with US in full swing 
(Huntington 1996; Walt 2009). However, slightly over two decades and contrary to 
much anticipation, there has been a reconfiguration of the distribution of power or 
international power arrangement and an increasing shift toward multi-polarity. This 
new international orientation was reinforced by the event sequel to the terror attacks 
on US soil in September 11, 2001 and further cemented by the recent global economic 
meltdown witnessed in US and many parts of Europe in 2008. Another reason for this 
shift can also be attributed to the high cost of preserving hegemony and the eventual 
spread of economic capabilities to rival core states (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1990). 
In essence, regionalism in global affairs has emerged with high expectations invoked 
on regional powers to show effective and dynamic leadership within their regional 
(sphere) of influence.  
There has therefore been a gamut of reciprocal study focusing on regional 
powers/politics or blocs like the EU, Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa 
(BRICS), Canada, Nigeria etc. (Archaya 2007; Breslin et al. 2002; Fawn 2009; 
Hurrell 2007; Flemes 2009; Habib 2009). Many of these studies have attempted to 
examine the impact and influences of regional powers on global power configuration.  
Much has been talked about regarding the potentialities of regional powers in Africa 
to effectively arrest conflict and the retrogressive wheels of underdevelopment by 
leading the path towards regional and continental rebirth and growth in an atmosphere 
of stability. A number of states in Africa have been identified as critical to stimulating 
African development initiative across different regions. In other words, there is an 
expectation on states like Nigeria and South Africa to play key roles in the process of 
regional integration and economic rejuvenation of the region they belong to. Partly 
due to their superior economic and military strength within their, it is anticipated their 
prosperity would have a spill-over effect and thereby inspiring the cause of regional 





also has the capacity to cause a reciprocal period of recession for the region. Regional 
security, peace, cooperation and stability are therefore possible through the leadership 
initiatives of regional powers (Barnett 2005; Huntington 1996). 
However, while regional powers can be catalysts for regional political-economic 
integration within a region, they can also be sources and agents for further escalation 
of conflict and confrontation. The institutionalist and constructivist theorists point to a 
positive correlation between regional power and the regional cooperation. However, 
classical and structural realist theorists suggest the opposite seeing regional powers as 
sources of confrontation (Scholvin 2012). Theoretically, and empirically, regional 
powers can therefore impact on their regions in both cooperative and confrontational 
ways.  
No doubt, several other studies have been conducted on the context of Nigeria and 
South Africa’s roles and responsibilities particularly in their sub-regions and generally 
in the rest of Africa. However, very few have gone beyond the rigour of a thorough 
evaluation of the effectiveness of this role in terms of actual engagement, and the 
comparative approach that this study seeks to introduce. This section will bring to the 
fore some of the literatures related to the subject matter and point out the deficiencies. 
However, while regional powers can be catalysts for regional political-economic 
integration within their region, they can also be sources and agents for further 
escalation of conflict and confrontation. The institutionalist and constructivist 
theorists point to a positive correlation between regional power and regional 
cooperation; classical and structural realist theorists however suggest the opposite 
seeing regional powers as sources of confrontation (Scholvin 2012). Theoretically, 
and empirically, following from the above discussion, regional powers can therefore 
impact on their regions in both cooperative and confrontational ways. And in the 
context of this study, it is necessary to examine the power elements (hard and soft) 








2.2.4 Literatures on the foreign policy of regional powers in Sub-Saharan 
Africa  (Nigeria and South Africa) 
No doubt, several studies have been conducted on the context of the leadership roles 
and responsibilities of regional powers (particularly of Nigeria and South Africa) in 
their sub-regions and generally in the rest of Africa. However, very few have gone 
beyond the rigour of a thorough analysis of the effectiveness of this role in terms of 
actual engagement and the comparative approach that this study seeks to introduce. 
This section reviews some of the literatures in the past decade on the subject matter 
and further points out the deficiencies in existing literatures. 
A number of states in Africa have been identified as critical to stimulating African 
development initiative across different regions. In other words, there is an expectation 
on states like Nigeria and South Africa to play key roles in the process of regional 
integration and economic rejuvenation of the region they belong to. Partly due to their 
superior economic and military strength, it is anticipated their prosperity would have a 
spill-over effect across the region and thereby inspiring the cause of regional 
prosperity. Conversely, any kind of downward trend or recession in these countries 
also has the capacity to cause a reciprocal period of recession for the region. Regional 
security, peace, cooperation and stability are therefore possible through the leadership 
initiatives of these regional powers (Barnett 2005; Huntington 1996). Attempts would 
now be focused on a critical review of literatures on the regional power conception of 
Nigeria and South Africa with the aim to foreground a thorough context for this study 
and establish gaps in existing literatures. 
The reference to Nigeria and South Africa in the literature as an ‘axis of virtue’ is no 
doubt in reflection of their comparative power advantage and huge potential to use 
this advantage to play leadership roles within the African continent (see Adebajo 
2007). This is discussed further in the following chapter. Generally, within the 
African continent, literature recognizes five sub-regions and an equal number of 
pivotal states including Nigeria in West Africa and South Africa in Southern Africa. 
Others are Egypt in North Africa, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in Central 
Africa and Kenya for East Africa (even though this is contested) (Mazrui; 2006). As 
explained earlier, in this study and hence the chapter, we focus especially on Nigeria 





Africa and thus share a huge chunk of the African economic market. (Adebajo 2007). 
Secondly, both countries are perceived internationally as major African leaders with 
their extensive and robust foreign policy involvement in Africa coupled with their 
desire towards finding African solutions to African problems (Smith 2012; Schoeman 
2007; Landsberg 2012).  
To be sure, the population of Nigeria is an equivalent of the entire population of four 
European countries including Belgium, France, Portugal and the United Kingdom. 
Nigeria’s Muslim population is also more than any Arab state in the world including 
Egypt
9
. South Africa on the other hand is undoubtedly the most industrialized African 
country. In fact, prior to the end of apartheid, South Africa was the only African 
country with nuclear warheads (Fischer 1994; Mazrui 2006; Peters 1992; Joseph 
1988). Similarly, while Nigeria is often referred to as Africa’s human resources hub, 
South Africa on the other hand is reputed as the mineral and material resources 
repository of (chrome, diamonds, gold, iron ore, manganese, platinum, etc.) in the 
continent. Again, South Africa profiles the largest concentration of diaspora Whites 
outside Europe and America (Mazrui 2006).   
Nigeria’s Wole Soyinka was also the first Black and African to be awarded the Noble 
Prize for Literature although South African(s) have won more Noble laureates than 
any/all African countries put together with four Noble Prizes for peace and two other 
for literature (see table 2.1). Sparks (2003) in Kagwanja (2009:2), claims that South 
Africa is “a regional superpower in the world’s most marginalized continent, the one 
country that could perhaps provide the engine to pull African out of its mire of 
poverty and desperation”. It is for these reasons that Mazrui (2005) rightly notes that 
“Nigeria and South Africa are truly exceptional societies of the postcolonial era…and 
have revealed comparative destinies of the African experience and contrasting visions 
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 The 2005 Census in Nigeria accounts for over 68 million Muslims compared to 55 million Muslims in 





 Table 2.1: Nigeria and South Africa’s Nobel laureate winners 
S/
N 
Nigeria Category  South Africa Category 
1. Wole Soyinka 
(1986) 
Literature Albert John Luthuli (1960) Peace 
2.   Tutu, Desmond (1984) Peace 
3.   Nadine Gordimer (1991) Literature 
4.   Nelson Mandela (1993) Peace 
5.   Frederik Willem de Klerk 
(1993) 
Peace 
6.   John M. Coetzee (2003) Literature 
Source: Compiled by author 
We move on to review key literatures on both countries’ foreing policy. 
2.2.4.1 Overview of the literature on Nigeria’s foreign policy  
Much of the literatures on Nigeria’s foreign policy revolve around four concentric 
circles of Nigeria’s immediate neighbours (Benin, Chad, Niger, Cameroon and 
Equatorial Guinea); its West African neighbours (regional); the African continent and 
finally its relations with the world and international organizations (Folarin 2010). This 
aligns partially with Adebajo and Mustapha’s (2008) apt narrative of Nigeria’s post-
Cold War foreign policy dealing largely within the broader framework of three 
contexts; domestic, regional, and external (or global). Mustapha especially provides 
an analysis of three inter-connected determinants of Nigeria’s foreign policy process. 
According to him, “The first…is the arena of formal diplomatic negotiations and 
agreements and the pursuit of sub-regional hegemonic ambitions (diplomatic 
apparatus). The second…is the way in which its ‘fractured’ nationhood impinges on 
the foreign policy process (nationality) [while] the third is the impact of Nigeria’s 
global reputation or ‘identity’ on the foreign policy process (identity)” (p.41). The 
concentric circles theory mentioned above correctly captures the distinctiveness of 
Africa in Nigeria’s foreign policy as a pattern of concentric circles may be discernible 
in the foreign policy behaviour and attitude of Nigeria to issues within the African 
continent and the world at large (Adigbuo 2005; Gambari 1986; Folarin 2010; 
Akpotor and Nwolise 1999). 
 By corollary, a major theme in most literatures on Nigeria’s foreign policy is the 
focus on the Afrocentric nature of Nigeria’s foreign policy with the central argument 





particularly deviated from its African focus since it was first articulated on October 7, 
1960 by Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (see Adeyemo 2002; Folarin 2010; Saliu 2006; 
Uzodike et al 2013; Fawole 2013).   
Okpokpo (1999) makes a useful point on the content and context of Nigeria’s foreign 
policy in the new millennium by arguing that even though the country’s foreign 
policy thrust has since independence been focused on Africa, it nevertheless needs to 
begin to endeavour to take a more assertive global disposition particularly on issues as 
globalization, human rights and democracy. Hence, if Nigeria is to play a key role in 
current high level diplomatic circles, it must begin to build its foreign policy on more 
than only one pillar. Okpokpo further explained the impact internal political events 
have on the dimension of foreign policy particularly in Nigeria. Consequently, 
Nigeria’s image abroad has been badly configured by the recklessness of its previous 
leadership as exhibited in gross human right abuses, financial waste, democratic 
truncation and abortion. He argues further that these negative realities largely 
accounted for Nigeria’s sour relationship with the international community chief 
among them are Commonwealth countries, Canada, the European Union (EU) and of 
course the United States of America (USA). He contended that Nigeria’s claim to the 
status of ‘giant of Africa’ is nothing but a ‘fictional’ title and as such countries like 
South Africa and Egypt often regarded as true ‘giants’ “work hard to get a name and 
maintain their place within the intentional arena” (p. 35). His main thesis was that the 
main foreign policy priority and focus of Nigeria should be that which emphasizes 
economic development and he general well-being of Nigerian people. According to 
him, “though Africa should not be forgotten, Nigeria’s interest should come first in all 
our foreign policy analysis and decisions…geared towards the promotion of our 
cultural heritage and scientific, economic and technical cooperation with viable 
partners”.  
As argued in some quarters, Nigeria’s foreign policy should be aimed at attracting 
benefits for the improvement of the lives of its people. Adeniji however disagrees 
with this position by asserting that Nigeria’s foreign policy needs to begin to reflect 
the nuances of a new African agenda that takes into account the fundamental changes 
in the international system as it affects Africa. According to him, Africa must 





one of the major powers, if not the major power in Africa (Adeniji 2000:21-22).  
Scholars have also attempted to establish the centrality of Nigeria’s foreign policy to 
West African sub-region in particular and Africa in general in such issues as 
transnational security challenges (Obi 2008; Badmus & Ogunmola 2003; IPA 2003); 
neo-colonialism (Akindele 1998); democratization (Asobie 2002); poverty, diseases 
and underdevelopment (Akinbobola 2000; Nweke 2000); massive debt to the West 
(Saliu 1999, Olusanya et al, 1989) etc. Omotola (2008:46) for instance writing on the 
changing role of Nigeria in promoting democratic values in Africa suggests that: 
Nigeria has fared relatively well in promoting democracy in 
Africa, given the number of cases and issues in which it has 
intervened to condemn unconstitutional change of 
government, contribute to the restoration of democracy, 
support electoral processes and institutions of African states, 
and/or give appreciable support to regional and sub-regional 
frameworks for the promotion of sustainable peace, 
democracy and development.  
Obi (2008) for his part also comments on Nigeria’s response to transnational 
challenges within the West African region. He notes unequivocally that Nigeria’s 
consistent pursuit for leadership role in ECOWAS and its quest for regional economic 
integration and development are premised on the acknowledgment by ECOWAS of 
Nigeria’s capacity to exercise sub-regional leadership. His emphasis therefore is that 
although Nigeria acknowledges the centrality of ECOWAS to transnational security, 
it is however handicapped by its failure to match rhetoric with comprehensive 
concrete achievement through the ECOWAS framework. This, according to him, is 
evidenced in the absence of a “systematic and coherent approach in addressing from 
Nigeria’s strategic foreign policy perspective” (Obi 2008:193). Added to this is its 
failure to clearly articulate a specific policy for the sub-region beyond the vague and 
incoherent foreign policy thrust in which Africa and West Africa is broadly conceived 
as the cornerstone of her foreign policy. 
Eze (2009) equally provides a cursory analysis of Nigeria’s engagement in Peace 
Support Operations (PSOs) as an enduring signature and landmark of the country’s 
foreign policy since independence in 1960. His argument is that although its 





however restrained by uninspiring economy and a new international order informed 
by the end of the Cold War. 
In another excellent review of Nigeria’s power status particularly in the West African 
sub-region, Saliu (2006) argues that for a long time to come Nigeria’s dominance of 
the sub-region will remain unchallenged as the power configuration and climate 
within the region appear to remain tilted in favour of Nigeria due largely to its 
possession of the traditional elements of power such measured for instance in 
economic and military terms.  
A number of literatures have also surfaced in Nigeria’s foreign policy discourse 
underscoring the argument that Nigeria’s dynamic and outstanding national role 
conception in the continent have been informed by a number of conditions including 
its natural endowments, demographic preponderance
10
 (Akinterinwa 2001; Ayam 
2001; Aluko 1981; Mazrui 2006; Saliu 1996), mineral resources (Fawole 2003; 
Folarin 2010; Obadare 2001) and a formidable military (Folarin 2010; Shaw, 1987; 
Thomas 2001). Meierding (2010) for instance highlights the increasing significance of 
what he termed ‘local’ hegemons in international politics by attempting to apply 
mainstream international relations theories beyond the traditional realm of Great 
Powers with specific reference to Nigeria as a middle power. An essential core of his 
argument therefore is that Nigeria’s foreign policy behaviour is highly consistent with 
the prescription and postulation of International Relations theories of liberalism, neo-
realism, rational choice, liberalism, hegemonic stability as well as constructivism. 
According to him, despite the fact that Nigeria is not a global hegemon and is faced 
with numerous domestic constraints, it nevertheless exercises considerable influence 
in the West African sub-region as a result of its enormous oil wealth (see Herskovits 
1978).  
Scholars (Amusan 2006; Adeniji 2005; Gambari 1997; Ikhariale 2002; Saliu and 
Omotola (2008) have also assessed the chances of Nigeria’s bid for a permanent seat 
in the proposed expanded United Nations Security Council (UNSC) while presenting 
a detailed account of Nigeria’s credentials and antecedents for this position. Saliu and 
Omotola (2008:71) point to a number of factors that strengthen the country’s 
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candidacy for a UNSC permanent seat over the likes of South Africa and Egypt. This 
includes “its service as a non-permanent member of the Security Council for three 
terms, its impressive peacekeeping profile, not only under the aegis of the UN, but 
also under the OAU (now AU), ECOWAS (ECOMOG) and through bilateral 
channels; and its unparalleled African leadership role” (Saliu and Omotoal 2010:81). 
For instance Adeniji (2005) in his argument opines that among Nigeria’s credentials 
include: its diplomatic behaviour and awareness of special responsibility towards 
Africa influenced by the injuries inflicted by slave trade, colonialism and apartheid on 
the continent; being the country with the largest concentration of black people on 
earth; its contribution to unequalled peacekeeping globally. He further points to the 
impediments to this aspiration particularly from other interest African states 
especially South Africa and Egypt. In his view, Nigeria’s claim to the proposed seat is 
albeit genuine and legitimate arguing on the premise that the country has been 
magnanimous since its independence in advancing the course of Africa and its people 
as evidenced in its involvement in Angola, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Sierra Leone, 
Liberia and many others.  
Kuna (n:d) further adds to this argument in his assessment of Nigeria’s role in conflict 
management particularly in the areas of peace-building, conflict resolution and 
peacekeeping efforts. He submits that given its contribution to the maintenance of 
regional peace and stability, “Nigeria stands in a good position to represent Africa and 
Black people all over the world in the Security Council” (p.10). Bach (2007) points to 
a manifest perception of Nigeria as a ‘natural’ leader in African continental affairs. He 
submits that Nigeria’s reputation in West Africa is one that is driven by a pattern of 
dominance or influence void of power. He argues that Nigeria has done very little to 
project its relational and structural power within the West African region and points to 
a disconnect between the regionalisation efforts within the region and the projection 
of the country’s (Nigeria) regional power ambition. 
Most of the literatures reviewed so far no doubt provide sufficient intellectual 
background and historical foundation for this study and further points out a critique of 
the main issues in Nigeria’s foreign policy which this study would benefit from. What 
is clear is that very minimal literatures exist on comparative regional power 





Nigeria’s power capabilities and influence within the African continent must take into 
cognizance the contending power blocs within the continent. Again, barely any work 
exists that have made an elaborate comparative analysis across regimes types and 
regime change which is reflected in the choice of Nigeria under the military and 
civilian administrations and South Africa under the apartheid and post-apartheid 
democratic dispensation respectively.  
It is for this reason that a comparative assessment which this study seeks to introduce 
becomes meaningful and significant in contributing to existing literatures. The current 
study takes a bold attempt to push further Adebajo’s argument with relevant updates 
that go beyond 2008 when his study lapsed. No doubt, there is a dearth of literatures 
on regional power politics within the African region. Against the backdrop of the 
post-apartheid strained relationship between Nigeria and South Africa, a need exists 
for the comparative study of both countries at different levels to assess what value or 
otherwise these pattern of relationship or behaviour have on the African continent. 
2.2.4.2 Overview of the literature on South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy 
As a point of departure, it is important to note at this stage that etched in the foreign 
policy history of South Africa foreign policy relations since the apartheid era is the 
deliberate intention to dominate other states. Therefore, one cannot fully grasp the 
“significance of Pretoria’s current Africa policy without examining its past destructive 
military and economic role” particularly within the Southern African sub-region 
(Naidoo 2010:84). Therefore, in exploring South Africa’s foreign policy in the post-
apartheid era, we shall take our discussion in line with Naidoo’s (2010) categorization 
of literatures into three broad paths: the estimative/prescriptive
11
; the new 
dispensation
12
 and the ambiguity
13
. I add a fourth category focusing on South Africa’s 
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emerging and regional power status vis-à-vis the Global South and the African 
continent. Naidoo (2010) argues that these three broad patterns on South Africa’s 
post-apartheid foreign policy discussions are further reflected in four categories of 
writings foreign policy with regard to its regional foreign policy of (integration, 
cooperation and development); regional issues pertaining to trade and investment; 
regional issues centred on collective security through peacekeeping/brokering and 
finally on the role of South Africa in the post-apartheid period. As expected, there has 
generally been a surge of interest in the study of South African foreign policy since 
the dawn of the post-apartheid dispensation. A corollary effect of this is an avalanche 
of robust academic and scholarly works on the subject matter till date. Hence, our 
selective and in-exaustive review of South Africa’s foreign policy in the post-
apartheid period follows along these same contexts identified by Naidoo (2010). 
To begin with, the turn of the 1990s characterised by a massive change in the 
international position of South Africa at the time in what Mills (1990) described as a 
‘new’ and ‘pre-post-apartheid’ period of South Africa’s foreign policy, a number of 
scholarship began to emerge following the gradual removal of over forty years of 
isolation. Much of the literatures during this period focused on the possible foreign 
policy choices that South Africa could adopt in the emerging post-apartheid period. 
One of the early works in this ‘estimative/prescriptive’ chapter was by Mills (1990) 
who for instance historicized the country’s foreign policy behaviour since 1945 and 
made projections about the possible pattern of foreign policy options available to 
President De Klerk moving forward. He mentioned that the dramatic transformation 
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of the international system at the time cemented with the substitution of the US-Soviet 
Union conflict by new form of conflicts necessitated the need for a new kind of 
foreign policy to response to these pressing international changes. As Mills (1990) 
further confirms, these events rendered unlikely two historical foreign policy options 
available to South Africa; of a pro-Western and pro-Soviet stance. Accordingly to 
him, South Africa in this era would be left with no other foreign policy alternative but 
that of ‘non-alignment neutrality’ substituted for the policy of regionalism where 
military and economic alliances could be formed with its neighbours for mutual 
benefits (ibid:186-187).   
Barratt (1991:1993) and Evans (1991a; 1991b) equally concede to this point in their 
emphasis that even though caution needs to be exercised in the crafting of South 
Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy, its role in world politics both in the short and 
long term would go on to be conditioned by its commitment to bilateral, unilateral and 
multilateral commitments and its success at both domestic and regional levels. Their 
concern was more about the behaviour of South African foreign policy in the future in 
local, regional and global politics. According to Evans (1991), complex 
interdependence would perhaps become a guiding paradigm of South Africa’s foreign 
policy rather than political realism which pervaded its external relations under 
apartheid. It was envisaged that “South Africa is likely to be a powerful regional 
player in sub-Saharan politics” and as a natural hegemon and protagonist within its 
sub-region while at the same time being able to aspire to a leadership role in South-
South relations (Evans 1991:720).  
Vale (1990:1992) however presents a slightly different argument on what shape South 
Africa’s foreign policy should take. In his submission, the country’s post-apartheid 
foreign policy should be one that takes into cognizance its preoccupation with the 
domestic reconstruction which especially prioritizes the economy. He argues that the 
economic philosophy and arrangements it is able to reach with international economic 
groupings like the European Commission (EC) would have serious implication for its 
foreign policy behaviour. If this happens, the region would be better placed to “take 
advantage of access to African markets through agreements and other such 
mechanisms”. Du Pisani (1994) equally acknowledges that the birth of a more 
democratic South Africa is likely to usher in a pattern of relationship with Southern 





socioeconomic reconstruction, economic relations and the need for foreign investment 
in which three possible scenarios (bi-lateral; regional integration and peripheralization 
and neo-regionalism) could emerge. Habib’s extensive explanation of South Africa’s 
post-apartheid foreign policy also advances the argument that South Africa’s 
contemporary foreign policy can only be understood within the context of its post-
apartheid political transition. According to him, “its actors, the ideas they express, the 
interest they represent and the institutions they craft are all crucially influenced and 
impacted upon by the democratic transition and how it has evolved” (Habib 2009:1). 
The second band of literatures (the new dispensation) on South Africa’s foreign 
policy in the post-apartheid period surfaced at the dawn of democratization in 1994 
with attention focusing on the evolving South African foreign policy according to 
Mills from “a pariah to a participant” in the global system (see Naidoo 2010). 
Mandela’s paper ‘South Africa's Future Foreign Policy’ published in Foreign Affairs 
(1993) signalled the close of a chapter in South Africa’s foreign policy and 
consequently foreshadowed this new phase of post-apartheid foreign policy literature. 
Mandela’s seminal paper laid the foundation for what would later form a larger part of 
the fundamental principles of South Africa’s foreign policy in the post-apartheid (to 
be discussed later) framed on the believe that human rights was to be the cornerstone 
of its international relations. 
Clapham (1994) submits that the successful conclusion of the transfer of power in 
South Africa to a government inevitably dominated by the country’s African majority 
carries major implication for the country’s foreign policy. In his view, to all intents 
and purposes, South Africa has now become what it really is not only in diplomatic 
terms but also in geographical terms. In essence, the success of its foreign policy will 
then depend highly on its being part of Africa and the extent to which it is able to 
share the aspirations of African states as a whole.  
In the wake of South Africa’s post-apartheid democratic experience, van der 
Westhuizen’s (1995) published an article making a case for the possible role South 
Africa could play in order to sustain its relative emerging prominence. His major 
argument dwelt on the premise that South Africa should comprehensively assume the 
position of a regional hegemon both in Southern Africa in particular and Africa in 





its influence. The importance of the preservation of South Africa’s international 
prominence was also echoed as a precondition to avoid the risk of losing its prestige. 
He contends that South Africa requires a dynamic foreign policy role of peacekeeping 
that is bold enough to project itself to the world as fundamentally one with the 
capacity to establish its hegemonic presence. His conclusion was therefore that the 
country can begin to effectively demonstrate that it can indeed be a ‘gentle’ giant 
within the African continent. 
The third strand of literature which according to Naidoo (2010) started in 1997 
focused on the ambiguous nature of South Africa’s foreign policy in terms of the 
contrast between policy and practice
14
. According to Naidoo, four major contributions 
by Taylor’s (2001), Sidiropoulos (2004), Adebajo et al (2007) and Carlsnaes and Nel 
(2006) are recognizable in this regard.   
The fourth thread of literature on South Africa’s foreign policy examines the regional 
influence of South African in Southern Africa in particular and the African continent 
in general
15
. For instance, Sidiropoulos (2007:22) submits that South Africa’s regional 
power status can be justified on the following basis: being keen to shoulder the 
responsibilities that go with being a power in its region; its commitment to partnering 
with key emerging powers such as India, Brazil and China in boosting 
interdependence among these partners; does not want to upset the apple cart in Africa 
and wants to be admired and welcomed as part of the group and finally that is proud 
of its science and technology capacity, a developed private sector and a global rather 
than a parochial agenda. 
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Again, Vines (2010:61) argues that “South Africa’s peace and security efforts have 
been driven by increasing external expectations and by its own ambitions”. He 
questions the capacity of the Zuma government to effectively take up such 
responsibility of regional security particularly in the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) while pointing specifically to the inconsistent pattern of the 
South Africa’s mediation efforts as recorded in the cases of Zimbabwe, Angola, 
Lesotho and Cote d’Ivoire. His central argument is that even though Pretoria is 
encumbered with domestic issues which have remained the priority of the Zuma 
government, South Africa should not in any way turn a blind eye at regional issues 
around its neighbours such as Lesotho and Swaziland. 
In Regional Power South Africa: Co-operative Hegemony Constrained by Historical 
Legacy, Daniel Flemes (2009) makes a description of regional powers in terms of its 
distinguishing features while also applying these criteria to South Africa. He argued 
that even though South Africa seems to possess the capacity for regional hegemony, 
this capability is however hampered by its historical legacies and the unwillingness of 
some of its neighbours to accept this leadership role induced largely by its political 
and historical legacy. As a result of this position, he observed South Africa’s 
preference for using institutional instruments to assert its interest both regionally and 
globally via effective participation in regional and international institutions. He goes 
on to trace this commitment to regional institutionalization to the African National 
Congress’ (ANC) foreign policy posture and post-apartheid South Africa’s political 
culture. In addition, South Africa’s claim to leadership is more obvious at the global 
stage much more than the regional level leading to wide acceptance of its leadership 
at the global level.  
Flemes also notes the need for further studies to verify the positive correlation 
between leadership acceptance and the use of discursive and institutional foreign 
policy instruments with the negative correlation rejection of leadership and use of 
material instruments to assert interest. He further mentioned the pivotal significance 
of secondary powers like Nigeria for regional acceptance. 
2.2.5 Review of the literature on Nigeria and South Africa’s hegemony 
It is important for this study to also review some of the existing literatures on Nigeria 





because many of the literatures in this genre focus on a single country case analysis of 
Nigeria (Adebajo 1996; Shaw, Ihonvbere, Gray and Dickens 1996; Mabry 2000; Bach 
2007; Adebajo and Mustapaha 2008; Omotola 2009) or South Africa (Pfister 2000; 
Nathan 2005; Gelb 2001; Alden and Soko 2005; Landsberg 2006; Landsberg and 
Kondlo 2007; Prys 2007; Flemes 2007, 2009; Sidiropoulos 2007; Habib 2008; 
Geldenhuys 2008; Kagwanja 2009; Bischoff 2009; Alden and le Pere 2009; Mandela 
2010; Tjemolane 2011; CSS Report 2011; Bohler-Muller 2012; Scholvin 2012). In 
essence, while very few literatures exist dwelling on a comparative study of both 
countries (Adebajo 1995; Adebajo and Landsberg 1996; le Pere 1999; Ogwu 1999; 
Adedeji 1999; Adeniji 2000; Obasanjo 2001; Adebajo and Landsberg 2003; Games 
2004; Akinboye 2003; 2005; Ogwu 2005; Daniel, Lutchman and Naidu 2005; 
Gumede, Nwanma and Smith 2006;  Mazrui 2006; Landsberg 2008; Onuoha 2009; 
Flemes and Wojczewski 2010; Amusan 2011; Adebajo 2012; Zabadi and Onuoha 
2012) often times, many of these analyses do not apply beyond sub-regional influence 
where both states are seen to be dominant or are limited to the context of relationship 
existing between both countries.  
There is currently no specific PhD thesis that investigates the dynamics of power 
relationship between Nigeria and South Africa and the implication of this for the 
African continent. For the purpose of emphasis, we focus our literature survey on the 
post-apartheid era beginning from 1994 for three reasons. First, it was at this period 
that the balance of power equation in the African continent changed considerably 
following the re-inclusion of South Africa into the international comity of nations 
after decades of international isolation. Prior to this period, Nigeria had enjoyed 
unrivalled dominance and was at the forefront of continental issues in Africa. 
Secondly, this period also marked Nigeria’s political transformation into a stable 
democracy having witnessed years of political-economic decay as a result of military 
authoritarian rule that invariably led to its isolation and further exclusion from many 
international membership.  
Thirdly and perhaps more importantly, it is common knowledge that since South 
Africa’s breakthrough from apartheid and the emergence of Nelson Mandela as the 
country’s first black President, its relationship with Nigeria has not only been 





2012). In the wake of 20 years of South Africa’s celebration of democracy, it becomes 
imperative to examine the impact of South Africa’s democratic rule on its relations 
with Nigeria and also unearth the implication of this relationship for Africa. We turn 
to a review of some of the relevant literatures highlighted above. 
In a chapter in the State of the Nation; Daniel, Lutchman and Naidu (2005) examine 
the issue of Nigeria and South Africa’s hegemony by foregrounding their analysis on 
the importance of African markets for South Africa’s corporate and parastatal 
economic involvement. They examine the increasing economic chemistry between 
Nigeria and South Africa in the light of the growing substantial economic stake of the 
latter on the former in the past couple of years. According to them, “South African 
capital appears to be the entity most willing and capable of breathing new life into the 
enfeebled body of the Nigerian economy” (p.558).  
Onuoha (2005) studies the nature of power configuration between Nigeria and South 
Africa by examining bilateral relations since emergence of democratic rule in both 
states in 1999 and 1994 respectively. He attempts to situate how democratic rule and 
globalization impacts on Nigeria-South Africa relations by arguing that the 
relationship between both states is couched in an economic rivalry which appears 
tilted in South Africa’s favour. His main thesis is that South Africa undoubtedly 
possess superior economy strength over and above Nigeria and this unarguably 
qualifies it as the African regional hegemon since according to him, “South Africa 
currently determines who gets what, how and when in Africa” (p.58). His submission 
is therefore that Nigeria can take full advantage of this opportunity provided by South 
Africa’s domination of the former’s economy by transforming its public enterprise 
and reduce corruption. 
Landsberg’s (2008:203-219) chapter in Gulliver’s Troubles: Nigeria’s foreign policy 
after the Cold War examines the success of Nigeria and South Africa’s partnership 
since 1999 particularly in constructing an African ‘concert of powers’
16
. His focus 
was on the formidable role played by both countries in the formation of NEPAD and 
the AU in 2001 and 2002 respectively. The author also sets for himself two main 
ambitious tasks of investigating whether the African ‘concert of power’ was a 
                                                          
16
 The idea of a ‘concert of power’ was first coined by Rosecrance (1992) in his publication on “A new 





deliberate or coincidental policy of strategic partnership of both countries and also 
examining some of the tensions that have emerged as a result of this important 
bilateral ‘special’ relationship. Landsberg noted that NEPAD and the AU emerged as 
a result of the recognition of Nigeria and South Africa that Africa’s marginalisation 
and under-development could only be reversed if both countries acted together as a 
‘concert of powers’ in Africa (p.203). He points to two distinct periods of Nigeria-
South Africa relations; first was between 1999 to 2004 accompanied by a strong 
bilateral relation between both countries while the second was the period between 
2005 and 2007, characterized by a deterioration of bilateral ties due partly to the 
accusation of Obasanjo as playing second fiddle to Mbeki and the controversy over 
the contest for a permanent seat for Africa at the UN. 
Focusing on the leaderships of Thabo Mbeki and Olusegun Obasanjo (both elected in 
1999), Landsberg concludes that both Presidents had a synchronized foreign policy 
goal of bringing about stabilization and democratization to the Africa continent and 
this invariably made it easy for the synergy of partnership to exist. Again, despite the 
frail relationship between both countries and the domestic challenges that both 
Obasanjo and Mbeki were confronted with, “the partnership has shown itself to be 
versatile and adaptable, and has demonstrated that it is capable of dealing with the 
intricacies of African power politics and divisions” (Landsberg 2008:215). 
Amusan and van Wyk’s (2011) “[t]he complexities of bilateral relations: the Nigeria-
South Africa relationship (2000-2006)” gives an elaborate analysis of the nature of the 
existing relationship between both countries which in their argument is embedded in 
the complex interdependence paradigm where the two states are dependent on each 
other. They explain that any attempt by the both states to ‘do it all alone’ would do 
nothing more than expose the sensitivity and vulnerability of the two states 
particularly in the economic and political sphere. The main thrust of their argument 
therefore is that both Nigeria and South Africa need each other for their own 
development and ultimately for the development of Africa since according to him; 
“[a]s long as both states are dominant powers in their respective sub-region, there is 
always a need for them to co-formulate some functional policy for African 
development” (Amusan and van Wyk 2011:37). The paper therefore foreshadows that 





future relationships would likely be mutually inclusive and driven by collaboration, 
integration and conflict, but would nevertheless remain conditioned by more efforts 
towards cooperation. 
Understandably, Amusan and van Wyk’s (2011) paper limits its analysis of both 
countries’ relationship to the context of the complex interdependence theory 
presuming that relationship between states are always cooperative while forgetting 
that states in seeking to further their self-interests enter into conflictual relationship 
with other states. Again, even when states behave cooperatively with other states, it is 
still within the ambits of trying to advance its own interest because states would not 
cooperate with other states if this relationship stands to disadvantage them in any way 
both in the short and long term. Simply put, South Africa would only relate with 
Nigeria if it stands to gain in this relationship and this ideology has perhaps 
influenced its economic relationship with Nigeria since the end of apartheid; a 
relationship it has benefited from immensely. By implication, this analysis falls short 
of balanced application of theory to the pattern and context of Nigeria’s relationship 
with South Africa. 
Adebajo (2012) attempts to historicise Nigeria and South Africa’s relationship 
particularly since the 1960s through the periods of regime type and regime change in 
both countries. In his theatrical account of four ‘Acts’, he lays bare a sequence of the 
existing deep seated historical rivalries between both countries dating back to the 
1960s and efforts towards mending broken diplomatic fences between the two 
particularly in the post-apartheid years. He does this by pointing to the contrast and 
similarities in both countries’ continental ambition for African leadership. In his 
account, the first Act (1960-1993) opened with the birth of Nigeria in 1960 which 
brought anticipation of the coming of age of an African political and economic giant. 
It was at the period also that South Africa’s political profile plummeted after its 
expulsion from the Commonwealth following the Sharpeville massacre. In other 
words, the over three decades of this period witnessed Nigeria’s attempt at seeking 
greater sub-regional influence in West Africa through economic development 
although hampered for the most part by France support for francophone states.  
On the other hand, South Africa’s dominance in Southern Africa was unrivalled but 





during this period, Nigeria was the prophet and South Africa the pariah. Nelson 
Mandela’s release in 1990 from prison and his eventual emergence as president in 
1994 set the stage for a second Act (1994-1998). Adebajo argues that this second 
epoch was typified by a dash of any possible hope of a ‘special relationship’ between 
Abuja and Pretoria highlighted by a row
17
 between Nigeria’s Sani Abacha and South 
Africa’s Nelson Mandela culminating in the latter’s failed call for oil sanctions 
against Abacha’s regime and its expulsion from the Commonwealth. According to 
Adebajo, this period, witnessed a reversal of international status of both countries 
with Nigeria becoming the pariah and South Africa the saint: 
It was now Nigeria, and not South Africa, that was being 
considered for expulsion from the Commonwealth. It was 
Nigeria under a repressive military regime, that was facing 
mounting criticism over its human rights record; it was 
Nigeria that was becoming increasingly isolated in 
international society; and it was Nigeria that was considered 
to be possibly heading towards civil war (Adebajo 2007:4-5). 
However, the relationship between both countries was resuscitated by Mbeki’s 
concerted efforts to restore cooperative engagement between both states.  
The third scene spanning between 1999 and 2008 opened with the induction of 
Obasanjo and Mbeki as heads of state of Nigeria and South Africa respectively in the 
same year (1999). This period ushered in a new wave of political and economic 
collaborative efforts between both states even interjected by a few hiccups occurred. 
The fourth Act (2009-2012) witnessed by the tenures of two former vice presidents 
(Goodluck Jonathan and Jacob Zuma) who went on to become presidents of their 
respective countries. Diplomatic rivalry during this period took another sour turn with 
South Africa’s increasing romance with other allies like Angola and further 
exacerbated by its ascendancy as a result of its membership of G20 and BRICS. The 
conflicting stands of both countries in international issues relating for instance with 
Cote d’Ivoire and Libya in 2011. The highlight of this period however was South 
Africa’s deportation of 125 Nigerians on March 2nd, 2012 over fake yellow fever 
vaccination cards followed by Nigeria reciprocal deportation of 28, 56 and 42 South 
Africans on March 4, 6 and 7 in retaliation. Adebajo however, notes a measure of 
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optimism in Nigeria-South Africa relations moving forward based on recent efforts at 
strengthening bilateral ties.  
This thesis thus aims to fill an intellectual gap in exploring the nexus between the 
foreign policy posture of both Nigeria and South Africa for continental hegemony in 
the context of the hegemonic stability theory. 
2.3 Theoretical framework (Hegemonic Stability Theory) 
This thesis is based on hegemonic stability theory as propounded by Kindleberger 
(1973) and other scholars like Keohane (1984; 1989), Modelski (1987), Krasner 
(1989) Gilpin (1987), Gadzey (1994). The concept has not only gained special 
emphasis but also a distinctive connotation over the years.  
The idea of hegemony as it developed in the twentieth century owes much of its 
propulsion from Antonio Gramsci, the General Secretary of the Italian Communist 
Party who was incarcerated for his political inclinations in 1926 and died in prison in 
1937. As discussed earlier, though Gramsci’s concept was tilted towards a Marxist 
approach, its close association with the concept of power renders it applicable to 
many other theories of hegemony.  
However, the theory of hegemonic stability was originally formulated by Charles 
Kindleberger (1973, 1981, 1986a, 1986b) in his application of the term to the rise and 
decline of the US’s influence in international affairs. His main argument is that since 
states are rational egoists seeking to maximize their own interests and welfare defined 
in material terms, there is the necessity of a single leader for the provision of the 
public good of international stability. In essence, international economic stability is 
only possible where there is a clearly identified preponderant power/state in terms of 
material capabilities and by implication, the stability of the international system rests 
on a single dominant state which is able to articulate and enforce the rules of 
interaction among the most important members of the system. He identifies a number 
of preconditions for a stable international economic system; provision of a market for 
distress goods, producing steady flow of capital, maintaining a rediscounted 
mechanism for providing liquidity when the monetary system is frozen, managing the 
structure of foreign exchange rates, and providing a degree of coordination of 





will and capability (based on a large and growing economy; economic and 
technological dominance, massive political power with evidence of superior military 
strength) to enforce the rules of the system and a commitment to a system perceived 
to be mutually beneficial to major states.  
A more familiar form of hegemony was the United States in the aftermath of the 
Bretton Woods conference
18
. At that caucus meeting, it was decided that the US 
currency would be the yardstick, a main denominator – through which the strength of 
other currencies could be ascertained. This was an understandable occurrence because 
the conference came during World War II. The US remained unscathed while Europe 
was reeling from the financial and physical apocalypse that the war engendered. This 
meant that the US was strong and intact enough to be the world leader. It fitted with a 
general understanding of a hegemon because a hegemon “must have access to crucial 
raw materials, control major sources of capital, maintain a large market for imports, 
and hold comparative advantages in goods with high value added, yielding relatively 
high wages and profits” (Keohane 2005:33-34). The US enjoyed hegemony because it 
had no formidable rivals. Caveats have to be made for the temptation to argue that the 
United Stated hegemony served American interests only. The US was very 
instrumental in promoting and maintaining world peace (Gilpin 1981:145; Shaw et al 
1996:33). Consequently, the US and United Kingdom have been the leading 
recipients of flack when world affairs became adverse.  
This is a summary of the unipolar paradigm through which the US as a single power 
has managed to dominate the rest of the world. Prior to the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the USSR was a contender to the world hegemon but with its collapse the US 
maintained its dominance. To this day, hegemony stability survives on the weakness 
of prospective contenders. A hegemon prescribes ideas that should be employed in 
respective political spheres. Though the United States has not dominated the world in 
the way that colonialism did, some people argue that it has actually been driven by 
cupidity and has been intolerant to nations and ideologies that are at variance with the 
US preferences. These subtle ways of domination could be through aid – which can 
arguably be called economic blackmail. Countries that benefit from US largesse feel 
                                                          
18
 Another way in which the US showed its power was through the Washington Consensus. The World 
Bank, International Monetary Fund, and US Treasury Department, all based in Washington crafted 





indebted to endorse its ideologies (Destradi 2010:912913). According to David Lake 
(2009) interstate stratification is founded on socially contracted authority between 
dominant states and members of outranked states. These two types of states enter into 
this contract with mutual exchange: the superior state provides values and other public 
goods within its means while the dominated state reciprocates through ‘compliance 
and legitimacy’ (Lake 2009:36). 
Because of its close correlation with power, the hegemonic stability theory is partly a 
mutation of realism and structuralism. Consequently, realists would elect a hegemon 
from the ‘asymmetrical distribution’ of power among different states (Prys 2010:9). 
While the concept of power is still tightly attached to who qualifies to be a hegemon, 
types of power have changed over time. Using one form of power as the underlying 
measure would produce unrealistic results and would be deterministic in nature (Prys 
2010:9). In the past, power was mostly attached to nations that enjoyed large 
population, military might, conquest, geographic positioning and raw materials. 
Flemes maintains that to date, what has kept the United States fixed as a hegemon is 
its military power. This comes against the backdrop of the US spending more than 
any other country in the world on defense equipment (Flemes 2007:6; 2009:135). 
According to Joseph Nye (1990:154), power in contemporary terms is related to the 
gradations of technology, education and economic stamina. However, Nye does not 
infer that the technological or educational advancement are the only sine qua non to 
render a nation hegemon. A nation contending for international power should exude 
the ability to influence global political decisions. In this sense, Nye, concludes, the 
United States has maintained its prime position and power on the global political 
landscape armed essentially by a combination of its hard power with with its vast soft 
power arsenals (Nye 1990:155).    
Lake (1993) argues that the hegemonic stability theory is more or less a combination 
of two analytically distinct theories; leadership and hegemony theories. His argument 
is that the theory of leadership emphasizes the provision of public good and 
international economic infrastructure in an atmosphere of international stability while 
hegemonic theory on the other hand argues that “the politics of international 
economic relations arise from the different structurally derived preferences over trade 
policy possessed by competing states… and the assumption that states possess the 





The hegemonic stability theory therefore theorizes on the relationship between the 
structure of the international system, based on the distribution of power (Dougherty 
and Pfaltzgraff 1996). The theory is therefore anchored on the conviction that the 
international system can only be steady when there is one internationally recognized 
power or overriding state that does two things: first, it should have a bounty of 
resources that suffice for it to be an international leader. Second, it should be poised 
to plans of action that are indispensable in creating and liberal economic order. 
Similarly connected are the two deductions that emanate from this theory: the 
hegemonic power should produce the public goods for all participants in the 
international system. Another conclusion is that in the international system, less 
powerful nations generate more benefits than the hegemon. This is so because they do 
not participate in producing public goods, but they receive the public goods from the 
hegemonic power. This second assertion gives the hegemonic theory its novelty. It is 
taken as common sense that powerful nations would want a stable globe for their own 
benefit (Mares 1988:456). 
Bohler-Muller (2012:5) discredits any false-charity arguments by arguing that 
‘[d]espite all the peripheral rhetoric, it is no secret that in the world of realpolitik, 
international relations are driven primarily by national interests’. Robert Gilpin 
(1981:29) explains the word hegemony from its etymology which suggests one state 
supplanting other states in the international system. He further argues that hegemons 
extend their power to other states with the hope and certainty that this extension will 
be beneficial to the hegemon. In this case, it is not a negligible matter for to claim that 
in the international system the “small exploit the large”. A crude explanation of the 
hegemonic stability theory is that the presence of single strong power in the 
international system is beneficial to the whole international system. On the other 
hand, turmoil reigns supreme when the international system lacks the presence of a 
hegemonic power (Snidal 1985:579; Nye 1990:153). This claim has been challenged 
for its sweeping assertion that there can never be order in the world devoid a single 
super power. Snidal (1985) tries to prove that international co-operation and order can 
be maintained and even grow in a world bereft of a hegemon.   
In literature, there is the general categorization of hegemons into three types; 
benevolent, mixed-motives (strategic) and exploitative hegemons. The benevolent 





hegemons thus use rewards rather than force to earn the allegiance of other states. The 
mixed-motives and strategic hegemon has a fair measure of general as well as self-
centred interests in its leadership position. When there is necessity, mixed motive 
hegemons exploit the contingency of coercion to realize their motives. The 
exploitative hegemon is concerned with relative gains and uses coercion to win 
compliance and attain its ends (Universitat Bern, pg 2-3). Destradi (2010:909-910) 
calls this type of leadership as ‘imperial’ and also notes that it has a realist inclination 
or bent. Exploitative hegemon is undoubtedly the type of hegemon that has provoked 
the struggle against having “super powers”. It causes – in the international political 
economy – an unfair brand of influence and adoption of ideas, akin to the Marxist 
understanding of oppressive power. Some writers have actually reserved the term 
hegemony to this coercive type of power. This conception of hegemon does not brook 
the possibility of benevolent hegemons (Destradi 2010:910).   
Hegemonic stability theory posits that an open and liberal world economy requires the 
necessary and compulsory existence of a hegemonic and dominant power (Gilpin 
1997:72). According to Gilpin, four fundamental set of resources are particularly 
crucial for the recognition of a hegemon. They include: control over raw materials, 
sources of capital, market and competitive advantage in the production of highly 
valued goods.  Keohane (1996:287) conceived of the theory as the preponderance of 
material resources. His view was that the concentration of power in one dominant 
state facilitates the development of strong regimes and the fragmentation of power is 
associated with regime collapse. 
Mares (1988) points to what he calls the ‘stable alliance’ which is similar to 
Gramsci’s comprehension of hegemony. Mares points out that in the international 
relations, many states would prefer to have balance than to bandwagon (to merely 
acquiesce in the dictates of one power). The fact that they prefer balance means that 
the states involved voluntarily enter into interstate agreements irrespective of the level 
of their strength (Mares 1988:453). The theory therefore recognizes the fact that the 
hegemonic state is comparable to the attainment and maintenance of an epoch of 
stability and prosperity while its decline is conterminous with international insecurity 
and economic stagnation. The major requirement for a hegemonic condition therefore 






To this end, scholars have made such categorization of varieties of hegemonic 
presence to include benevolent, selfish, pariah, liberal hegemon, co-operative, 
structural hegemon, pivotal hegemon etc. Two fundamental outcome of a hegemonic 
regime are stability and security. Consequently, the theory is based on the assumption 
that a dominant state assumes a hegemonic role within the international system with a 
period characterized by prevalent and visible economic growth and prosperity at the 
international scene. There is therefore a defining relationship between hegemonic 
periods and stability which Nye (1990:188) described as a period of resultant peace 
and economic stability inspired by the presence of a hegemon. To him, “economic 
stability historically has occurred when there has been a sole hegemonic 
power….Without a hegemonic power, conflict is the order of the day”. 
Keohane (1980:17) further viewed the theory of hegemonic stability as the provision 
of  “order in the international system (or regional) system, reducing anarchy and 
performing some functions similar to a central government – deterring aggression, 
promoting free trade, and backing  hard currency that can be used as a world (or 
regional) standard” (See Adebajo and Landsberg 2003:174). 
Adebajo et al (2003:174) similarly recapitulates this view by stating that a “hegemon 
needs to have effective tool at its disposal, such as the ability to dispense foreign 
assistance, forge alliances, and use various sticks and carrots to achieve its policy 
objective”. By implication, it must be able to communicate clearly to the 
“hegemonized”, its capacity to not only reward obedience and conformity with 
hegemonic norms and ideas but also to punish deviance or unacceptable behavior 
from belligerent states. A number of theoretical standpoints exist for the explanation 
of the hegemonic stability theory. The neo-liberal perspective of hegemonic stability 
theory posits that an open and liberal world economy requires the necessary and 
compulsory existence of a hegemonic and dominant power (Gilpin 1997:72). It argues 
that a materially advantaged state has a strong interest in providing leadership to its 
sphere of influence through the provision of public goods (GIGA 2010; Kindleberger 
1981).  
The theory therefore recognizes the fact that the hegemonic state is comparable to the 
attainment and maintenance of an epoch of stability and prosperity while its decline is 





the major requirement for a hegemonic condition therefore includes power, 
capabilities and influence and the provision of public good (Prys 2009b).  
Similarly, the critical theory perspective of hegemony aptly presented by Bieler and 
Morton (2004) outlines the historical context within which various diverse but related 
neo-Gramscian perspective emerge. This perspective expands the domain of 
hegemony beyond the familiar international relations dimension of economic and 
military capabilities of state. It highlights how capitalist economic conditions and 
forms of social power are “reproduced, mediated and contested” (p.1). The theory 
focuses on social relations of production between “social interests in the struggle for 
consensual leadership rather than concentrating solely on state dominance…. Using 
historical materialist and a critique of capitalism the theory focuses on social forces 
engendered by changes in the social relations of production, forms of state and world 
order” (Bieler and Morton 2004:97). The theory therefore deviates from a focus on 
state dominance rather than on an “appreciation of how ideas, institutions and 
material capabilities interact in the construction and contestation of hegemony”. 
Adebajo et al (2003:174) similarly recapitulate this view by stating that a “hegemon 
needs to have effective tool at its disposal, such as the ability to dispense foreign 
assistance, forge alliances, and use various sticks and carrots to achieve its policy 
objective”. By implication, it must be able to communicate clearly to the 
‘hegemonized’ its capacity to not only reward obedience and conformity with 
hegemonic norms and ideas but also to punish deviance or unacceptable behavior 
from belligerent states.     
South Africa in recent times has been grossly referred to and celebrated as Africa’s 
hegemon (Alden and le Pere 2004) particularly since the erosion of the decades of 
apartheid rule. Nigeria, on the other hand, has also been widely regarded as the ‘giant’ 
of Africa or Africa’s Gulliver even though this cliché seems to have dwindled at an 
accelerated pace since the start of the post-apartheid era in 1994 coinciding also with 
Nigeria’s comparative economic decline around the same period (late 1980s). This no 
doubt implies an accession to both countries’ position as potential or definite regional 
hegemons in Africa. The literature is rife with the claim that both countries perhaps 
hold the key to unlocking Africa’s economic wealth and political recovery (le Pere 





While it is true that the hegemonic stability theory was originally conceived to explain 
global great-power behavior and may not explicitly capture regional power relations, 
this study attempts to extrapolate and apply its basic assumptions in its analysis of 
hegemonic order in Africa.
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 This theory is evaluated in terms of its coherence and 
consistency, parsimony and explanatory power to capture regional power realities in 
the African region.  
In the design and implementation of foreign policy of any state, there are multiple 
factors (domestic and external) that impact on its construction as well as foundational 
principles that often motivate such policy. A discussion of these issues forms the 














                                                          
19
 The researcher is grateful to Doug Lemke and Ayo Whetho for inspiring the confidence to 
undertake this study and also Sakiemi Idoniboye-Obu for his kind contributions in developing the 







FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND DETERMINANTS OF NIGERIA’S 
FOREIGN POLICY 
3.1  Introduction 
This chapter sets out to establish the institutional and ideological underpinnings that 
inspire Nigeria’s foreign policy rooted essentially in the country’s historical 
experience since independence. These are the fundamental principles and guiding 
frameworks that invariably account for Nigeria’s foreign policy incursion particularly 
in Africa over the past five decades. Since independence in 1960, Nigeria has 
considered it very pertinent to engage itself in the socio-political and economic affairs 
of Africa (Okpokpo 1999). On the political front, Nigeria is easily seen as the 
vanguard of leadership in the African continent earning itself perceptions and 
reputation of other African states as the ‘big brother’. From the First Republic, the 
then Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa on October 7, 1960, set the tone 
for the underlying values of his government’s foreign policy emphasizing amongst 
others, the promotion of African unity and development; what is widely regarded as 
‘Pan-Africanism’ (Dudley 1982; Osaghae 1998). 
Several decades since the articulation of the above foreign policy guideline, it has 
continued to remain the cornerstone and guiding principle of Nigeria’s external 
relations with the rest of the African countries. The principle of Pan-Africanism has 
featured prominently in Nigeria’s engagements with many countries within Africa 
and, to a large extent, remained virtually the same in spite of various regime changes 
and oscillation between military and civilian administration. Furthermore, it is often 
not unusual to find that in the design and implementation, the tenure and texture of the 
foreign policy of a nation directly flows from its past political experiences.  
An acknowledgment of the huge political-economic status of Nigeria in Africa is 
critical to any estimation of the expected role of the country in African affairs. 
Nnamdi Azikiwe, a former president, for instance, strongly championed the idea that, 
Nigeria should play a frontline leadership role in Africa. In what he referred to as “the 





nation should take up the task leading Africa through the path of recovery and 
development (Claude 1964; See Omotola 2008:15; Saliu 2005a).  
The 1979 Constitution of the Second Republic further strengthened the legal basis of 
Nigeria’s Afro-centric pre-occupation when it stated that  
[t]he state shall promote African Unity as well as the 
total political, economic, social and cultural liberation 
of Africa and all other forms  of international co-
operation conducive to the consolidation of universal 
peace and mutual respect  and friendship among all 
peoples and states and shall combat racial 
discrimination in all its manifestation (Republic of 
Nigeria 1979).  
Against this backdrop, this chapter assesses the pattern and context in which Nigeria’s 
foreign policy towards Africa particularly since 1960 when it attained independence is 
shaped. Specifically, it examines the drivers and determinants of Nigeria’s foreign 
policy (domestic and external) by unpacking the fundamental impetus behind the 
foreign policy initiatives during these five decades. 
With respect to the theoretical and practical aspects of Nigeria’s foreign policy 
relations in Africa, this chapter is concerned with providing answers to two particular 
questions: 
 Under what foreign policy guidelines (if any) is Nigeria’s external relations 
particularly with Africa rooted? 
 What are the domestic (centrifugal) and external (centripetal) determinants 
that account for Nigeria’s foreign policy and in what ways do these factors 
impinge on or shape the country’s foreign policy? 
 
3.2 Fundamental principles and ideologies of Nigeria’s foreign policy                                              
To begin with, Nigeria’s foreign policy no doubt has been largely determined and 
conditioned by the prevailing circumstances (both domestic and external) within and 
outside of the country. Often, its foreign policy imperatives and actions are in reaction 
to these factors. Consequently, any serious intention to understand or analyze 
Nigeria’s foreign policy must begin with an examination of the prevailing factors and 





being a newly independent country in 1960, Nigeria opted to take on the status of an 
African ‘knight in shining armour’ in the face of the ruins of colonial and foreign 
domination (Adebajo 2007). With the back and forth oscillation from civilian to 
military dispensations, Nigeria’s commitment to Africa remained unalloyed. It is 
therefore imperative to examine these factors that have shaped the conception and 
articulation of Nigeria’s foreign policy in its strong pro-African context.  
In discussing the characteristics of foreign policy relations prior to independence, the 
passionate concern for world peace; the nonalignment policy; cooperation, respect for 
the sovereign equality of all nations; non-intervention in the internal affairs of other 
states and decolonization are policy positions that predated the emergence of 
independent Nigeria. And as Otubanjo rightly notes, “the guiding principles of 
Nigeria’s foreign policy were first articulated by the Balewa government and find 
their most explicit form in the address of the Prime Minister to the General Assembly 
of the United Nations on the occasion of Nigeria’s admission as the ninety-ninth 
member of the organization on October 7, 1960. In discussing the fundamental 
principles of Nigeria’s foreign policy, we shall elucidate on some of these principles 
that can over the years be summarized as the core paradigms upon which Nigeria’s 
foreign policy thrust is built.  
i)  Respect for independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all states 
This tripartite principle originates from the backdrop that states are at the heart and 
the primary actors of the international system; and that Nigeria’s capacity to defend 
its own sovereignty is only justified on the moral obligation of its respect for other 
state’s territorial integrity (Folarin 2010). Categorically, the criterion of territory is 
sacrosanct to any definition of a state. Jennings and Watts (1992:563) rightly observes 
that, “a state without a territory is not possible”. Thus, the principle guaranteeing the 
protection of the territorial expression and integrity of sovereign and independent 
states within the international system is one that must not be contradicted. This is also 
aptly in line with the Charter of the United Nations (1945) which recognizes the 
principle of sovereign equality of all states while equally acknowledging that the 
respect for territorial integrity and independence of states are fundamental principles 





Furthermore, Nigeria recognizes that the territorial integrity of any state must be 
jealously guarded and not jeopardized and through the instrumentality of its foreign 
policy initiatives. It therefore strives to uphold these values by taking effective 
measures such as taking leading role either independently or through multilateral 
regional and international regimes to collectively prevent the suppression of these 
rights in conformity with the principles of justice and international law. The extent to 
which successive Nigerian government had adhered to these principles is however a 
subject of debate. 
ii) Non-interference in the internal affairs of other states 
Even though this principle has been abused several times by successive Nigerian 
administrations, it nonetheless remains an important element of Nigeria’s foreign 
policy thrust. Nigeria has over the years grappled with the difficulty of determining 
the circumstances under which intervention becomes necessary and, more 
importantly, in understanding the dividing line between interference and intervention. 
Interference may be seen to mean an unsolicited involvement in the internal affairs of 
a sovereign state while conversely, intervention can be seen from the spectrum of an 
internationally acceptable and recognized action premised for instance on 
humanitarian concern or that of restoring peace and stability to a nation ravaged by an 
internal crisis which has the potency of escalating to neighboring states (Pogoson, 
2006). Among the reasons often proposed for this trend is the protection of the 
nation’s security interest. Nigeria’s intervention in the Chadian internal crisis in the 
1970s and 1980s, Liberia in the 1990s for example are justified under this platform. It 
was the hunch of the Nigerian government that conflict in Chad which is a 
neighboring country, poses security problem for Nigeria. On the other hand, Nigeria’s 
intervention in the Liberian and Sierra-Leonean domestic crisis is essentially to justify 
her regional power status and perception of her leadership role in the sub-regions. 
iii) Recognition of self-determination and sovereign equality of all African states 
Nigeria since independence has been at the forefront of the struggle for the self-
determination and recognition of other states (Fawole 2003; Folarin 2010; Abegunrin 
2003; Bukarambe 2000; Adebayo & Mustapha 2008). To be sure, Nigeria’s effective 
engagement with the international community in championing the cause towards the 





apartheid across the world was noteworthy. For instance, in December 1960, Nigeria 
joined many other countries in adopting the resolution on “The Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and People” (UNGA 1960). It also participated 
by playing an active role in the support for the liberation movement particularly in 
Southern Africa by extending strong financial support for political parties such as the 
African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) 
(Fawole 2003). For these and many reasons, Nigeria was on several occasions 
dignified with the chairmanship of the United Nations Special Committee Against 
Anti-apartheid. These included Leslie Harriman, Ibarahim Gambari, Joseph Garba, 
Yussuf Maitama, Edwin Ogbu, Akporode Clark among others (UN Multimedia 
2009). 
iv) Collective promotion of the values of cooperation and peaceful co-existence 
   in Africa (Multilateralism). 
Nigeria since independence has committed itself to the membership of various 
international organizations like the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Commonwealth of 
Nations etc. This is no doubt a reflection of its firm belief that the problems that the 
world faces in general and the crisis in Africa in particular can only be solved via 
collective efforts. It is for this reason that Nigeria proposes African solutions to 
African problems particularly through the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), 
the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and other international 
regimes (Landsberg 2008). As a result of Nigeria’s strong belief and commitment to 
the Pan-African principle, she has participated in several collaborative arrangements 
and cooperative engagements with international governmental organizations and 
international non-governmental organizations alike across the continent and the world 
at large with a bid to collectively seek out corporate solutions to global issues (See 
Table 3.1).  
For instance, following the attainment of independence in 1960, the country did not 
hesitate in joining the United Nations Organization (UNO) while also playing 
formidable and active role both in the formation of the Organization of Africa Unity 
and its eventual transformation into African Union (AU). In fact Nigeria contributed 





birthed in Lagos as well as being the frontrunner in the establishsment of the 
ECOWAS. 
  Table 3.1: Some international cooperative arrangements with Nigeria’s     
 participation 
Type Regional Cooperative Arrangements 
Institutional framework for the resolution 
of disputes 
The ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention mentioned earlier, the Plan of 
Action for the Implementation of the Programme 
for Coordination and Assistance for Security and 
Development (PCASED, 2002), the Protocol 
Relating to Mutual Assistance of Defence (1981), 
and the Protocol on Democracy and Good  
Governance (2001) 
Specialized institutions The Mediation and Security Council, 
Defence and Security Commission, 
ECOMOG, the Council of Elders, and the 
Office of Political Affairs, Defence and 
Security (PADS) 
Economic regimes Treaty establishing the African Economic 
Community 
Source: Author’s compilation  
iv) Principle of non-alignment 
The period of the Cold War was fundamentally a period of subtle antagonism and 
competition between the two main socio-economic and political ideological positions 
at the time (socialism and capitalism). The rivalry that this period generated prompted 
Nigeria along with many African countries to adopt a neutralist position as response 
to pressure exerted by these rivalries. The principle of non-alignment was therefore a 
foreign policy posture of Nigeria that:  
 
emphasized first, that Nigeria must avoid identifying 
with any of the power blocs in the then-prevailing world 
system, and second, that the country must maintain an 
independent posture and judgment on all issues which 
come before the United Nations and the world 
community, particularly, issues affecting human rights 
and freedoms (Okeke 1981:203-204).
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However, the extent to which Nigeria was non-aligned remained a subject of debate 
as many concluded that Nigeria for instance in the early years of its independence 
under Balewa was particularly pro-West possibly as a result of its colonial ties 
(Anglin 1964; Philips 1964; Folarin 2010).  
 
v) Principle of reciprocity 
As a long standing value and principle of international relations, reciprocity is 
inherent in every foreign policy behavior of every state. And by implication, Nigeria’s 
foreign policy and external relations with other states is conditioned by the accurate 
calculation of the (good or bad) intentions of other states with which it interacts. 
Generally, the principle of reciprocity requires officials conducting foreign policies of 
nation-states to reciprocate gestures from other nation-states in their interactions in 
the international community. As such, it is possible for state A to determine its foreign 
policy towards other states by understanding the intentions of state B. By implication, 
reciprocity may be positive or negative when it is cooperative or retaliatory 
respectively.  
Nigeria’s new foreign policy slogan of “citizen diplomacy” as espoused by the then 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ojo Maduekwe in 2007 is a good illustration of foreign 
policy based on reciprocity of the gesture of other states. The fundamental core of this 
principle is that Nigeria would relate with nationals from other states exactly in the 
same manner that these states relates with its citizens. (Onyearu 2008:2). A more 
recent example would be the diplomatic faceoff between Nigeria and South Africa 
over the deportation of over 185 Nigeria for allegedly possessing illegal vaccination 
cards. Nigeria informed by the principle of reciprocity acted promptly by deporting 
over 125 business executives thus denying them entry into Nigeria.  
3.3 Determinants of Nigeria’s foreign policy towards Africa 
Since independence, Nigeria has overtly or covertly crafted a ‘giant of Africa’ image 
for itself with its Afro-centric foreign policy which is best contextualized within a 
regional and continental framework (Adebayo and Landsberg 2003). Its foreign 
policy has demonstrated a resolute conviction to be at the forefront of the struggle for 





entanglement of poverty and neocolonialism. Its leaders have blazed the trail of a 
preordained ‘leader and lender’ of the African continent (Kolawole; 2004).  This 
aspiration to continental leadership has been consistently expressed through the 
instrumentality of its foreign policy over its 50-year history and is significant to the 
understanding of the fundamental components of Nigeria's foreign policy (Adebajo 
and Mustapha 2008).  
Examining both the centripetal and centrifugal constituents of Nigeria's foreign policy 
is therefore critical to our understanding of the country's external relations 
perspectives. Nigeria’s foreign policy has often been conceived by scholars and 
academics in the context of four "concentric circles" of national interest that guide 
Nigeria's foreign policy priorities (Gambari 1989). The first circle represents the 
imperative of the survival and sustenance of Nigeria's security, independence and 
prosperity which is indirectly hinged upon its stability of its immediate neighbors - 
Niger, Benin, Chad and Cameroon. The second circle focuses on Nigeria's external 
relations with countries within the West-African sub-region while the third circle is 
extended to African issues of continental dimensions of peace, development and 
democratization. The fourth and final sphere encompasses Nigeria's relations with 
international organizations and institutions along with states outside the domain of the 
African continent (Gambari 1989). 
Any attempt to understand Nigeria’s foreign policy thrust must begin with an 
appreciation of the nexus of the domestic forces and external environment of the 
foreign policy formulation in the country. This is critical to understanding the myriad 
of factors that have influenced the country's foreign policy since independence. As 
Terhemba and Kasali (2007:45) appropriately notes, “It has become an axiomatic 
truth that the foreign policy of a country is to a large extent determined by its 
domestic structures”. Generally, factors that determine the foreign policy thrust of any 
state can be broadly categorized into two categories. These include: 
1. The domestic setting (Centripetal)   
2. The external environment (Centrifugal) 
Northedge (1968:15) accurately points out that the foreign policy of any country is a 
product of environmental factors both internal and external. While it is indeed true 





domestic factors inspiring a nation’s foreign policy could as well be a reflection of an 
external factor. More so, particularly in today’s globalized age, the distinction 
between the domestic and external settings affecting foreign policy construction is 
one that is increasingly becoming blurred resulting in a conceptualization challenge 
that scholars of Nigeria's foreign policy have most often grappled with (See Otunbajo 
1989; Gambari 1986). 
Aluko (1977) made classification of the domestic and external factors that contribute 
to the shaping of the foreign policies of African states including Nigeria. In the case 
of the former they include the following: the nature of the economy; the internal 
political pressure; colonial heritage (historical traditions); and leadership character 
and the ideological orientation of the ruling elite. Other factors not listed here may 
include; the Nigerian Constitution, political parties, public opinion and the Nigerian 
Civil War. External factors are the geographical location of the state; the existence of 
colonialism and white supremacist regimes in the continent; Pan-Africanism and the 
continuing rivalry between the East and the West; non-alignment, international law 
and world opinion.  
According to him, these themes guide the foreign policy convictions of many African 
states. The domestic and external factors are particularly relevant in understanding 
Nigeria’s foreign policy making. We will now turn to a discussion of the domestic 
factors that guide the foreign policy shaping in Nigeria. We move on to attempt a 
thorough analysis of the internal factors that affect the formulation of Nigeria's 
foreign policy within the purview of the guiding perspective laid out by Aluko (1977). 
3.3.1 Domestic setting influencing Nigeria’s foreign policy 
We shall begin our analysis by first establishing the setting and context in which post-
independent Nigeria's foreign policy has been shaped. The over 50 years of Nigeria’s 
independence has been characterized by phases of military, authoritarian rule and 
periods of democratic civilian rule (IPA 2013). As Idang (1973: 1) rightly points out:  
Since a nation's foreign policy is not only a direct 
continuation of its domestic policy, but is also a reflection of 
its way of life, there are certain domestic inputs which define 
foreign policy goals and priorities, determine the choices 
open to the foreign policy elite, and shape major foreign 





It is therefore particularly crucial to examine the nexus between domestic issues and 
foreign policy in understanding the construction of the latter in Nigeria. Alongside the 
domestic determinants mentioned above, we will also examine others including 
military capability, type of government, government institutions, officials and 
technocrats and religious heterogeneity and ethnic fragmentation. 
a) The Nigerian constitutions  
A major source of Nigeria’s foreign policy prerogatives which also serves as the 
guiding document for the conduct of its foreign policy especially under civilian 
democratic rule is the Constitution. As reflected in table 3.2 below, the successive 
Constitutions of the Federal Republic of Nigeria clearly articulate the principles that 
should direct the conduct of Nigeria’s foreign policy while also stating the roles each 
policy maker should occupy and play in the administration of these policies. 
Table 3.2 Nigerian constitutional development and foreign policy changes 








The state shall promote African Unity, 
as well as total political, economic, 
social and cultural liberation of Africa 
and all other forms of international co-
operation conducive to the 
consolidation of universal peace and 
mutual respect and friendship among 
all peoples and State, and shall combat 
racial discrimination in all its 
manifestations. 




The foreign policy objectives shall be - 
(a) promotion and protection of the 
national interest; 
(b) promotion of the total liberation of 
Africa and support of African unity; 
(c) promotion of international co-
operation for the consolidation of 





among all nations and elimination of 
racial discrimination in all its 
manifestations; 
(d) respect for international law and 
treaty obligations as well as the seeking 
of settlement of international disputes 
by negotiation, mediation conciliation, 
arbitration and adjudication; and 
(e) promotion of a just world economic 
order. 




The foreign policy objectives shall be -
(a) promotion and protection of the 
national interest; 
(b) promotion of African integration 
and support for African unity; 
(c) promotion of international co-
operation for the consolidation of 
universal peace and mutual respect 
among all nations and elimination of 
discrimination in all its manifestations; 
(d) respect for international law and 
treaty obligations as well as the seeking 
of settlement of international disputes 
by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, 
arbitration and adjudication; and 
(e) promotion of a just world economic 
order. 
Source: Author’s compilation (See respective Constitutions) 
Currently, Nigeria’s foreign policy is guided by the provisions of the constitution of 
1999, which is apparently a slight amendment to its 1979 predecessor with the specific 





b) The nature of the economy 
The nature of Nigeria’s economy has continued to shape its foreign policy context in 
both negative and positive terms. Since the 1960s, Nigeria’s economic position 
particularly comparative to other African economies has afforded it the material 
resources to pursue a very broad and extensive foreign policy posture within Africa. 
Nigeria’s economy is richly endowed particularly in the agricultural and mineral 
sectors. Prior to the discovery and exploration of oil, Nigeria’s economy had thrived 
on the agricultural sector with vibrant export markets in groundnut, oil palm, cocoa, 
etc. Today, Nigeria’s economy is one that is hugely dependent on oil revenue. 
Between 1974 and 2010, oil accounted for over ninety percent of Nigeria’s overall 
earnings and has continued to be the dominant export product of the country even till 
date (Pham 2007). Oil revenue has over the years therefore been seen as a major 
foreign policy tool and a crucial determinant of Nigeria’s foreign policy. Currently, 
oil income accounts for over 90% of Nigeria’s foreign exchange earnings and, more 
importantly, oil is critical in how other countries perceive and evaluate Nigeria 
strategic significance in the global calculus (Pham 2007). Aside the fact that oil has 
become a major propelling force of Nigeria’s foreign policy today, it is also a critical 
factor in the foreign policies of many other states with or without oil in the 
international system today (Soremekun, 2003; Folarin 2010). 
Again, armed by its membership of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC), Nigeria has been able to position itself at the centre of global 
politics using oil as it dominant foreign policy instrument. Kalu (2000) in his 
contributory text on ‘Economic Development and Nigerian Foreign Policy’ addresses 
the issue of internal economic contradiction and Nigerian foreign policy construction 
focusing on how the nation's foreign policy is affected and influenced by the national 
economy. In his theoretically assessment of the external constraints on Nigeria's 
economic policy, he draws the conclusion that a healthy and robust domestic 
economy is an important and crucial element in determining Nigeria's national 
interest. And ultimately the character of its foreign policy and a proper estimation of 
this is critical to nuanced understanding of the range of choices that political elites 





Udogu (2002:144) in his review captured Kalu’s arguments succinctly by noting that 
“the centrality of a healthy economy in determining the range and scope of the foreign 
policy of a nation-state is a sine qua non” evidenced for example in the aggressive 
manner in which Nigeria pursued its foreign policy in the 1970s and late 1980s when 
the country’s oil wealth increased greatly. According to him, Nigeria’s bold and 
assertive foreign policy during these period was a testament of the influence of 
economic opulence and development on the foreign policy construction of any 
country It is on record that during this period Nigeria threatened to withhold the sale 
of its oil to some of the Western powers who had failed to retract their support for 
apartheid South Africa (Kalu 2000; Udogu 2002). 
States that are endowed with oil have earned a respectable image as a result of the 
universal importance attached to petroleum. By corollary, states that are without oil 
need oil and thus their survival is hinged on their relationship with oil producing 
states. As Folarin (2010) notes, this circumstance affords the former with a lot of 
bargaining power and leverage to influence global political decisions. And ofcourse, 
Nigeria’s is a privileged member of this group and coupled with its huge market 
potentials for the world, “Nigeria possesses the economic power to run an ambitious 
foreign policy” (Folarin 2010:189). Nevertheless, it has been argued that despite the 
vibrancy that oil exposed to the Nigerian foreign policy, it also poses serious dilemma 
and thus serve as a constraining factor to its foreign policy. There is the view that 
Nigeria’s oil “is a divisive and disintegrating force particularly in throwing up 
centrifugal subnational forces and separatist groups within the country” (IPA 2003).  
Another constraining factor of the nature of Nigeria’s economy would be its economic 
dependence and susceptibility which limits its capacity to effectively call the shorts in 
an international economic system that is asymmetrically skewed to its disadvantage.  
c) The internal political pressure  
Aluko’s (1977) reference to internal political pressure as a domestic factor affecting a 
nation’s foreign policy appears apt especially in the case of Nigeria. According to 
him, the structure of the federation, the governmental setting, role of political parties, 
pressure groups and public opinion all add up to providing the contour and character 
of the internal or domestic setting of the Nigerian political space. For instance, in the 





history since independence, regional governments enjoyed certain level of autonomy 
based on the federal structure that was practiced and this had serious implication for 
the country’s foreign policy formulation.  
The huge youth population of Nigeria consisting of university students, school 
leavers, professional people (lecturers and professors, lawyers, physicians, teachers), 
business provide a large pool of youth groups which when aggregated make an impact 
on the foreign policy construction in the country (Claudes 1964). Historically, youth 
associations such as the Nigerian Youth Movement, Zikist Movement etc. have 
played critical role in nation building. The clamor for the appointment of an 
ambassador to all independent African states; that a population census be held, the 
creation of a separate ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations; a 
republican form of government; sending of an ambassador to Russia and the lifting of 
the ban on Communist literature and the call for a stronger central government, the 
creation of more states and a more vigorous and neutral foreign policy are a number 
of the issues that have been put forward by different youth movements at different 
periods of Nigeria’s history (Claudes 1964). 
In the expression of their opinions, pressure groups such as the labour unions and 
students association go a long way in influencing the eventual outcome of certain 
foreign policy positions of the country. The influence that these groups command 
cannot be underestimated and there have been several instances where the Nigerian 
government had adopted some foreign policy positions on international issues as a 
result of campaigns mounted by the civil society representing the masses. For 
instance, the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS) played a formidable 
role in reinforcing Nigeria’s anti-apartheid foreign policy position in its fight against 
apartheid government in South Africa. Example of this includes the protest at Nsuka 
and Lagos of the ordinary Nigerian students following the 1976 Soweto uprising and 
also financial contribution to the anti-apartheid movement (SAIIA; 2010). 
d) The personality of the leader  
As evidenced in the case of Nigeria’s foreign policy rhetoric, the ideological 
orientation of the ruling elites represents an important constraint and influence on 
Nigeria’s foreign policy making. No doubt, the foreign policy capacity of a nation is 





argued that foreign relations of a state is intrinsically tied to the preferences and 
prerogative of the serving President or Head of State. As such, a change in 
government would no doubt mean reciprocal change in the external behaviour of the 
state (Aluko, 1981). Therefore, foreign policy of a state is largely influence by the 
principles, ideology and convictions of the leader the ideology and as Adeyemo 
(2002:69) notes one can expect a radical foreign policy position from a militant styled 
leader. As exemplified in the leadership of Murtala Mohammed (see Folarin 
2010:195). 
 
This is because the perceptions, idiosyncrasies and personality of the leader at 
different points highlight pertinent discordant tunes of varied leadership particularly 
in the conduct of foreign policy. Practically, Nigeria’s leadership models show to a 
certain degree how the personality feature attracts extensive influence on its foreign 
policy posture (Fawole 1999). Consequently, it is therefore not surprising that the 
moderate, conservative, religious and moralistic posture of Balewa, the quiet 
‘gentlemanly’ attitude of Gowon, the timidity and lack of self-confidence of Shagari 
and the radical and ‘aggressive’ disposition of Murtala-Obasanjo (Gambari; 1989) 
were brought to bear on their approach to and pursuit of foreign policy issues. 
Babangida’s courage and initiative ideas, as well as Abacha’s recluse instinct and ‘tit-
for-tat’ diplomacy and Abdulsalam’s quiet diplomacy etc., all add up to influence the 
operation of Nigeria’s foreign policy within the leadership posture (Ajetunmobi et al 
(2011; 308).  
More recently is the comparative reference to the personality of the former Presidents 
of Nigeria (Obasanjo and Yar Adua). While Yar Adua is referred to as slow and 
incapable of a functional foreign policy, Obasanjo on the other hand is seen as 
assertive and bold in representing the foreign policy posture of the country during the 
period of his leadership. In the case of the former, there was a passive and general 
lack of interest in the foreign policy making of the country at the time thus impacting 
directly on the quality of Nigeria’s diplomatic interactions during this period. On the 
contrary, Obasanjo’s active role in the transformation of the OAU into the AU was 
largely instructed by his dominant and progressive personality profile. The 
implication of his personality influence needs no further elaboration (Onunaiju 2009; 





To corroborate this position, Ajetunmobi et al (2011: 308) established that “while 
President Olusegun Obasanjo had his shortcomings in foreign policy implementation, 
the nation has achieved significant gains through the regime’s shuttle diplomacy”. 
Therefore, the background and idiosyncrasies coupled with the psychological qualities 
of a leader give certain coloration to their perception of world view and the ideology, 
values and principles they uphold of the role of state. Nigeria’s role in Africa and 
world affairs determine to a great extent the type of policies pursued and the strategy 
or posture adopted to achieve the policies. A typical example is to argue that in the 
analysis of the personality and leadership style of President Obasanjo, an appreciation 
of how Nigeria’s foreign policy posture can be contextualized. By implication, there 
have been a degree of inconsistencies and in-continuity in Nigeria's foreign policy 
construction and pattern due largely to the varied personality profile and traits of its 
different leaders. This reality has created a situation where each leader often 
implements his own ideas based on his understanding and nuances of the context of 
specific event thereby complicating a thorough definition of what is Nigeria's national 
interest. And as Ajetunmobi et al (2011: 308) rightly notes “the history of Nigerian 
foreign policy since 1960 has constantly been changing though, the principle guiding 
her foreign relations remain the same”. 
On the impact of personality driven approach on Nigeria’s foreign policy, the 
International Peace Academy (2003), in their submission at its seminar on the 
domestic, regional and external dimensions of Nigeria’s foreign policy in the post-
Cold War era, acknowledged the role of personalities on the foreign policy making 
process of Nigeria. They argue that the oscillation of leadership personalities have 
serious implication for the continuity of foreign policy because “each leader has 
implemented his own ideas, making it difficult to define Nigeria’s national interest” 
(IPA 2003:4). In essence, while the leadership personalities of respective leaders may 
convey a vibrant and buoyant foreign policy, it may also evince inconsistency and 
discontinuity in the foreign policy implementation of the country as a result of 
differences in the foreign policy values and expectation of these leaders. 
e) Government agencies, officials and technocrats 
According to Mustapha (2008:41) in one of his accounts of the domestic constraints 
on Nigeria’s foreign policy which he referred to as the first distinct ‘face’ that inspire 





formal and diplomatic negotiations and agreements, and the pursuit of sub-regional 
regional hegemonic ambitions” of Nigeria. A number of key institutions are directly 
or indirectly involved in Nigeria's foreign policy formulation and implementation. 
They include; the Presidency; Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA); Ministry of 
Defence; National Intelligence Agency (NIA); Ministry of Finance; Nigerian Institute 
of International Affairs (NIIA); National Assembly and its relevant committes; 
Presidential Advisory Council on International Relations etc.  
Inamete (2001) in his examination of the ‘Foreign Policy Decision-Making process in 
Nigeria’ attempts to draw a linkage between the institutions, instruments, and 
processes and Nigeria's foreign policy formulations. He argues that institutions such 
as the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Finance, Agriculture, etc. have been 
very relevant and almost indispensable in the foreign policy making and construction 
of Nigerian foreign policy while also observing that the usefulness of these 
institutions have their direct linkage to the periodic significance that each leadership 
wishes to attach per time (Inamete 2001). 
Constitutionally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) under the leadership of the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs (as represented in Table 3.3) is responsible for conducting 
and managing external affairs of the country and staffed with highly trained officers 
with theoretical knowledge, practical expertise as well as a technical intelligence of 
foreign affairs. The MFA thus represents the core implementation organ of foreign 
policy with the Nigeria’s High Commissions, embassies, and other diplomatic 
missions under its jurisdiction. In essence, the force of the country’s foreign policy at 
any period in time has always been attributed to the command of the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs. The table below shows a background of the various Ministers of 










  Table 3.3: Nigeria’s Foreign Affairs Ministers since independence  
S/N Names Period Served 
1 Sir Abubakar TafawaBalewa 1960-1961 
2 Dr. Jaja Anucha Wachukwu 1961-1965 
3 Alhaji Nuhu Bamal 1965-1966 
4 Dr. Akoi Arikpo 1967-1975 
5 Major General Joseph Garba 1975-1978 
6 Henry Adefope 1978-1979 
7 Ishaya Audu 1979-1983 
8 Chief Emeka Anyaoku 1983-1983 
9 Prof. Ibrahim Gambari 1984-1985 
10 Prof. Bolaji Akinyemi 1985-1987 
11 General Ike Nwachukwu 1987-1989; 1990-1993 
12 Dr. Rilwanu Lukman 1989-1990 
13 Ambassador Matthew Mbu 1993-1993 
14 Ambassador Babagana Kingibe 1993-1995 
15 Chief Tom Ikimi 1995-1998 
16 Ignatius Olisemeka 1998-1999 
17 Alhaji Sule Lamido 1999-2003 
18 Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji 2003-2006 
19 Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala 2006-2006 
20 Prof. U. Joy Ogwu 2006-2007 
21 Chief Ojo Maduekwe 2007-2010 
22 Martin Ihoeghian Uhomoibhi (acting)  2010-2010 
23 Henry Odein Ajumogobia (2010–2011) 2010–2011 
22 Ambassador Olugbenga Ashiru 2011-present 
 Source: Author’s compilation 
 
f) Religious heterogeneity and ethnic fragmentation 
Historically, the heterogeneous Nigeria’s ethnic and religious mix had often 
necessitated a guarded foreign policy perspective on sensitive issues that could trigger 
ethnic or religious tension across the country. Nigeria for instance severed diplomatic 
relations with Israel in 1973 following the Yom Kippur War as a result of its Muslim 
opposition and affinity with the rest of the Arab Muslim world. Diplomatic ties were 
only restored in September 1992. Despite that it is officially a secular state, it 
nevertheless is conditioned by a need to appeal to the sensitivities of its two major 
religious identity (Islam and Christianity). 
g)  Ideological orientation of the ruling elites  
Ideology is defined as the belief system that explains and justifies a preferred political 





Ideology engenders political unity and minimizes potential social incohesion. 
Ideologies “constructs a psychological and social bond that would make a nation 
unshakeable in the face of external threat or divisive influences” (Folarin 2010:154). 
Closely related to the issue of personality of the leader discussed previously is also the 
ideology of the ruling elite. It is therefore possible to predict the behavioural pattern 
of state’s action, inactions or reactions as a result of its dominant ideology (Northedge 
1976). By extension, this reflects on what is conceived as national roles or otherwise. 
King (1996:33) views ideology rather as “a major instrument for coping with the 
stranger element within and among nations”. According to Aluko (1981:10), the 
ruling elite in Africa wield enormous influence and power over the foreign relations 
of their countries and able to convert their personal or group interest into the national 
interest of those states (See Folarin 2010:192). 
Nevertheless, it may be difficult to intelligently ascertain Nigeria’s specific guiding 
ideology of its foreign policy due partly to highly sensitive multi-ethnic and multi-
faith identities and differences. In essence, Nigeria’s foreign policy ideology is rooted 
in its ethnic and religious heterogeneity and therefore evincing different dimension of 
ideological standpoint in its international posture in global affairs. These ideologies 
have combined to provide a focus to foreign policy posture (King 1996:33-51).  
Nigerian foreign policy making has always been configured by the ideological and 
cultural orientations of policy makers or the political elites or group(s) in power per 
time. Idang (1973:48) in his contribution notes that the role of foreign policy elites as 
the “constitutionally designated individuals ‘who determine the political destiny of the 
nation’ and set foreign policy goals”. He submits further that an in-depth examination 
of Nigeria’s foreign policy formulation since independence suggests that it is elitist 
and government-driven and this has significantly been complicated by the 
phenomenon of prolonged military rule (Idang 1973). His argument follows therefore 
that the foreign policy decision making process in Nigeria cannot be divulged from 
the character and view perspective of its ruling elite per time. 
h) National perception   
Perhaps this determinant has more influence on Nigeria’s foreign policy than any 





black race), Nigeria and Nigerians have over the years built a perception of the 
‘giant’, ‘redeemer’ and ‘natural leader’ of Africa and ‘leader’ of the black world. 
According to Metz (1991: nd), “Nigerian external relations have emphasized African 
issues, which have become the avowed cornerstone of foreign policy”. Since 
independence therefore, Nigeria has therefore sought to continue to play the role of a 
benevolent leader where its foreign policy is not particularly concerned about 
improving the quality of life of its people but more importantly tied to advancing the 
cause of other countries within the African continent 
At the root of the above argument in what Uzodike et al 2013 termed the “Prestige 
school of thought” is the claim that Nigeria has an ancestrally ordained mandate to 
lead the quest for continental peace while at the same time championing Africa’s 
socio-economic and political development as: 
 
Playing such a noble role in the economic construction and 
reconstruction of the region presents Nigeria with an 
opportunity to assert her dominant position in the region as a 
matter of prestige. Analysts argue that if Nigeria fails to do 
so, other credible and contending regional challengers such 
as Ghana, Egypt, Cote d’ Ivoire (formerly Ivory Coast) and 
South Africa would take on such responsibilities. 
 
The implication of this is that the country’s over 50 years of foreign policy incursion 
has been cemented in an aspiration to continental leadership and hegemonic 
ambitions. Nigeria’s overwhelming human, financial and material contribution to 
Africa is clear evidence of its ambition to be recognized as a regional power since 
according to Folarin (2010:187) “its natural and historical endowments coupled with 
the intense contributions and sacrifices for Africa’s progress since independence have 
naturally earned Nigeria honour and its leadership position in the continent”. 
3.3.2 External setting affecting Nigeria’s foreign policy 
Foreign policy of any nation is deeply inspired and conditioned by a number of 
centrifugal (external) factors and Nigeria is not an exception. Since independence, 
Nigeria’s external relations has been motivated and guided by a variety of conditions 
and forces some of which are necessitated as a reason of its geographic location, the 
international political economic environment in which it is a state actor, its 





articulation of some of these external determinants of Nigeria’s foreign policy since 
independence while demonstrating how they significantly impact both positively and 
negative on Nigeria’s foreign policy construction.   
a)  The existence of colonialism and white supremacist regimes in Africa 
The existence of colonialism and white supremacist regimes in Africa has been a 
major inspiration of Nigeria’s foreign policy since independence with the country and 
its leaders being consistent in their commitment to the total emancipation of the 
African people still under the bondage of colonial rule. Nigeria in its foreign policy 
construction and external relations had also sought to put an end to apartheid rule and 
all forms of racial discrimination. This thinking influenced the country’s dominant 
leadership role in the African continent and has consequently brought her into the 
limelight of world politics, especially within the United Nations as well as the Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM) in her response to the desire for world peace and security 
Chinade (n:d); Abdurrahman (n:d). No doubt, this explains Nigeria‘s election into the 
non-permanent seat of the UN Security Council (UNSC) (1966-67, 1978-79 and 
1994-95 and 2010-2011) while continuing its quest for the realization of the dream of 
a UNSC permanent seat for Africa. Nigeria therefore joined the OAU to “eradicate all 
forms of colonialism from Africa” (OAU Charter). General Yakubu Gowon in his 
criticism of the strongholds of colonialism noted that colonialism was a “slur on the 
dignity of the black people everywhere, and that until colonialism and white 
supremacist rule are eliminated in Africa no black man could seriously be proud of 
being black” (see Aluko 1977:13).  
During the period of struggle against colonial appearance in Africa, Nigeria therefore 
sought to establish bilateral assistance particularly to freedom fighters across the 
continent. It also took advantage of the platform created by the OAU Liberation 
Committee to facilitate the cause for nationalist struggle Aluko (1973). Nigeria’s 
foreign policy position to ostracize and isolate the white minority regimes in Africa 
from international organizations across the world was in acknowledgment of the 
impact of the latter on the former. South Africa’s eventual exclusion from the 
Commonwealth in 1961 and such other international organizations like International 





International Olympic Committee (ILO) was a crucial achievement of this cause 
(Austin 1966). 
b) The rivalry between the East and the West 
At the external level, the end of the Cold War typified by the continuing rivalry and 
competition between the superpowers resulted in a fundamental change in the 
undercurrents of international politics. Nigeria’s independence in 1960 came at the 
period of the Cold War with developing countries like Nigeria with enormous oil 
wealth; a large army and equally reasonable spread of well-educated citizens now 
caught in the web of this super power quagmire. Nigeria found a safe haven in the 
foreign policy of nonalignment which was informed both by its refusal to take sides in 
the battle of supremacy and also by its membership of the OAU (Shaw and Aluko 
1983). This period created the potential for developing countries like Nigeria to 
exercise power in the international system that has been hithertho dominated by the 
bi-polar conflict of the superpowers. For instance, Nigeria was able to play a 
leadership role in Africa as a result of the dwindled strategic significance of major 
external powers (Otubanjo 1989).  
The foreign policy trajectories of Nigeria consequently can be highlighted from the 
influences of post-Cold War era. For the most of the first three decades of Nigeria’s 
post-colonial and post-independent existence, its foreign policy perspective was 
therefore focused upon crushing the menace of all forms of colonialism and its agents. 
Nigeria was notably at the forefront of this fight along with the vast majority of 
African countries as “anti-colonialism became the ‘most obvious and consistent, and 
all embracing common denominator of African foreign policy” at the time (Otubanjo 
1989).  
In 1960, barely 17 of the 54 countries present in Africa today had been able to secure 
their independence from colonialism. Thus, the deep resentment generated as a result 
of political exclusion arising from colonialism crystalized into a foreign policy 
initiative which Nigeria among other nations occupied the front seat in the fight to put 
an end to the evils that has turned African into a dark continent. 
c) Geographical location 
The geographical location of a state is an important international determinant of its 





deal for the nature and pattern of the external relations it establishes with other states. 
For instance, it is important to know the natural frontiers of the country; that is 
whether such country is land locked, bordered by the sea, mountainous or even within 
the desert. Whether a nation has a large territory, population, educated, rich, 
democratic and who its neighbours are all geographic location indices that have direct 
implication on the nation’s foreign policy (Wanjohi; 2011). And as rightly observed 
by Aluko (1977:12), “It is truism that where a country is situated has some 
implications for its external behavior”. The geographic location of Nigeria as country 
bordered by the Atlantic Ocean makes it possible for such other countries like Niger, 
Mali and Burkina Faso that are landlocked to depend on it for their economic 
survival. Nigeria therefore shares certain socio-cultural, political and economic ties 
with the peoples of the West-African sub-region in particular and Africa in general. 
According to Gambari (1984), the security of the region has to be strengthened 
collectively in order to “resist external aggression' and 'to check religious 
disturbances, armed robberies and the menace created by aliens illegally residing in 
our respective countries” (cited in Nwokedi 1985).  
It is therefore without doubt that the pursuit of Nigeria’s economic priorities can only 
be guaranteed in an atmosphere of relative stability and peaceful coexistence within 
the region that it finds itself. For instance, Nigeria’s foreign policy decision to commit 
troops to war-torn political environments within the African region is a reflection of 
the influence that its geographical location has on its foreign policy construction. This 
decision is inspired by its understanding that political upheavals within a state have a 
spiral and domino effect on surrounding states. It is within this framework of a sub-
regional and continental political and economic arrangement in which it is a member 
that Nigeria through its foreign policy initiative endeavors to maximize its national 
economic interests.  
This is in line with Aluko’s (1981) argument that Nigeria's efforts leading to the 
eventual establishment of the Chad Basin Commission, the River Niger Authority and 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are examples of the 
government's obligation to the consciousness of regarding the sub-region as 





Furthermore, Nigeria’s geopolitical location around Francophone countries also 
invokes a certain level of influence on its foreign policy construction. This is 
evidenced in the perceived threat of Nigeria to France and its interest in these 
countries. Nigeria has had to deal with the centrifugal pressures both from its 
Francophone neighbours and also from France in its leadership quest within the West-
African sub-region. Thus, the argument of Aluko (1981) appears plausible that the 
heavy reliance for their political, economic and military survival by the small 
countries surrounding Nigeria on extra-continental powers, especially France 
constitutes a danger to Nigeria's security. And this is a dilemma that Nigeria’s foreign 
policy makers have had to grapple with over the years (Cited in Nwokedi 1985). One 
of these challenges is one of finding a ‘cautious’ foreign policy and external relations 
balance between its Francophone neighbours on the one hand and France on the other; 
a term Nwokedi (1985) referred to as ‘Franco-African differences’. 
d) Membership of international organizations  
By its membership of some international governmental organizations (i.e. OAU [AU], 
ECOWAS, UN, Commonwealth, OPEC etc.), Nigeria is obligated to abide by 
international codes of conduct. This means that since it is a signatory to the treaties 
establishing these organizations, it is bound by the rules that are jointly made by the 
members of the organizations. It is therefore able to participate in all UN or AU 
sponsored economic, social, financial conferences and debates. All through the period 
of OAU’s existence unto its transformation into the Africa Union (AU), Nigeria has 
committed itself to the unification of the AU and the African continent and this 
motivation has been at the forefront of its external relations with the rest of the 
countries in Africa. It is therefore not in doubt that in the construction of Nigeria’s 
foreign policy; its membership of the AU conveys a measurable and significant 
influence. 
e) Colonial heritage 
Like every colonized country, the strong influence of colonialism is one that has 
affected and continues to affect the conduct of Nigeria’s foreign relations particularly 
since its acceptance into the comity of independent states in 1960. In the first analysis, 
Nigeria inherited at independence, historically common links with Britain, its colonial 





common administrative, educational, legal system and other tangible links such as the 
continuation of treaties under colonial rule after independence, concepts such as rule 
of law, democratic institutions, religion and the adoption of a capitalist economic 
system have their direct linkage to British colonial rule. All these colonial links 
collectively give a specific and defining character to Nigeria’s foreign policy 
perspective. For instance, Nigeria colonial history as former British colony and a 
member of the Commonwealth invariably constrained Nigeria’s predisposition to be 
pro-Western on most issues despite its nonaligned status to avoid neocolonialism 
(Folarin 2010).  
Nigeria’s colonial heritage has further played a fundamental role in its foreign policy 
behaviour toward other nations evidenced especially in its membership of the 
Commonwealth of Nations. For instance, a state arising from the doldrums of 
colonialism as in the case of Nigeria (or even apartheid with respect to South Africa) 
finds itself somewhat attached to the dominant perspective of its colonizer or previous 
leadership. The logical corollary of this is that the colonial experience of Nigeria from 
January, 1914 with the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern protectorate 
leading to 1960 when she attained independence, suggests that this political and 
evolutionary background was largely instrumental to the foreign policy construction 
and perspective of the country. It therefore goes without saying that Nigeria in its 
external relations with the rest of the world and with Africa especially could 
invariably not have pursued a foreign policy which would have appeared contrary, 
different or separate from its former colonial master, Britain. Its decision to 
participate in the Commonwealth cannot be unconnected to its conviction that it 
considers itself as a strategic partner in using the multilateral platform as a potential 
avenue to “realize its national objective of economic post-colonial transformation and 
becoming a major voice in the global system, which have been attained over the 
years” (Folarin 2010:151). 
 
Furthermore, the common experiences of the devastating effect of the colonial system 
in Africa also played a crucial role in shaping Nigeria’s international behaviour, its 
disposition and the articulation of the roles it seeks to occupy in post independent 
Africa. These sore experiences unified African states across boundaries and thus 





enemy of external oppression. Nigeria thus saw a need to step into a vacant leadership 
position using its foreign policy thrust. Nigeria after independence took up the 
mandate to purge Africa of all signatures of colonialism, “because of the legacies of 
division, disunity and conflict, which negate the principle of brotherhood, unity and 
collective progress that the founding fathers of Nigeria wished for the continent” 
(Folarin 2010). 
3.4 Conclusion 
A number of issues can be drawn from the above discussion. First is the evidence that 
the foreign policy of a country is ultimately shaped not only by a single factor but by 
a number of factors which could serve both a facilitating and constraining role in the 
foreign policy practice of that nation. In the case of Nigeria, its foreign policy is as 
well influenced by a host of factors, conditions and forces that collectively give form, 
focus and direction to its external relations while at the same time impinging on the 
achievement of its foreign policy goals. By implication, Nigeria’s foreign policy is 
influenced by both formal structures of foreign policy making- diplomats, technocrats, 
presidency, military, ministries, national institutions etc. as well as informal structure 
pressure groups, academics, its historical experiences etc. 
Secondly, there is also the difficulty in accounting for the precise impact of these 
conditions or factors on the actual foreign policy of the country as it is sometimes 
problematic to effectively gauge or estimate the impact of some of the determinants 
(for example oil) on Nigeria’s foreign policy. For instance, the end of the Cold War 
dramatically changed the foreign policy dynamics and configurations particularly of 
developing countries like Nigeria. This reality is acknowledged in the IPA report 
(2003:4) that “the end of the Cold War resulted in a fundamental change in the 
dynamics of contemporary international relations”. 
Furthermore, going from the above, it is also possible to draw a deep correlation 
between the roles that Nigeria plays in Africa and a number of factors that influence 
its foreign policy. There is thus a connection and significant relationship between the 
capacity of a country to play a leading or dominant role within its geopolitical sphere 
and the conditions that impact on its foreign policy aided by the factors that determine 
or constrain its foreign policy. Aided by the lack of interest and reduced strategic 





War, Nigeria’s massive oil wealth, large army strength has thus afforded it the 
opportunity to develop an Afrocentric foreign policy. For instance, flowing from this 
stream is its national perception of the country as the “natural leader” and “redeemer” 
of the African continent; a role it has continued to play since its independence in 1960 
(see subsequent chapters for more details) (IPA 2003).  
Domestic factors serve as major constraints to the effective articulation and 
implementation of Nigeria’s foreign policy. This chapter examined the principles and 
foundations of Nigeria’s foreign policy as guidelines that inspire its external relations 
particularly with Africa. It concludes that the country’s foreign policy over the years 
has been rooted in such principles as: respect for independence, sovereignty, and 
territorial integrity of all states, reciprocity, non-alignment, multilateralism, 
recognition of self-determination and sovereign equality of all African states, non-
interference in the internal affairs of other states etc. Furthermore, the chapter 
accounts for the motivation and determinants of Nigeria’s foreign policy behavior and 
extrapolates how these factors have configured Nigeria’s external relations as we 
would show later. The chapter to follow assesses in more detail the long years of 
Nigeria’s foreign relations in Africa at the three concentric circles mentioned earlier. 
We examine Nigeria’s African foreign policy character since independence under the 




























NIGERIA’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA: AN APPRAISAL 
 
4.1  Introduction 
This chapter highlights and reviews Nigeria’s foreign policy perspectives since the 
period of its independence in 1960 to the most recent era of Goodluck Jonathan’s 
civilian administration. The aim is to capture the nuances of changes, dynamics, 
oscillation, consistencies and inconsistencies of Nigeria’s foreign policy as it straddles 
from one regime type to another. The chapter therefore presents an intellectual 
chronicle of foreign policy decision-making in Nigeria in the context of its relations 
with Africa since its emergence from British colonial rule. We are interested to know: 
in what manner has Nigeria conducted itself in terms of its external relations towards 
Africa in the past five decades in the light of its foreign policy principles and 
determining factors (discussed in previous chapters) and whether its foreign policy 
has demonstrated any measure of consistency or inconsistency in its construction and 
implementation since independence. There is also the imperative to understand 
whether Nigeria’s foreign policy towards Africa has evinced any hegemonic ambition 
in its design and implementation.  
 
4.2 Nigeria-Africa foreign policy from 1960-2012 
4.2.1    Nigeria’s foreign relations from 1960-1966 (Balewa Administration) 
On the attainment of independence in 1960, Nigeria wasted no time in setting the 
contexts of its international engagement with Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa 
Balewa in his first official pre-independent foreign policy statement delivered on the 
20th August 1960. Crowder (1966:289) captured his speech aptly as “a brief but 
strongly worded policy statement”. Balewa’s speech attempted to set the tone for the 
fundamental principles that would guide the conduct of Nigeria’s foreign relations by 
noting that “Nigeria would follow an independent policy, which would be founded on 
Nigeria’s interest and would be consistent with moral and democratic principles on 
which the country’s Constitution was based” (Gambari 2008). Sir Balewa further 
explicated the followings aims and principles of his government’s foreign policy 
when he delivered a speech at the UN’s General Assembly at Nigeria’s admission to 





Respect for the territorial integrity of all nations, Promotion 
of African unity; The defence and promotion of Nigeria’s 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and national independence; 
The creation of the necessary economic and political 
conditions to secure the government, territorial integrity and 
national independence of other African countries and their 
total liberation from imperialism and all forms of foreign 
domination; Non-partisanship in East-West ideological 
disputes and freedom of association and action in the 
international system; Promotion of world peace built on 
freedom, mutual respect and equality for all peoples of the 
world; and Promotion of the rights of all black and other 
colonial domination throughout the world etc. (See Gambari 
1981). 
It is instructive to note that these principles remain not only the guiding light and 
foundation of Nigeria’s external relations but also serve as the underlying platform 
upon which the country’s foreign policy and hence its external relations is constructed 
notwithstanding regime types or changes. However, despite the articulation of the 
above principles, the Balewa regime sometimes failed in acting in accordance with 
the spirit and letters of those principles. It would be recalled that the regime displayed 
unwavering preferences for pro-West relations and a clear antipathy towards the 
Eastern bloc (Gambari 2008). This was in spite of its widely acknowledged principle 
of non-alignment during the East-West cold war.  
There was also evidence suggesting that Nigeria was yet to effectively detach itself 
from the apron string of its former colonial masters and was still to a large degree an 
appendage of the British. For instance, contrary to the Nigerian foreign policy 
principles of non-alignment and freedom of the African continent from all forms of 
colonialism, Kings (1996) notes that Balewa compromised these principles of 
Nigeria’s foreign policy when in 1960, he signed an Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact 
with Britain setting up a military base in Nigeria (see also Idang 1973:51; Folarin 
2010:223), This ambivalence in foreign policy perspective made Gambari (2008) to 
conclude that Nigeria’s record during this period was characterized by uncertainty and 
timidity under the Balewa regime.  
To show its strong loyalty to its former colonial master, Nigeria displayed strong 
apathy towards the East bloc while communist-related literature was also proscribed 





refused employment into the Nigerian Civil Service at the time. It was these actions 
that inspired Amechi (1989:56) to assert that “prior to the civil war in Nigeria, the 
Soviet Union and Nigeria maintained what can be called a zero or minimal 
relationship”.  
Again, in his contribution, Amechi (1989:56) writing on Pan-Africanism, observed 
that Balewa had made the assertion that “we belong to Africa and Africa must claim 
first attention in our external affairs”. Balewa’s conception of a Pan-African Union 
was based on the assumption that economic and cultural cooperation would serve the 
African purpose better than political union. He detested any boundary adjustment that 
could alter the existing one which grew out of the European creation following the 
1884-85 Berlin Conference. Hence the resultant effect was an unswerving 
inconsistency, ambivalence and contradictions between the professed principles and 
actual practice of foreign relations (Arifalo and Ajayi 2003). This subject will be 
revisited later in this chapter. 
Nigeria during this period was also at the forefront of the efforts towards the 
eradication of colonialism from the African continent evidenced in its support for 
liberation struggles particularly in Southern Africa. With respect to Nigeria’s 
engagement with Africa during this period, Balewa was instrumental to the formation 
of the OAU in May 1960 and further played a significant role during the Congolese 
crisis in 1960 with his active support in providing peacekeeping troops and relief 
materials. Nigeria also asserted its influence when she spearheaded South Africa’s 
expulsion from the Olympic and Commonwealth Games in protest of its apartheid 
policies. Also in a show of solidarity with the rest over of Africa, Nigeria severed 
diplomatic relations with France over the latter’s atomic bomb test in Western Sahara 
(Phillips 1964; Adeyemo 2002; Folarin 2010).  
In all, Nigeria’s first civilian regime under Balewa has often been referred to in the 
literature as largely conservative, cautious, lacking innovation, legalistic and seeming 
to appeal to the West (though patronizing of Britain). At the same time, to a large 
degree, it was regarded as anti-communist and non-aligned in posture. Folarin 
(2010:226) argue that Nigeria’s foreign policy during the period under Balewa 
although portrayed clearly conceived roles, however, these roles “were partially or 





The military coup of January 15, 1966 led to the abrupt end of the First Republic and 
the assassination of the Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa; a federal minister, Okotie-
Eboh; two regional premiers; Samuel Akintola and Ahmadu Bello, along with top 
Army officers such as Brigadier Zak Maimalari, Brigadier Ademulegun, Lt. Col. 
Largema, Colonel Ralph Shodeinde and Lt. Col. James Pam (Adebanwi, 2012). The 
major casualties of the coup were therefore the North and West with the East loosing 
none of its leading politicians or ranking soldiers. In a swift manipulation of the 
confused situation that emanated thereafter, General Aguyi-Ironsi emerged as the first 
military Head of State of Nigeria. However, his regime did not last so as to make any 
spectacular change in the foreign policy posture of Nigeria that is worthy of mention. 
This was because the regime was embedded in deep ethno-regional crisis culminating 
in the eventual murder and overthrow of General Aguiyi-Ironsi. It was clear that the 
assassination of both Balewa and Aguiyi-Ironsi was ethnically motivated and 
thereafter set the tone for ethnic divisions and the advent of the military into politics. 
It therefore did not come as a surprise when on July 29, 1966 the military regime of 
General Aguiyi-Ironsi was toppled leading to the emergence of General Yakubu 
Gowon as the new Head of State on August 1, 1966. 
4.2.2        Nigeria’s foreign policy under Yakubu Gowon (1966-1975) 
The regime of Gowon was confronted with the urgent responsibility of inspiring the 
right kind of leadership in the context of its international engagement with the outside 
world particularly in Africa. As expected, coming into power via a counter-coup in 
July 1966, the prevailing circumstance at which his regime ruled had serious 
implication upon which his administration operated. For instance, Dudley (1982:278), 
observed that “[g]iven the imperatives of domestic politics and the opportunities of a 
more relaxed international system, it was not surprising that Gowon’s foreign policy, 
attitude and orientation, as well as the perception of Nigeria’s interest and means of 
attaining them were significantly different from those of Balewa”. In fact, compared 
to Balewa’s timid and mostly moderate foreign policy perspective, Gowon’s foreign 
policy posture was largely regarded as “relatively more activist and influential  during 
the 1970s” (Gambari 2008:63). 
 
During this period, three main issues were at the forefront of policy discussions which 





regime’s foreign policy behavior with the international system at the time. First is the 
Nigerian Civil (Biafra) War which lasted between 1967 and 1970. It was very obvious 
that Nigeria’s existence as a country was threatened as it became largely uncertain 
whether its future could still be guaranteed. Gambari (2008) correctly points out that 
the Civil War proved a watershed moment in Nigeria’s foreign policy history. 
According to him, the international community’s support and the granting of 
diplomatic recognition for Biafra particularly coming from South Africa, France, 
Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Tanzania and Zambia, among 
others, motivated a reassessment of Nigeria’s foreign policy towards Africa. There 
was therefore the imperative to critically reevaluate the often low profile and penitent 
posture that was a typical character of the previous regime. Nigeria therefore 
concerned itself for the most part with the urgency of ensuring the maintenance and 
survival of its national unity even in the face of nationwide insecurity, ethnic war and 
domestic instability.  
Folarin (2010) notes that Nigeria’s experience with the Civil War led to the clearer 
appreciation of the country’s role in Africa, of good-neighborliness and of the greater 
security importance of Nigeria’s immediate neighbors. The country therefore sought 
out necessary means to prevent the total disintegration of the Nigerian territorial 
conception. To this end, Nigeria’s good relations with Britain came in handy in 
quashing the insurgency (Arifalo and Ajayi 2003). And as Adeniran (1989:35) notes 
“a dependent country such as Nigeria needed a country like Britain before, during and 
after the civil war to ensure national survival and a diplomatic breakthrough on all 
fronts”. Even though Britain was not quick to show its support for Nigeria during this 
period, it eventually extended support to the federal government towards the end of 
the war (Adeniran 1989). 
Following the end of the Civil War, Gowon initiated a policy to reconcile all parties 
and went on to effectively take control of all activities of Nigeria’s external affairs. 
More importantly, the victory of Nigeria during the Civil War further ushered the 
country towards the path of a more purposeful leadership role in African affairs.  
Second is the oil boom with the resultant improvement in the country’s wealth and 
revenues from the sale of oil. According to Kolawole (2004), the prosperity that was 





resources more than ever which further encouraged foreign policy incursion even 
beyond Africa. Taking advantage of the oil breakthrough, Gowon succeeded in 
pursuing a vigorous Africa-centered foreign policy in general and one that focuses on 
West Africa in particular. Hence, Nigeria’s membership of the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) made it possible for the country to pursue an 
elaborate and activist foreign policy that ensures that the frontiers of its leadership 
influences is not only further deepened but also extended.  
In the third place, and as rightly observed by Gambari (2008) is Gowon’s decision to 
review the geo-political structure of Nigeria by dividing the country into twelve states 
as against the initial four regional structures. This restructuring altered Nigeria’s 
federal arrangement into a centralized and hierarchical system which is typical of 
every military structure with that of Nigeria being no different. This decision and 
eventual alteration had a consequence of tilting the national balance of power 
structure in favor of the federal government vis-a-vis the states thus making it possible 
for the country to construct a more robust and unified foreign policy.    
It can therefore be argued that the foreign policy initiated by Gowon during this 
period was largely preoccupied with the twin responsibility of the development of 
countries within the African continent on the one hand and the liberation and 
emancipation of its people from the claws of neo-colonialism and racial hegemony on 
the other. One of the first steps that the Gowon regime took was to embark on efforts 
to re-establish the already strained relationship with Cote’ d’Ivoire, Gabon, Tanzania 
and Rhodesia. This was brought about as a result of the Civil War. It was therefore 
not surprising that Nigeria at the time played a fundamental role in the liberation 
struggles of South Africa and other Southern African white dominated territories like 
Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Namibia (Ajala 1989). Nigeria displayed a less subtle 
approach to the armed struggle in South Africa by taking a more radical foreign 
policy perspective and further engaging the Western states towards decolonization 
particularly in Southern Africa thus marking a clear departure from its antecedent 
pattern of external relations policy of dialogue in exercising its total support for the 
liberation movement.  
Nigeria also extended its spheres of influence to such areas such as Mozambique, 





Portuguese ensuring that the people’s right to self-determination is guaranteed. It was 
in recognition of this role played by Nigeria in Africa that General Gowon eventually 
emerged as Chairman of OAU in 1973. Gowon used this opportunity to further 
provide platforms for economic development and political reawakening for the 
African continent (Adeniran 1989). 
Furthermore, the period of oil boom made available the opportunity for Nigeria to 
further deepen its leadership role both in Africa and the West African sub-region 
(Osaghae 2002).  During the Gowon administration, Nigeria displayed unprecedented 
level of generosity to its neighbors in a bid to show its appreciation for their support 
during the civil war. In the first instance, oil was sold at subsidized rates for regimes 
within the West-African region that were supportive towards Nigeria, whereas 
governments who were considered recalcitrant failed to benefit from the concession 
as a deterrent to their opposition to the Nigerian government’s policies. In the last 
instance, the regime of Gowon further went on to build a petroleum refinery alongside 
a presidential palace in Lome, Togo; extend the generation of electricity from Kainji 
dam to Niger etc.  
It was not in doubt that these diplomatic gestures went a long way in improving the 
international perception of Nigeria and its leadership role towards its neighbors. This 
was also strengthened by the Gowon administration’s decision to spearhead the 
establishment of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
alongside the late President Eyadema of Togo. Particularly during this period, 
Nigeria’s minister of economic development, Adebayo Adedeji played a formidable 
role in the eventual emergence of the ECOWAS (Gana 1989). The ECOWAS 
international regime thus made it possible for Gowon to effectively unite countries 
within the West African sub-continent. This impressive act made it not too difficult 
for some countries and their leaders to give Nigeria the rightful place that it truly 
deserves (Kolawole 2005).  
On July 29, 1975, the Gowon administration was overthrown through a bloodless 







4.2.3       Nigerian foreign policy under Murtala Mohammed/Obasanjo regime   
  (1975-1979) 
The worsening domestic situation in Nigeria particularly between 1974 and 1975 had 
serious adverse implication for the foreign policy development of Nigeria setting the 
pace among other issues perhaps related to Gowon’s failure to hand over power to a 
civilian government made an overthrow of his government inevitable. The regime was 
notable for a no-nonsense posture as it embarked on initiatives that were perceived to 
be not only radical but very distant from its earlier predecessor. Notable among such 
drastic actions was the setting up of a committee constituted of army personnel, 
academics, and career diplomats from the Ministry of External Affairs saddled with 
the responsibility of reviewing the basis of Nigeria’s foreign policy and to formulate 
new guidelines for future external relations. The committee, headed by Professor 
Adebayo Adedeji, presented its report eight months after its inauguration among 
which was the proposal for the review of Nigeria’s foreign policy since independence 
while also making projections for the foreign policy strategies, principles, goals and 
objectives for the years ahead (Garba 1991). 
The regime consequently reaffirmed Nigeria’s position that Africa would continue to 
occupy the central position in its foreign policy. It also made it clear that the country’s 
national interest would not be negotiated nor sacrificed in its bid to exercise its 
foreign policy posture towards Africa (Ajala 1989). It was evident that from the 
outset, the new administration “would no longer sit on the fence on important issues 
affecting Africa as such a policy had in the past been detrimental to the country’s 
image and interests” (Ajala 1989:181-182). Nigeria subsequently made good its 
commitment to the liberation movement of Southern Africa by increasing 
significantly its economic, diplomatic and material support towards the struggle. The 
Angolan crisis created the first litmus test for the Nigerian military government to 
make good this promise. In this instance, South Africa’s invasion of Southern 
province of Angola (Cunene) on the ostensible argument of protecting the Cunene 
dam was met with the condemnation of the Nigerian government in strongest terms. 
In furtherance of this cause, the Murtala Mohammed/Obasanjo regime wasted no time 
in challenging the United States over South Africa’s violation of the territorial 





According to Osaghae (2002), this effort was seen as remarkable and sensational. 
Nigeria’s support for and recognition of the Movimento Popular de Libertação de 
Angola (MPLA) which Gambari (2008:65) regarded as the “most significant foreign 
policy action” of the Nigerian regime was not compromised as it rallied other African 
states to throw its weight behind the MPLA contrary to the United States support for 
the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) and Frente 
Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA). Even though the foreign policy decision 
to back the MPLA cost the Nigeria government over USD20 million, it nevertheless 
resulted into positive rewards as the MPLA eventually came out triumphant (Okolo 
1989). Consequently, Nigeria also played a significant role in convincing the OAU to 
accord full recognition to the MPLA led government. The MPLA later formed the 
first indigenous government of Angola following its independence from Portugal in 
1975. No doubt, this feat drew further into the ground Nigeria’s affirmation of its 
leadership status in Africa and one that yielded respect from foreign powers (Okolo 
1989). 
Following Angola’s independence from colonial rule, Nigeria continued to pour not 
only financial and material assistance to the country; it also extended huge political 
and diplomatic support to Angola. It was unarguable that at this period, Nigeria 
effectively became the spokesperson of the Angolan government within Africa. The 
government sponsored delegates to countries within Africa to pursue recognition for 
MPLA (Hélia 2008). 
With the death of General Murtala Mohammed on the aftermath of an ignoble and 
unsuccessful coup d’état, Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo succeeded Murtala 
Mohammed in 1976. The new leader further clarified and deepened Nigeria’s 
commitment to total liberation of the African continent in 1977 when Nigeria played 
host to the World Conference for Action against Apartheid in Lagos. Obasanjo 
accused the foreign multinational companies of “contributing in no small measure to 
the enemy nations of Apartheid” (Dudley 1982). He added that the country was 
“mounting surveillance on all those enterprises who depend on our raw materials and 
market but continue to help our enemies, such enterprise must decide now to choose 
between us and our enemies” (Dudley 1982:298). Obasanjo’s regime also broadened 
the provision of the 1972 Indigenization Decree on the premise that control over local 





had three schedules of 100%, 60% and 40% Nigerian participation respectively 
through either private owners or institutions. (Arifalo and Ajayi, 2003) Foreign 
companies were ordered to ‘Nigerianize’ their sales, marketing and personnel 
department. Thus, in 1979, Nigeria nationalized Shell-BP (Nigeria) Ltd and changed 
its name to African Petroleum. This was in reaction to Britain’s breach of oil embargo 
on Rhodes in Zimbabwe. This action was taken during the Commonwealth conference 
in Lusaka, Zambia with the adoption of Nigeria’s position. Consequently, Britain 
shifted its position on its policy on Rhodesia (Whiteman 2008). 
The regime’s support for the MPLA in Angola and the nationalization of a British oil 
firm demonstrated the Afro-centric dimension of Nigeria’s external relations during 
the period. Such desire to protect the African interest in the international system was 
not restricted to actions against the west only. Africa thus became not the centerpiece 
of Nigeria’s foreign policy with Nigeria playing the role of the former’s mouthpiece. 
In 1979, Obasanjo without mincing words stated at the OAU summit in Khartoum 
(Sudan) that: “Nigeria’s objective was and is the independence of Africa and its 
freedom from external control or intervention from whatever source (whether East or 
West)” (Dudley 1982:278). A fundamental effect of this new emphasis on African 
liberation by the Murtala/Obasanjo regime on Nigeria’s external relations was that 
greater coherence now existed on the process of making and implementing foreign 
policy. In the area of peacekeeping in Africa, the regime also led what Gambari 
(2008) rightly captured as a “costly and frustrating” initiative to reconcile the warring 
factions in the Chad conflict between 1979 and 1982. It also played a frontline role in 
the resolution of such international conflicts as the Tanzania-Uganda conflict, the 
Western Sahara crisis with Morocco and the Ethiopia-Somalia war (Agbi 1989:161).  
On the whole, the Murtala/Obasanjo regime demonstrated greater independence in 
foreign policy making. While the Gowon regime evinced little or not-too fundamental 
change in the blueprint it inherited, the 1975-79 dispensation witnessed the incursion 
of radical intelligentsia on the policy making process and space. It has been observed 
that: “The impetus from academic and various advisory bodies took on greater 
prominence, a characteristic which marked not only the foreign policy scene of 
administration as a whole” (Dudley 1982:304). The army relinquished power on 






4.2.4        Nigerian foreign policy under Shehu Shagari (1979-1983) 
It is pertinent to mention at the outset that between 1979 and 1983 when the Shagari 
regime was in office, Nigeria sought the cooperation of Britain in its quest for the 
liberation of Southern African countries like Zimbabwe and Zambia. This was partly 
because it was difficult for the civilian administration of Shagari to completely detach 
itself from the approach adopted by its military predecessors which was largely a 
militant African centered foreign policy. Agbi (1989:171) comments that “it was 
difficult to reverse the Afro-centric orientation of Nigeria’s foreign policy”. What is 
not in doubt about the Shagari’s administration was that the pattern of external 
relations of the regime was characterized by its active engagement with both 
superpowers of the Western and Eastern bloc. Consequently, there was therefore, no 
denying the fact that Nigeria was able to spread its friendship tentacles across both 
sides of the global hemisphere, that is, East and West. The regime thus was able to 
demonstrate an independent status in its foreign policy and external relations by 
establishing and maintaining friendly relations with countries of the eastern bloc as 
well as the Western bloc. This foreign policy outlook of the Nigerian government at 
the time had serious implication for its decolonization policy as it was on the verge of 
untying itself from the string of its colonial master’s apron.  
The main agenda of Nigeria’s foreign policy towards Africa at the time was geared 
towards decolonization and eradication of all forms of racism within the continent. As 
a result, international institutions such as the UN, OAU, Commonwealth and other 
international platforms were used as major channels to articulate these demands 
particularly for sanctions and seclusion of the Apartheid Pretoria regime. Nigeria 
continued to maintain its support for the liberation movements in Southern Africa 
with a yearly allocation of $5million in aid to these movements (Osaghae 2002). 
However, on the home front, it was becoming even clearer that the Shagari regime 
was moving at an alarming rate closer to becoming self-destruct. This was because the 
economic recession alongside the high and unparalleled level of corruption of the 
regime left the country with no chance but to go cap in hand to international donors. 
This period marked the threshold of a new era of debtor-creditor relationship in 
Nigeria’s external relations particularly with the advancement of capitalist economic 





At the regional level, Nigeria continued to play a fundamental and dominant role in its 
commitments towards ECOWAS. However, and regrettably so, the federal 
government was compelled to embark on a massive deportation of illegal aliens 
originally from Ghana and other West African countries that had flooded Nigeria due 
to the economic difficulty in their states (Adebanwi 2012). There was also the 
reduction in aids towards the West African countries while concession on oil sales 
continued unabated. According to Otubanjo (1989:6), Nigeria’s foreign policy under 
Shagari administration was:  
very popular with the people as well as being the object of 
respect in the international system but while adopting its 
principles, goals and rhetoric, the regime quickly showed that 
it neither had the zeal nor the competence to keep up the pace 
it had inherited.  
Nigeria’s foreign policy experienced a period of recess during this dispensation and as 
Otunbanjo (1989:6) rightly points out Nigeria’s foreign policy at this period remained 
largely at a “routine observance of existing relations and obligations. Disappointingly 
too, the deepening socio-economic and political crisis that witnessed the last years of 
Shagari’s regime made military intervention not only anticipated but also predictable 
and it therefore did not come as a surprise when on December 31, 1983, the civilian 
regime of Shagari was overthrown via another military intervention and the 



















  Table 4.1: Regime transition in Nigeria 
Period of rule Name of ruler Name of regime Type of regime 
1960-1966 Abubarkar Tafawa Balewa 1st Republic Civilian 
1966-1966 Aguiyi Ironsi 1st Military rule Military 




3rd Military rule Military 
1979-1983 Shehu Shagari 2nd Republic First military to 
civilian transition 
1983-1985 Muhammadu Buhari 4th Military rule Military 
1985-1993 Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida 5th Military rule/3rd 
aborted republic  
Military/civilian 






1993-1998 Sani Abacha 6th Military rule Military 
1998-1999 Abdulsalami Abubakar 7th Military rule Military 
1999-2007 Olusegun Obasanjo 4th Republic Second military to 
civilian transition 
2007-2011 Musa Yar’ Adua/Jonathan 4th Republic First civilian to 
civilian transition 
20011-to Date Goodluck Jonathan  4th Republic Second civilian to 
civilian transition 
    Source: Author’s compilation 
4.2.5          Nigerian foreign policy under Buhari (1983-1985)  
During the period of Buhari’s rule, Nigeria continued to extend its external relations 
towards Africa, albeit in an even more aggressive manner. This was in-spite of 
dwindling economic fortunes and the general lack of approval that characterized the 
regime at the time. All efforts made by the regime to stamp its authority within the 
domestic, sub-region, continental and global spheres of influence was short-lived as a 
result of its short life span (Abegunrin 2003). The leadership was therefore unable to 
make serious and far reaching innovations or landmark achievement in the shaping of 
the foreign policy perspective of the country at the time and as Abegunrin (2003:122) 





Muhammed and Obasanjo regimes is dubious”. Nevertheless, credit must be given to 
the Buhari’s regime for its remarkable insight in ensuring that the legacy of an Africa-
centered foreign policy of Nigeria is continued, maintained and respected (Abegunrin 
2003). To this end, Africa therefore continued to remain the centerpiece of Nigeria’s 
foreign policy. Accordingly, countries like South Africa and Namibia continued to 
receive adequate attention in the foreign policy construction of the country 
(Abegunrin 2003, Inamete 2001). 
The economic hardship and lack of faith in the Buhari leadership which was 
widespread during this period restricted the regime to maintaining low profile 
diplomacy. This was partly due to the general aparthy of the Nigerian people towards 
military rule and all its institutions of coercion. The Buhari regime nevertheless still 
displayed serious commitment to the fundamental struggle against the tripartite evil of 
colonization, racism and apartheid in Africa which was a global scourge at the time. 
The regime in demonstrating this occupied the front seat in the fight against the anti-
Reagan linkage policy on Namibian independence. Effectively, the Buhari regime 
recorded remarkable achievement in its bid to re-establish Nigeria as a leading 
international figure in African affairs and perhaps beyond the continent. As 
anticipated and in a similar fashion that his predecessors had come and gone, the 
Buhari regime was toppled by another insurrection ushering in the leadership of 
General Ibrahim Babangida as Head of State on August 27, 1985. 
4.2.6 Nigerian foreign policy under Babangida (1985-1993) 
Before the start of Babangida’s administration, Nigeria’s foreign policy lacked a clear 
sense of direction as it reflected in most cases the domestic confusion that was often a 
dominant character within the country at different periods of its history (See Osaghae 
2002). It was therefore not surprising that the office of the Foreign Minister was 
occupied by four different persons at an equal number of times. They include Bolaji 
Akinyemi, Gen. Ike Nwanchukwu (two terms), Lukman Rilwan and, finally, Mathew 
Mbu (Inamete 2001). 
The Babangida regime had championed four fundamental pivotal issues in the 
molding of its foreign policy. They include protecting its national interest, afro-
centricity, good neighborliness and greater integration in the West African sub-





key actor and supporter of the African continent. A fundamental dimension and 
change that the regime added to Nigeria’s foreign policy outlook was the “economic 
diplomacy” initiative. Babangida’s administration was particularly the first to 
“formally, and in practice, placed the economic dimension of Nigerian foreign policy 
as the foremost aspect of that policy” (Inamete 2001:158). Thus, the principle of 
economic diplomacy which emphasizes trade as against aid received wide popularity 
since the period of Babangida regime (West Africa 25-31, May 1992, 874). The 
Babangida government’s foreign policy was therefore largely conditioned by 
economic factors rather than political reasons (Inamete 2001).   
The Technical Aid Corps Scheme (TACS) introduced in 1987 by the then Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Bolaji Akinyemi signified a remarkable contribution of the regime 
(Inamete 2001). This initiative which was originally inspired by the US Peace Corps 
involved the secondment of Nigerian graduates and professionals- doctors, engineers, 
lawyers, teachers, and others- to various African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, 
entirely at Nigeria’s expenses. The program served as a great boost to Nigeria’s status 
as a major contributor to African economic transformation and development. Among 
other improvements of the country’s foreign policy posture was its blatant reaction to 
the apartheid South Africa’s threat, the commencement of diplomatic ties with Israel 
and, more significantly, its deployment of a peacekeeping mission to quell the civil 
war in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Gambia while also playing a significant role in the 
United Nations peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Rwanda and Angola (West Africa 
25-31, May 1992, 874, Inamete 2001).  
Particularly within the West African sub-region, Nigeria continued its leadership role 
by maintaining the spirit of good neighborliness particularly in engaging the military 
component of ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in resolving conflicts around 
the sub-region. For instance, the peacekeeping mission to Liberia under the auspices 
of the ECOWAS was sponsored largely by the Nigerian military government as part 
of its peace initiatives within the sub-region. This effort received wide commendation 
and acknowledgement among the community of nations as the Nigerian regime 
reasserted its leadership dominance of the African continent in general and West 
African sub-continent in particular. A number of factors contributed to Nigeria’s 





Samuel Doe, President of Liberia. The UN’s emphasis to providing regional approach 
to solving regional problems was also a factor. (See UN Charter).  
Moreover, the peacekeeping capability of the UN at the time was already 
overstretched coupled with the potential threat that the Liberian crisis created to the 
collective security of the West African sub-region, all added up to inspiring Nigeria’s 
intervention in the crisis. It did not therefore come as a surprise when at the 
ECOWAS meeting in 1985; Babangida stated unequivocally that, “ECOWAS was 
ripe for rebirth” (See Owoeye 1993). From this point, Nigeria took upon itself the 
mandate of rescuing ECOWAS from becoming an irrelevant organization. This it did 
by playing a critical role in repositioning the almost moribund body for some level of 
relevance among its members.  
To this end, “General Babangida restored commitment to ECOWAS through his 
three-year chairmanship of the sub-regional body between 1985 and 1988” (Adebajo 
2008:9). The country took up over 30% of the organization’s yearly budget (Francist 
2009). It also took up the responsibility of maintaining the organization’s Secretariat 
while also serving as its President at different times (1978/79 [Obasanjo], 1985 
[Buhari], 1985/89 [Babangida], 19996/98 [Abacha], 1998/99 [Abubakar], [2008/10] 
Yar Adua, 2010/12] Jonathan as well as and going on to host its Summits of Head of 
States and Government in 1986, 1987 and 1991, 1994, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 
and 2012 (See Anadi 2005). Furthermore, Nigeria continued to provide support in 
various forms to ECOWAS member states. Chief among these was the contribution of 
$15 million to the building of the new ECOWAS secretariat in Abuja, Nigeria’s new 
capital city in what Adebajo (2008:9) termed “a grandiloquent symbol of Nigeria’s 
leadership aspirations”. 
At the continental level, the OAU continued to remain the most important platform 
for displaying and expressing Nigeria’s commitments to the eradication of apartheid 
and the advancement of African unity. In 1991, for instance, Nigeria hosted both 
ECOWAS and the OAU Summit in Nigeria's new capital city Abuja with Babangida 
emerged OAU Chairman although the event came with much criticism by the 
Nigerian press for its extravagant spending (West Africa 22-28 June 1992, 277; 





public opinion in Nigeria was opposed to the lavish hospitality extended to guests at 
both Summits at a time. 
In 1986, Nigeria led thirty-two other countries in boycotting the Commonwealth 
games in Edinburgh, Scotland in protest of the Thatcher Government's romance with 
apartheid South Africa. Britain’s reluctance to apply comprehensive sanctions against 
South Africa’s apartheid regime was not to be tolerated by the African people. Nigeria 
continued to make donations to the South African Relief Fund and the Namibian 
Solidarity Fund. A US$1.5million aid was given to the South West Africa People’s 
Organisation (SWAPO) while the African National Congress (ANC) received a 
donation of US$1million and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) US$600,000 in 1989 
(Osaghae 2002). As recognition of its role and commitment to the liberation struggle 
particularly in Southern Africa, Nigeria received the continued privilege of chairing 
the UN Committee on Apartheid. 
Apart from the fight for the liberation in Africa, Nigeria vigorously pursued the goal 
and idea of African unity and development in other significant way. For instance, the 
mediatory efforts resulting in the peaceful resolution of the internal disputes between 
Angola and Uganda, the lead role it played in the formulation and signing of the treaty 
of the African Economic Community in 1991 coupled with the establishment of a 
conflict resolution department in the OAU were all landmark achievement credited to 
the administration’s robust foreign policy. In an effort to make clear its leadership 
aspiration and present a good impression of the country, Babangida also embarked 
upon the donation of financial rewards to countries like Zimbabwe. It was as a result 
of this that Zimbabwe was able to host Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit. It is 
however unclear as to how much was donated for this purpose. The Babangida regime 
further added its voice to the reparation debate by demanding in strong terms that 
reparation is paid to Africa by the former colonists on account of the devastations that 
the continent experienced as a result of slave trade and colonialism (Osaghae 1998). It 
was also during this period that Nigeria’s Emeka Anyaoku emerged as Secretary 
General of the Commonwealth. Equally, a bid that turned out unsuccessful was 
presented to UN General Assembly proposing General Obasanjo for the office of the 





strengthen Nigeria’s conviction to occupy center-stage in issues of the international 
system.  
Despite Nigeria’s foreign policy efforts to stamp its footprints as a major player in the 
annals of African political-economic development within the international system, the 
wide acceptance that the Babangida’s regime enjoyed in its foreign policy outlook did 
not however translate in any serious manner into positive support by the international 
community. Particularly, the bad reputation that the country attracted to itself 
particularly in the area of drug-trafficking and massive corruption at all levels 
continued to thwart any serious development campaign effort of the country across 
the continent (See Klein 1994). Again, the inconclusive democratic process of the 
country created a serious setback since at it was generally believed that there was no 
serious resolve and commitment on the part of its leadership to the principles of 
democratic processes and procedures.  
Nigeria’s corporate existence hanged in the balance when the first democratic 
experiment since 1979 was truncated almost prematurely. The annulment of the 
popular June 12, 1992, Presidential election generated widespread reaction both 
locally and at the international front while further dampening Nigeria’s image among 
the community of nations. Following the cancellation of the results of the 1992 
general elections which is still wide regarded by Nigerians till today as the freest and 
fairest in the country’s history since independence, the Interim National Government 
(ING) under the leadership of Chief Ernest Shonekan was installed by Babangida 
regime (See Diamond, Kirk-Greene, and Oyediran 1997, Nwosu 2008, Opara 2007, 
Osaghae 1998). However, no sooner than it started to settle down to the demands of 
governance was the Shonekan interregnum deposed by the General Sani Abacha 
junta.  
4.2.7 Nigerian foreign policy under Abacha (1993-1998) 
To all intents and purposes, a notable feature of the Abacha regime was its high 
degree of inconsistency and incoherence. The regime was characterized by its 
ambivalence and swiftness to respond to international issues without clear 
calculations of costs and outcomes. Perhaps, this was largely due to the wide hostility 
that the regime was confronted with in the most part of its existence. As a result of 





deflecting every attempt by the international community to label it as a pariah state. 
Expectedly, its foreign policy was targeted towards what Osaghae (2002) called a 
‘struggle for survival’. As a result of this, Nigeria’s external relations during this 
period witnessed what can be regarded as the ‘darkest moment’ in its history. As 
correctly asserted by Osaghae (2002:194-196), the Abacha regime represented “an era 
in which isolationism was the rule rather than the exception. Diplomacy was replaced 
by bull fighting. Nigeria was not counting friends but creating enemies”. 
In West Africa, ECOWAS remained the central focus and continued to receive 
attention. However, the activities of ECOWAS were hampered by the involvement of 
the Francophone countries with the formation of West African Economic and 
Monetary Union (UMEOA) in January of 1994 following the devaluation of the CFA 
franc. From that time, the Francophone countries showed a lack of commitment to the 
body and seldom attended the annual summit. At this time, the membership of 
ECOWAS was reduced to Anglophone countries. Due to the lack of attention from 
member nations of ECOWAS, Nigeria threatened to withdraw its support for the 
ECOMOG. ECOMOG however continued to attract the sponsorship and support of 
Nigeria. For instance, “Nigeria provided 12000 of 13000 troops to the ECOMOG 
mission in Sierra Leone between 1998 and 1999, and its treasury released nearly $400 
million a year for the mission” (Adebajo 2008:189). On Liberia, it is estimated that 
Nigeria’s total military expenditure between 1990 and 1999 was over $12 billion
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(See Omotoogun 2003, Financial Times 15 Sept 2000).  
Nigeria was also entangled in a boundary dispute with Cameroun over the oil rich 
Bakassi Peninsula with the former repeatedly accusing the latter of being an 
aggressor, and having French military backing. It would be recalled that after much 
unsuccessful attempts at resolving the issue, including the mediation of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), it was finally resolved in 2008 with Nigeria 
conceding to the ICJ’s ruling to cede the oil rich peninsula to Cameroun (Okonta 
2008; Kuna: n:d). 
On the African scene, Nigeria continued to concentrate its external relations towards 
the struggle for the emancipation of black South Africa from white dominated 
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apartheid rule. The Nigerian administration made good its dissatisfaction and 
disapproval of the senseless continuation of apartheid rule in South Africa. Thus, the 
end of apartheid and the entry of South Africa on the African political scene as a 
major power and a rival to Nigeria invariably changed in a drastic manner the political 
arrangement and permutation of the African continent. The overthrow of the apartheid 
government of South Africa and the holding of elections in 1994 signaled the 
completion of a phase of Nigeria’s foreign policy towards Africa in terms of the 
struggle for the emancipation of the African people from the jaws of colonial and 
apartheid rule (Adebajo and Mustapha 2008). Nigeria consequently found itself at a 
crossroad of deciding what path and pattern of foreign policy to adopt in order to fill 
the void of its African presence. The emergence of South Africa into the African 
political space triggered new problems for Nigeria in dealing with the rising profile of 
the former as a rival for continental leadership. Perhaps this explains the reason why 
both countries kicked off its post-apartheid relations on a wrong footing. As early as 
1994, relations between both Nigeria and South Africa countries nosedived rapidly 
particularly with President Nelson Mandela criticism of the Ogoni execution of Saro 
Wiwa and others despite the fact that other African countries refused to comment on 
the issue (Keith 1997). This led to many African countries accusing South Africa of 
being a protégé of the Western world.  
With no remarkable achievement at home, the Abacha regime began to appeal to the 
patriotism and nationalistic instinct and consciousness of all Nigerians calling on 
them to preserve and jealously guide their independence against any foreign 
infiltration. To sum up, the five year despotic rule of Abacha in terms of its foreign 
policy resulted in the complete erosion of the earlier gains that the country had 
recorded over the years and plunged the country and its people further into the 
abysmal space of dis-reputation. Succinctly put, Nigeria was isolated and avoided like 
a plague both by foreign investors and the international community at large (See 
Okonta 2008; Whiteman 2008; Uhomoibhi 2008). Abacha’s untimely death in June 8, 
1998 ultimately led to his replacement by General Abubakar after a brief period of 
interregnum under Ernest Shonekan. 
4.2.8  Nigerian foreign policy under General Abubakar (1998-1999) 
Following the least expected death of Abacha on June 8, 1998, General Abdulsalami 





major tasks of “midwifing” the re-emergence of democracy and civilian rule in 
Nigeria while also bringing an appreciable degree of stability into the domestic terrain 
and external relations of the Nigeria. He tested the international acceptance of his 
regime by paying two visits to South Africa in quick succession. The first was for bi-
lateral purpose while the other was to attend a non-aligned nations’ movement 
meeting (The Guardian, Sept. 26, 1998). 
In Abubakar’s own words, his administration “will consolidate old friendships and 
will win new ones and repair damaged relations” (The Guardian, Sept. 26, 1998). He 
also called on the international community to participate in the privatization 
programme, to invest in export-oriented industries and for Nigerian creditors to grant 
her debt relief (The Guardian, Sept. 26, 1998). Three months to his regime, Gen. 
Abubakar visited Britain and had an audience with Prime Minister Tony Blair. He 
later travelled to United States to address the 53
rd
 session of the UN’s General 
Assembly while also making an appeal to the international community for assistance 
“in the implementation of our programmes and policies aimed at uplifting the living 
standards of our people (Sept. 26, 1998). On the whole, Nigeria’s external relation 
under Abubakar was largely driven around a bid to re-invigorate the already damaged 
image of the country. These efforts marked a clear departure from the erstwhile 
destructive tendencies of his predecessor, Sani Abacha. In May, 1999, General 
Abubakar’s became the second head of state in Nigeria to successfully hand over 
power to a democratically elected civilian thus closing an eventful chapter of Nigeria 
political history. Coincidentally, President Obasanjo who assumed office was the only 
ruler before Abubakar to achieve such feat.  
4.2.9 Nigerian foreign policy under Obasanjo (1999-2007) 
After exactly twenty years of military domination since the termination of the Second 
Republic in 1979, Nigeria effectively returned to civilian rule with the swearing in of 
former military dictator, Chief General Olusegun Obasanjo on 29
th
 May, 1999. 
Obasanjo had emerged victorious following the Presidential election of February 27, 
1999. General Obasanjo’s re-emergence into the political scene was as a result of his 
release from prison for a phantom coup attempt barely a year before the start of the 
general elections. Nigeria's Head of State therefore took over the reins of leadership 







 On assumption of office in May 1999, Obasanjo hit the ground running with a 
desire to mend the already tarnished image of Nigeria and restore it to its former 
glory. He was known for his extensive travel around the globe particularly to major 
countries of the world (Britain, United States of America etc) in a bid to convince the 
international community of the country’s resolve for a fresh start. In the subsequent 
section, we shall examine the foreign policy initiatives of the democratic dispensation 
beginning with particular highlight on the Obasanjo regime by looking at its external 
relations in certain contexts within the West Africa sub-region and Africa at large. 
The Fourth Republic under the democratic leadership of Obasanjo commenced on 
May 29, 1999, bringing an end to thirty-five (35) years of military tyranny and also 
bringing alive hopes for a prosperous Nigeria. Obasanjo’s foreign policy thrust in the 
Fourth Republic focused on ensuring that the misconceptions about Nigerian was 
corrected and also seeking to ensure that the country’s status as Africa’s regional 
power is strengthened and broadened.  To this effect, Africa continued to attract the 
attention of Nigeria's foreign policy, with particular emphasis on the promotion of 
African integration, development, peace and security. It is in the light of this that 
Nigeria directed its support towards a new African organization by spearheading the 
transformation of the OAU into the African Union (AU). We shall proceed to discuss 
the fundamental foreign policy positions that the country took during this period along 
six thematic outlines. 
4.2.9.1 Democratic consolidation and promoting political stability in Africa 
There was the general conviction by the Obasanjo administration that the emergence 
of Nigeria into the democratic space created extensive opportunities for the country to 
rise above its limitations and ascend to providing the right leadership that Africa 
desperately needs to move away from the shackles of poverty and underdevelopment. 
Thus, the regime’s first tenure was characterized by a deep resolution to translate the 
country’s strategic and comparative advantages into practical rewards and benefits 
both for the country and for Africa at large (Ajetunmobi 2011). Obasanjo therefore 
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took advantage of his choleric and highly persuasive personality to attract recognition 
for the country in the international arena. He succeeded in this effort as he was able to 
move Nigeria however minimal towards a position of respect and leadership in Africa 
and perhaps in world affairs (Ajetunmobi 2011, Obasanjo 2011; Omotere 2011). 
As a democratic nation, Nigeria finally found a legal basis to advocate for the 
enthronement of democratic values and principles within the West African sub-
region. It sought to ensure that democratic rule became the norm by showing strong 
resistance for non-democratic regimes within the sub-region. The administration, for 
instance, resisted regime changes inspired by military coup particularly in the case of 
Sao Tome and Principe. Following the bloodless mutiny of July 18 2003 in Sao Tome 
and Principe by dissident soldiers, Obasanjo successfully rallied round the 
international community to set up a mediation team to negotiate a peace deal with the 
coup plotters (New York Times; July 24, 2003, see irinnews Report). It would be 
recalled that President Frederique had left his country to attend the Leon Sullivan 
Summit when a military insurrection attempted to overthrow his leadership. The 
Nigerian government ensured the return of de Menezes to power. The eventual 
breakthrough of the mediation resulting in the retreat of the coup plotter and the return 
of President Fradique Demenezes back to office was seen as a very remarkable credit 
to the Nigerian administration as a global enforcer of democratic principles (New York 
Times; July 17, 2003). In addition, Nigeria joined other countries to ensure that a 
successful transition to democracy in Guinea-Bissau was in place. This was after the 
dismissal of the Kumba Yala led government (Iliffe 2011, All Africa 23 June 2005).  
However, suffice to say that it has been argued at different quarters that Obasanjo’s 
decision to grant asylum to Charles Taylor in 2003 dented the image of his 
administration and its foreign policy record (Nigeria World, March 29, 2004). 
Obasanjo, contrary to both domestic protest and international criticism and in a bid to 
put an end to the lingering political crises granted Taylor asylum in Nigeria. His 
decision was propelled by his bid to resolve the political quagmire that threatened the 
existence of Liberia as a country and its surrounding neighbors (Iliffe 2011). This 
decision generated wide criticism and negative reaction both locally and 
internationally towards the Obasanjo administration. The Government’s argument, 
however, was that granting asylum to Taylor was critical to any possibility for 





refugees into Nigeria due to the civil unrest had serious national economic, social and 
security implications for the country’s stability (Kuna; n:d). It argued further that the 
crisis of that magnitude had the possibility and capacity to overflow into neighboring 
countries including Nigeria thus destabilizing the relative peace present within the 
sub-region. Already the country was playing host to several refugees located at the 
Oru refugee camp in Ijebu Ode, Ogun state (IFRC). 
Going from the above illustrations, it was evident that Nigeria's foreign policy during 
the Fourth Republic under Obasanjo’s civilian dispensation strongly canvassed for a 
recognition and appreciation of Nigeria’s commitment towards African stability. His 
election as Chairman of AU on July 6, 2004 was perhaps an acknowledgement of the 
efforts of the Nigerian president in his contribution to continental stability and the 
consolidation of democracy within the continent. 
4.2.9.2 Commitment to hosting international conferences  
The Government of Nigeria committed itself to the hosting an international 
conference among which was the meeting of the Heads of Government of the 
Commonwealth countries (CHOGM). . The meeting was held in Abuja from 
December 5th to 8th, 2003 with the Queen of England in attendance. Nigeria used this 
platform to present for discussion the suspension of Zimbabwe alongside other 
developmental issues of poverty reduction, world trade etc. The conference was 
largely regarded as successful and added to an appreciation of the foreign policy 
posture of the Nigerian government at the time (The Comet, December 17, 2003). 
There was the general anticipation that the summit would usher in opportunities for 
the inflow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into the country.  
Using sports as a vehicle for the propagation of its foreign policy, the Nigerian 
government also in the same year, allocated resources towards the successfully 
hosting of the 8
th





and was tagged the "Unity Games".  
The President was criticized for his frequent trips abroad. As of 2003, Obasanjo had 
made a total of 93 trips out of the country justified as “necessary to burnish Nigeria's 
poor international image, seek debt forgiveness and attract much-needed foreign 
investment to the country” (Pana Press). Akindele (2005) recounted that according to 





hundred and thirteen times since he took over the leadership of the country in May 
1999 while as at June 2002, official trips outside of Nigeria was put at 340 days. 
Those who objected to this wanted him to stay at home to tackle the many problems 
confronting the country. In addition, most world leaders and investors saw the 
President as one capable of turning the country around, and in droves visited Nigeria 
for one possible relationship or the other. In his efforts to address the country’s 
dwindled status, he undertook several foreign visits outside Nigeria to promote his 
government’s privatization and deregulation policy even though his Chief Economic 
adviser, Dr. Magnus Kpakol, argues that President Obasanjo’s extensive foreign trips 
had fetched the nation about N200 billion in foreign direct investments (Asia Africa 
Intelligence Wire August 13, 2002). Akindele (2005), notes that according to official 
sources, as at mid-August 2002, Obasanjo’s foreign trip since he took over power was 
put at a hundred and thirteen times and a period of 340 days as at June 2002 
(Akindele 2005; Alao 2012:). As shown vividly in the table 4.2 below and in what  
Ebong (2010: n:d) termed “Ajala diplomacy”, Obasanjo’s literally spent at least a 
period of a year less two weeks out of the country during his first tenure .  
   Table 4.2: Diplomatic visits by President Obasanjo to global powers, April 
 1999 to December 2007 
Date Country Focus of discussion 
April 1999 China  Bilateral discussions 
October 1999 United States Bilateral and regional issues 
January 2000 India  Chief guest at the 50th Republic Day 
celebrations 
February 2000 France Bilateral discussion 
September 2000 United Kingdom Bilateral discussion and debt relief 
March 2001 France Bilateral discussion 
May 2001 United States Bilateral and regional issues 
August 2001 China  Bilateral discussion 
July 2003 United Kingdom Bilateral issues and debt relief 
November 2003 Germany Bilateral discussion 
November 2004 India  Working visit 
December 2004 United States Bilateral and regional issues including 





April 2005 China  Bilateral discussion and Obasanjo 
visited as AU chairperson 
May 2005 France  Bilateral discussion 
September 2005 Brazil  Bilateral discussion 
March 2006 United States Bilateral and regional issues 
December 2007 United States Bilateral and regional issues 
   Source: Alao (2012) 
4.2.9.3  Economic integration and cooperation of Africa 
Obasanjo inherited a debt burden of over $32 billion and it therefore became 
imperative to find drastic solutions to the country’s dwindling economic fortune as 
this was vital to the survival and sustenance of the new democratic regime. The 
Obasanjo administration undertook bilateral relations and Joint Commissions with 
several nations with a bid to revive declining bilateral arrangements because of its 
understanding that bilateral agreements bring to bear a veritable opportunity for 
establishing positive economic relations between countries since they provide states 
with the essential platform for mutually inclusive engagement for the multiple 
purposes of economic, scientific, educational, technical, trade, scientific, sporting, and 
cultural relation among each other and recognizing that no nation can exist on its own.  
The Nigerian/South African Bi-National Commission instituted in 1999 represents a 
good example of such Joint Commissions. Taking advantage of the international 
principle of reciprocity, the Commission laid the foundation for the establishment of 
mutually beneficial economic relationship between both countries particularly in the 
areas of telecommunication, infrastructural development mining, trade and 
investment. The Nigeria-Congo Joint Commission was also another example of 
bilateral arrangement established in 2001, with agreements reached and signed in the 
area of cultural and educational co-operation, air services and merchant shipping. 
(MFA 2008; All Africa 2001) 
In addition to this, in 2003, Nigeria further signed three bilateral agreements with the 
Republic of Uganda in Kampala. The agreements centered on bilateral trade; 
investment promotion and protection and technological cooperation respectively. A 
similar type of Bi-National Commission was established with Algeria at the beginning 
of 2002. The agreements made between both countries for co-operation in three 





(Lagos-Algiers) and the Optic Fiber link. Cooperation agreements for bilateral 
relations were also signed with such countries as the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Botswana, Sao Tome and Principe, Gabon, Cameroun (in spite of the International 
Court of Justice (1CJ) ruling on the Bakassi), Benin Republic, and Equatorial Guinea 
among others (MFA 2008). 
4.2.9.4  Peaceful resolution of conflict and African regional integration 
In the area of peaceful resolution of conflicts, the regime of Obasanjo restored 
confidence and credibility in Africa by pursuing a “Peace Philosophy”. He advocated 
four broad issue areas that Africa must address if it must move towards lasting peace 
in Africa. These include: redirecting the mind, redefining sovereignty, redefinition of 
security and institutionalization of democracy (Obasanjo 1999). In the light of the 
above, President Obasanjo unequivocally tabled before the O.A.U. Summit in 1999 a 
proposal to make the year 2000 a year of peace, security and solidarity. The motion 
was generally accepted and adopted by the Summit.  
Additionally, Obasanjo's administration played a formidable role in the peaceful 
resolution of the crisis in Sierra Leone. Nigeria equally intervened while playing the 
lead role in the Mano River dispute between Liberia, Guinea and Sierra-Leone thus 
bringing an end to the sequence of hostility prevalent within the region and in Sierra-
Leone in particular. This is also apart from the role it played in the post-war 
reconstruction of Liberia after years of civil war. In the same vein, at the regional 
level, and in regard to regional economic integration, Nigeria’s resolve that African 
economic development lies in its effective integration with each other and it was on 
the basis of this reality that President Obasanjo prompted African leaders to adopt the 
treaty establishing the African Union (Iliffe 2011). President Obasanjo's intervention 
to a large extent influenced the Head of States in adopting the Constitutive Act of the 
Union with the NEPAD as its economic variant (Iliffe 2011). According to the Comet, 
August 7, 2001 publication, the Nigerian government had sustained the nation’s 
commitment to the Technical Aid Corps with a total expenditure of over $22.5 million 
since its inception in 1987. In addition, Nigeria also assisted in the intensive training 
of one hundred Congolese policemen (The Comet, October 1, 2001). Besides, the 
government also provided the needed leadership in ECOWAS and was very active in 





Another outstanding achievement to the credit of President Obasanjo's administration 
particularly in the area of sub-regional cooperation was the successful inauguration of 
the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) in Gabon in 1999 (McDonald 2005). The 
Gulf of Guinea Commission comprised Nigeria, Cameroon, Gabon, and Sao Tome 
and Principe; its objectives was aimed at strengthening economic and political ties 
among its member states as well as establishing a platform for the furtherance of 
cooperative engagements among sub-regional organizations such as the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Central African Economic 
Community (CAEC) (Flemes 2007). Obasanjo’s administration’s resolve to ensure 
that peace prevailed within the continent of Africa was based on his realization that 
peace and stability are the critical conditions under which any meaningful 
development can be guaranteed. As stated earlier, Obasanjo’s Peace Philosophy 
ensured that the country continued to participate in regional and international peace-
keeping efforts–in such areas like Sierra-Leone (1996-2000), Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Cote d’Ivoire (2000-2008), Chad (1979-1982), Guinea 
Bissau (1998-2000), Liberia (1990-1998), Sudan etc (See Kuna: n:d). 
4.2.9.5  Formation of the African Union (AU) and the New Partnership for 
 Africa’s Development (NEPAD) 
In 2001, in a bid to address Africa’s socio-economic and political development 
concerns, Nigeria’s Obasanjo along with South-Africa’s Thabo Mbeki and Algeria’s 
Bouteflika jointly proposed the integration of the Millennium African Renaissance 
Plan (MAP) into the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). NEPAD 
essentially represented a new economic blueprint for the development of the African 
continent. In addition, the Obasanjo administration contributed immensely to the 
eventual transformation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to African 
Union (Adebajo and Mustapha 2008). Obasanjo along with Thabo Mbeki of South 
Africa helped in a significant way with the articulation of the “Pan-African 
integrationist institution-the African Union (AU) in 2002” and the “New Partnership 
for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in 2001” (Landsberg 2008:203). Acknowledging 
that the vision of the African Union was also in sync with original beliefs of the 
founding fathers of the OAU targeted towards the promotion of African unity and 
prosperity the African people, the OAU was finally dissolved and was replaced by the 





4.2.10  Yar’ Adua/Jonathan’s foreign policy of citizen diplomacy (2007- 
   2010) 
Our foreign policy has come of age and the age of innocence 
is over. We remain proud of our track record from Tafawa 
Balewa up till now. The country that is the largest black 
nation in the world could not have done otherwise. A world 
where every sixth black man is a Nigerian could not have 
done otherwise, or where every four Africans is a Nigerian 
could not have done otherwise. We should ask ourselves 
some hard questions: to what extents has our foreign policy 
benefited Nigerians? To what extent has our foreign policy 
put food on our tables? In order words where is the citizen in 
our foreign policy? -- President Umaru Yar’Adua (Cited in 
Adejumo 2007). 
The above statement aptly captures the foreign policy thrust under the Yar Adua 
tenure although the extent to which it actualized this policy is another object of 
discussion entirely. On the assumption of office on May 29, 2007, President Umaru 
Yar'Adua’s inaugural speech was very clear about the intention of his administration 
to build on the achievements and accomplishments of his predecessors. However, his 
leadership attempted to reprioritize Nigeria’s foreign policy focus away from the 
traditional Afrocentric posture into a practical emphasis on the Nigerian people with 
Nigerians at the forefront of diplomatic engagements with the rest of the world. This 
celebrated foreign policy posture coined as ‘Citizen Diplomacy' requires the 
government of Nigeria to more consciously resort to the calculi of the basic needs, 
human rights, and socio-economic welfare of the citizen in conducting bilateral and 
multilateral engagements with other nations. This may sound fairly prosaic, but, its 
normative implications and transformative potentials are enormous (Pogoson 
2010:12; All Africa 2007). 
The country’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Chief Ojo Maduekwe, on September 2007, 
presented this idea of “citizenship diplomacy” meaning that Nigeria and Nigerian 
citizens both home and abroad will henceforth be the focus of Nigeria’s foreign 
policy. According to Mbachu (2007:9), “the basic thrust of the new foreign policy 
initiative revolve around concerns for the basic needs, human rights and socio-
economic welfare of Nigerian citizens in bilateral and multilateral engagements with 





diplomacy concludes that it suggest that, from now on the Nigerian citizen abroad is 
the centre of Nigeria’s national interest and therefore the country’s entire diplomatic 
machinery should be geared towards protecting his or her interest– economic welfare 
etc. The intention of the administration was to develop a foreign policy that reflects to 
a large extent the domestic policy and aspiration of Nigeria(ns). 
In essence, it was assumed that although Africa would continue to remain part of its 
foreign policy agenda, Nigeria’s national interest would however take prominence 
over sub-regional, continental and global issues. It was therefore not surprising that 
Yar’ Adua’s attention was centered particularly on fixing Nigeria’s ailing economy 
thereby reinforcing its leadership role in Africa and establishing itself as a major actor 
in the global economic and political arena (Alao 2012:6; FMIC; 2010). The emphasis 
of his administration’s goal on lifting Nigeria’s economy to becoming one of the 20 
largest economies in the world by the year 2020 was a clear indication of the priority 
of domestic interest in shaping the country’s foreign policy (Yar’Adua 2007). At the 
time, it was the general believe by majority of Nigerians that there had been no 
meaningful balance between Nigeria’s external policies and its domestic interests. 
Hence, the country had received very little in return for its generosity, its ambitious 
Afrocentric foreign policy and the extensive sacrifices made in regional and 
continental diplomacy (Alao 2012:7).  
 
Many were quick to criticise the government’s policy of citizen diplomacy as it was 
perceived that this should have been the sole priority of government as “[t]he extent 
of non-articulation and opacity of this newly fangled ludicrous foreign policy that has 
been gleefully touted as the driver of Nigeria’s policy is seen in the fact that this is a 
standard consular obligation owed Nigerians and not policy” (Ezirim 2013:10). 
In retrospect, the regime’s emphasis on a foreign policy of citizen diplomacy was no 
less rhetorical as Yar’ Adua did very little to put forward a clear cut and well-
articulated foreign policy that reflected essentially the aspirations of the Nigerian 
people. Foreign policy during this period thus reflected a very passive attitude and 
style similar to the period under President Shagari as there was very little evidence to 





Scholars have alluded to a number of reasons for the lack of inspiration of a foreign 
policy initiative during this period. Firstly, the poor state of health of the President no 
doubt hampered significantly any solid plan or intention of the Presidency as he was 
for the most part of his leadership under intensive care. There were a number of 
speculations that the President’s state of health did not permit for long trans-
continental flights and thus he avoided most international forums and obligations. 
Secondly, having being dramatically catapulted to the apex of governance through a 
questionable electoral process, it was clear that Yar’ Adua had neither prior 
inclination nor preparedness of being President and his reluctance to run for 
presidency was in fact evident. According to Abba (2009), “President Yar’ Adua had 
no grand vision of foreign policy because he was opportunistically extrapolated to the 
apex political position through a most discredited electoral process”. His lack of clear 
cut foreign policy vision was therefore expected.  
In all, the two years of Yar’ Adua tenure in office had no clear cut foreign policy 
priority particularly when viewed in terms of its relations with Africa. Moreover, 
there was also a wide lacuna between policy and practice as the administration’s 
policy of ‘citizen diplomacy’ was not more than a mere rhetorical statement of the 
obvious mandate of any meaningful foreign policy of a government. Even the policy 
itself did very little to alleviate the hostile image of corruption, cybercrime, drug 
smuggling etc. that the international community have about Nigeria and its people. 
Pogoson (2009:71) citing the instance of the rash deportation of 24 Nigerian from 
Equatorial Guinea is proof that “the hostility against Nigerian nationals in different 
parts of the world has not shown any sign of abating”.  
The government’s lack of clear cut focus for its foreign policy no doubt had direct 
implication on the country’s regional power status and ultimately on the assessment 
and perception of the international community as evidenced in America’s first Black 
President, Obama choosing to avoid Nigeria like a flee and visit Ghana instead 
(Pogoson 2009:71). By implication, during this period, very little attention was paid 
to Nigeria’s contribution or position on international issues particularly as  
exemplified during the Zimbabwe and Darfur crisis (Pogoson 2009:71). Yar’ Adua’s 
untimely death in May 5, 2010 mid-way into his tenure paved the way for his deputy 





his death, the President inaugurated a six man Honourary Presidential Advisory 
Council on International Relations on the 16
th
 of April, 2009 headed by the former 
Commonwealth Secretary-General and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Chief Emeka 
Anyaoku. The Council was saddled with the task of leading the vanguard to 
“reinvigorate Nigeria’s foreign policy process in the light of the prevailing realities in 
today’s increasing complex world” (Pogoson 2009:70). Other responsibilities of the 
Council were the mandate to assist to reposition Nigeria as a respected member of the 




4.2.11  Goodluck Jonathan’s era of economic diplomacy (2009-to-date) 
Like his predecessor, President Jonathan had no inclination of becoming President as 
he only emerged initially in an acting capacity following the bizarre circumstance 
surrounding the demise of the then President (Yar’ Adua). A number of conspiracy 
theorists argue that this was a deliberate action by Obasanjo as a way of bringing the 
presidency back to the South once Yar’Adua was dead. This was despite that 
Obasanjo who anointed him into office was in full knowledge all along that Yar’Adua 
was sick and not well-travelled. Even though there is currently barely any existing 
documented literature on the foreign policy profile of Jonathan’s administration with 
respect to Nigeria’s involvement with Africa, we shall attempt to recap the major 
undercurrents and highlights of the regime’s tenure so far, beginning from the period 
Goodluck Jonathan took over as acting President in 2010 (to complete Yar’ Adua 
tenure) and his current four year tenure which is nearing completion. As the tenure 
draws to a close, there is perhaps no better time to evaluate the signature of President 
Jonathan administration’s foreign policy at the two concentric circles of West African 
sub-region and African continent respectively. Much of the data from this section are 
therefore gleaned from press releases by key government officials and consequently 
corroborated by archival materials gathered from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
Abuja as well as newspaper publications during this period.  
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The overall terms of reference of the Council include: to advise from time to time on Nigeria’s 
membership role in regional and international organisation; to review and advice on foreign policy 
dimension of the seven point agenda; to review and advise from time to time on the effectiveness of 
Nigeria’s diplomatic missions abroad in the promotion of the nation’s interests; to advise on the 
reform and retooling of foreign policy institutions; and to advise on any other matter relating to 






To begin with, much expectation greeted assumption into office of President Jonathan 
on May 29th 2010. There was no doubt that the country was ripe for a new foreign 
policy focus that effectively represented the general aspirations of the Nigerian 
people. Anigbogu (2012:1) remarked that “there was no doubt that Nigeria’s Foreign 
Policy bequeathed to the nation at independence in 1960, required a new policy 
direction”. Generally, Nigerian were tired of a foreign policy that failed to add value 
to their economic wellbeing nor advance the interest, welfare wellbeing of Nigerians 
both home and abroad. On the conviction that the past 50 years has witnessed a 
remarkable shift and change in the international system heralded by the end of the 
Cold War and of colonialism following the dismantling of White minority rule in 
Southern Africa (and especially in South Africa), a new stage appeared to be set for 
fresh foreign policy priorities that would reflect the nuances and demands of the 
current global era. It was in recognition of this reality that the President initiated the 
review of the country’s foreign policy in line with the Transformation Agenda of his 
administration. 
Analyst agree that underlying the foreign policy priority of President Goodluck 
Jonathan is the principle of ‘economic diplomacy’ which to all intents and purposes is 
aimed at deriving maximum benefit from the foreign policy direction of the 
government. According to the President, only a stable political and economic 
environment would give Nigeria a robust foreign policy. Economic diplomacy in this 
sense is conceived as: 
The process through which countries tackle the outside 
world, to maximize their national gain in all the fields of 
activity including trade, investment and other forms of 
economically beneficial exchanges, where they enjoy 
comparative advantage through bilateral, regional and 
multilateral dimensions, each of which is important. 
According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Olugbenga Ashiru 
“Nigeria’s new foreign policy direction is now on investment and economic 
cooperation, which thus ties foreign policy to the country domestic agenda, a radical 
departure from the old one which has Africa as the centre point” (African Outlook). In 
essence, Nigeria’s foreign policy was beginning to move away from its traditional 
focus on Africa to one that prioritizes the need to address the ailing economy of the 





government notes that “Nigeria’s foreign policy will continue to be dictated by the 
political and economic programme at home”.  
In concrete terms, very little has happened at the foreign policy scene since the 
inception of the Jonathan presidency and the absence of a credible online presence of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also testament to this fact. Nigeria’s reaction to 
issues particularly in Africa has been characterized by non-intervention and 
indifference which has invariably dwindled the country’s reputation in recent times. 
There is the general agreement that Nigeria’s international reputation as a major 
continental powerhouse has suffered remarkably during this period and as Adebajo 
(2013) remarked; “Nigeria’s foreign policy has suffered terminal decline and the 
country’s international voice has become muted” (Adebajo 2013). To a large extent, 
the general feeling of many Nigerians is that foreign policy since 2010 has suffered 
comatose. We would however go to highlight and reflect on the foreign policy 
involvement of Nigeria at these two levels mentioned earlier.   
In Africa, Nigeria has continued to demonstrate its support for the AU and ECOWAS 
policy of zero tolerance for unconstitutional and undemocratic change of government. 
Its condemnation of the undemocratic change of government in both Mali and Guinea 
Bissau is according to the Minister of Foreign Affairs evidence of this fact. 
Ambassador Ashiru notes that: “ Nigeria has made strenuous efforts to lead the 
process of entrenching democracy in Africa [by providing] material and other forms 
of support to the democratic electoral process[es]” in Ghana, Guinea Bisau, Liberia, 
Mali, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and other countries in Africa. In the case of Guine 
Bissau Cote d’ Ivoire and Mali, the Ambassador claims that “it was President 
Goodluck Jonathan that negotiated a peaceful resolution of the crisis and prevented 
the coup leaders in those countries from executing their detained erstwhile presidents 
and prime ministers”. According to the Presidency, in furtherance of its leadership 
position in Africa and more importantly in serving the national strategic interest of the 
country, Nigeria committed about 1200 troops and N7 billion to the intervention in 
Mali while also promising the construction of military clinics for the Malian army.  
Nigeria’s voice and position on the Libyan crisis was also made very clear with its 
timeous announcement of its recognition of the Transitional National Council (TNC). 





of the first countries to lead the way for other Africa countries to follow. Ambassador 
Ashiru (2013) also notes that “majority of member states of the AU, hitherto sitting 
on the fence followed Nigeria’s lead”. Nigeria’s position on Libya may not be 
unconnected to its weariness about the latter’s erstwhile president Ghadaffi.   
Nigeria, under the Jonathan administration has also attempted to revisit the judgment 
of the International Court of Justice on ceding of the oil rich Bakassi Peninsula to 
Cameroun after much pressure from the National Assembly and from popular opinion 
on the decision of Obasanjo to concede to the ICJ ruling. Pointing to new evidences, 
which were not presented to the ICJ during the ruling on the ownership of the oil rich 
peninsula, the Presidency on October 4, 2012, established a four man committee to 
review the judgment (Bello and Soniyi 2012). The committee was expected to look at 
the new evidences and make recommendations on what recourse is available for 
Nigeria in reclaiming the lost peninsula.  
4.3 Conclusion: Comparative analysis of Nigeria’s foreign policy in the 
 military and  civilian dispensations 
This chapter examines Nigeria foreign policy under successive Nigerian governments 
from the gained insight from the previous chapter on the fundamental principles and 
conditions that that guide and inspire the country’s foreign policy. In examining the 
cumulative legacies of Nigeria’s leaderships since independence in the context of its 
relationship with Africa and with the rest of the world, we can infer that despite the 
fact of ideological differences of government from time to time, the Nigerian 
government over the years has demonstrated and maintained a close rapport with 
other African states and in fact has continued to play key role in the stabilization of 
the continent. Fifty years down the line, the post-colonial foreign policy construction 
of Nigeria perhaps has displayed a largely consistent and defining role in promoting 
the political integration of Africa; a cause which has resulted in the eventual 
emergence of the African Union (AU). The foreign policy path that successive 
Nigerian governments have taken since independence have essentially portrayed 
similar pattern with very minimal difference particularly in terms of implementation 
rather than in contexts and objectives.  
One major inference that can be made from the above discussion is that the 





successive administration had a strong bearing on the strength of Nigeria’s foreign 
policy. In essence, the domestic and external environment at which successive 
leadership operated inspired a measure of influence on foreign policy formulation and 
implementation at different periods. For instance, the type of regime coupled with the 
nature of the international political economy of particular leadership invoke certain 
constrain on the foreign policy of Nigeria from time to time. Foreign policy has 
therefore been addressed at different and varied degrees on different occasions. Thus, 
while its foreign policy in Africa during the periods of colonialism, Cold War and 
apartheid period was largely forceful, the same is not the case since the end of these 
events. Again, the periods of the civil war, oil boom, military regimes, internal 
terrorist insurgencies, economic downturn coupled with the trend of globalization had 
serious critical implications on the dynamics of Nigeria’s foreign policy at the time. 
Thus, while Africa has remained the centerpiece of Nigeria’s foreign policy, the force 
with which these policies have been pursued have varied across regime dispensations. 
This means that for instance, while at some point, Nigeria’s foreign policy was very 
aggressive and active, at other periods like the Balewa, Shagari and perhaps the Yar 
Adua eras, Nigeria foreign policy took a docile posture with very minimal bold steps 
taken towards the African agenda. 
And as a senior research fellow of the NIIA asserts;  
[so] we (Nigeria) have always conducted our foreign policy 
well. In international peacekeeping we have always been 
there, outside Africa, we have also been there, inside Africa 
we have also shown our capacity to deal with internal 
destabilization and pacifying situations that is almost 
exploding (See excerpts of interview in Babalola 2012:1) 
Using certain indicators, it is important to critically assess the measure of 
differentiations and/or similarities that exist(ed) at different level of Nigeria’s foreign 
policy making and implementation. This kind of analysis which is done in the context 
of regime type and regime change is important for this research in showing the level 
of divergence, period of strength or otherwise, consistencies and inconsistencies under 
various regimes. We shall therefore comparatively analyze Nigeria’s foreign policy 
under the two regime types that has characterized its over fifty years of international 





As aptly captured in the table 4.3 below, Nigeria’s foreign policy has reflected 
different nuances over the years. Hence, while foreign policy under late Tafawa 
Balewa was largely conservative, docile and pro-western, Major-General Aguiyi 
lronsi was said, to have assumed the reins of power in chaos and never settled down 
to afford enough time for any foreign policy making. General Gowon's regime on the 
other hand sought to reconstruct and reconcile the differences immediately after the 
civil war while the Murtala/Obasanjo regime demonstrated a high level of dynamism 
and purpose hitherto unimagined in the history of Nigeria's foreign policy. Prominent 
is her support for the liberalization movement in the former Northern Rhodesia, now 
(Zimbabwe). As for the Buhari regime, it preferred to focus on the domestic front and 
inculcating personal discipline while the Babangida years were synonymous with 
strident strides in economic diplomacy, peace-keeping and integration within the 
continent whereas Nigeria was widely acknowledged for its peacekeeping role and 
defensive foreign policy posture during the Abacha regime. The death of Abiola in 
1998 made it possible for yet another General, which eventually culminated into the 
transition programme that led to Obasanjo's administration in the Fourth Republic 
which was widely acknowledged to be at the forefront of the cause of ‘Africa for 
Africans’ 
   Table 4.3: Foreign Policy Regime Style and Policy Distinction of Nigerian     
  leaders 
Regime Regime 
type 
Style  Notable Signature  
Balewa Civilian Conservative  Afrocentrism 
Gowon Military Reconciliatory Oil/Quiet Diplomacy 
Murtala/Obasanjo Military Activist Activism  
Shagari Civilian Passive Domestic Priority 
Buhari Military Proactive Nationalism 
Babangida Military Aggressive  Economic Diplomacy 
Abacha Military Incoherent International isolation 
Abubakar Military Pacifist  International Reconciliation 
Obasanjo Civilian Energetic and 
dynamic 
Shuttle Diplomacy 
Yar Adua Civilian Inactive Citizen Diplomacy 
Jonathan Civilian Passive Economic Diplomacy 
   Source: Author’s compilation  
The determining factors of foreign policy discussed in the previous chapter evince 





across successive governments, showing that each government has displayed 
distinctive priorities and style which is often time inconsistent from preceding 
leadership(s). For example, the early 1960s, Nigeria’s foreign policy direction aimed 
at proper behavior in the international system, with Britain playing a major role in 
Nigerian foreign relations during this period. For this reason, the Balewa government 
emphasized the ideals and principle of world peace, respect for sovereign equality of 
states, nonalignment, reciprocity etc. The Balewa leadership of the first republic was 
often accused of being too pro-Western choosing to maintain a low profile which was 
considered as embarrassing to the country’s status.  
Equally, Gowon’s military leadership, a posture of quiet diplomacy generally 
characterized the foreign policy implementation during this period. He continued in 
the strides of his predecessor by keeping a low profile and operating within the ambits 
of general resolutions and consensus of the OAU.  However, the period of the civil 
war marked a sharp divergence in Nigerian foreign policy posture. The decision by 
Britain and some other countries and international bodies to grant recognition to 
Biafra during the war highlighted the increased vulnerability of Nigeria’s non-
alignment principle and an appreciation of the positive role that the OAU could play 
in African affairs. With the OAU divided by support from white-dominated African 
countries the general OAU membership’s support for the Nigerian federation, the 
OAU stance proved significant for Nigerian diplomacy. Nigeria was eventually able 
to secure the support of the Soviet Union after the West refused to supply arms to the 
country. The aftermath of the war resulted in a radical change from a hitherto pro-
West ideology to an increased attention towards the East. 
This event did not however derail Nigeria’s commitment to Africa as the centre piece 
of its foreign policy. Africa continued to gain significant precedence in Nigeria's 
foreign policy construction. The period of the 1970s, much of Nigeria’s foreign policy 
attention was focused on such issues as the struggle for liberation particularly in the 
Southern African part of Africa; the furtherance of regional economic integration of 
ECOWAS, and the imperative of total decolonization and economic independence of 
the African continent. To demonstrate its commitment to Africa, the objectives of 
promotion of African unity; political, economic, social, and cultural liberation of 





comprehensively provided for in the 1979 constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria.  
Nonetheless, to a large extent, Nigeria contribution to the course of Africa at different 
global and regional platforms has in no small measure stirred up political-economic 
growth and development in Africa. As demonstrated above, in Nigeria’s over fifty 
years of foreign policy construction and implementation, it continued to be at the 
forefront of debates for regional integration, poverty eradication, economic 
cooperation and peace-keeping initiatives. This is evidenced in its several contribution 
to the formation of such organizations as the OAU (now AU), ECOWAS, AEC etc. 
Africa as the centerpiece of Nigeria’s foreign policy points toward the fact that in the 
nation’s external relations, Africa will receive priority attention. As shown above, the 
decision in making Africa her central focus was precipitated by certain factors. First is 
the geo-political location of Nigeria within the African region and the perception that 
it is served by destiny with the political and economic responsibility of taking care of 
Africa (Adebajo and Mustapha 2008). Two, Nigeria is unarguably the most populous 
black African nation on the globe. It is a vast populous country south of the Sahara. 
Statistically, with a real GDP of $58.4 billion and a population of over 140 million 
people with over 250 ethnic groups, Nigeria accounts for over 50% of the nearly two 
hundred million populations of West Africa, and at the same time commands 51% of 
the West Africa Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (APRM 2008). 
Consequently, as shown above, since its over 50 years of external diplomatic 
engagement and external relations with Africa, Nigeria has undoubtedly contributed 
immensely to the growth and development of the continent since attaining 
independence. Despite these bold steps at rescuing Africa, some scholars have queried 
the importance of Nigeria’s decision to concentrate its influence on Africa in terms of 
the socio-economic benefit and political importance that the Nigeria-Africa relations 
command or dispense to directly or otherwise to the Nigeria people.   
What is clear from the above discussion is that Nigeria’s role since independence in 
1960 has been preconditioned by one that is centered on Africa and as Folarin (2010) 
remarked Nigeria’s African policy is as old as the Nigerian state itself. This 
conviction has remained strong for over 50 years since independence even though at 





this tenacity is to be found in the national role conception which most Nigerians, 
including the political elite, have about the country. As explained in the previous 
chapter, this role conception of Africa’s most populous nation are traceable to the 
country’s demographic preponderance, its economic and natural endowments, and its 
staggering human resources (Obadare 2001; Folarin 2010). This is aside the general 
perception of Nigeria as a natural leader of the continent evidenced in Balewa’s 
assertion in response to Nkrumah’s clamour of African Union that: 
Nigeria is big enough and does not need to join others… if 
others wish to join Nigeria, their position would be made 
clear to them in such a union” (cited in Phillips, 1964: 90).   
On the flip side, many analysts argue that Nigeria’s foreign policy in Africa has done 
very little to affect positively the lives of the Nigerian people. The point here is that 
Nigeria has pursued an Afrocentric foreign policy at the detriment of its own people. 
As an anylyst puts it: 
It is now habitual and priority for Nigerian government to 
solve crisis in neighboring African countries faster than the 
insurgency at home. If the federal government had responded 
in a similar manner to the Boko Haram menace during its 
formative years, their activities would have been nipped in 
the bud. Security challenges now seem insuperable, 
extrajudicial killings and human rights abuses are now the 
hallmark of the Joint Task Force (JTF) on duty in the 
troubled northern states of Nigeria. The “brilliant record” of 
Nigeria’s participation in peace mission in neighboring 
African countries counts for nothing when compared to the 
insurmountable security challenges at home. There is nothing 
‘responsible’ about being proactive in regional conflicts 
when the Boko Haram menace has claimed over 3,000 lives 
and counting. The present security challenges at home does 
not warrant any form of peace-keeping outside the shores of 
the country (see Ilevbare 2013; cited in Uzodike: nd).  
Nigerians have paid very huge sacrifices for the African continent which in most 
cases is at the expense of the country. To make matters worse, it further appears that 
other African countries who have been recipients of Nigeria’s goodwill have also not 
fully appreciated the kind gestures and intentions of Nigeria. This is perhaps glaring 
in the manner Nigerian citizens are being treated and subjected to inhuman conditions 





on the false allegation of fake yellow fever cards is one example. It is on this basis 
that many have called for a complete overhaul of the country’s foreign policy to 
reflect the current domestic aspiration and challenges of the Nigerian state. There 
seem to be a general consensus on a foreign policy that takes into cognizance 
Nigeria’s economic, political, social, and most importantly its national interest while 
not totally ignoring the traditional Afrocentric tenets of its foreign policy (Babalola 
2012). 
Another issue to consider is the motive for the involvement of Nigeria in Africa. This 
thesis argues that contrary to the argument that Nigeria’s interest in Africa is driven 
by goodwill and a need to promote the collective security of the continent, in fact, its 
foreign policy in Africa is fanned by a self-inspired interest and desire to dominant 
Africa. The reason for its military intervention in violent conflicts in West Africa 
especially, is not unconnected with a realist hegemonic tendency. Edged in its military 
and economic benevolence towards Africa is the overt or covert ambition to be a true 
or anointed representation of the rest of Africa. And as echoed by Tavares (2011:166) 
that national and individual interests, rather than any institutional principle, served as 
the basis for Nigeria’s interventions in Chad (1979-1983), Liberia (1990-2003), 
Sierra-Leone (1998-2002), and Mali (2013). Secondly, many analysts believe that any 
meaningful foreign policy of any powerful state should be one that is tied to 
reciprocal relations which emphasizes mutual gains for both parties. The priority of 
promoting and advancing national agendas of a hegemonic ambition as a regional 
power plays an important role in the decision to engage in other parts of Africa. It is 
only through this means that Nigeria could have asserted its influence at a meaningful 
player within the region Tavares (2011:166).  
The chapter also agrees with Folarin’s (2010) estimation that “[r]ole conception by 
the founding fathers of independent Nigeria was therefore very clear and devoid of 
any ambiguity” and this have to a large degree been reflected in Nigeria’s African 
policy since 1960. The following chapter moves to discuss the foreign policy 
principles and perspectives of South Africa in relation to Africa while also examining 








FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND DETERMINANTS OF SOUTH 
AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY 
5.1  Introduction 
  
This chapter unearths the fundamental principles as well as the internal and external 
determinants of South Africa’s foreign policy. More importantly, it examines how 
these determinants serve a facilitating or constraining role in the shaping of South 
Africa’s foreign policy. In essence, the chapter addresses the question of the 
ideological and philosophical foundations upon which South Africa’s foreign policy is 
laid and also examines the institutional and non-institutional contexts that shape the 
country’s foreign policy under both apartheid and post-apartheid dispensations. In 
considering the above, the chapter examines the roles that these agencies have played 
in setting the tone for South Africa’s foreign policy and the conceptualization thereof. 
What we intend to show is how foreign policy making is in most cases a web of 
complex interplays and inter-linkages between and among a number of key actors. In 
essence, as Masters (2012:20) puts it: “[i]dentifying ‘who’ shapes foreign policy 
decision-making, or prying open the so-called ‘black box’, is an extraordinarily 
complex process and one which highlights the numerous interlinkages between those 
seeking to influence foreign policy decision making”. Like every modern state, South 
African foreign policy is guided by a number of fundamental principles which we 
shall now turn to.  
5.2  Fundamental principles of South Africa’s foreign policy        
It is sufficient to assert that given the peculiarity of South Africa’s foreign policy 
environment and the different contours that its political landscape had taken in the 
past couple of decades, it would appear extremely difficult to effectively articulate the 
fundamental principles guiding the country’s foreign policy. This is so because, 
regime transition and change from apartheid rule to an all-inclusive democratic polity 
invoked certain reciprocal context and change in the principles and ideological 
foundations that inspired the foreign policy thrusts of these vastly different regime 
periods. To be sure, South Africa’s foreign policy principles can be said to have 
transformed from the apartheid period (1948-1994) led by the National Party into the 





period stimulating different nuances for the understanding of foreign policy decision 
making in South Africa. These principles have therefore oscillated from one shade 
and dimension to another and have perhaps gained some measure of stability since the 
post-apartheid era. Consequently, our discussion of the core paradigm and principles 
that guide South Africa’s foreign policy shall revolve around the two contexts 
mentioned above.  
 
5.2.1 Fundamental principles of South Africa’s foreign policy in the apartheid 
   era (1948-1994) 
In accounting for the foreign policy trajectories of South Africa up to 1977, Olivier 
(1977:210-11), notes that South Africa's foreign policy “can be classified as 
consisting of a number of separate foreign policies and lines of conduct”. According 
to him, three main characteristics typify the pattern of South Africa's foreign policy 
and these include: 
1. non-isolationist, anti-sanctions and pro-western aimed at enhanced co-
operation with non-communist states and international organizations; with 
emphasis on international trade and commerce because it was a strong 
instrument to fight isolation and to strengthen the position of South Africa; 
2. peaceful co-existence and regional co-operation based on geographical 
realities, the need to foster friendly relations with neighboring states, and 
South Africa as part of the African continent (with a permanent white 
population); and 
3. external justification to enhance South Africa's image abroad and the 
maintenance of internal sovereignty by refraining from interference in the 
internal affairs of other states (based on Article 2(7) of the United Nations 
Charter).      
In the period that follows (1978-1989), South Africa’s foreign policy became largely 
inspired by the regime style and leadership of P.W. Botha who was Prime Minister 
and later became State President. South Africa’s foreign policy during this period was 
predicated upon the imperative to effectively counter and address the international 
isolationism against South Africa and supported by what Mills and Baynham 





quelling the total international opposition and attack against South Africa at the time 
(Sole 1994:104; Henwood 1997). To this end, Henword (1997:1-2) remarked that:  
the foreign policy of South Africa during this period was 
shaped by increased hostility against South Africa. South 
Africa's response was an increased reliance on 'strong arm 
tactics' against any perceived enemy or threat. The result was 
an escalation in the use of violence as a means of addressing 
problems in the regional context (the infamous 
destabilization policy). 
Domestic events taking place within South Africa which began in 1991 as well as its 
acceptance back into the international community conveyed significant levels of 
changes particularly in the foreign policy focus and construction of the country which 
is remarkably different from the previous regimes and periods. These multiple events 
made the review of South Africa’s foreign policy almost inevitable and expedient 
with the country “in need of a foreign policy suited to a new world, not only as a 
result of internal changes, but also as by reason of global changes brought about by 
the end of the Cold War” (Henword 1997:2). Critical to this new foreign policy was 
the priority given to regionalism; a term which places emphasis on the need to be 
effectively integrated into the Southern African region. According to Evans (1994:8-
9) and cited in Henword (1997:2), South Africa’s transitional foreign policy was 
based on two foundational pillars: 
1. the quest for a political solution to the internal problems of South Africa that 
would satisfy the international community and ensure their support; and 
2. the revitalization of the South African economy.  
Three central priorities or ideologies dominated South Africa’s foreign policy during 
the late period of the apartheid years. Firstly, its first priority centered on the 
imperative to establish a positive relation with Africa, and especially Southern Africa 
while the second priority was the quest for the re-establishment, extension, sustenance 
and propagation of South Africa's influence particularly in the Middle East, Asia, 
Eastern Europe and the rest of the world. A third priority revolved around the pursuit 
to solidify South Africa's relations with the UN and other intergovernmental 
multilateral organizations from which it had been hitherto suspended. According to 





Africa following its emergence from being a pariah state to a participant and active 
actor in regional and global politics. 
Henword (1997:2) asserts that “this latter phase in the development of South Africa's 
foreign policy formed the foundation of the foreign policy of the first democratically 
elected Government of South Africa”. Hence, between 1989 and 1994, South Africa’s 
foreign policy was redirected and reviewed to reflect its ongoing internal political 
reform and its emergence into world politics as an accepted and recognized member 
of the international community.  
5.2.2 Fundamental principles of South Africa’s foreign policy in the post-
 apartheid period (1994 to 2012) 
South Africa’s foreign policy in the post-apartheid era or what is sometimes referred 
to as the post-settlement period is generally a reflection of the international relations 
policy of the African National Congress (ANC). According to Venter and Landsberg 
(2006:251), “as early as 1994, before the African National Congress (ANC) officially 
assumed control of state power, it committed itself to overhauling the country’s 
foreign policy” (see section on the ANC in this chapter). 
Schoeman (2007:96) while contributing to the discourse observed that South Africa’s 
foreign policy particularly in the post-apartheid dispensation is to a large degree 
inspired by an Afro-centric orientation; that is, an African-oriented pattern which is 
very much visible in the design of its foreign policy. Mandela (1993:89) correctly 
affirms the inevitability of Africa to South Africa when he asserts that “South Africa 
cannot escape its African destiny. If we do not devote our energies to this continent, 
we too could fall victim to the forces that have brought ruin to its various parts”. 
However, as Tjemolane (2011:63), rightly notes, “South Africa did not immediately 
assume an Africa-oriented policy after 1994, and its foreign policy has not always 
been ‘so African’, especially in the pre-1994 period”. This is again supported by the 
ANC’s 2007 foreign policy discussion paper, International policy: A just world and a 
better Africa is a possibility, which confirms the point of South Africa’s pro-African 
and pro-South foreign policy (ANC 2007). The ANC document is no doubt a 
reference to the fact that South Africa’s economic and political destiny is intrinsically 






Again, at the very early stage of South Africa’s foreign policy formulation in the post-
apartheid period, and prior to the presidential and legislative elections in April 1994, 
Mandela in a paper published in Foreign Affairs (1993)
24
 aptly articulates the 
following beliefs and focus as significantly forming the pillars upon which South 
Africa’s foreign policy will rest: 
— that issues of human rights are central to international relations and an 
understanding that they extend beyond the political, embracing the economic, 
social and environmental; 
— that a just and lasting solutions to the problems of humankind can only come 
through the promotion of democracy worldwide; 
— that considerations of justice and respect for international law should guide the 
relations between nations;   
— that peace is the goal for which all nations should strive, and where this breaks 
down, internationally agreed and nonviolent mechanisms, including effective 
arms-control regimes, must be employed; 
— that the concerns and interests of the continent of Africa should be reflected in 
our foreign-policy choices; and 
— that economic development depends on growing regional and international 
economic cooperation in an interdependent world  (Mandela 1993:87). 
He acknowledged that “these convictions stand in stark contrast to how, for nearly 
five decades, apartheid South Africa disastrously conducted its international relations” 
(Mandela 1993:87). 
Moving forward, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) in this regard played a 
critical role in articulating the foreign policy perspective and guiding principles for 
the conduct of external relations in the post-apartheid South Africa (DFA 2002). 
According to Alfred Nzo who emerged as the first Minister of Foreign Affairs in the 
post-apartheid period, “principles are the tenets of our approach to foreign 
policy…and are in line with our perception of the kind of nation we seek to be, and 
the kind of world we seek to live in” (DFA 2002 cited in Landsberg 2006:252). 
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On a generic scale, the defining guidelines that inform South Africa’s approach to its 
foreign policy relations in the post-apartheid democratic period as documented in the 
DFA’s Annual Report of 2003/04 is as follows:  
1. Foreign policy is an integral part of government policy, aimed at promoting 
security and improving the quality of life of all South Africans; 
2. Commitment to the African Renaissance through the African Union and its 
programme for Africa's development, namely, the New Partnership for 
Africa's Development; 
3. Commitment to economic development through regional integration and 
development in the Southern African Development Community and the 
Southern African Customs Union; 
4. Interact with African partners as equals; 
5. Pursue friendly relations with all peoples and nations of the world; and 
6. Safeguard South Africa's territorial integrity and sovereignty. 
In articulating the foreign policy guidelines for the conduct of South Africa’s foreign 
policy at the start of the post-apartheid era, Nzo, stated that:  
1. the conduct of South Africa’s international relations should be transparent and 
take place in close consultation with Parliament; 
2. the national interest of South Africa should always dictate its policies; 
3. South Africa must expand its participation in regional, continental and global 
multilateral  organizations; 
4. The security and the quality of life of South Africans, as well as justice and the 
international rule of law, peace, economic stability and regional cooperation 
were some of the fundamental principles underlying the foreign policy of 
South Africa; and 
5. South Africa could not become involved in all laudable initiatives and issues 
in international politics, because of lack of adequate resources (RSA National 
Assembly; 1994). 
 
In 2011, while addressing the public at the University of the Western Cape, the 
Deputy Minister of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation 
(DIRCO), Marius Fransman, spelt out the foreign policy thrust of South Africa as 





1. consolidating the African agenda;  
2. strengthening South-South cooperation; 
3. strengthening North-South cooperation;  
4. ensuring South Africa's participation in the global system of governance; and  
5. strengthening bilateral political and economic relations with all countries of 
the world.     (Sabinet Law May 13, 2011).  
In the first place, the principle of the promotion of human rights in the context of 
political, economic, social and environmental environments is borne out of South 
Africa’s (and more importantly, the ANC’s) legacy of resistance of the apartheid 
regime which was to all intents and purposes a crime against humanity (ANC Policy 
Discussion Document 2012). This principle formed the hallmark of Mandela’s 
administration’s foreign policy thrust as evidenced for example in its repudiation of 
the refusal of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to grant recognition to Republic 
of China (ROC). The emphasis on human rights at all level was therefore critical to 
the Mandela administration. 
South Africa’s commitment to the principle of peace, and the agreed mechanism for 
the peaceful resolution of disputes is evinced in its resilience to continental and global 
security which was not a priority prior to the post-apartheid period. This principle 
became pronounced particularly in the second political dispensation sequel to the end 
of apartheid. In demonstrating this political conviction, South Africa’s quest to ensure 
peaceful coexistence of member states both within the African continent and across is 
demonstrated in its commitment to peacekeeping operation under the leadership of the 
African Union (AU), Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the 
United Nations (UN), to war-torn areas like Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
Lesotho, Cote d’ Ivoire, Burundi etc. (Adebajo and Landdsberg 2007). Again, its 
commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) particularly the 
voluntarily commitment to destroy and discontinue nuclear proliferation programs 
was indicative of this resolution.  An “Outcomes-based approach” was proposed and 
adopted by the Jacob Zuma led administration in 2009 (see table 5.1 below). This 
approach includes four component priorities reflecting the principles of peace, 
security, prosperity and integration which ultimately identifies South Africa’s 
“overarching objective as “creating a better South Africa and contributing to a better 





   Table 5.1: Outcomes Based Approach in identifying South Africa’s policy    
 objectives 
OUTCOME 11 PRIORITIES Sub-Outputs (Deliverables) 
Output 1: Enhanced African agenda and 
sustainable development 
 Deepened contribution to regional 
and continental security and 
stability and sustainable 
development 
 Contribution to peace missions and 
Post Conflict Reconstruction and 
Development (PCRD) 
 Enhancing technical and 
development cooperation 
Output 2: Enhanced regional integration  Regional economic integration 
 Regional political integration 
Output 3: Reformed global governance 
and peace &security institutions 
 Strengthened regional, continental 
and global governance institutions 
and international platforms. 
 Enhanced representation of South 
Africans in international 
institutions 
Output 4: Enhanced trade and 
investment 
 increased value-added exports to 
targeted economies  
 Increased inward investment from 
targeted countries. 
 increase our market share through 
aggressive marketing 
Source: SAGI 2010; See Naidoo 2010 
Post-apartheid foreign policy generally points to a pattern of oscillation from one 
direction to varied dimension often times affected by the regime style and personality 
of leadership at different periods. For instance, it is widely acknowledged that the 
foreign policy of the Mandela administration and the period afterwards have been 
characterized as displaying an idealistic perspective and moralist vision which 
strongly emphasizes the significance of South Africa paying back the “debt” it owed 
the rest of Africa and, of course, the world for   the latter’s support towards the 
liberation struggle during the apartheid years. It was on the basis of this understanding 
that the stance on “mutual partnership” was adopted as against “selfish hegemony” 





South Africa’s foreign policy has often been met with sharp criticisms for failing to 
clearly outline how its foreign policy objectives would be realized. 
In the following section, we shall highlight a number of micro and macro aspects of 
foreign policy construction in South Africa during these periods dealing specifically 
with the internal and external environments within which its foreign policy is shaped 
and formulated.  
5.3  Centripetal and centrifugal determinants of South Africa’s foreign policy 
  toward Africa 
This section provides an estimation of the actors and factors influencing foreign 
policy    construction and formulation in South Africa and the role these agencies play 
in shaping South Africa’s foreign policy. Understanding that “the foreign policy 
decisions and actions of a government do not represent the intent of any one figure, 
but rather are the unintended result of bargaining, pulling, hauling, and tugging by 
bureaucratic competition in their ceaseless quest for more funds, resources, and 
influence” (Art 1993:99), as clearly indicated by Coplin (1974:187) in the table 5.2 
below.  
Table 5.2: Factors identified as foreign policy determinants 
Author    Determinants 
Author Domestic External 
Coplin 
(1974)  
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This section hence brings to fore the role of institutional and unofficial frameworks of 
foreign policy making and implementation including leadership of political office 
holders, such as Presidents, Prime Ministers, Minister of foreign Affairs etc. who are 
usually the chief architect of foreign policy formulation; the bureaucracies as well as 
Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs). Other determinants may include the 
media, academic researchers and scholars, prominent individuals and such other 
factors as regime type, state capabilities, levels of economic development, 
international regime, prevalent international opinion and ethics (Holsti 1995:19; 
Kegley & Wittkopf 2001:61; Landsberg 2006:251). We analyze the constraints and 
limitation that these key figures and factors invoke on the foreign policy decision 
making and formulation process of the state. In doing so, we again categorize the 
discussion along two political periods of apartheid and the period sequel to it.  
Spence (1965:3), in capturing the role of the domestic environment on South Africa’s 
foreign policy asserts correctly that “the truism that foreign policy begins at home is 
nowhere better exemplified than in the case of South Africa where domestic  
preoccupations have defined the pattern of national interests”. According to him, the 
influence that Afrikaner nationalism, for instance, commanded or invoked on foreign 
policy decision making in South Africa during this period is testimony to how 
domestic interplay within a country could imprint on the pattern of foreign policy 
established within the same country. Having said this, we shall go on to examine 
some of these domestic environments that conditioned South African foreign policy 
under apartheid regimes and the period following the end of apartheid rule. 
Just as foreign policy of any state is affected and constrained by domestic influences, 
in similar fashion, several other external factors intrinsically impinge on the pattern of 
foreign policy making of the same state and South Africa is no exception. The 
influence of international circumstances as “conditions existing outside the borders of 
a state that stimulate foreign policy actions” (Coplin 1980:176) on foreign policy 
making has therefore gained wide acknowledgement over time contrary to the earlier 
assumption that “foreign policy is in essence a state’s reaction to events and forces 
beyond its borders” (Geldenhuys 1984:205). Very clearly therefore is the reality that 
foreign policy is shaped both by internal and external conditions or what Geldenhuys 





these external milieus that impinge on the foreign policy construction in South Africa 
both during the period under apartheid and after. Particularly, we establish some of 
the foreign pressure wielded against the apartheid government during the period under 
apartheid in coercing the government to abandon its policies and actions and the 
current international conditions that shape external relations with sub-regional 
(Southern Africa), regional (Africa) and global actors. We analyze the institutions in 
two categories; official and unofficial foreign policy institutions. 
5.3.1 The apartheid era 
5.3.1.1 Official institutional frameworks of foreign policy making  
In discussing the role and constraints that government departments, institutions and 
agencies played in the foreign policy formulation during apartheid South Africa, we 
shall articulate the roles played both by different departments’ heads or ministers and 
that of its officials. As echoed by Geldenhuys (1984:107), it may prove a hideous task 
to separate the contribution of one from the other. In doing this, we examine carefully 
and in-depth the roles of important departments such as the Department of 
Information and Foreign Affairs
25
 which existed previously as two separate 
departments prior to 1980 and active involvement in foreign policy conduct during the 
periods of their existence. Other bureaucratic institutions examined include the 
Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), Department of Defence, and the Bureau 
for State Security (BOSS) [formerly known as the National Intelligence Service 
(NIS)].  
(a) Department of Information 
Particularly since becoming a separate Department in 1972, at different periods under 
the leaderships of Warring, de Klerk (1966), Mulder (1968) and Rhoodie, the 
department underwent a rapid transformation especially during Mulder’s 
appointment. Mention must be made of the Department’s disapproval of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs in the early 1970s and in its attempt to gain some level 
of significance for itself questioned the “weak personality trait” of Minister Muller. 
The department’s prominence came on the heels of Vorster’s announcement to 
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provide the international community and organizations with proper and adequate 
information regarding the racial policies of the government at the time (Geldenhuys 
1984:107). According to him, this was in a bid to deal with the ‘perceived ignorance’ 
coming from the international system many of which condemned the apartheid policy 
of white minority rule in South Africa despite its efforts towards peaceful resolution.  
Geldenhuys (1984:108-109) advanced seven reasons explaining the Department’s 
foray into the foreign policy space largely centered on the passive manner in which 
the Department of Foreign Affairs approached South Africa’s foreign relations at the 
time. In the first place, it contended that it was irritated by the low keyed fashion in 
which South Africa’s foreign policy was conducted often choosing to exercise caution 
as against “standing up and fighting South Africa’s critics”. Secondly, it argued that 
the official orchestrators of foreign affairs in South Africa were very distant from the 
international realties evidenced in its communication and contact deficit with many 
international stakeholders. Thirdly, it contested the perceived ‘lukewarmness’ and 
‘hospitality’ of South African diplomats towards policies of government clearly 
displayed in anti-government disposition of many South African foreign 
representatives.  
Fourthly, it queried the lack of clarity regarding the commitment of some of South 
Africa’s diplomats on the ground of their preference to settle permanently abroad 
(including their wives) following their retirement from office. Fifthly, the focus on the 
United Nations (UN) seems to be the priority of the South Africa’s foreign policy 
orientation while painfully neglecting other equally pivotal areas to South Africa. It 
argued further that in order to effectively counter the triggers of its opposition, it was 
important to focus on “many more fronts than at the UN- and using new means”. 
Sixthly and largely related to the fifth point, the Department of Information generally 
concluded that South Africa’s foreign policy which inclined largely towards a western 
orientation needed a serious makeover and remodeling. Finally, a major argument of 
the Department of Information against its Foreign Affairs counterpart was that South 
Africa’s diplomatic relations with the rest of the world had increasingly worsened in 
the past couple of years with the latter doing very little to stem the tide of events but 





Department of Information resolve was therefore to “seek ways to supplement 
conventional diplomacy using unconventional or unorthodox means”. 
In its quest to ensure a much more assertive and proactive foreign policy, the 
Information Department further introduced radical changes into the operations of the 
Department itself by seeking covert and overt ways to counter the increasing isolation 
of South Africa in international affairs. Its intention was to lure important policy 
makers to “act in a fashion conducive to South Africa’s perceived interests or 
alternatively to refrain from prejudicial actions” (Geldenhuys 1984:110). The 
Department of Information thus sought for unconventional means by advancing 
campaign propaganda targeted at improving the international perception of South 
Africa and its image abroad “mainly through large-scale press advertising”
26
.  
The establishment of the magazine To the Point in 1971 and its international variant 
To the Point International in 1974 were strategic in this initiative of articulating 
information about the apartheid government. This was in addition to the extensive 
secret projects undertaken to feed the media with positive articles on South Africa 
which was under the auspices of Heinz Behrens, a renowned public relations expert.  
Rhoodie’s assumption of office as minister gave a fresh lease of relevance to the 
Department of Information in the conduct of South Africa’s foreign relations. In 
taking a ‘defensive’ and ‘offensive’ approach
27
, Rhoodie boldly stated that the 
Department would leave no stone unturned in its quest to influence the conduct of 
foreign policy in South Africa: 
In a world in which weapons such as bribery, vilification, 
insinuation, indoctrination and propaganda were being used 
against South Africa, the Department of Information would 
rule “no means, no channel and no tactic out” out of order in 
fulfilling its designated task of influencing foreign opinion 
former and decision makers. 
The Department would eventually be reintegrated into the Department of Foreign 
Affairs in 1980 following the assumption of office of P.W. Botha. 
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(b) Department of Foreign Affairs  
The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) formerly known as the Department of 
External Affairs was established in 1927 and later renamed DFA in 1960 following its 
separation from the Prime Minister’s office in 1955 (Muller 1998:243; Pfister 
2005:13) and through its Africa Division, was responsible for formulating and 
implementing South Africa’s foreign policy for Africa (Geldenhuys 1984). The 
Department was composed of seasoned bureaucrats or public servants (both with staff 
within the country and abroad) saddled with the primary responsibility of providing 
expertise on international matters for government; the task of implementing foreign 
policy of government and also direct involvement in the foreign policy making 
process (Geldenhuys 1984:121). The role of the Department in the decision making 
process largely revolved around “formulating policy recommendations for the 
political decision makers” (Geldenhuys 1984:121).  
According to Pfister (2005:13), the major part of the Department’s life was guided by 
two fundamental principles. First is its idealist and liberal orientation which pointed to 
its preference in most cases for “democratic principles and the rule of law, rather than 
the use of force as the elements of interaction between states”. The second is the value 
for the non-interference in the domestic matters of another state and the restriction to 
civil relations with states. Particularly, the Africa Division of the DFA established in 
1957 and later renamed Africa Branch in 1988
28
 was instrumental in the formulation 
and implementation of the DFA’s Africa policy. Of importance were the roles played 
by the Ministers (Eric Louw [1955-63], Hilgard Muller [1964-77] and Pik Botha 
[1977-94], Secretary/Director Generals [Gerhardt Jooste [1956-66], Brand Fourie 
[1966-82], Hans van Dalsen [1982-85], Rae Killen [1985-87], Neil van Heerden 
[1987-92] and Rusty Evans [1992] of the Department at different periods (as shown in 
table 5.3). The DFA played significant role in foreign policy making even though its 
prominence oscillated from time to time depending on the Prime Minister and 
Minister in charge per time. For instance, the Department was not particularly 
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relevant to foreign policy formulation during the period when Minister Botha was in 
office (Pfister 2005:15).             
Although the DFA presumably had dominant foreign policy making positions, 
however, this status was greatly challenged by other actors such as the military, the 
Department of Information, National Intelligence, political parties such as the 
Progressive Party, interest groups, particularly the Broederbond (Brotherhood 
Union
29
), think tanks such as the African Institute and the South African Institute of 
International Affairs, the media, namely the Daily Rand (A white English speaking 
newspaper instrumentally critical of apartheid policy), organised business, parastatals 
and private companies, parliament and the public (Geldenhuys 1984, Pfister 2005). In 
other words, South Africa’s foreign policy was inspired not only by its racist and 
apartheid policy but also by its reception and perception of this policy by the 
international community especially in Africa at different levels. 
    Table 5.3: South Africa’s Foreign Affairs leadership from 1958 to 1994 
Prime Minister/State 
President 
Period Minister of Foreign 
Affairs 
Period 
Hendrik Verwoerd 1958–1966  Eric Louw  1955-1963 
B. J. Vorster 1966–1978  Hilgard Muller  1964-1977 
P. W. Botha 1978–1989       
     Pik Botha 
                                                
 1977-1994 F. W. de Klerk 1989–1994 
    Source: Author’s compilation 
Following the merger of the Departments of Information and Foreign Affairs on April 
1 1980, the new Department of Foreign Affairs and Information became concurrently 
involved in the process and life of South Africa’s foreign relations. In doing this, the 
Department was consequently able to play the dual function of direct engagement 
with foreign policy making and also in the conduct of this foreign policy. The 
Department was particularly instrumental in establishing open and secret diplomatic 
contacts with governments of Ivory Coast, Israel, Senegal etc. (Geldenhuys 1984:111-
119) while also being able to situate South Africa on the map of global prominence by 
attracting considerable attention of the international community towards South Africa.  
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(c) The Military 
In examining the role of the military in the foreign policy making of any state, Coplin 
(1980:171) concludes that the “military strength includes both the capacity and the 
will to use military force” suggesting further that this capacity is informed by three 
factors: troop size, degree of training and military equipment. 
According to Geldenhuys (1984:140), in considering the role that the bureaucracy 
plays in foreign policy formulation “special attention needs to be paid to the role of 
the military” and as Jenson (1982:130) acknowledges “as international conflict 
becomes more ubiquitous and national security is seen as a more critical issue, one 
might expect to see the military assuming a more prominent role in such policy” 
(cited in Geldenhuys 1984:140). This is especially true in the case of the South 
African military during the period while the apartheid government prevailed as the 
Defence force was particularly instrumental in responding appropriately to external 
and internal threats against South Africa as a result of its apartheid policy. The 
significance of the Defence Force was due to increasing insecurity particularly within 
the Southern Africa region since the 1960s. The military therefore proved 
indispensable as a foreign policy tool for South Africa’s response to the disturbing 
security threat situation.  
To this end, the Defence Force was therefore used as a foreign policy instrument to 
exert South Africa’s dominance particularly in the Southern African region. Thus, in 
responding to both internal and external threats from both the ANC and the South 
West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), South Africa often employed tough 
military sanctions against its opposition using its military. Pretoria further devised a 
strategy of military dependence and vulnerability of its Southern African 
neighbouring states in a bid to keep them less provocative and passive in their 
relations with South Africa (See Geldenhuys 1984:145). 
In the late 1960s, during the period when P.W. Botha was Defence Minister, the 
influence of the military on South Africa’s foreign policy increased substantially 
following the establishment of the Department of Military Intelligence (DMI) in 1961 
under the auspices of the Director of Military Intelligence
30
 was largely responsible 
for intelligence gathering particularly in the 1970s. It was during this period that the 
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Department played “significant role in directing South Africa’s engagement in the 
Nigerian Civil War (1967-70)” (Pfister 2005:16). Again, in the 1980s when P.W. 
Botha was Prime Minister (1978-89), the Department of Defence equally sought to 
play a significant role via the Defence Minister Magnus Malan (1980-91) and 
Commander-in-Chief of the South African Defence Force (SADF) (1976-80) through 
the support of Botha who was a former Defence Minister himself.   
The Defence Force was therefore critical to maintaining the national security interest 
of South Africa during this period. By maintaining a largely realist approach to 
international relations of an eye for an eye, the military was committed to a policy of 
destabilisation
31
 directed by the Directorate of Special Tasks which fundamentally 
was a military strategy to invoke overt and covert attack against oppositions that 
extended any form of support for the ANC along with its cohorts and all other 
institutions or bodies that canvassed for sanctions against the South African 
government.   
Overall, the role of the military in the foreign policy space during the apartheid period 
was seen as that of complementing and reinforcing other roles played by other 
Departments like Foreign Affairs and Information. It is for this reason that the 
military was therefore undoubtedly predominantly less concerned about the political 
and diplomatic repercussion or implication of the use of military sanctions and actions 
against its oppositions (Geldenhuys 1984:99-100). 
(d) Leadership style and influence of the Prime Ministers and State Presidents 
At different periods in the foreign policy history of South Africa during the apartheid 
era, the position and personality of the President and that of the Prime Minister had 
incontrovertible implications for the foreign policy direction of South Africa at the 
time. As rightly indicated in the makeup of most contemporary states, the task of 
foreign policy construction has often been the responsibility of the executive which is 
headed by the Head of State or Government Geldenhuys (1984:71). In the case of 
South Africa at the time, the Executive Council was presided over by the Prime 
Minister. The style of the leadership during each period therefore points to a direction 
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of foreign policy pattern being established. The Prime Minister along with the 
Executive Cabinet during the periods under review played critical and influential role 
in shaping and molding South Africa’s foreign policy. For instance, the roles played 
by Vorster and Botha during their tenure as Prime Ministers were aptly captured by 
Geldenhuys (1984:71) in his assessment of the influence of executive political actors 
on foreign policy making in South Africa. He notes that there was usually the 
common assumption that foreign policy formulation was intrinsically connected to the 
Prime Minister that was in office at the time fanned by the increasing presence of the 
Prime Minister in regularly presenting foreign policy matters both in parliament and 
even in the public domain.  
In contrast to his predecessor (Strydom), Verwoerd’s foreign policy decision to 
institutionalize (in what was later to be popularly labeled as ‘apartheid’ or separate 
development) reflected a white supremacy rule (see Geldenhuys 1984:11). This policy 
entrenched further “the laager mentality of the Afrikaner community” and was 
substantially instrumental in shaping the isolationist policy of the South African 
government at the time. In order words, Verwoerd’s lack of experience with foreign 
policy making contributed significantly to his reliance on his Minister of 
External/Foreign Affairs Eric Louw for the most part of his tenure. Similarly, 
Verwoerd’s dominant character translated into his leadership of the cabinet and 
evident in his proclivity and penchant to dictate to ministers and acting like a 
‘presidential figure’ who is “above and apart from his cabinet colleagues” 
(Geldenhuys 1984:74). The establishment of eight homelands for the black population 
of South Africa was to a strong reference to Verwoerd expectation that the 
international community would assuage its pressure on South Africa’s as the success 
of the territorial and ethnic separation became evident to the international community 
(Geldenhuys 1984:11). 
Again, Vorster’s pragmatic and enigmatic personality allowed for some level of 
sporting interactions along racial lines while his ‘outward looking policy’ was a 
consequence of his pragmatism. Having served in Verwoerd’s cabinet as Minister of 
Justice for up to five years and prior to that as Deputy Minister of Education, Arts and 
Science and of Welfare, and Pensions, Vorster brought into his cabinet a wealth of 





Verwoerd, Vorster’s leadership of the cabinet typifies what Geldenhuys (1984:74) 
rightly likened to that of “primus inter pares…conforming more to the team concept 
of Cabinet government in which case the prime minister conveys a sense of collective 
responsibility of Cabinet where the prime minister leader is to a large extent reliant on 
the support, feedback and assistance of his Cabinet colleagues”.  
Consequently, in the foreign policy front, it was evident that Vorster was not 
sufficiently grounded in foreign policy construction as he was on domestic policies
32
. 
He therefore sought the advantage of the various government ministries and 
departments and as Pfister (2005) points out, this invariably resulted (in most cases) in 
interdepartmental fights over who takes the leading role. Particularly so, he relied 
extensively on his experienced Foreign Minister, Hilgard Muller who had been in 
office two years before Vorster’s premiership. It was this same struggle over 
prominence that eventually led to the ‘Information Scandal’ and ultimately the 
resignation of Vorster in September 1972 paving way for P.W. Botha’s leadership.  
However, Vorster’s decision to improve international diplomatic relations was 
cemented by his “move to revoke Verwoerd’s rigid segregationist sports policy” 
(Geldenhuys 1984:72) and most notably his ‘outward movement’ policy. These 
decisions are clearly indicative of his deeper commitment and involvement in the 
international diplomatic scene which in most cases was personally executed. For 
instance, his hosting of a series of meetings with Lesotho’s Prime Minister in 1967, a 
ministerial delegate from Malawi and subsequent talks with the Prime Minister of 
Rhodesia in 1967 are references to his active engagement with foreign affairs during 
his period. These visits were reciprocated in 1970 with two visits to Malawi and 
Rhodesia. This was apart from the numerous covert visits to meet with Presidents 
Houphouet-Boigny, Senghor, and Tolbert of Ivory Coast, Senegal and Liberia 
respectively (See Geldenhuys 1984:73).   
On assumption of office in September 1978, Botha’s experience at both the foreign 
policy making process and external relations sharply contrasted with his predecessor 
given his many years of exposure with foreign affairs in previous leaderships. He rose 
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through the ranks of the National Party having served at different points as Minister of 
Defence (where he served for over 12 years), Member of Parliament, Deputy 
Minister, Party leader in the Cape Province etc. Botha’s leadership therefore brought a 
wealth of experience and expertise into foreign policy making and external relations 
thus making him “far better equipped for foreign policy matters than his predecessor” 
(Geldenhuys 1984:72). Invariably, as captured by Geldenhuys (1984:74) and cited in 
Pfister (2005:12), the leadership change from Vorster to Botha therefore “brought 
dramatic changes in personality, style and substance in the policy making process” of 
apartheid South Africa. Using his influence and predominantly military background, 
Pfister (2005) notes that Botha’s preference tilted towards the military and the State 
Security Council (SSC) as foreign policy institutions and instruments in establishing 
his foreign policy goals particular in the Southern Africa and further North.  
On the other hand, de Klerk’s equally pragmatist approach became instrumental to the 
lifting of the 30-year ban on the ANC and other liberation movements within the 
country while also resulting in the release of Nelson Mandela from prison nine days 
after his opening speech in  Parliament in February 1990 (Arnold 1992). This decision 
will go on to shape forever the nature and future of South Africa’s foreign policy 
construction and relations in the years to follow. 
5.3.1.2 Unofficial institutions of foreign policy making  
(a) Influence of Afrikaner nationalism (Broederbond) 
As an elite-based partisan interest group, the Broederbond (Brotherhood union) was 
an organisation established in 1918, set up primarily to promote the interest of the 
Afrikaner community in South Africa. As rightly suggested by Spence (1965:11), 
“any discussion of South African foreign policy must take this crucial factor into 
account, because it governs, to an overwhelming degree, the Afrikaner’s view of his 
role in Africa and its reactions to outside world”. The organisation therefore played 
significant roles in crafting, legitimising and furthering the apartheid system and its 
policies (Pfister 2005:19). Of all the Cabinet Ministers during the period under 
review, only two (Eric Louw and another) were not members of the Broederbond 
showing significantly the enormous influence that the organisation commanded on 
South Africa’s domestic and external policy formulation (Geldenhuys 1984:99-100; 





Broederbond, the latter subtly influenced the former at the level of policy choices at 
both the domestic and international contexts. The leit motif of the organisation was 
primarily that “the Afrikaners were a chosen people with the right and mission to 
civilise Africa and keep communism out” (Pfister 2005:20), a “claim to represent 
‘white civilization’ on the southern tip of Africa, and the right implicit in this claim to 
determine his economic and political destiny as he thinks fit” (Spence 1965:12). To a 
large extent, this self-imposed conviction of saviour and ‘knight in shining armour’ 
intrinsically mirrored South Africa’s foreign policy position during the period under 
review.   
(b) Civil societies and interest groups  
The influence particularly of interest groups (organised labour, churches etc.) on 
South Africa’s foreign policy is one that cannot be completely ignored. This is 
because, black labour movements particularly formed part of the larger movement 
against the apartheid policy of the South African government at the time. It was as a 
result of the efforts of the black trade unions that South Africa was eventually 
expelled from the International Labour Organisation (ILO) (Geldenhuys 1984:166). 
Following labour reforms introduced on the recommendation of the Wiehahn 
Commission signalling a recognition of black labour movements rights with 
considerable thrust for championing not only issues surrounding labour interest but 
more importantly the anti-apartheid struggles. This proved particularly useful since 
the ANC and other political parties which were critical of the government were 
already banned. 
Equally, churches in South Africa “reflect both the country’s international political 
ostracism and divisions within society at large” (Geldenhuys 1984:167). Moreover, 
the reformed Afrikaans churches most especially Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk 
(NGK)
33
 was notable for its isolation from the general basilica congregation both in 
South Africa and world over. Other reformed churches included, the Nederduitsch 
Hervormde Kerk and the Gereformeerde Kerk. By identifying with Afrikaner 
nationalism and the National Party, the Afrikaner church community therefore 
occupied a major role by exercising considerable influence on the foreign policy 
construction of South Africa at the time. At the same token, there was little difference 
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between the Afrikaner church and the National Party and as such both were to a 
considerable extent inseparable. Thus, the former was able to exert a degree of 
influence on the latter through its members who were also members of the National 
Party and, of course, the Cabinet. For instance, as a result of its perceived threat to the 
political future of whites both in Rhodesia and Namibia, the NGK was able to wield 
considerable influence on the South African government to intervene in the situation 
in both countries.   
In the foreign policy landscape, the Afrikaner churches were increasingly drawn into 
the international debate over apartheid as they were seen by many as supporting the 
apartheid policy of South Africa and finding ‘scriptural’ references to substantiate 
their claim. It is for this reason that it was therefore met with huge international 
criticism from the World Council of Churches (WCC) for its objectionable and 
despicable pro-apartheid stance.  
Conversely, the other churches (mostly English speaking) which were racially tolerant 
were also caught up in the web of international criticism against the apartheid 
government of South Africa as it became extremely vocal against its condemnation of 
South Africa’s racial policies. According to Geldenhuys (1984:168), a number of 
reasons provided the impetus for these churches with a non-racial membership to 
exert considerable influence and constraint on South Africa’s foreign policy in many 
ways. In the first place, many of these churches continued to maintain close 
relationship with the WCC thus creating huge tension with the government along with 
the NGK. This was because the WCC was upbeat in its criticism against South 
Africa’s racial and apartheid policies while also showing unwavering support for 
many of South Africa’s anti-apartheid movements in exile under its programme 
targeted at combating racism (Geldenhuys 1984:168). Secondly, the South African 
Council of Churches (SACC) was also at the forefront of mounting up public 
criticism against the apartheid government with many members of the English and 
Black churches publicly expressing concern and support towards international 
attempts to isolate South Africa from the international political-economic system by 
cutting off trade relations and further supporting international boycott against the 
government. In the third place, a number of these churches also extended their support 





conscience. This was apart from the willingness of the churches to extend their hands 
of service to both casualties of the Namibian war (Geldenhuys 1984:168). Overall, the 
anti-apartheid English and Black churches proved critical (during the period) in 
ensuring that the black population of South Africa had a voice to speak against the 
oppression of the apartheid regime and as Geldenhuys (1984:168) rightly suggests, 
thus playing a crucial role in “sensitising and indeed shaping foreign opinion on South 
Africa” at the time.  
(c) Mass media (Newspapers, radio and television etc.) 
In this section, we focus on the roles played by the newspapers, radio and television 
stations on the process of foreign policy-making in South Africa in the apartheid era. 
Geldenhuys (1984:182) notes correctly that the South African press like every other 
press reflected the domestic nuances prevalent within the South African society itself- 
of race, language and political affiliation. To this end, the press reproduced the same 
social and racial context of the White and Black people with the latter equally divided 
into ‘Afrikaans’ press and the ‘English’ press while also reflecting the same political 
variant of pro-government press and opposition press (Geldenhuys 1984:182). Each 
of these categories of press exerted different degree of influence or lack of influence 
at different point of the period under study. It is from this simple understanding that 
we situate the influence of the press on South Africa’s foreign policy formulation 
during this period. South African newspapers were largely owned by four private 
printing and publishing companies; the Argus Printing and Publishing Company, 
South African Associated Newspaper (SAAN), the Nasionale Pers and the Perskor 











Table 5.4: List of English, Black and Afrikaans Newspapers during apartheid   
English and Black Afrikaans 
Argus Printing and 
Publishing Company 






The Star (Johannesburg) 
Daily News (Durban) 
The Argus (Cape Town) 
Pretoria News (Pretoria) 
Sunday Tribune (Durban) 
Sowetan  
(Johannesburg; for blacks) 
Ilanga (Durban; for blacks) 
The Cape Herald  
(Cape Town; for coloureds)  
Rand Daily Mail 
Mail (Johannesburg) 
Cape Times (Cape Town) 
Sunday Express  
(Johannesburg) 



















Source: Author’s compilation, 2012 
The Afrikaans press emerged in the second decade of the twentieth century and about 
the same period when the National Party was established in July 1914. According to 
Geldenhuys (1984:182), its raison d’être was fundamentally to “champion the cause 
of Afrikaner nationalism in partnership with the National Party, the Afrikaans 
churches and Afrikaans cultural organisations”. Eventually, a strong linkage was 
established between the press and political parties with the Nasionale Pers’ Die 
Burger being the mouthpiece of the Cape National Party in 1915 and the Die 
Volksblad emerging as the talking drum for the National Party in Orange Free State in 
1917 while the Die Transvaler becoming the spokesperson for the National Party in 
Transvaal (Geldenhuys 1984:182). In 1982, there was also the Die Patriot which was 
set up primarily as the voice for the newly formed Conservative Party. This 
connection between the press and the political party also became evident with the 
eventual emergence of Malan and Verwoerd as National Party leader and Prime 
Minister respectively. It would be recalled that both of them had different stints as 





Since 1948 when the National Party came into government, there was a switch of 
support from the English press which had hitherto embraced the previous government 
to the Afrikaans press being pro-government with many of its affiliates faithfully 
performing the role of being the representative of the National Party. The Afrikaans 
press primarily was used as an instrument to further the deepening of both the 
domestic and foreign policies of the apartheid government during this period.  
Conversely, at the same time, the English and black press became an opposing 
reaction to Afrikaans press thus becoming what is often known as the “alternative 
press” (Pfister 2005:22). Many of the White English speaking newspapers including 
the Rand Daily Mail, The World (later renamed Post) and Weekend World were 
critical of South Africa’s racist policies and frequently opposed the National Party’s 
position while aligning its support over time for the Progressive Party. Particularly in 
1966, the newspaper won the World Press Achievement Reward in honour of its open 
criticism of the apartheid regime’s “injustice and the maltreatment of prisoners, 
especially blacks” (Pfister 2005:21).  It would also be recalled that it was the 
investigative journalism of the paper that eventually led to the Information Scandal 
and ultimately its closure in 1985 (Pfister 2005:21; Walker 1982:313-35). The Weekly 
Mail
34
 established in 1981 was later to continue in maintaining this struggle against 
South Africa’s apartheid policy.  
Other news magazines like the English speaking News/Check established in 1972 
paid significant attention to foreign affairs with a special focus on Africa. Even 
though it did not share the political sentiments of the English press, it was at the 
forefront of Vorster’s outward looking policy. To the Point was also another news 
magazine fully funded and established by the government to provide information both 
locally and globally on developments in Africa while creating an image laundering 
platform for the South African government. 
On the influence of the radio and television on foreign policy formulation in South 
Africa during this period, it is noteworthy to mention the efforts of the South African 
Broadcasting Corporation (SABC). Established in 1936, the SABC was mandated 
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 and radio broadcasts in South Africa with coverage extending 
beyond the country into London and Washington. In examining the period under 
study, it is sufficient to claim that SABC maintained considerable relationship with its 
owner (the government) even though it was granted autonomy by the Act of 
Parliament that set it up in 1939.   
(d)  The intelligentsia (University academics and think tanks) 
At different periods within the purview of this study, the intellectual community had 
commanded varied degrees of significance in the making of foreign policy within 
South Africa. Munger (1965:51-53) mentioned that prior to the period of Verwoerd’s 
leadership, “policy formulators lacked help from universities” in trying to understand 
the dynamics of the African continent. Such research institutions as the South African 
Institute of International Affairs (SIIA) and the Africa Institute had increasingly come 
to play a critical part in life of South Africa’s foreign policy construction. The 
academic contributions of these intellectual elites consistently became a basis for 
government’s decision regarding policy choices. A good number of publications exist 
which detailed aspects of South Africa’s relationship with other countries or regions 
across Africa and the world. There was the increasing need and expectation for the 
views and opinion of the members of the academic community particularly in the 
universities and private research institutes in South Africa regarding foreign policy 
choices of government. Therefore, over the years, academic experts had come to play 
a considerable dominant role in shaping and making a significant impression on the 
formulation of government’s foreign policies.  
(e)  International sanctions and isolation 
As a result of its racial domestic policy, South Africa was increasingly isolated from 
the rest of the international community when the apartheid government was in power. 
International isolation therefore came in two forms. First, there was the isolation 
directed at the South African government itself. For instance, the UN Convention on 
the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid otherwise referred to as 
the Apartheid Convention (30 November 1973) was part of the UN’s opposition and 
sanction of the discriminatory racial policies of the South African Government 
(known as apartheid) which lasted from 1948 to 1990. Articles 55 and 56 of the 
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Charter establishing the UN were apt in condemning both the South African 
government and its apartheid policy. The apartheid policy was consequently labeled 
as crime against humanity (Resolution 2202 A (XXI) of December 16, 1966) by the 
General Assembly, and in 1984, the Security Council endorsed this as a resolution 
(resolution 556 (1984) of 23 October 1984). As such, as pointed out by Geldenhuys 
(1984:205) consistent actions were “undertaken by external political actors with the 
purpose of persuading or coercing the South African government either to abandon 
certain policies and actions or, alternatively to behave in a particular fashion”. These 
collective external actions were particularly targeted at invoking certain change in 
behavior in South Africa’s domestic policies which it eventual ceded in 1990s 
culminating in the eventual annulment of its apartheid policy.  
Secondly, there was the increasing pressure from many international actors to equally 
isolate such other institutions or international actors that were believed to be 
supporting directly or indirectly South Africa and condoning its discriminatory policy. 
By implication, “foreign and local institutions including foreign governments and 
transnational corporations, believed to be helping Pretoria sustain its policies” were 
equally isolated and condemned (Geldenhuys 1984:205). During this period therefore, 
the conduct of South Africa’s foreign relations was greatly impeded by its 
international isolation as a pariah state while it conducted its foreign policy under a 
generally harsh and violent domestic and international environment that was neither 
receptive to anything South African nor willing to enter into any meaningful open 
diplomatic relations with it. 
Closely related to the above was the extension of international sanctions against the 
South African government in many cases applied by both states and non-state actors 
alike in several ways with the intent of compelling the establishment of a democratic 
government brought about through a racially inclusive free and fair election where the 
majority rules. In this wise, economic, sport, military, diplomatic etc. sanctions were 
directed at the South African government ultimately to completely isolate it from the 
international community and hopefully force it to renege on its racial policies that 
were prejudicial to all values of human rights. Particularly in this regard, a Resolution 
(1761) condemning South Africa’s apartheid policies was passed by the United 





Resolution 181 was equally passed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
calling for a voluntary arms embargo against the government of South Africa 
(Geldenhuys 1984:206). Before then, the UNGA at its 15
th
 session held in 1961, 
resolved to request at both individual and collective levels of its member states to 
exert all necessary form of coercion and sanctions against the South African 
government. This was followed by the establishment of a Special Committee Against 
Apartheid tasked with overseeing the implementation of the concerted sanctions 
against the apartheid regime (Geldenhuys 1984:206). It was not until November 1977 
that the voluntary arms embargo imposed on South Africa was later changed to a 
mandatory arms embargo by the UNSC (Geldenhuys 1984:206).  
Economic sanctions (made possible by the withdrawal of trade relations, foreign 
direct investment, consumer boycott, and divestment) were in like manner extended 
towards South Africa and deployed as an alternative to violence (Miller 2004:3-4) 
came in two different dimensions; trade and financial restrictions. According to 
Laverty (2007) “trade sanctions are aimed at the restriction or cessation of imports 
and exports between the actors and the target nation. Financial sanctions, on the other 
hand, came through as corporate and private disinvestment [the extraction of 
corporate ownership or the restraining or withdrawal of all forms of foreign capital 
that is invested in the country] (Kaempfer 1987:459) and divestment (the breaking of 
financial and economic relations with companies that profit from business). This was 
intended to control or manipulate the flow of private foreign capital into the country 
targeted by sanctions, in this case South Africa. In retrospect, the voluntary economic 
sanctions imposed on South African appeared to have yielded substantial success 
against the apartheid government and as correctly remarked by Geldenhuys 
(1984:206), “the punitive measures called for were designed to isolate South Africa 
diplomatically, economically and militarily”. 
Other sanctions imposed on the South African government included social and sports 
sanctions intended to intensify the already imposed economic and military sanctions. 
In the case of the former, South Africa was excluded from the membership of such 
international institutions like the International Labor Organization, United Nations 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO), 





for Africa (ECA), and its eventually expulsion from the UNGA in 1974. While for the 
latter, South Africa and its people were summarily excluded from active participation 
at any competitive level in many sporting events across the world. A typical example 
was its exclusion from the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). 
Following the end of apartheid, Nelson Mandela who emerged as the first President of 
an all-inclusive democratic election in April 1994 was quick to assert the efficacy of 
economic and sports sanctions in quashing the apartheid government thus bringing 
about political change and democratic transition in the country. By implication, the 
imposition of international sanctions contributed in no small measure in redirecting 
both the domestic and foreign policy posture of South Africa during these periods 
(Levy 1999:2). 
(f) The end of the Cold-War and the end of apartheid  
Many have argued that the end of the Cold War invoked a different global 
permutation in world politics. Following the dismantling of the Berlin Wall, in 
November 1989, leading to the disintegration of the USSR and its hold over Eastern 
Europe, communism became less fashionable as an economic and political system. 
These events contributed significantly to the transformation of events in South Africa 
especially as both sides of the conflict (South African National Party/government and 
the ANC) relied on the communist institutions in sustaining their argument. As 
explained before, while the ANC received wide support from the USSR communist 
government, the South African government was keen to justify its apartheid policy on 
the basis of the imperative to dispel further communist incursion particularly into 
Africa at the detriment of capitalism. The end of the Cold-War thus changed the 
international configuration and impeded on the support that both parties were likely to 
continue to receive. According to Giliomee and Mbenga 2007:394-395): 
Anti-communism had long been the main reason why 
Western governments accepted and even bolstered white rule 
in South Africa. But the disappearance of the communist 
threat and the ANC’s retreat from nationalization had made 
the South African government’s anti-communism old-
fashioned, and deprived it of its strongest argument for 






As demonstrated above, the change in policy (public and foreign) thus had a lot to do 
with the international outcome of the end of the Cold-War. Thus, without doubt, the 
coming into power of the ANC would almost not have been possible without the fall 
of communism, the dismantling of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of USSR. 
Mandela (1993) in acknowledging the impact of the Cold War on both South Africa 
and the African continent explained that “all nations will have boldly to recast their 
nets if they are to reap any benefit from the international affairs in the post-Cold War 
era”. Pfister (2005:122) in extending this argument further contends that “the waning 
of the Cold War crucially impacted on South Africa and its foreign relations with 
Africa” while stating further that this period “at the end of the 1980s led to a retreat of 
the West from Africa, particularly in the economic sphere” (Pfister 2000:1). This 
period was therefore marked by a reduction on the emphasis on the military 
component of South Africa’s foreign policy particularly in the South African region 
and a re-emphasis on the DFA in foreign relations, bilateral and multilateral 
negotiations. 
According to Pfister (2000), one of the principal factors that have shaped the foreign 
policy perspective of South Africa towards Africa in the post-apartheid era is the 
termination of apartheid in 1994. He notes that this transformation has afforded South 
Africa the opportunity for the first time in the country’s history, “to establish and 
maintain contacts with African states on equal terms”. 
5.3.1.2  The Post-apartheid period 
(a) Parliament 
A major actor in the foreign policy scene of most democratic states is parliament. 
South Africa’s democratic era emerged with the parliament playing not only a 
constitutional role in the design of foreign policy but also in giving general guidance 
for this foreign policy perspective. In the post-apartheid period, the powers of the 
South African parliament (the National Assembly and the National Council of 
Provinces) has reduced dramatically compared to its apartheid predecessors where the 
parliament was particularly crucial to foreign policy formulation (Bridgman 2002:71). 
Chief among the parliamentary actors in the legislature is the Parliamentary Portfolio 
Committee on Foreign Affairs (PPCFA) which is statutorily responsible for 





Department. Apart from this, the Committee also considers related bills, deliberates 
and approves Departmental budgetary votes and overseeing the work of the 
Department and making recommendations regarding any aspect of the functioning, 
structure and policy of the Department (SA Parliament). 
Moreover, the South African Parliament also participates in global legislative forums 
such as the Pan-African Parliament; SADC Parliamentary Forum; Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Association; Inter- Parliamentary Union (IPU); and African, Caribbean, 
Pacific-European Union Forum (SA Parliament). Currently, Parliament identifies four 
fundamental foreign policy priorities that guide its participation and contribution at 
global platforms and discussions; developing and strengthening partnerships in 
Africa, advancing multilateralism, bilateralism through friendship societies and 
strategic groups, and providing for public input. There is also the Portfolio Committee 
on Defence and Military Veterans that executes practically similar roles over the DoD 
and the SANDF in its organization, budgeting and policies even though with little 
vigour as its Foreign Affairs counterpart. Overall, Parliament undertakes the foreign 
policy role of representing, aggregating and articulating the general public opinion 
and interest while also giving the public the platform to comment on particular issues 
at different points in time through its open sessions (Bridgman 2002:69; Alden and le 
Pere 2003:17).  
Taking a closer look at the structure of South Africa’s political system, there is in 
effect an overlapping of both the executive and the legislative branches of government 
making it almost impossible for the legislature especially to operate effectively and 
carry out its oversight functions over the executive as is traditionally expected. While 
this might not necessarily be a feature of the institutional configuration of the 
National Assembly but rather a specific consequence of the use of a party list electoral 
system, Alden and le Pere (2003:17) rightly point out that “lack of resources and the 
pressure of party politics have consistently hampered the portfolio committee’s 
oversight and review functions”. Effectively, there is a limited capacity on the part of 
Parliament to play critical roles in foreign policy formulation given the internal and 






(b) Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) 
Governance in the contemporary modern state usually saddles the task of external 
relations to a Ministry or Department with the responsibility primarily of planning and 
implementing the state’s foreign policy (Frankel, 1963:28). The South African state is 
not an exception. The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
36
 has traditionally and 
constitutionally acted in this capacity until its name change in 2009 into Department 
of International Relations (DIRCO). DIRCO is South Africa’s foreign ministry 
responsible for external relationships with countries abroad and partner international 
organizations while also maintaining and nourishing South Africa's diplomatic 
missions through its diplomats, ambassadors, embassies, consulates etc. Currently, the 
Department is headed by the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, 
Maite Nkoana-Mashabane (see Table 5.5). A major responsibility of the Department 
is that of “formulating, coordinating, implementing and managing South Africa’s 
foreign policy and international relations programmes throughout the world” (DIRCO 
2009b). 
   Table 5.5: Foreign policy leadership in the post-apartheid period 
President Period Minister of 
Foreign Affairs 
Period 
Nelson Mandela 1994–1999  Alfred Nzo 1994-1999 
 
Thabo Mbeki 1999–2008  
Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma                              
  
     
1999-2009 
                                       Kgalema Motlanthe 2008–2009 
Jacob Zuma 2009–present Maite Nkoana-
Mashabane 
2009-present 
   Source: Author’s Compilation; 2012 
Today, and with the emergence of the post-apartheid period in 1994, the role of the 
DIRCO in foreign policy making has taken a sharp turn and changed rapidly from the 
erstwhile “attempts to ward off international sanctions and diplomatic isolation” 
against South Africa to being the custodians of South Africa’s foreign policy (Alden 
and le Pere (2003:14). This remarkable difference in foreign policy attitude did not 
emerge overnight but with series of turns and twists that the Department has had to 
take over the years. The Department was confronted with multiple internal constraints 
at the start of the new political dispensation. Tjemolane (2010:68-70) highlights five 
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challenges identified by a number of scholars that the Department was faced with; the 
departmental racial composition (See Suttner, 1996: Internet, Alden and le Pere, 
2004:285), gender imbalances (See le Pere and van Nieuwkerk (2004:121, DIRCO, 
2009c:23), internal divisions based on ideological affiliation (See Inglis, 2008:37, van 
der Westhuizen, 1998:444, le Pere and van Nieuwkerk, 2004:121-122), departmental 
leadership and its performance in policy coordination (See Cilliers 1999; Alden and 
le Pere 2004:285; Muller 1997:69;  le Pere & van Nieuwkerk 2004:123) and lastly its 
tense relations with the Portfolio Committee on International Relations and 
Cooperation, the DTI, and the DOD (Landsberg and Masiza 1995:13; Vale 1995; 
Cilliers 1999:5).  
Particularly, South Africa’s foreign policy implementation is intrinsically tied to 
DIRCO as it is through this platform that the country pursues its national interest and 
also conducts its external (bilateral and multilateral) relations with the rest of the 
world. However, the role of DIRCO has oscillated between successive leaderships 
from time to time driven most times by the assertiveness or lack thereof of the foreign 
affairs minister and the influence of the Executive President at the time. For instance, 
the DIRCO’s foreign policy role was almost completely overshadowed by the 
personality and presence of President Mandela (Mills 1997:24; Alden and le Pere 
2004:285; Cilliers, 1999:5; Masters 2012:21-22) thus giving the department minimal 
role to play in foreign policy formulation during this period. And as Alden and le Pere 
(2004:286) explained “its internal fragmentation and inertia together with the 
centrifugal effects of competitive networks conspired (in most instances) to make it 
rather peripheral to shaping influencing policy during the Mandela years”.  
Nevertheless, DIRCO has sought to find more pragmatic means to involve itself in 
South Africa’s foreign policy formulation through the South African Council on 
International Relations (SACOIR) set up in 2011. SACOIR aims to provide a 
platform that inspires greater levels of participation and involvement of the civil 
society, academia, business, organized labour and other national departments in 
generating public debate and a consultative forum for regular review as well as advise 






Even though it was not able to play an effective foreign policy role due largely to 
Mandela’s dominant posture couple with its “lack of coordinated vision” at the time, 
it nevertheless remained connected to the implementation of South Africa’s foreign 
policy (Alden and le Pere 2003:15; Hughes 2004). However, this role has increased 
greatly moving into the subsequent dispensations of Mbeki and Zuma as the 
Department “regained a substantial portion of its influence that it had lost during the 
apartheid years” (Schraeder 2001:236). 
DIRCO budgetary allocation has continued to increase in reflection of its increasing 
significance in the foreign policy molding and implementation of the Department (see 
Table 5.6). Also, the yearly strategic plan of the Department often makes a huge 
statement regarding the country’s foreign policy and national interest at different 
periods.  For instance, the Department sets out the foundation for its South-South 
relations with such multilateral forums and institutions like the IBSA Dialogue Forum 
(IBSA); BRICS; the New Africa-Asia Strategic Partnership (NAASP); the Indian 
Ocean Rim Association of Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC); the Forum on China-
Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)  G77 and China 
(DIRCO 2009). The Department’s capacity to play an increasing role in foreign 
policy shaping has often been hindered by competing actors in the foreign policy 
environment such as the Department of Defence, the ANC, the Presidency, 
Department of Trade, etc.  
               Table 5.6: Yearly budgetary allocations to DIRCO from the  
   National Treasury 
Year Budgetary Allocation (R million) 
2001/02 1, 660, 839, 000 
2002/03 2, 079, 297, 000 
2003/04 2, 243, 555, 000 
2004/05 2, 485, 814, 000 
2005/06 2, 595, 071, 000 
2006/07 2, 916, 584, 000 
2007/08 3, 168, 451, 000 
2008/09 4, 340, 708, 000 





2010/11 4, 824, 400, 000 
2011/2012 4, 796, 800, 000 
2012/2013 5, 116, 591, 000 
     Source: Author’s Compilation; (See South African Department of 
   Finance, Annual Reports for the financial years shown on the table) 
(c) Department of Defence (DoD) and the South African National Defence 
 Force  (SANDF) 
Following the end of apartheid, South Africa in 1994 joined the rest of the global 
community as a democratic nation while also witnessing remarkable internal 
institutional transformation within its political space. One of such institutions that was 
transformed in terms of its role in the Republic’s foreign policy perspective was the 
Department of Defence (DoD) headed by Secretary for Defence and the South 
African National Defence Force (SANDF) led by the Chief of the National Defence 
Force. Key to this transformation was the imperative to make it highly “representative 
of the South African people” while equally guaranteeing “transparency in defence 
management and accountability to civil authority, establishing greater efficiency and 
aligning defence policy with the Constitution, international law and national culture” 
(Roux 2005:1).  
Chapter 11 of the South African Constitution stipulates the fundamental objective of 
the Defence Force to “defend and protect the republic, its territorial integrity and its 
people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law 
regulating the use of force” while also making provision for the establishment of the 
Department of Defence (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa; 1996). As with 
its counterpart (DFA/DIRCO), a major critical issue that the SANDF has been 
confronted with is that of making sure that its personnel reflect a sense of racial and 
gender equality where the initially predominant white and male presence of the 
apartheid military is completely eradicated or at least reduced to barest minimum 








Table 5.7: Racial reflection of the SANDF personnel  
Race Male Female Total 
Year African Indians Coloured White African Indians Coloured White  
1998 38 781 791 6 581 17 881 3 645 95 623 5 128 73 525 
2004 
/05 
39724  785  7692  11467  8 838 219 2 037 6 207 76 969 
2007 
/08 
40 233 640 7 061 8 587 10 938 235 2 274 4 877 74 845 
2010 
/11 
42010  628  7262  7574  14 377 256 2 726 4 212 79 045 
Source: South African Defence Review and South African Department of Defence 
Annual Reports (1998-2011) 
Today, the role of these two interrelated institutions in shaping and implementing 
South Africa’s foreign policy has remained largely intact albeit with a different focus. 
Three major factors make the military a very critical component of South Africa 
foreign policy decision making (Kent-Brown 2002:126). One is the substantial and 
traditional relevance of the military in guaranteeing the national interest and security 
of the Republic and its people. In this instance, South Africa’s military strength 
becomes useful in dislodging possible perceived threat against its national security. 
This is explained in its decision, for instance, to intervene in the constitutional and 
political crisis in Lesotho, in 1998 using its military informed by its overall 
assessment of its capacity and willingness to halt further escalation of the conflict. 
Second is the profit imperative to sustain the growth of South Africa’s arms industry 
and the quest to maintain its place in the global arms market (Alden and le Pere 
2003:16).  
Often times, the decision to intervene militarily in any given dispute rests with the 
DoD in collaboration with the President and the Committee on National Conventional 
Arms Control. This makes the Department a critical element of South Africa’s foreign 
policy. In the third place is the mandate of military diplomacy evidenced in South 
Africa’s increasing commitment in the area of peacekeeping particularly in the 
African continent. Masters (2012:30) indicates that “South Africa’s commitment to 
international peace and security, and particularly in supporting peace-keeping efforts 
on the African continent (and UN ambitions), have seen the Department of Defence 





These factors therefore place the DoD as a dominant element and key actor in the 
shaping of the country’s foreign policy. The Department continues to play a key role 
in partnering with DIRCO in promoting peace, security and stability in Africa through 
a multinational and multilateral approach in its defence initiatives. However, the 
historical (apartheid) past of the Department has made it extremely difficult to wield 
substantial influence in the foreign policy sphere of South Africa. There are still 
considerable amount of suspicion and distraught, particularly among its Southern 
African neighbours of the devastating influence that the military wielded during the 
apartheid period in South Africa’s regional destabilization policy and activities 
(Schraeder 2010:237). 
(d) National non-governmental actors  
No doubt, foreign policy formulation and implementation of any state is the 
prerogative of the government of that particular state. However, foreign policy of any 
state often reflects the civil and political pressures from several non-state actors 
within the country; therefore government leaders are obliged to pay attention to their 
voices and concerns (Coplin 1980:115). This mutual relationship and influence 
pattern existing between the state and non-state actors such as civil society or non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) has clearly been theoretically and empirically 
articulated by several authors including Deutsch et al (1957), Nye and Keohane 
(1971), Huntington (1973), Nye and Keohane (1974), Krasner (1995), Katzenstein 
(1996), Price (1997), Price (1998), Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), Boli and Thomas 
(1999), Young (2000), Hawkins (2002), Risse (2002), Heins (2005), Barnett (2005), 
Kans and Mingst (2010), Princen (2003), and Kim (2011).  
Coplin (1980), for instance, identifies two of such actors; (interest groups and public 
and the news media) located within a state and command substantial impact of foreign 
policy construction. Interest groups, for instance, are formed along certain common 
interest to its members; economic, ethnic, policy change etc. attempt to put pressure 
on government leaders to take actions that are favourable to its members. Particularly 
in democratic countries, and depending also on one time period to the next, interest 
groups and the media play active roles and help to shape the foreign policy priorities 
of such countries. More recently, Kim (2011:1) provided sufficient evidence 





other states both directly and indirectly, functioning as information providers, 
lobbying groups, agenda setters, and norm generators”.  
In the case of South Africa, the 1996 Constitution makes provision for citizens of 
South Africa to participate in the policy formulation fundamentally through voting 
and elections. McGowan and Nel (2002:341) posit that, “civil society refers to any 
non-state actor within a society including academia, businesses, labour unions, private 
media, churches, voluntary organisations and others”. This comprises a wide range of 
actors including research and academic institutes such as the Institute for Security 
Studies (ISS), South African Institute for International Affairs (SAIIA), African 
Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), Institute for Global 
Dialogue, South African Foreign Policy Initiative (SAFPI) while others like the South 
African Civil Society Information Service (SACSIS), and South African Non-
governmental Organisations Coalition (SANGOCO) help to articulate the voice of the 
public by providing credible information on issues of public interest. There are also 
the print and electronic media such as Mail and Guardian, Witness, Business Day, 
The Star, e-News, and SABC1-3 which present to the public on a regularly basis 
relevant information on critical international issues that ultimately help the citizenry 
to develop informed opinions regarding foreign policy issues of government.  
Alden and le Pere (2003:17) also point out that the country’s “rich civil society 
includes a range of non-state actors concerned with influencing foreign policy, such 
as trade unions, civic organisations, human-rights groups and academic think-tanks” 
arguing further that the sector had undergone a profound transformation since the 
onset of the democratic transition. They explained that there is now a remarkable 
difference between the role that the civil societies play prior to the end of apartheid 
and the period afterwards.  In essence, today, perhaps since the crushing of the 
apartheid policies, the influence of interest groups in the foreign policy sphere have 
increasingly dwindled over the years with the civil society unable to convert its 
previous energies into fresh mandates for political-economic influence. As argued 
elsewhere, civil societies are still being inundated by the shadow of the ANC whom it 
collaborated with in the national liberation struggles against apartheid (Alden and le 





This is not to suggest that the members of the civil society have not added its voice 
substantially to global issues with the intent to affect South Africa’s position on 
specific issues. Since 1994, civil society has added its voice to South Africa’s policy 
development and position on issues ranging from the environment and climate to 
promoting human rights and democratic principles across the world. Civil society has 
therefore contributed significantly to foreign policy choices and the drafting of policy 
papers, discussion document and white papers of government. To be sure, the voice of 
the civil society and the public in general was particularly relevant in articulating the 
opinion of the populace and giving the government a sense of direction in such cases 
as the Dalai Lama saga, the Libyan conflict, the Zimbabwe situation, etc. However, it 
is often difficult to determine the level, degree or even outcomes of such civil society 
expressions and influence. The influence that the civil society wields on foreign 
policy perspectives are often determined by the conviction and willingness of the 
President in recognizing their roles in the policy formulation sphere. 
(e) Personality of the leadership/Executive President 
The role of the Executive President is ably amplified in Chapter 5, Sections 83, 84(h), 
(i) and 85 of the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa which clearly 
outlines the role of the President in the design of South Africa’s foreign policy 
(Schraeder 2001:236). Masters (2012:21) corroborates this position by submitting that 
“South Africa’s presidents have continued, to varying degree, to occupy the central 
position in the foreign policy machinery”. We had earlier illustrated this connection 
between foreign policy and the personality and style of leadership at different points 
of a state’s existence. Reflecting this nexus on the post-apartheid period in South 
Africa, we clearly see that during the leadership of President Mandela, his personality 
and character translated into practical foreign policy choices for South Africa and as 
Mills (1997:3) asserts, “President Mandela’s stature in the international domain has 
meant that South Africa’s image and its foreign policy tends largely to be equated 
with the President’s profile”. This again, highlights the import of personality and 
leadership style and its influence in shaping the context and shaping of foreign policy. 
Invariably therefore, it was not farfetched for many to assume that Mandela’s public 
statements often were seen as guiding light for South Africa’s foreign relations as 





Ofcourse, this is sometimes a negative for a country if the president is someone who 
is prone to taking rash decisions. 
Mandela’s foreign policy vision and disposition clearly overshadowed other foreign 
policy stakeholders and thereby increasingly blurring the lines between the individual, 
the ANC ruling party and the state institutions. It was therefore not surprising that 
Pretoria’s external relations during this period were carved in Mandela’s values for 
democracy, respect for human rights and international law (Masters 2012; Mandela 
1993). South Africa’s position relating to Nigeria in the event of the killing of the 
Ogoni 9 was pretty much at Mandela’s instance. In this instance, South African 
prestige and image were dented as Mandela found himself isolated and humbled 
within the region. 
The same is true for Mbeki’s leadership in the almost 10 years while in office where 
he was at the centre of South Africa’s foreign policy. His leadership brought about the 
revival of the Pan-African agenda in the debate on issues of African political-
economy and evidenced in the country’s foreign policy of an African renaissance, 
NEPAD and the eventual reform of the OAU (Alden and le Pere 2004:285; Masters 
2012; DFA 2003). Mbeki played an active role in the reshaping of South African 
foreign policy into clearly defined ideological patterns. His largely technocratic 
posture added a fresh dimension to the context of the Republic’s foreign policy at the 
time. His preference was more for the use of the state institutions like the DFA in 
articulating and achieving state foreign policy objectives (Schraeder 2001:236).  
More importantly, the South African Constitution provides for a legal framework that 
supports the centrality of the role of the President to foreign policy decision making. 
Chapter 5 of the Constitution entrusts upon the President the executive authority 
which includes among others the task of developing and implementing national 
policy. As head of state and government, the President also has powers to appoint 
(and dismiss when necessary) ambassadors, plenipotentiaries diplomatic and consular 
representatives and the obligation of receiving and recognizing foreign diplomatic and 







(f) The (dominant) political party (Africa National Congress; ANC) 
In most democracies, there is usually a strong relationship between the government 
and the dominant or majority political party. In South Africa’s democratic politics, 
aside the disposition of the President, as the dominant and ruling party since the post-
apartheid democratic dispensation in 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) 
National Executive Council (NEC), its sub-committee on International Relations and 
an International Relations Rapid Response Task Team also play prominent roles in 
foreign policy discussion and formulation (Masters 2012:27). In its Foreign Policy 
Perspectives in a Democratic South Africa, published in March 1994, the ANC laid 
down some of the following principles that were expected to guide the conduct of 
South Africa’s foreign policy:   
- a belief and preoccupation with human rights, which extends beyond the 
political, embracing economic, social and environmental dimensions; 
- a belief that just and lasting solutions to the problems of humankind can only 
come through the promotion of democracy worldwide; 
- a belief that justice and international law should guide relations between 
nations; 
- a belief that international peace is the goal towards which all nations should 
strive; 
- a belief that South Africa’s foreign policy should reflect the interests of 
Africa; 
- a belief that South Africa’s economic development depends on growing and 
international economic cooperation; and 
- a belief that South Africa’s foreign relations must mirror a deep commitment 
to the consolidation of its democracy. 
 
Clearly, many of these priorities itemized by the ANC were motivated by the long 
years of resistance of the apartheid regime. Included in the ANC foreign policy 
proposal is the strive for cooperation and integration, peace and security at both the 
regional and continental level while also repudiating any hegemonic ambition and 
choosing to relate with all African states especially on the basis of “partnership and 
equality” (ANC 1994; Venter and Landsberg 2006:252). In a similar vein, Pfister 





to reassure African states, particularly its neighbors, of the government’s non-
hegemonic intentions”. According to Mandela (1993:86), “the African National 
Congress (ANC) believes that the charting of a new foreign policy for South Africa is 
a key element in the creation of a peaceful and prosperous country”. The ANC 
therefore invariably sought to locate these objectives within the Global North-South 
debate by throwing itself behind the countries within the South. In doing this, it set for 
itself the task to re-establish a fundamentally and ideologically different foreign 
policy for South Africa, one that should take cognizance of the unique history of the 
South African people.  
According to Hughes (2004), “The composition of the committee is highly significant 
as it serves to coordinate ANC foreign policy interests and representation from the 
Presidency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, parliament, the tripartite alliance and 
other significant stakeholders”. One of the critical responsibilities of the committee 
includes ensuring the coordination of government’s (Presidency, DIRCO etc.) 
position with that of the ANC. 
It goes without saying that the foreign policy priorities of governments are literally a 
mirror reflection of the policy preferences of the ANC. It is possible to effectively 
say, that, as long as the ANC remains in power, the future of South Africa 
international relations is intrinsically tied to its ideological manifestations. In a similar 
sense, the ANC’s foreign policy position is drawn from its reaffirmation of the 
Freedom Charter which “constitutes the firm foundation for the conduct of the ANC`s 
international relations” (ANC 1991). The ANC’s foreign policy position regarding 
South Africa’s international relations is particularly informed by its historical past and 
experiences with the Southern African region, Africa and of course the rest of the 
world. 
Right before the commencement of the new government in office in 1994, the ANC 
already announced and articulated its foreign policy position regarding its 
international relations when it stated through its leader, Mandela six pivotal areas that 
would go on to underpin South Africa's future foreign policy (see previous sections) 
(Mandela 1993;87; Van Der Westhuizen 1998:442). He further highlighted the 
centrality of the ANC future foreign policy paths that the South African government 





anticipated the potential role of the ANC when he states that “given its history and 
standing amongst South Africans as the major liberation movement, it will probably 
play the most influential role in the making of foreign policy of the new government”.  
Today, we see clearly that the overwhelming control of the internal democracy 
structures of South Africa makes it possible for the ANC to wield overriding 
influence through its leadership in government on foreign policy formulation. For 
instance, the ANC’s orientated foreign policy orientation which recognizes the 
principle of human rights, the rights of non-state actors, and the principle of non-
alignment are equally extrapolated and transposed into South Africa’s policy positions 
in such issue areas as its support for the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), 
and the struggle for self-determination of the Palestinian people, arms exports as well 
as its prioritization of Africa (Hughes 2004:32).  
However, there is an increasing dissatisfaction on the part of the ANC in terms of the 
recognition of its role in foreign policy molding suggesting the reality of a rising 
lacuna between the party and its input into government’s policy formulation process 
(Hughes 2004:32). The ANC has struggled to assert its influence by its failure to 
“provide policy guidance to governmental departments, initiatives and policies” 
(Hughes 2004:32).  
(g) Regime type and regime change 
The study of foreign policy change and its relationship with political regime type and 
institutional arrangements has been articulated by several scholars including 
Gasiorowski, (1995) in demonstrating the existing relationships among state structural 
attributes, leadership, foreign policy behavior, and international outcomes (Leeds and 
Davis 1999:5). In assessing the fundamental factors that influence and determine 
foreign policy positions of states today, the significant role that regime settings play 
have become critical to this estimation. Clearly, foreign policy change and transition 
is influenced by the type of regime and political institutional arrangement prevalent in 
the state thereby creating conditions of limitations and inducements for foreign policy 
consistencies or inconsistencies. According to Leeds and Davis (1999:5), 
“…institutional attributes of states influence state behavior in the international system 





Under the new democratic dispensation that emerged following the dismantling of the 
apartheid regime in 1994, foreign policy posture of South Africa took a remarkable 
and totally different posture informed significantly by its historical experiences of the 
apartheid past. There was a change from a strong realist background to foreign 
relations to a largely idealist leaning ushering in new priorities that emphasized the 
centrality of Africa, (and especially Southern Africa), the expansion and consolidation 
of South Africa's position in other regions of the world, such as the Middle East, Far 
East, South East Asia and Eastern Europe, and the expansion South Africa's relations 
with the UN and other inter-governmental multilateral organisations (Henwood 
1997:2). According to Henwood (1997:2), “The constitutional and institutional 
changes that took place in South Africa since 1994 provided for important changes in 
the foreign policy formulation and implementation processes”. These aspects need to 
be explained to determine their influence on the foreign policy process in South 
Africa. 
These constitutional changes included the replacement of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, Act 110 of 1983, with the transitional constitution, 
(Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993)
37
 and the subsequent 
acceptance of a 'final' constitution, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
1996, Act 108. These constitutional changes have formed part of the process to 
democratize South Africa in all respects, including the foreign policy South Africa 
follows or would like to implement. The Constitution does not include any specific 
foreign policy guidelines, but provides a framework for procedural matters and policy 
decisions. The Constitution also provides a framework of values that ought to be 
present in the declared and implemented foreign policy of South Africa.  
At the start of the new democratic dispensation in 1994, the South African 
Transitional Constitution of 1993 and the new Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 assigned the constitutional powers
38
 of foreign policy decision making to 
the President. This provision is expanded under the capacity of the President to 
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“receive and recognise foreign diplomatic and consular representatives and to appoint 
ambassadors, plenipotentiaries and diplomatic and consular representatives; and for 
the national executive (including the President) to: negotiate and sign international 
agreements, but only requires parliamentary ratification in the case of agreements of a 
technical, administrative and executive nature”.  
(h) Political ideology and the international power structure 
International relations of states along with other actors are usually a function of the 
guiding paradigm that informs such relations. Overtime, realism and idealism have 
become the two major theoretical positions that inform nations’ decision to relate with 
other actors within the international system and also the pattern that such relations 
should take. The nature of the international political system and South Africa’s 
position within this power structure conveys certain level of pressure and constraint 
on its foreign policy making. Foreign policy of any nation must be seen as targeted 
towards addressing the threats directed at the corporate survival and existence of such 
nation. Likewise for South Africa, its foreign policy is therefore often influenced by 
the need to protect itself from such threats. According to Coplin (1980:177), “Foreign 
policy must necessarily attempt to deal with these threats by meeting each change in 
international conditions, whether it is geographical, economic, political, or military”.  
Fundamentally, South Africa’s status as an emerging power, developing country 
coupled with its position in the Southern hemisphere and belonging within the African 
continent are factors and constraints that it must take into consideration in the 
construction of its foreign policy. In the post-apartheid era, South Africa increasing 
desire to want to represent the opinion of Africa by championing the imperative to 
effectively integrate Africa in the international global economic system has been a 
clear motivation for its membership of (BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa). Clearly inscribed in its foreign policy since 1994, has been the self-
imposed conviction of being able to effectively represent the rest of Africa in the new 
international economic order. This foreign policy decision has often been perceived as 
an intention by South Africa to assert itself as a continental hegemon over and above 
the rest of the region. According to Adebajo (2007:195) “there is fear and resentment 






And largely operating within the broader context of an idealist paradigm, South 
Africa’s foreign policy since the end of apartheid has often tilted towards a bias for 
international cooperation, respect for international norms, a commitment to the 
promotion of human rights, specifically the political, economic, social and 
environmental circumstances conducive to these; commitment to the promotion of 
democracy throughout the world; commitment to the principle of justice and 
international law in the conduct of relations between states; commitment to 
international peace and to internationally agreed upon mechanisms for the resolution 
of conflicts; commitment to the promotion of Africa’s interest in world affairs; and  
commitment to economic development through regional and international co-
operation in an interdependent (and globalised) world (DFA 2005). South Africa 
therefore eschews all forms of conflict or violence in the resolution of dispute by 
promoting the contemplation of peaceful instrument towards conflict resolution. 
(i) Membership of international organizations 
South Africa’s membership with various International Governmental Organization 
(IGOs) and International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGO) alike no doubt 
command a level of influence on the nature and pattern of its foreign policy choices. 
Particularly since the end of apartheid rule and following the reacceptance of South 
Africa back into the international comity of nations, South Africa have remained 
consistent in respecting the protocol and Charters of international organizations 
(African Union, Commonwealth of Nations, Non-Aligned Movement, United 
Nations) particularly the ones that it is a member and signatory to. For instance, as a 
result of its membership of the African Union, South Africa has been at the forefront 
of issues around attempts to craft a “new progressive governance agenda” aimed to 
“achieve development, peace and security, democratic governance and economic 
growth” for Africa (Adebajo 2007:195). It is for this reason therefore that South 
Africa is able to use this platform to collectively find solutions to regional, continental 
and global problems that ordinarily it cannot by itself provide answers for. The need 
to provide common resolutions to mutually shared problems like political, 
environmental and ecological issues prevalent across the world consequently 
necessitates the necessity for South Africa like every other country to cooperate with 





specialized agencies and international organizations. Table 5.8 below captures a 
number of some of the international organizations that South Africa is a member. 
Table 5.8: Selected international agencies/organizations to which South Africa is 
a member 
Political Economic 
United Nations (UN) 
African Union (AU) 
Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) 
BRICS Forum (Brazil, Russia, India, China 
and South Africa) 
Commonwealth of Nations 
International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) 
International Criminal Court (ICC) 
Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) 
Nonaligned Movement (NAM) 
Group of 24 (G24) 
Group of 77 (G77) 
African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of 
States (ACP) 
Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and 
Central Bank Governors (G20) 
International Criminal Police Organization 
(Interpol) 
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) 
 
BRICS 
International Monetary Fund 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU) 
African Development Bank 
United Labor Organization 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
International Labour Organization (ILO) 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
International Mobile Satellite Organization 
(IMSO) 
International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO) 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) 
International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) 
International Development Association (IDA) 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) 
International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD) 
World Customs Organization (WCO) 
Sports  Research based 
International Olympic Committee  (IOC) 
International Paralympics Committee 
Confederation of African Football (CAF) 
International Cycling Association (ICA) 
African Centre for Gene Technologies (ACGT) 
Astronomical Society of Southern Africa (ASSA) 






The Fédération Internationale de Football 
Association (FIFA) 
International Cricket Council (ICC) 
International World Games Association 
International Association of Athletics 
Federations (IAAF) 
Fédération Internationale de Basketball 
(FIBA) 
International Hockey Federation  (FIH) 
International Rugby Board (IRB) 
International Tennis Federation  (ITF) 
Agricultural Research Council (ARC) 
Southern African Development Research 
Network (SADRN) 
The Grassland Society of Southern Africa 
(GSSA) 
Source: Author’s compilation, 2013 
(j) Geographical location 
The geographic location of a state plays a critical role in the international 
circumstances that shape its foreign policy. The importance of geography in shaping 
contemporary international politics has been emphasized by many scholars (Coplin 
1980, Aluko 1977). Cohen (1963:186) in illustrating the significance of this asserts 
that: 
Two basic location conditions characterize the geographical 
positions of USSR and the United States. First, these two 
superpowers have grown up in physical isolation from one 
another. They are still physically remote, save in a time-
distance, air-age sense. Secondly, the Soviet Union lives in a 
direct land or narrow seas contact with a large number of 
sovereign states; Americans have few neighbors. 
Equally linked to geographical location is the military and economic capacity of a 
country’s neighbors. This may either condition a pattern of reliant relationship or an 
independent one in which its neighbors are dependent on it for survival. Ofcourse, 
there is also the aspect of huge deposit of mineral wealth and migrant labour system 
whereby everyone is headed south in the SADC region. 
5.4  Conclusion 
 
This chapter assessed South Africa’s foreign policy principles and determinants both 
in the apartheid era (1961-1993) and the period sequel to the end of apartheid [post-





principles, determinants, actors and agencies have helped to shape the process of 
foreign policy making and implementation in South Africa. Another aim of the 
chapter was to examine the complexity of the interaction between and among these 
foreign policy actors and agencies design and implementation in the two political 
dispensations under study. 
The chapter submits that a number of principles and ideological foundations of South 
Africa’s foreign policy particularly during the apartheid period include its non-
isolationist, anti-sanction, pro-western orientation and the imperative to establish a 
positive relationship with the rest of Africa in a bid to justify its apartheid policies. 
The regime change brought about as a result of the end of apartheid rule also changed 
the context in which South Africa’s foreign policy is formulated. As a result, the 
domestic dynamics within the country at both periods have inspired a different kind of 
foreign inspiration that on its part also reflected another kind of ideology and 
principle. The period of the 1989 upwards marked a redirection of the foreign policy 
priorities and agencies for the formulation of these policies directed to reflect the 
political and economic reform within the state. Thus, in the post-apartheid era, foreign 
policy was shaped by principles of Afrocentrism, respect for human right, 
commitment to economic development through regional multilateral frameworks etc.  
Again, the chapter further notes that the foreign policy determinants include both 
institutional and non-institutional actors and agencies. Under the apartheid period, the 
institutional frameworks include the Leadership in the Prime Minister and President at 
the time, Department of Information, Department of Foreign Affairs, The Department 
of Military Intelligence. On the other hand, the unofficial institutions include the 
influence of the Afrikaner nationalism, civil societies and interest groups, mass media, 
the intelligentsia, as well as international sanctions, isolation and the end of the Cold 
War. At the same time, the post-apartheid instructional and non-instructional 
frameworks of foreign policy making and implementation had changed radically to 
reflect the following actors and agencies; parliament, DIRCO, DoD, national non-
governmental actors, influence of the executive President and of the dominant party 
(ANC), regime type and change, political ideology and the international power 





Evident in the above analysis is the fact that foreign policy formulation in South 
Africa like in many other civilized countries is crafted in a multiple and complex 
interlink of many actors with varied degrees of participation or involvement. It is 
therefore often difficult to assign the formulation of a specific foreign policy to a 
particular actor as the “number of actors with a stake in foreign policy decision 
making has increased accordingly” (Masters 2012:37). As rightly observed by 
Masters (2012:37), at the centre of South Africa’s foreign policy making is the 
President while other actors including the DoD, DIRCO, Parliament, etc. are involved 
in this process based largely on their capacity, resources and time frame in which the 
decision is to be made.  
One can also agree with the fact that the two international environments during the 
apartheid and post-apartheid eras gave a unique impression on the foreign policy 
footprints of South Africa as we shall see in the succeeding chapter. This has of 
course reconfigured the foreign policy priorities particularly in the post-apartheid 
dispensation. The following chapter builds up on this chapter by examining the 
foreign policy make of South Africa particularly in relation to Africa. The chapter 
examines these foreign policy dimensions over two political periods of apartheid and 


















SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA: AN 
APPRAISAL 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines South Africa’s foreign policy particularly with sub-Saharan 
Africa prior to and after 1994 when the country emerged from the doldrums of 
apartheid rule. Pfister (2005:1) points out that South Africa’s foreign policy relations 
during the apartheid period “were determined by the inherent conflict between 
Pretoria’s apartheid ideology and its ambition to be accepted as a fellow African state 
on the one hand, and African continental rejection of its race discrimination policies 
and the consequent exclusion from the community of African states on the other”. 
South Africa’s foreign relations date back to the first and second World Wars during 
which period the country played a crucial role as a key member of the British Empire 
and the Commonwealth. Using information gathered from secondary materials and 
other relevant archival sources, the chapter seeks to capture the various patterns, 
changes, thrusts and nuances of South Africa’s foreign policy perspective over a 
period of about 50 years (between the 1960s up until 2012). It is important also to 
discuss the implication that South Africa’s apartheid foreign policy has on its external 
relations in the 21
st
 century. This chapter which is largely historical and descriptive 
focuses on South Africa’s foreign policy making beginning from 1961 when the 
country became a republic and ending with a review of the current Zuma 
administration. Critical in this is the periodization of South Africa’s foreign policy 
from the apartheid period to the post-apartheid democratic dispensation. 
South Africa’s foreign policy with Africa began in the 1960s at a time when many 
countries on the African continent attained their independence following those that 
had obtained their independence in the 1950s. It would suffice to indicate that its 
foreign policy began to blossom after it became a republic in 1961. However, much of 
these relations was mainly restricted to the Southern African region with its interest 
improving significantly by the time the country got its full independence from British 
imperialism in 1961 (Pfister 2000). However, South Africa’s position on the continent 





of 1948-54 conceived by Daniel Francois Malan proposed South Africa’s cooperation 
with the colonialists to protract western domination on the continent, with Pretoria 
acting as the liaison for western civilization in Africa, taking a strong stance against 
the influences of communism and militarization (Geldenhuys 1984; Mills and 
Baynham 1995; Pfister 2005). Pfister (2000) further highlights that the country’s 
contact with independent black African states were kept highly secret and away from 
the public eye following failure of the policy of dialogue or outward movement
39
; a 
brain child of Prime minister B.J. Voster as an attempt to deal with the increasing 
isolation of South Africa by the international community. It is also important to note 
that at the height of apartheid, the country had two parallel foreign policies; the 
official foreign policy formulated and implemented by the apartheid government 
under the Nationalist Party and the ‘unofficial’ foreign policy championed by the 
African National Congress party for the liberation of Black South Africans from white 
oppression.  
To-date, foreign policies in South Africa continue to be informed by both the official 
government policy and the position of the ANC. This chapter is thus an attempt to 
account for the evolution of South Africa’s foreign policy in the two political 
dispensations of apartheid (1950s to 1993) and post-apartheid eras (1994-to-date). 
The former has been divided into four periods (1958-1966; 1966-1978; 1978-1989; 
1989-1994) while the latter is divided into three periods (1994-1999; 1999-2008; 
2009-2012). This would allow for an evolutionary analysis of the respective foreign 
policy of each period and regime and the transition from one period to the other while 
noting the remarkable character of that period for any comparative assessment. 
6.2 South Africa’s foreign policy in Africa during the apartheid period 
We begin with a review of the foreign policy perspectives of South Africa during the 
apartheid period focusing especially on the period from 1961 when the country 
became a republic under Verwoerd (1958-66), and then moving on to the era of 
Vorster (1966-78), Botha (1978-89), and finally ending with de’ Klerk (1989-94).  
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6.2.1 H.F Verwoerd, 1958-1966 (Politics of security)
40
 
It was during the premiership of Hendrick Verwoed that the wave of independence 
swept across the African continent on the aftermath of decolonialism (Pfister 2005). 
The South African government had anticipated that it would be able to improve its 
international relationship by advancing its relations with Black Africa (Mills and 
Baynham 1994; Mills 2000). Between 1960 and 1962, membership of African 
countries in the United Nations had increased from a modest nine (9) to a significant 
thirty two (32) members (Stultz 1969). Following the formation of the Organization 
of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, African countries using the OAU mechanism 
declared war on all forms of colonialism and white minority rule particularly in the 
Southern African region. This period was therefore marked by the international 
community’s isolation of the Republic of South Africa. Pretoria in retaliation to this 
international resentment as a pariah state attempted coercive tactics in dealing with its 
opponents and critics of its apartheid policy at every level of the global stage. For 
instance, the government denied entry visas to persons who were thought to be critical 
of the regime and equally tried to mitigate the consequences and effects of 
international sanctions against the Republic by reducing its dependence on the 
importation of goods (Stultz 1969).  
For many reasons, South Africa was unwelcoming and unreceptive to this trend of 
political independence of African states and in fact considered it a ‘traumatic event’ 
(Nolutshungu 1975:102) for three reasons. First, the country’s domestic policy of 
apartheid and the oppression of black South Africans could easily be justified by 
pointing to its ideological resemblance to that of colonial imperialism on the 
continent, which of course was enveloped in the pomposity of bringing civilization to 
the continent. Two, at the time, South Africa’s ties with African states were between 
South Africa and the colonial powers. The independence of black African states thus 
presented a huge dilemma; that of maintaining bilateral ties with the African states via 
dealing directly with black diplomats. This is contextualized in the contradiction and 
confusion of receiving black diplomats in the country given the domestic policy of 
apartheid. In the third place, there was increasing fear by Verwoerd’s government that 
diplomats from ‘unfriendly’ African states could act as agents for political change in 
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South Africa. Pfister (2005) highlights that in 1959, the then foreign minister Eric 
Louw referred to Africa’s goal for eradication of colonialism as a “disturbing and 
indeed alarming event”. Moreover, South Africa’s diplomatic ties with pre-
independence Africa had mainly been through multilateral relations, embodied in 
participation in a number of inter territorial organizations for technical cooperation. 
Thus in accepting albeit grudgingly, the demise of colonialism, South Africa under 
Verwoerd had a new challenge to reconstitute and reorganize its attitude towards 
Africa. In March 1957, Louw held that South Africa must “accept its future role in 
Africa as a vocation and must in all respects play its full part as an African power” 
(Geldenhuys 1984, Barber and Barratt 1990). 
South Africa therefore moved swiftly to apply a strategy of appeasement in an effort 
to mitigate its already troubling and increasing isolation from the international 
community. This strategy of appeasement involved giving technical assistance to 
African states through the country’s cooperation with organizations such as the Inter-
African Bureau of Soil Conservation and Land Utility (BIS), the Commission for 
Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara (CCTA), the Scientific Council 
for Africa South of the Sahara (CSA) and the Foundation for Mutual Assistance in 
Africa (FAMA). However, the domestic policy of apartheid presented complexities 
that made the establishment of partnerships based on impartial relations with African 
states difficult since it meant black African diplomats especially from the already 
independent African states would be exposed to the apartheid legislation applied to 
black South Africans in South Africa.  
Nonetheless, South Africa held strong sentiments that “African states would come to 
realize that apartheid was no threat to them and all Africa could combine together 
against external interference” (Barber & Barratt 1990). South Africa’s need to forge 
diplomatic ties with independent African states became more apparent when Ghana 
achieved her independence in 1957. Foreign Minister Louw stated that good relations 
with the new state were fundamental to the government’s policy and Pretoria even 
sent a delegation to Ghana’s independence celebrations. Nkrumah and Louw made 
informal agreements for exchange of diplomats and subsequently South Africa 
extended trade, economic and technical links to Ghana, which Ghana mutually 
accepted despite Nkrumah’s abjuration of the apartheid policy (Geldenhuys 1984, 





With the increasing desperation for South Africa to maintain ties with African states 
and the occasional presence of black African diplomats in conferences on technical 
cooperation, the Department of Foreign Affairs resorted to establishing diplomatic 
suburbs for black ambassadors outside Cape Town and Pretoria. This did very little to 
gain the favorable response of interest groups from the white population (Geldenhuys 
1984, Barber and Barratt 1990, Pfister 2005). Barber and Barratt point to a “storm of 
protest from the United Party and unease among Nationalists because a Ghanaian 
attending international conference was given the same treatment as whites” (1990:39). 
The Verwoerd government thus resorted to appointing a roving ambassador- a white 
ambassador touring Africa’s capitals to avoid the posting of black ambassadors to 
South Africa (Mills 2000; Geldenhuys 1984). 
Meanwhile South Africa’s foreign relations with African countries and the 
international community continued to take a dwindling turn, with Ghana increasingly 
expressing her hostility towards its domestic political arrangement which ultimately 
led to the demise of diplomatic relations between both countries. South Africa’s 
overwhelming and irrational underestimation of Africa’s disgust and hostility towards 
the apartheid regime came to light when at a second conference of independent 
African states held in June 1960 in Addis Ababa, members were urged to severe 
diplomatic ties with South Africa. Pfister (2005) points out that by 1963 South 
Africa’s continuous ostracism by African states was reinforced by its expulsion from 
CCTA, CSA, BIS, FAMA and the Organization of African Union (OAU). The 
increasing pressure from Africa subsequently led to South Africa’s further expulsion 
from the International Labour Organization (ILO), the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) and the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) thus 
further limiting South African diplomatic representation on the continent to countries 
that were still under colonial rule: Angola, Mauritius, Mozambique and Rhodesia 
(Geldenhuys 1984).  
Hence, despite South Africa’s emphasis on the promotion of technical cooperation 
with African states and her reliance on her competitive economic capability to provide 
aid as a significant channel for communication and establishment of formal ties with 
African states, it failed to maintain diplomatic ties with the newly independent 
African states. In summary, Stultz (1969:3) notes accurately that South Africa’s white 





concern was very much that of having a domestic policy that reflected and correlated 
with its foreign policy ambition (Mills 2000). The style of leadership during this 
period represented a dramatic diversion from what was prevalent during the years 
preceding the creation of the Republic in 1961. 
6.2.3 B.J. Vorster [1966-78] (Outward looking policy) 
South Africa’s Prime Minister B.J. Vorster who ruled the country between 1966 and 
1978 was often described as a ‘more relaxed and pragmatic’ leader, and regarded as 
not necessarily anti-apartheid. His foreign policy sought to address South Africa’s 
increasing seclusion from the international community and determination to salvage 
the country’s global reputation and a focus on economically important overseas 
dealings, including those with African nations.  
On the African continent, Vorster continued in the footsteps of Verwoerd by meeting 
with Lesotho’s Prime Minister Joseph Leabua Jonathan in January 1967 where he 
emphasized the importance of Pretoria’s assistance (Pfister 2005). He also provided 
Lesotho’s government with “technical assistance and expertise and finance for 
development/investment projects to impress African countries further north” (Pfister 
2005). Similarly, the DFA equally provided technical assistance, expertise and 
finance for development to projects to impress African countries further north on 
bilateral basis following South Africa’s expulsion from most of the territorial 
organizations. Pfister (2005) points out that South Africa’s development assistance 
was done through private and parastatal companies focusing on giving assistance in 
areas that were of particular interest to heads of states in an attempt to favorably alter 
their anti-apartheid stance. South Africa was thus forced to develop bilateral ties with 
countries such as Malawi and Madagascar in 1967. Given Malawi’s strong 
dependence on South Africa for trade, investment and employment for migrant 
workers, and President Hastings Kamuzu Banda’s conservative and western-oriented 
politico-ideological style, it became a target for South Africa’s political maneuvers 
aimed at building African support. Vorster held a series of meetings with Banda both 
in South Africa and in Malawi resulting in the upgrade of the former’s missions to 
embassies. The relationships of both countries were further strengthened by the 
participation of South African companies in the construction of a new capital in 





However, Banda equally utilized South Africa’s need for ‘friends in Africa’ for his 
own political interests by, for example, bringing the center of political power close to 
his home terrain despite having secured Japanese funding for the construction of the 
railway line to Nacala. Banda stated to South African foreign minister Muller 
“anything  you can do to assist us in this too I should naturally very greatly 
appreciate” once again capitalizing on South Africa preparedness to assist with the 
purpose of creating political inroads into Africa (Pfister 2005:42). 
The term “outward looking” or “outward movement” has often been used to describe 
“South Africa’s efforts at reconciliation especially with black Africa (Mills 2000) and 
“regained confidence in the political, economic and military spheres”  with the hope 
to exploit its economic hegemony in the region (Pfister 2005; Mills 2000:230). Pfister 
(2005) identified four phases of the foreign policy leadership of Vorster; Outward 
movement, Dialogue, Secret diplomacy and Détente. We go on to examine Vorster’s 
foreign policy at the regional and continental level in the context of these four phases 
identified above. 
Outward movement 
This foreign policy characterized as the ‘outward movement’ signified the significant 
stride of diplomatic and bilateral relations and inroads that South Africa attempted 
and was able to make into many important African countries during the leadership of 
Vorster. Mills (2000) however notes that much of this relationship was particularly 
directed at its Southern African neighbours and the Francophone countries aided with 
the assistance from France. Following South Africa’s exclusion from the international 
community and from various international organizations, it consequently embarked on 
some activities and projects particularly through its agencies and institutions with a 
bid to offer all kinds of assistance on a bilateral level. Pretoria therefore attempted to 
maximize its political gain by wooing and choosing to establish bilateral relations 
particularly with neighboring countries that it perceived as needing its assistance. One 
of such countries was Malawi under the leadership of President Hastings Kamuzu 
Banda. This was in fact the first visit of a South African executive to an independent 
African state (Pfister 2005) which was regarded as an “historic breakthrough” (Barratt 





It was argued that the reason for the establishment of this partnership was due in part 
to Malawi’s proximity to South African borders, the leadership’s conservative and 
western-oriented politico-ideological style coupled with its economic dependence on 
the latter (Christiansen and Kydd 1983). In attending Malawi’s Independence Day 
celebration in July 1966, an official of the South African apartheid government was 
able to kick start bilateral discussions at both economic and military levels. It was 
indeed this initial visit which was followed by subsequent trade missions to Malawi 
that made it possible for an established reciprocal relationship to exist between both 
countries during this period. There was in-fact more than a decade of official 
delegation visits consisting of government officials negotiating for trade, finance, 
commerce, industry and development (Cockram 1970:134; Geldenhuys 1984:14; 
Pfister 2005:40).  
The South African government was able to undertake two major 
development/investment projects in Malawi that are worthy of mention. First, was its 
decision to singlehandedly build from scratch a new capital for Malawi located in 
Lilongwe (Pfister 2005); a project which a DFA report of 1979 regarded as a “prestige 
project” (Hoare 1967). This was after the Banda administration/government 
approached the South African government having failed to secure the required capital 
to finance the project from Britain. South Africa was therefore too willing to provide 
the necessary assistance in order to secure political benefit. Secondly, the decision to 
construct a 700km railway line to Nacala was also taken up by South Africa in order 
deepen Malawi’s dependence on South Africa. The Lilongwe Capital Project as it is 
called was awarded primarily to South African business entities like the IDC which 
acted as the financier and the Credit Guarantee which was the insurer (Pfister 
2005:42). These two developments and investment projects were able to put into 
motion South Africa’s political ambition particularly within the Southern African 
region. This foreign policy decision was based on the realization that Malawi 
presented huge potential to South Africa for the maximization of not only economic 
gain but the extension of political benefits for the country. It was also perceived that 





market that the Southern African region presents to South African export businesses
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(Sindima 2002:177).  
Again, in Madagascar, Vorster continued with the Outward Movement policy. Since 
its independence from France in 1960, President Philibert Tsiranana was quick to 
throw an invitation to the South African mission for assistance in the survey and 
subsequent exploitation of the country’s natural and mineral resources like chrome, 
graphite, bauxite and the deposit of gold scattered around the country. Like in the case 
of Malawi, the South African government was able to quickly realize the economic 
and political advantage in this invitation particularly in affording it the opportunity of 
making inroads into the African continent in general and the Southern African sub-
region in particular. Consequently, approval was made by the DFA for the 
deployment of a mission consisting of representatives from the IDC, state owned 
Southern Oil Exploration Corporation (Soekor), General Mining and Finance 
Corporation and the Chamber of Mines (Reuvid 1995:232-5; O’Meara 1983 Pfister 
2005:44). Subsequently, a series of foreign missions were undertaken between 1967 
and 1972 by South Africa to Madagascar with representatives from Department of 
Tourism, Commerce and Industries together with other investment and mining 
companies. Among the initiatives presented by the South African government was the 
intention for the development of the Nosy Be in the Northern tip of Madagascar and 
The Narinda Bay along with the upgrade of the tourist infrastructure which was duly 
supported by Tsiranana. 
It is important to examine the implication of South Africa’s foreign policy of Outward 
Movement during this period. In the first analysis, and as acknowledged by Pfister 
(2005), “given Malawi’s economic dependence on South Africa and its little 
significance in continental matters”, South Africa’s Outward Movement policy was 
only able to produce minimal success if any which included the establishment of a 
diplomatic mission in Malawi. As corroborated by Mills and Baynham’s (1994:16) 
argument that “the outward movement achieved very little progress towards 
formalising relations with either black Africa, or the newly independent states in the 
region”. Again, on the international scale, South Africa romance with Malawi had a 
measure of impact on Africa’s anti-apartheid stance particularly at the United Nations 
                                                          
41





General Assembly (UNGA). On one occasion, Malawi abstained during voting on the 
Lusaka Manifesto in April 1969 and the OAU in September of the same year. The 
Lusaka Manifesto was a document adopted by 13 African countries in Lusaka, 
Zambia during the fifth Summit of Eastern and Central African States. 
Dialogue 
In addressing the issue of apartheid particularly by many countries in Africa, there 
was the confusion of whether to accept or reject the domestic conditions that the 
apartheid system represented in line with the principle of non-interference. And as 
Pfister (2005:57) rightly notes “the counting game of which African countries were 
pro- and anti- Dialogue was a tricky issue, with speculation abounding in the South 
African media and the contemporary literature”. At its 1971 meeting, the OAU sought 
to clarify the issue regarding dialogue with South Africa by rejecting the possibility of 
dialogue but rather demanding that such dialogue should first take place between the 
South African government and all of its people both minority and majority. It is 
instructive to note that at the Summit’s meeting of Heads States and Governments in 
Addis Ababa, out of the 39 members present, six voted in favor of dialogue with 
South Africa. This included Gabon, the Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi 
and Mauritius ((Barratt 1971:6-7; Pfister 2005:58). This decision fundamentally 
accounts for South Africa’s eventual exclusion and the refusal for the establishment of 
instruments of dialogue and negotiation with the rest of Africa until certain terms and 
conditions were met.   
In engaging with the rest of Africa, South Africa’s military was regarded as the 
primary actor in facilitating this process and initiative. South Africa sought to play a 
dominant role in continental affairs even though it possessed limited capability for 
that purpose at the time. It therefore sought to establish dialogue with many of the 
newly independent African countries on a bilateral scale using its various institutions 
such as the DFA and the South African military. For instance, a close bilateral 
relationship existed between South Africa and France for many reasons.  At the time, 
despite the end of colonialism, France was able to establish strong political, 
economic, military as well as cultural interdependent linkages with its former African 
colonies like Ivory Coast, Gabon, and the Central African Republic. Pfister (2005:48) 
notes that for France, “the wielding of power in Francophone Africa was central to its 





On the other hand, South Africa was able to invoke some influence on the foreign 
relations of France with African states suggesting some kind of Paris-Pretoria alliance 
particularly in Francophone Africa from the late 1960s. South Africa was able to 
establish some form of cooperative engagement with France in Africa. This 
collaboration therefore afforded South Africa the opportunity to receive military 
supplies from France which were necessary for it to play a major role within the 
continent. According to Cuddumbey (1996), France emerged as a primary armament 
supplier to South Africa until the mid-1970s (See Pfister 2005). In accounting for the 
importance of these supplies from France, P.W. Botha noted that: 
All these helicopters and the aircraft, coming from France, at 
a time in our history when we were totally isolated; you must 
not forget the impact of that; it is tremendous. If you are 
alone on the ocean, and your boat is about to sink, then 
another ship goes along; that is quite something” (cited in 
Pfister 2005). 
In return for military armament, South Africa was able to provide France with 
uranium while also making use of its land space for a space tracking station which 
was sited close to Pretoria. In all, South Africa was able to project its power influence 
in Africa through the instrumentality of a combination and permutation of its 
economic and military capacities with the latter made possible by the strategic 
collaboration of France. We go on to show some of these cases. 
Pfister (2005) notes that Chad presented the first instance of Franco-South-Africa 
cooperation in Africa. At a meeting between the Director of Military Intelligence, 
Brigadier Pierre Retief and President Tombalbaye in October 1965, Retief’s proposal 
of geological assistance to explore Chad’s mineral resources was considered. 
Consequently, there was the offer and acceptance of “two Land Rovers, a rock cutting 
machine, a diamond driller and the deployment of further geologists” by Chad’s 
Tombalbaye (See Pfister 2005).  
Again, South Africa sought to play an important role in Nigeria during the Civil 
War
42
 that almost tore the country apart. The recognition of Biafra as a sovereign state 
by Gabon, Ivory Coast, Tanzania and Zambia contrary to OAU’s position of 
safeguarding the territorial integrity of member states gave South Africa this leeway 
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of playing a significant role in the crisis (Pfister 2005:52). With Nigeria gaining the 
support of Soviet Union following the reluctance of Great Britain and the anti-
communist resistance of Presidents Houphouet-Boigny and Bongo of Ivory Coast and 
Gabon respectively, there was the perception that the Soviet support of the Nigerian 
government would perhaps pave way for the infiltration of Africa with communist 
ideologies. Both leaders were therefore able to collaborate with South Africa in 
countering Soviet’s support for the Nigerian Army. South Africa’s military in 
collaboration with Ivory Coast and Gabon offered military assistance to Biafra. It is 
reported that P.W. Botha offered $1.4 million to the Ivory Coast while also providing 
“more or less 200 tons of unspecified weapons of ammunition” (Pfister 2005:53). 
This military support continued until October 1969 following Biafra’s dwindled 
chance of winning the civil war. 
In 1969, at the peak of the Nigerian civil war, a diplomatic relationship between Ivory 
Coast and South Africa was established at the instance of President Houphouet-
Boigny advocating dialogue with Pretoria. It was significant to note that apartheid as 
South Africa’s domestic problem could not only be addressed by the deployment of 
force but more importantly by opening up the space for more platforms for dialogue 
with the South African government. Also, Idi Amin of Uganda sought to establish 
contact with Pretoria within months of his assumption of power in 1971 following his 
ousting of President Milton Obote in a successful coup with proposals from the 
former for a visit of a ten man delegation to South Africa with the mandate “to study 
conditions prevailing in South Africa and to make a report to me [Idi Amin] which 
will also be submitted to the Organization of Africa Unity” (See Pfister 2005:57). 
However, as Pfister explained, this request was turned down by Vorster 
fundamentally because it was perceived to interfere in its internal affairs and would 
therefore be unacceptable. 
As a result of the aftermath of the civil war in Nigeria, Pfister (2005) highlights that 
South Africa was also able to establish bilateral dialogue with Ghana in the West 
African sub-region.  
Secret Diplomacy 
In working together to shape foreign policy strategy of South Africa during this 





Department of Information and the Bureau for State Security (BOSS). Each of these 
four institutions attempted to play divergent and individual roles in the conduct of 
South Africa’s foreign policy at the time. In this case, the Department of Information 
sought to break free from the poor result of the DFA’s conventional diplomacy by 
engaging in “unconventional and unorthodox diplomacy” in bringing about dialogue 
(Pfister 2005:68). For instance, the Department of Information influenced South 
Africa’s foreign policy in Arica by focusing on establishing dialogue and external 
relations with Ivory Coast and Senegal which at the time held high political influences 
in the political configuration in Africa. On the assumption that continental approval 
would be safeguarded by gaining the support of both countries, the Department of 
Information sought to use its current affairs magazine To the Point (established in 
1971) to establish contact. 
Détente   
In the context of South Africa’s usage of détente
43
, the policy was intended to 
highlight the conviction of South Africa about the imperative of what must be done to 
improve the country’s foreign relations with Africa. In other words, it was important 
for South Africa to “settle the situation in Rhodesia and South-West Africa 
(S.W.A)/Namibia if the strained relation with Africa is to be restored. Pfister (2005) 
suggests that the confidential access of BOSS to Vorster and its cooperation with 
Washington’s CIA (which clearly supported the apartheid regime) proved critical in 
inspiring détente. This policy also received significant support from the Afrikaner 
community particularly the Broederbond. To this regard, Vorster showed willingness 
to sacrifice Rhodesia in pursuit of détente.  
South Africa also attempted to draw Zaire into its détente agenda in 1975, during the 
Angolan war, with Mobutu’s support for the National Front for the Liberation of 
Angola (FNLA), and in opposition of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of 
Angola (MPLA). South Africa was approached by Mobutu
44
 for military and 
intelligence support which Zaire benefited from. There were unconfirmed reports that 
South Africa had undertaken the training of Zairian troops to establish special units 
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intended to harass the political opponents of Mobutu (The Library of Congress 
Country Studies 2004). Fifteen South African military instructors were reportedly 
sighted at the Shaba military base near Kitona. Prior to this period, diplomatic 
relations between both countries were limited to mutual trade relations.  
6.2.4 P.W. Botha, (1978-89) (Destabilization/total national strategy) 
For the eleven years during which Botha was in office as Prime Minister (1978-89), 
the tenure was largely characterized by heavy reliance on the military as a foreign 
policy option in countering the total onslaught of continental opposition against it. 
This was a reflection and continuation of Botha’s former position as Minister of 
Defence (since 1966). Botha drew much of his popularity from his largely “dramatic, 
forceful political style” (Geldenhuys 1984:36). A major emphasis that typified the 
Botha administration at the time was the “heavy emphasis on security” often provided 
by the military. This was in resistance to the “total onslaught on the country”. The 
regime was therefore noted for its “total national strategy”
45
. According to 
Geldenhuys (1984:38), “The total national strategy involves the mobilization of South 
Africa’s total physical and human resources in a national endeavour to thwart the 
onslaught”.  
Botha was concerned with protecting South Africa’s security position in the face of 
increasing instability particularly in the Southern African region. His idea of a 
Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) was therefore an intention to 
place more emphasis on its relations at the regional level with the rest of the Southern 
African region (See Breytenbach 1977, 1980:81; Geldenhuys and Venter 1979 and 
Rand Daily Mail 23/11/1979). According to him "The concept 'constellation of states' 
does not primarily denote a formal organisation, but rather a grouping of states with 
common interests and developing mutual relationships and between which a clear 
desire to extend areas of cooperation exists" (DFA; 1979, See  Geldenhuys; 1981). 
These included acts of aggression designed to promote South Africa’s intention to 
create a framework where regional countries would be economically, politically and 
militarily dependent or reliant on Pretoria. The promotion of foreign policy ties with 
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the other countries within this region therefore became a focal point for the Botha 
administration. 
It is equally important to highlight that the external environment under which the 
Botha administration operated was one that was characterized by the sharp Cold War 
pressure between Capitalist West and Communist East. South Africa at this time was 
faced with the challenge of quelling the insurgence of communism particularly into 
Africa and of course the Southern African sub-region. Botha was therefore able to 
draw sympathy from the West in its opposition of the communist incursion into 
Southern Africa. As McCarthy (1996:65) mentioned, Pretoria offered to play the role 
“as the Southern African bulwark against communist aggression and on the side of the 
West in a ‘war of proxy’, between the United States and the former USSR [Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics]”. 
South Africa’s diplomatic incursion into the rest of Africa guided largely by its 
military is summarized according to Pfister (2005:106) into three fundamental fields: 
securing access to the western Indian Ocean islands, sales of military hardware and 
finally relations further north with Gabon’s President Bongo in exploiting 
opportunities in Chad and Equatorial Guinea. Technical assistance was provided by 
the DFA to the Comoros Island as far back as the early 1970s.  
In its bid to counter the voluntary arms embargo imposed upon it by the UNSC, the 
Armaments Corporation of South Africa (Armscor) was set up primarily as a military 
and security alternative for South Africa to “develop ever more advanced weapons” 
(Pfister 2005:114). Armscor instituted primarily as a reaction to the international 
sanctions by the United Nations against South Africa that began in 1963 and 
formalized in 1967 was therefore able to initiate the exportation of arms and 
ammunition to such countries like Sudan and Somalia (Knight 2006:11-26; Pfister 
2005:114). Somalia under President Said Barre made a request for military support 
from South Africa with the latter eventually ‘approving’ it.  
Pfister (2005) provided an excellent background to the Cold War crisis in which 
Somalia was inevitably drawn in the middle as a result of its support for the USSR, its 
invasion of the Ogaden region and, consequently, a switch of support by USSR to 





later with South Africa. South Africa’s confrontation against the communist regime 
provided a platform for this alliance with Somalia with the leadership of both 
countries considering themselves as having the same aggressors. Pfister (2005:115) 
explained that initially, as part of South Africa’s Armscor bid to break through the 
Middle East markets; its interest in Somalia provided this springboard with its 
eventual extension of $250,000 worth of humanitarian aid and another $270,000 for 
the delivery of light weapons and ammunition to Somalia made in December 1983. 
Further talks for economic and military collaborations eventually collapsed with both 
countries failing to come to an agreement over repayment plan. 
Just as in the case of Somalia, South Africa’s foreign relations with Sudan again 
centered on securing arms, trade alliance and the establishment of overflying and 
landing rights in Sudan for South African Airways (SAA) through the initial provision 
of ammunition and humanitarian aid benefits to the latter. In the same manner, the 
DFA made available $245,000 to Sudan to “combat the drought and promote the 
airline’s cause” with no commensurate commitment on the part of Sudan’s President 
Nimeiri as subsequent discussions was cut short following the overthrow of his 
government (Pfister 2005:118, DFA Vol 4).  
Botha further consolidated on cooperation arrangements earlier established with 
Gabon under President Bongo by the previous government in bringing about further 
diplomatic relations with countries such as Chad, Equatorial Guinea etc. Particularly 
in this regard, both countries (Gabon and South Africa), cashed in on the political 
turmoil Chad was experiencing at the time following the overthrow and assassination 
of President Tombalbaye in a bloody military coup in 1975 resulting subsequently 
into a power struggle between two opposing forces. On the instance of Bongo’s 
request for South Africa’s intervention into the crisis in Chad, the DFA initially 
supplied medical equipment to Chad accompanied also by the provision of military 
supplies in 1982 (Pfister 2005:120). Similarly, Bongo made a second request for the 
involvement of Pretoria in establishing military presence in Equatorial Guinea. As 
Pfister recorded, this became possible following an initial visit of a South African 
delegation to Equatorial Guinea in 1983. In September 1989, President P.W. Botha 
was forced to step down after suffering a severe stroke that ultimately paved way for 





6.2.5 F.W. de Klerk [1989-1994] (Era of reformation) 
De Klerk on assumption of office considered important the imperative to mend the 
already broken fences of South Africa’s relations with the rest of Africa and of course 
contemplated ways to ameliorate imposed sanctions on the country by the rest of the 
world. On his inaugural speech after assuming leadership of the party, de Klerk made 
an unprecedented call for a non-racist South Africa and for renewed re-negotiations 
on the future of the country. To demonstrate his seriousness, he went on to lift the ban 
on the African National Congress (ANC) and instructed the release of Nelson 
Mandela. In essence, it was under President de Klerk and at his instance that the walls 
of apartheid rule crumbled like a pack of cards. According to Pfister (2005:125), de 
Klerk’s foreign policy was largely “aimed at ending South Africa’s international 
isolation, making overseas visits to explain the reform initiatives so that sanctions 
would be lifted”. According to Pfister (2005:130), the major consideration of de 
Klerk’s foreign policy posture was the task of rallying round for the support of the 
Organisation of African Unity by advancing trade and other economic exchange. It 
was hoped that this would translate into political dividends for the country. As such, 
South Africa was able to establish trade and economic agreements while also 
discussing issues of political reform with neighboring Southern African countries of 
Malawi (1990) and Madagascar (1991), along with reciprocal bilateral relations with 
other African countries like Ivory Coast (1990), Democratic Republic of Congo 
(1991), Gabon (1991), Togo (1990), Sao-Tome and Principe (1991), Kenya (1990), 
Sudan (1991), Cameroon (1991), Uganda (1990) and finally, Nigeria (1990). His 
foreign trips to Moscow, Paris, London, Washington and even China were equally 
directed at gathering enough support for its quest for readmission as recognized 
member of the international community.    
Pfister (2005:139) argues that “economic lever was very important  in Pretoria’s 
endeavour to promote contact with African states beyond the region” as according to 
him “this was relevant  in the wider context of strengthening the bargaining position 
in the domestic negotiations, particular attention being paid to the OAU Chairs 
Uganda and Nigeria”. In other words, de Klerk’s central foreign policy objective was 
no doubt the task of returning and reviving its membership of the international 
communities and international organizations at all levels. In achieving this, it 





Africa using the advantage that its relative economic advantage presented. For 
instance, trade agreements were signed with Malawi in June 1990 following a visit by 
the Malawian government officials, air transport agreement with Madagascar in 1991, 
and bilateral relations with Ivory Coast in 1990. Landing rights for SAA along with 
tourist and agricultural opportunities were also discussed with Sao Tome and Principe 
in 1991 (Pfister 2005:130-131). To this end, as shown in table 6.1, several foreign 
trips were made by both the President and also the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Pik 
Botha) from 1989 until 1994 when he finally handed over power to a democratically 
elected government under Nelson Mandela. South Africa therefore sought to regain 
membership of the international organizations that it had hitherto been suspended 
from. 
Table 6.1: De Klerk’s foreign visits abroad (1989-1992) 
Date and Year of Departure  Countries Visited 
1989 
 June 21-26 
 August 25, 28 
 October 1 
 December 1-2, 15 
 
West Germany, Britain  
Zaire, Zambia  
Britain,  
Cote d’Ivoire, Mozambique 
1990 
 May 8-25 
 
 August 14 
 September 24 
 October 11 
 October 21-25 
 
Portugal, Italy, Belgium, Great Britain, West Germany, 
Switzerland, Spain, Greece, France. 
Madagascar  
United States 
Portugal, Great Britain  
Luxemburg, Netherlands, Senegal, Morocco, 
1991 
 April 22, 24 
 June 8 
 November 9 
 




 January 30  
 February 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 
  
 April 9 
 May 12,  
 May 31-June 7 
 June 22-24 
 July  18 
 November 14   
 
Switzerland 




Russia, Japan, Singapore  
Spain 
Mozambique 
United Kingdom  
1993  
 December 10 
  
Norway 





In retrospect, it was clear that South Africa under de Klerk succeeded in restoring the 
former’s position as a player and actor in the international community having 
gathered` enough recognition particularly with the five permanent members of the 
UNSC (See Pfister 2005). De Klerk was able to turn around the extreme isolation of 
the country from a pariah state that it was towards a path of recognition as a member 
of the international system where it could freely conduct foreign relations and 
establish open diplomatic relations with Africa and the rest of the world (Mills 1997). 
South Africa’s isolation from the international system for over four decades was 
eventually overturned with de Klerk’s efforts to secure its readmission as a full-
fledged member of the international comity of nations. 
In conclusion, foreign policy making and implementation in South Africa for the most 
part of the 1970s and 1980s was increasingly targeted at responding to South Africa’s 
international isolation. This can be gleaned from the relentless efforts by successive 
Prime Ministers and presidents to bring the country into mainstream global politics. 
Again, this (much of the foreign policy efforts) was fundamentally about a 
government that was attempting to ensure national survival rather than influencing 
and shaping events in a manner that could be seen as demonstrating any form of 
hegemony.  
6.3 South Africa’s foreign policy towards Africa in the post-apartheid period 
 
This section reviews South Africa’s foreign policy in the period sequel to the end of 
apartheid (1994) which kicked off with the commencement of the democratic 
dispensation of Nelson Mandela (1994-99), and continued in the subsequent 
leaderships of Mbeki (1999-08), Motlanthe (2008-09) and Zuma (2009-to-date).  
6.3.1 Nelson Mandela’s idealist foreign policy (1994-1999) 
In 1994, South Africa emerged from the shackles of over four decades of apartheid 
policies thus setting the tone for the eventual end of its international isolation from the 
international community. The end of apartheid and the beginning of a fresh 
democratic dispensation that considers all the races and people of South Africa no 
doubt set an all different tenor for the conduct of South Africa’s external unilateral, 
bilateral and multilateral relations with Africa and ultimately the rest of the world. 





of readapting the country’s foreign policy to the realities of the post-Cold War era 
(Schraeder 2001:231, Mandela 1993:86-97). In this regard, Alden and le Pere 
(2003:11) stresses that “on assumption of power following the election of April 1994, 
the ANC faced the formidable task of translating the gains of liberation diplomacy 
into a pragmatic and principles foreign policy”. Barber (2005:1083) also remarks that, 
the general expectation from the international community was that South Africa 
would begin to assume its role of continental leadership by finding solutions to 
Africa’s many problems of poverty, political instability while stirring economic 
growth and bringing order to the continent. 
Given this, and President Mandela’s emergence as South Africa’s first democratically 
elected President in the post-apartheid era, the destiny to midwife this process of 
foreign policy transition was thus entrusted upon him. Prior to the assumption of 
office, Mandela in his renowned article titled “South Africa’s future foreign policy” 
published in the Journal Foreign Affairs in 1993 had clearly spelt out the guiding 
principles or ‘core concern’ of the foreign policy conduct under an ANC led 
government (Mandela 1993, Barber 2005:1079). Among the issues that Mandela 
sought to promote were the pursuit of human rights ranging from economic, social, 
environmental as well as political rights, respect for democracy, international law, 
support for peace and disarmament and universality (Barber 2005:1079). More 
importantly, Mandela in recognizing the inevitability of the African region to its 
destiny clearly asserted that “South Africa cannot escape its African destiny. If we do 
not devote our energies to this continent, we too could fall victim to the forces that 
have brought ruin to its various parts” (Mandela 1993:89) Evident in this declaration 
was the careful realization and decision of Mandela to give primacy to Africa in his 
construction of his foreign policy while in office and the understanding that “South 
Africa could not flourish surrounded by a sea of poverty” (Barber 2005:1080).  
It therefore did not come as a surprise when on assumption of office, Mandela 
devoted more attention towards consolidating the country’s already tainted 
relationship with the rest of the continent even though much of the groundwork for 
this had already been done by his predecessor de Klerk who was at the time (Second) 
Deputy President along with Thabo Mbeki following the formation of the 





2005). South Africa during this period sought to improve political and economic ties 
with its African neighbors witnessed by substantial increase in its foreign direct 
investment into Africa since 1994.  
Despite the leadership’s apparent inexperience with governance and administration,
46
 
the Mandela administration was enthusiastic in showing to the whole world its interest 
in reintegrating itself back into many of international organizations like the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC), OAU, UN etc. that it had hitherto been 
banished from. It equally showed willingness to hosting and chairing a number of 
these international organizations including the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD), World Trade Organisation (WTO), Non Aligned 
Movement (NAM) and the Commonwealth of Nations while also generous in hosting 
international sporting events like the rugby world cups in 1995
47
.  
President Mandela’s international personality played a dominant role in the direction 
of South Africa’s foreign policy posture and the pattern of its relations with the rest of 
the world during this period. As echoed earlier, this meant that the perception of the 
country and its foreign policy often reflected President Mandela’s personality profile. 
Alden and le Pere (2003:16) remarked rightly that “Mandela’s towering personality 
and international stature meant that he dominated every major foreign-policy 
decision, overshadowing the DFA, the cabinet and parliament. Mandela’s 
international renown was such that ‘it has meant South Africa’s image (and its foreign 
policy) tends to be equated with the president’s profile”. By all means, Mandela’s 
personality thus influenced the nature, direction and theoretical foundations of South 
Africa’s foreign policy at the inception of the post-apartheid era.  
President Mandela therefore settled for performing much of a conciliatory role in 
international affairs. This resolution was borne out of the conviction that South Africa 
had to secure a place for itself within the global environment by seeking to play a 
peace-keeping role as a major actor particularly within sub-regional and regional 
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politics in the Southern Africa and Africa respectively through ‘active and sustained 
mediation’ (Alden and le Pere 2003:8-9). Barber (2005:1083) highlights that the new 
South African government under Mandela devoted much of its attention on Africa 
even though this attention was largely met with pessimism and ‘suspicion’ from the 
rest of its Africa neighbors which according to him was due largely to the perceived 
status of the country to be potentially be a major power in Africa. 
Having said this, an examination of some of the issues that emerged under the 
Mandela administration would perhaps be necessary at this point. Alden and le Pere 
(2003:21) presented the ‘the Nigerian folly’ as the most serious challenge for the new 
South Africa’s government’s foreign policy initiative. In a display of the inexperience 
of South Africa’s leadership in external affairs, it found itself drawn into the political 
crisis in Nigeria which started since 1993 and worsened in 1995 under General Sani 
Abacha’s regime leading to a diplomatic glitch between the two countries. The last 
straw that broke the camel’s back was the extrajudicial execution of Ogoni human 
rights activists following a protest over environmental degradation of Ogoni due to oil 
extraction (Tripathi 2005; Barber 2005; Alden and le Pere:2003:21; Adebajo et al 
2007; 2008). Mandela’s position regarding the killing of the Ogoni nine
48
 by General 
Abacha was that it violated the principles of human rights and he sought to persuade 
the international community to exercise diplomatic and economic sanctions against 
Nigeria.  
At the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Aukland, New 
Zealand, Mandela led the call for the expulsion of Nigeria from the Commonwealth 
while also canvassing for the extension of oil embargo against the country (Alden and 
le Pere 2003:22). Though he (Mandela) succeeded in his call for expulsion, however, 
the boycott of Nigeria’s oil “produced nothing’ as it was not heeded by the West 
which continued to purchase Nigeria’s oil. Mandela’s unsuccessful attempt in 
galvanizing enough support from the international community against Nigeria 
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effectively damaged his reputation and status with many African countries perceiving 
it as an agent of the West (Venter 1997:94).  
Nevertheless, during his leadership, Mandela remained committed to promoting the 
principles of peaceful resolution of conflicts through persuasion and negotiation and 
this became evident particularly within the Southern African region. In his effort to 
foster sub-regional political stability, Mandela made his contribution to peacekeeping 
initiatives in bringing about political stability to the sub-region particularly with his 
intervention in the crisis in Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo [DRC]) and 
Lesotho in 1996 and 1998 respectively. For many reasons, Mandela’s bold mediatory 
efforts in resolving the political impasse between President Mobutu Sese Seko and 
rebel leader Laurent Kabila yielded very little dividends, if any. As Barber 
(2005:1085) explained, Mandela’s peace motives were outmaneuvered by other 
SADC members particularly Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia under the guise of 
acting within the framework of the SADC.  
Similarly, South Africa’s intervention stride in Lesotho was met with mixed reaction. 
In September 1998, its (South Africa) troops intervened to restore order and to a 
lingering political deadlock within the small landlocked state.  The manner in which 
the intervention was carried out by the South African National Defence Force 
(SANDF) provoked local and international reaction against this uninvited interference 
in Lesotho’s domestic affair. Firstly, the intervention in Lesotho did not receive the 
blessing of the SADC and so it was deemed as a case of South Africa singlehandedly 
choosing to assert its power in a helpless and defenseless state. Secondly, the 
intervention ran contrary to South Africa’s foreign policy precedence and principle of 
belief for the peaceful resolution of conflict through negotiation and dialogue as 
against a resort to the use of force. Thirdly, clearly, the intervention was ill-timed as 
the SANDF acknowledged that it had responded to the call with “ill-trained and 
inappropriate forces” while it also noted that it was summoned without adequate 
preparation (Alden and le Pere 2003:21-22). Finally, as fallout of the above, the 
widespread atrocities committed by the South African soldiers and the deaths 
recorded left much to be desired about the intervention. In all, even though the 
Lesotho operation was with good intention, it ended up achieving its end at the 





underlying motive of South Africa’s incursion into Lesotho was the imperative to 
protect its economic interest in securing the safety of Lesotho Highlands Water 
Project while also checking the possible influx of refugee through its borders.  
As shown above, to a great extent therefore, Mandela’s foreign policy in the post 
1994 period was one that was canonized on the principles of human rights and 
democracy and driven largely by an idealist paradigm (Nathan 2005:364; Mandela 
1993:87; Alden and le Pere 2003:8). According to Alden and le Pere (2003:8), “there 
was a logical symmetry between the ethical and normative constructs of its domestic 
policies and the idealist foundations of its idealist foreign policy”. It was clear, 
however, that even though Mandela’s foreign policy was rooted in an idealist 
principle, it nevertheless remained contradictory in its conduct and as Alden and le 
Pere (2003:19) asserts, “Rather than be guided by critical and principled perspectives, 
the inclination was to solve problems as they arose” thus producing in many cases a 
‘realist pragmatist’ reaction in its external relations.  
By implication, Mandela’s foreign policy often times was immersed in controversies 
and largely inconsistent in the execution of its foreign policy during this period.  In a 
summary of the foreign policy positions of Mandela, Alden and le Pere (2003:26) 
asserts that “a palpable tension remained between realism and idealism, between the 
country’s perceived commercial, trade and political interests and its aspirational role 
as a moral crusader for human rights and democracy”. Carved out for the incoming 
leadership was therefore the task of reconciling these foreign policy trajectories and 
contradictions that was the character its predecessor’s leadership. In retrospect, 
Mandela’s commitment to Africa was mere rhetorical manifested very minimal 
personal involvement in the continent. Very little evidence exists to show that 
Mandela indeed prioritized Africa over other regions. Outside of the mixed results 
achieved in Lesotho, hardly anywhere else was Mandela able to act successfully. This 
seems captured in his routine relegation of African summits (OAU) to the back 
burners while pursuing other interests. Mandela often made stops at airports for a few 
hours to meet with host leaders while on his way from other presumably more 
important meetings. It was infact Mbeki who carried the responsibility for pushing 





rarely employed in the service of Africa and when he attempted to do so, it was 
usually to lecture target leaders on human rights related issues. 
6.3.2 South Africa’s foreign policy towards Africa under Mbeki (1999-2008) 
It is often said that President Thabo Mbeki emerged as the anointed successor to 
former President Mandela long before the elections in 1999. Analysts argue that 
Mbeki was at the time not ready to rule but had the presidency of the party and of the 
country handed to him on a silver platter as a way of pleasing his father who also, on 
the other hand conceded that his son was not ready to take up the mantle of 
leadership. His re-election for another term in 2004 did not also come as a surprise. 
Before then, Mbeki had been Deputy President under the previous administration and 
thus demonstrated a measure of depth and grasp of South Africa’s policy formulation 
and implementation prior to his election as President. It goes without saying therefore 
that, like his predecessor Mbeki thus appeared in 1999 as an equally dominant figure 
in asserting considerable influence on the context and content of foreign policy 
formulation and implementation in South Africa particularly in its relations with the 
rest of the African continent. Mbeki equally wielded an overriding influence on the 
ANC and its structures thus making it less difficult for him to gain political control 
over policy choices. As mentioned previously, the incoming leadership of Mbeki was 
faced with the major challenge of aligning South Africa’s foreign policy formulation 
with its implementation while also seeking ways to reinvigorate and reconfigure its 
foreign policy priorities to reflect the domestic dynamics and preferences.  
In doing this, Mbeki sought to bring an ideological framework to South Africa’s 
foreign policy making by bringing a sense of direction and purpose. Nathan 
(2005:363) identified three major ideological leanings that characterized Mbeki’s 
foreign policy administration: ‘democratic, Africanist; and anti-imperialist’ (cited in 
Barber 2005:1088). We examine the foreign policy thrusts and implementation of the 
Mbeki regime in two contexts of the Southern African sub-region and the African 
continent respectively. 
In the Southern African sub-region, Mbeki emphasized in his foreign policy the 
restructuring of the SADC. No doubt, the emphasis on multilateral institutions such as 
the SADC was an important part of Mbeki’s ‘African Agenda’ initiative since it 





international levels. However, given South Africa’s political-economic history and 
apartheid background with its Southern African neighbors (where much of the 
relationship between the apartheid state and its immediate neighbors was largely 
conditioned in aggression and contention), international institutional frameworks 
therefore provided a veritable sub-regional platform for South Africa to effectively 
allay the fears of its neighbors. And as Landsberg (nd), explained: 
Given the destructive and ruffian-like role South Africa used 
to play in the region during the apartheid years, post-1994 
policy has become sensitive to regional anxieties, and 
pursued the correct policy which is based “on the principles 
of equity and mutual benefit” a denunciation of domineering 
and bossy postures towards the region and the belief that an 
emphasis on partnership and fairness would more effectively 
realise foreign policy goals.  
South Africa had hitherto played a key role in the eventual transformation of the 
South African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) established in 1980 
into the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992. Joining as a full 
member of the SADC in 1994, South Africa became pivotal, charting in a new 
development pathway for the SADC (Landsberg, 2006a:255). In the regional context 
of Southern Africa, Mbeki’s post-apartheid foreign policy thus focused extensively on 
keeping the SADC united and working towards resolving the institutional crisis that 
plague the SADC.  
Mbeki consequently sought means to reassure the rest of the Southern African sub-
region of South Africa’s non-hegemonic status but rather as a noble participant in 
developmental initiatives within the sub-region. He displayed his commitment to the 
promotion and integration of regional economic communities as a panacea and 
building blocks of strengthening the African Union, thus reinforcing the position of 
the Abuja Treaty of 1991
49
 which South Africa signed in 1997 and ratified by 
Parliament in 2000 under the Mbeki administration. His administration focused on 
ensuring that the gains of promoting regional integration, democratization, peace and 
security, and exponential pace of economic growth ultimately translated into greater 
economic and social standards for its people. South Africa’s regional strategies thus 
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placed priority on strengthening governance and improving the institutional capacity 
of the SADC, and a commitment to regional economic integration in order to ensure 
that South Africa meets the SADC timeframes (Landsberg; n:d:8). South Africa was 
also convinced that the establishment of a common currency for the SADC was 
significant in its strides for economic development even though this has come with 
little success. 
In examining Mbeki’s foreign policy towards Africa, we start by emphasizing that 
like his predecessor, Africa continued to receive significant attention in South 
Africa’s foreign policy construction during this period. Particularly, Mbeki was at the 
forefront of the African renaissance crusade and was one of the African leaders that 
sponsored the move for the transformation of the ineffective OAU while also 
proposing a supporting economic framework in the New Partnership for Africa 
Development (NEPAD). Mbeki’s International Relations, Peace and Security (IRPS) 
Strategic Plan features four congruently linked themes to represent South Africa’s 
foreign policy thrust during this period namely: South Africa’s domestic interest, 
African renaissance; promoting an agenda for the south, and developing an equitable 
global system (Malcolmson 2001:12-13; Alden and le Pere 2003:31-32). While as 
Deputy President, Mbeki had first revisited the idea of an African Renaissance when 
he highlights at Parliament in 1996, South Africa’s obligation to contribute to 
common continental efforts emphasizing the establishment of state democracies, 
respect for human rights, end to violent conflict, and a better life for all people of 
Africa (Lodge 1999:96; Youla 2009:52; Alden and le Pere 2003:60). On assumption 
of office in 1999, Mbeki thus revived his ‘progressive’ African Agenda
50
 idea 
outlining the pivotal roles of South Africa towards the Africa and as the continent’s 
mouthpiece (Schraeder 2001:233).  
In relation to Africa, a major concern for Mbeki was the reengineering of the 
OAU/African Union, promoting peace and security in Africa, by focus on cooperation 
by establishing strategic partnership and bi-lateral relations with selected African 
states (Alden and le Pere 2003:32). We go on to review and examine Mbeki’s foreign 
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policy efforts in these two areas in almost a decade that the Mbeki administration 
lasted. 
i)  Reengineering and Transforming the OAU  
Mbeki using his enigmatic personality and capacity as ‘leader of a relatively powerful 
state’ remained a dominant actor in continental and regional issues in Africa and 
Southern Africa. Mbeki’s progressive African Agenda was inspired by the necessity 
for South Africa to dissuade and respond to the perception of its dominance of the 
continent by seeking ways for joint collaborative efforts by all states in Africa to 
collectively respond and find solutions to common problems plaguing the continent 
(Landsberg 2007:195-196). Recognizing the pivotal role that multilateral institutions 
could play in the political and economic transformation of the African continent, 
South Africa under Mbeki thus played an important role in the metamorphosis of the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the rebranded African Union (AU) in 2002 
by securing the “incorporation of key elements of his African Renaissance vision into 
the AU project” (Landsberg 2007:197). For instance, Mbeki made sure that his 
Millennium Africa Recovery Programme (MAP) proposal formed a major part of the 
AU’s Constitutive Act of 2000 while also ensuring that the launch of the new Union 
was done in South Africa. Eventually, the city of Durban (South Africa) hosted the 
last Summit and the final interment of the OAU in 2002 with South Africa’s President 
Mbeki becoming the first Chair of the AU in the same year (Landsberg 2007:198).  
A fundamental principle of the AU that marks a remarkable departure from its 
predecessor (OAU) was the principle of ‘non-interference’ as against ‘non-
intervention’. In retrospect, one of the foundational principles of the OAU was the 
non-intervention of states in the internal affairs of other states within the continent. 
However, with the inception of the AU, this principle has been recaptured to mean 
non-interference. Mbeki was at the forefront while also mobilizing other states like 
Algeria, Ghana, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania to support the cause to give 
African states the right to intervene in political crisis that may arise in Africa with a 
bid to arrest the situation before its further escalation into uncontrollable dimensions 
where states that are contiguous are affected.  It is to Mbeki’s credit therefore that the 
AU Constitutive Act consequently guarantees the intervention of the AU on the basis 





threatening broader regional instability; and unconstitutional changes of government. 
(Landsberg 2007:199). 
ii) Promoting peace and security in Africa 
In the quest for the promotion of peace, stability and security, Mbeki’s foreign policy 
continued to emphasize a non-hegemonic posture, cordiality and mutual respect with 
other African countries. The government made huge investments within the continent 
in the area of conflict resolution and peace building efforts so as to win confidence of 
the rest of the continent. The Mbeki government thus prioritized the setting up of 
‘strategic partnerships’ with African states with a view to inspiring collective peace, 
stability and development. Landsberg (nd:15) on this point, notes that “whereas the 
Mandela placed the emphasis on peacemaking and negotiating peace agreements, the 
Mbeki government placed as much an emphasis on peacekeeping as it did on 
peacemaking”. For instance, in 2003, Mbeki contributed troops (1,600 in number) to 
the crisis in Burundi costing a total of R783 million in one year and over 1000 
soldiers to the DRC while also spending R1.4 billion on peace support operations in 
both Burundi and the DRC (Landsberg 2006:263).  
Among the security imperatives that Mbeki emphasized included challenges of 
peacekeeping and peacemaking interventions, conflict resolution and prevention, 
early warning signs, human security, the promotion of good governance, human 
rights, democracy and political accountability (Landsberg 1998:258; The Presidency 
2003:57-72). South Africa therefore played a critical role in bringing about peaceful 
settlement of the disputes in Angola, Burundi, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, 
Ethiopia-Eritrea, Sudan and Zimbabwe. 
 
In essence, in recognizing and addressing South Africa’s regional and geo-strategic 
goals, Mbeki promoted the idea of ‘quiet diplomacy’ as a means of diplomatic 
strategy in advancing South Africa’s position to the resolution of conflicts as in the 
case of Nigeria and Zimbabwe under Sani Abacha and Mugabe respectively. 
According to Landsberg (2006:259) “quiet diplomacy involves engaging the 
belligerents intense political situations behind the scene and moving them toward 
negotiated settlements”. During this period, South Africa continued to show its 





multilateral issues including economic, human rights, economic, peacekeeping and 
global security, etc. in the pursuit of diplomatic solutions. To a large extent therefore, 
South Africa’s foreign policy preference at this time was for conflict to be resolved 
not by confrontation or antagonistic positions but for adversaries to take advantage of 
instruments of negotiations, persuasion and mediation. While the quiet diplomacy 
engagement was not particularly successful in all cases, it nevertheless proved useful 
in the resolution of some other conflicts in Zimbabwe, DRC, Burundi, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Gabon, Namibia, Rwanda and generally in the Great Lakes region. 
 
One analyst remarked that former President Mbeki ran South Africa’s foreign policy 
like his personal fiefdom making it increasingly difficult to distinguish the country’s 
strategic priorities from the president’s personal ideological idiosyncrasies (Mangcu 
2009). The tension within the ANC ultimately led to the resignation of Thabo Mbeki 
in September, 2008 six month prior to the end of his term as President
51
. Of course, 
since it was certain that President Zuma would assume office in the following year, 
Motlanthe foreign policy was no less than a continuation of Mbeki’s foreign policy. 
6.4 Foreign policy under Jacob Zuma (2009-to-2012) 
On the assumption of office in May, 2009, there was the general expectation that 
President Jacob Zuma’s foreign policy would be remarkably different in style and 
represent a unique change in substance in its interactions with the rest of the world. 
The change of name from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) into the 
Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) was seen by 
analysts as one clear indication of the government’s resolve to pursue a distinct 
foreign policy that reflects South Africa’s domestic priorities. The newly appointed 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane articulated the rationale 
behind the change of name by stating the government’s intention to “reflect the new 
focus that our government wishes to place on partnerships and co-operation for 
development”. According to her, the idea was “largely motivated by international 
trends which require states to put emphasis on co-operation over competition, and 
collaboration over confrontation” (Nkoana-Mashabane 2009a; see Landsberg 
2012:77). Landsberg (2012:77) contends that “[t]he idea behind this was to signal the 
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Zuma government’s intention to introduce a new style and approach to the conduct of 
foreign affairs”. In essence, the name change of the Department was intended to bring 
foreign policy in sync with domestic priorities by bringing the works of the 
Department to the awareness, engagement and support of the South African people on 
matters of foreign policy (Nkoana-Mashabane, 2009b). 
But as Landsberg argues, “[t]he fight between Zuma and Mbeki within the ANC was 
a fight largely about style and personality, not one over policy, and since Zuma’s 
emergence as president there has, at least on paper, been more continuity than change 
in South Africa’s foreign policy” (Landsberg 2012:72). Drawing from the speeches 
and policy documents of President Zuma and his minister (Maite Nkoana-
Mashabane), a clear signature of South Africa’s foreign policy under Zuma is the 
imperative to advance the domestic priorities of economic growth and development 
(State of the Nation 2009; DIRCO 2009; Landsberg 2010). In essence, the 
administration’s emphasis would be on reconnecting its national interest with her 
relation with Africa and the rest of the world. In examining Zuma foreign policy 
towards Africa, discussion would revolve around South Africa’s involvement, role 
and contribution at the two streams of Southern Africa and Africa during this period 
respectively.  
We shall attempt to unpack the foreign policy priorities under the Zuma 
administration in the past four years under the broader foreign policy goals which 
include: 
 closing the gap between domestic and foreign policy, or the national interests; 
 promoting Southern African Development Community (SADC) integration; 
 prioritizing  the African continent through “African advancement”; 
 strengthening of South-South relations; 
 improving strategic relations with the North; 
 strengthening political and economic relations; and 
 participating in the global system of governance.  
The second and third foreign policy pillars highlight the specific focus on Southern 
African and African relations and forms the concern of this study. As expected, Africa 
continued to take priority in South Africa’s foreign policy focus under Zuma through 





Agenda” (DIRCO 2009). As articulated by the Minister, “the consolidation of the 
African Agenda remains central to our foreign policy objectives” and that the new 
government “will continue to work towards achieving a vision of Africa which is 
united, peaceful and prosperous” (Nkoana-Mashabane, 2009c; see Landsberg 
2012:81) suggesting the government’s readiness to take further the initiative of 
foreign policy strategies in relation to Africa. According to Landsberg (2010:279), 
“[r]elations with Africa constitute a permanent interest for the Republic, and the 
advantages to the Republic of pursuing close relations with continental partners, and 
vice versa, are many”.  
Outlining South Africa’s special responsibility towards the AU, Zuma’s Government 
pledged its support and continued contribution towards the organs of the AU and all 
of its associated frameworks like the African Central Bank, the African Monetary 
Fund, the African Investment Bank, the African Court of Justice, the African Court of 
Human and People’s Rights, NEPAD and APRM
52
 as well as the Pan-African 
Parliament of which it is host (Nkoana-Mashabane 2009c).  
South Africa has also contributed its voice to the grand debate about the debate 
regarding an African government with its preference for a gradual and incremental 
approach towards a government of the African Union premised on the understanding 
that the African Union is a union of independent and sovereign states and actions of 
its members are contingent on the mandate of member states (see Landsberg 
2010:280). South Africa therefore supported the proposal for a Union of African 
States contrary to late Gadhafi’s United State of Africa (USAf).  
A major achievement of the Zuma government is in the establishment of the South 
African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) which was similar in policy to 
Mbeki’s African Renaissance and International Co-operation Fund. The Fund aims to 
promote developmental partnerships by coordinating and integrating the several 
government departments of socio-economic, human resource development into one 
practical unit and bring order to a previously chaotic process of state intervention 
(Nkoana-Mashabane 2009c).  
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In the area of conflict resolution within the continent, South Africa has expectedly 
continued its foray into Africa in what some termed an extension of its ‘soft power’ 
(Nieuwkerk 2009). Zuma showed a preference for non-confrontational and 
accommodative, mediated solutions to conflict and deadly wars in Africa through its 
contribution to the promotion of peace, security and stability and sustained 
involvement in peacekeeping operations in Africa. 
In the area of human rights record, it was also anticipated that President’s Zuma’s 
administration would move away from the experiences of his predecessors. For 
instance, while former President Mbeki was opposed to the indictment of President 
Bashir of Sudan by the International Criminal Court (ICC), Zuma’s regime took a 
contrary position at the initial stage by insisting that the wanted President would be 
taken into custody by the South African government and handed over if he stepped 
foot in the country. This was despite the fact that he was invited for Zuma’s 
presidential inauguration in 2009 (Thipanyane 2011). This decision brought the 
country  at logger head with the African Union with the latter’s refusal to cooperate 
with the ICC in arresting Bashir. 
South Africa under Zuma has also committed itself to improving political and 
economic integration within the Southern African region through the SADC. In 
Zimbabwe for instance, Mills (2011:3) acknowledges that there have been some 
positive results from the GPA evident in the Zuma era. On the flip side, Mashiri 
(2011a) argues that there was a general loss of hope by Zimbabweans in President 
Zuma’s mediation efforts evidenced in his rather secretive facilitation style, a 
lackadaisical approach, probably an apparent conflict of interest, taking sides. 
Mashiri’s sentiments seem to resemble resentfulness and doubt over Zuma’s 
capabilities as mediator.  
In a bid to mend the broken fences between South Africa and Angola, President 
Zuma’s choice of Angola for his first state visit in August 2009
53
 was intended to 
demonstrate its determination to restore solidarity with Angola, a country with whom 
relations had been severely strained during the Mbeki years (Landsberg 2013).  
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6.5  Conclusion: Comparative analysis of South Africa’s foreign policy in the 
   apartheid and post-apartheid dispensations 
This chapter assessed South Africa’s foreign policy strategy both in the apartheid era 
(1961-1994) and the period sequel to the end of apartheid [post-apartheid] (1994-to-
date) with particular emphasis on Africa. The task was to present an overview of 
South Africa’s foreign policy towards Africa since 1961 when the Nationalist Party 
came into office. A number of conclusions can be drawn from the critical assessment 
of South Africa’s foreign during this period.  
To begin with, South Africa’s foreign policy priorities, formulation and 
implementation during both periods under review were aimed at achieving very 
contrasting agendas. While in the apartheid period, much of South Africa’s foreign 
policy was focused on containing international opposition, condemnation and 
sanctions of its domestic apartheid policies post-apartheid era, whereas, Southern 
Africa and Africa formed key components of South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign 
policy. Apartheid extinguished every positive role South Africa could possibly have 
played in Africa particularly at the time when different regimes under apartheid 
resorted to finding ways to destabilize the region. According to Brook (2013:1), “[b]y 
the end of the 1980s, South Africa was one of the most isolated states on earth”.  
Under apartheid, South Africa’s predominance in the Southern African region 
remained unquestioned. Prime Minister and State President P.W. Botha (1978-89), 
pursued a policy of dominance and coercive hegemony while equally establishing 
relations with a few African countries outside the region. Prime Minister B.J. 
Vorster’s (1966-78) policies of dialogue and détente intended to break dismantle 
South Africa’s international isolation in Africa and internationally proved 
unsuccessful. 
In contrast to previous regimes, South Africa’s foreign policy took a new turn 
following the end of apartheid and the inauguration of Nelson Mandela as president in 
1994. The expiration of apartheid afforded South Africa the opportunity to establish 
normal relations with the international community and in many ways reshaped South 
Africa’s foreign policy behavior towards the rest of the continent. It was therefore 
possible for Pretoria to establish relations with African states on ‘equal terms’. The 





initiated drastic changes in the area of foreign policy making institutions, structure 
and policies. South Africa’s re-emergence into the international space was therefore 
anticipated to bring back its confidence as a respected ‘world citizen’. This in turn 
brought huge expectations from Africa and the rest of the world that South Africa 
would begin to make significant contributions towards ensuring peace, democracy, 
respect for human rights and sustained development on the continent.  
Finally, cemented with the end of the Cold-War and the abolishment of apartheid, 
Pretoria was now able to replace its confrontational African foreign policy with one, 
emphasizing cooperation. It was expected that in a spirit of African solidarity, a new 
democratic South Africa would cooperate with the rest of the continent to move 
Africa towards development. Mandela’s foreign policy set the tone for South Africa’s 
foreign policy engagement in the post-apartheid era and is best remembered for its 
principle of human rights. In principle, the issue of human rights was to be central to 
the conduct of South Africa’s foreign relations. Mandela’s charismatic personality 
inspired a fresh outlook and launch pad for a new and vibrant South African foreign 
policy. 
In the post-1994 era, South Africa had been faced with the problem of reintegrating 
the country back into the international community of nations as a recognized member 
following years of international isolationism. Another point is that much of the 
foreign policy priority of South Africa during this period had prioritized the 
promotion of respect for human rights, peace and security, and economic 
development on the African continent. ‘Madiba’ clarified that South Africa would 
engage the world with a principled, highly moral foreign policy. However, in the past 
couple of years; the country has found itself caught between the rock and the hard 
place. As shown above, foreign policy has been marked by contradiction and 
dialectical confusion between normative policy principles and implementation. Much 
of the dilemma it had been confronted with had been finding the balance between 
policy and principle. South Africa’s value for the promotion of human rights has 
brought its foreign policy under scrutiny.  
Again, in the period after 1994, South Africa has equally pursued a foreign policy of 





domestic economic challenges and highlighted the country’s preferences to transform 
itself into an attractive partner for African states.  
South Africa also advanced a multilateral diplomacy by showing its preference for the 
peaceful resolution of conflicts in Africa through the instrumentality of international 
multilateral institutions like the SADC, the AU and the UN. However, there is still 
widespread suspicion about the recognition and acceptance of South Africa in the 
African region as a regional leader/power as it is often accused as a Western stooge. 
South Africa for the first time became a member of the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU) and the Non-Aligned Movement and returned as members to international 
organizations such as the United Nations and its affiliated agencies as well as the 
Commonwealth. 
Consequently, since the start of South Africa’s democratic dispensation in 1994, a 
more pertinent objective of the South African government has been the imperative 
towards mending and strengthening inter-African relationships and joining other 
constructive African states in finding African solutions to African problems. Given 
South Africa’s status as the leading African country in terms of economic prosperity 
and military strength, it has been able to translate both elements of power into 
political-economic advantage for other African states. South Africa has consequently 
become a more attractive partner for African states than ever before.   
South Africa’s foreign policy as articulated since 1994 has been targeted towards an 
incremental role and involvement in Africa. South Africa has consequently been able 
to use its foreign policy to draw influence for itself as a leading actor in the African 
international arena. According to Pfister (2000:1), South Africa’s comparative 
economic prosperity, political stability, and military strength in relation to other 
African states have placed considerable hope on her to make contribution towards the 
socioeconomic and political improvement of the continent. The arrival of South 
Africa as another powerhouse into the geo-political space changed the power 
configuration of the continent. For instance, Mbeki’s contribution in the establishment 





However, the trend of foreign policy in the past years evinced evidences of 
inconsistencies with policy and an attitude of amateurism in the conduct of foreign 
policy. As remarked by Spector (2013),  
[o]ver the past decade and more, however, South African 
foreign policy has been bedevilled by what could be 
termed a slow-growing, ad hoc amateurism; a too-easy 
reliance on the formalism of international organisations 
as a substitute for concrete results; and a growing 
confusion between supporting economic and commercial 
goals as a whole - as opposed to acting for the benefit of 
individual business profits. 
South Africa has therefore been able to use it foreign policies through successive 
regimes to foster cooperation, collaboration, partnership, and competition with many 
implications towards Africa. It remains to be seen how South Africa’s ‘African 
Agenda’ policy demonstrates a focus on Africa. The question now is, in almost 20 
years since the liberation and the post-apartheid state, what pattern has its foreign 
policy demonstrated as markedly different from the years prior to the end of 
apartheid? As articulated in chapter 2, a number of scholars have alluded to a South 
African hegemony whose form resembles significantly the imperialist foci of its 
apartheid predecessor and has merely changed its form and that the post-apartheid. By 
using its economic muscle to pursue a ‘South Africa-first’ policies and its reluctance 
to open up its economy to easy African access are evidences of its hegemonic 
influence. 
From the above analysis, it is not inappropriate to argue that clearly inscribed in South 
Africa’s foreign policy is the subtle ambition for continental hegemony with the 
country in most cases/instances attempting to punch above its weight. Whether South 
Africa possesses the material resources to sustain such massive role in Africa remains 
to be seen particularly when viewed in the context of its foreign policy hiccup 
witnessed in the Central African Republic. The ANC has been quick to discredit this 
ambition by reassuring African states of the government’s non-hegemonic intentions. 


































NIGERIA AND SOUTH AFRICA’S REGIONAL HEGEMONIC STATUS IN 
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA  
7.1  Introduction 
This chapter is a precursor to the next chapter and sets for itself two tasks. First is to 
comparatively explore the dimension of material (hard power) and ideational (soft 
power) capabilities of both Nigeria and South Africa with a view to make verifiable 
inferences on the substance and elements that make up the power configuration for 
the regional leadership of both countries. It does this by presenting a background to 
the power profiles of both countries in two concentric circles of sub-regional (West 
Africa and Southern Africa) on the one hand and in sub-Saharan Africa on the other 
hand. This leads us to the second agenda for this chapter which is to explore the overt 
or covert contention for regional hegemony by both countries in Africa. Of interest 
therefore is the need to gain valuable insight on the outstanding leadership criteria and 
credentials of military, economic, political as well as moral authority of these two 
regional powers for leadership in Africa. In essence, the chapter interrogates the 
connection between power, leadership and capabilities on the African continent.  
7.2 Elements of Nigeria and South Africa’s national power  
The hierarchical status of states within the international system is conditioned by their 
comparative hard and soft power superiority vis-à-vis other states. In many ways 
these power capabilities also determine states’ national role orientation as well as their 
level of involvement in the international community (Holsti 1977:109; 1970:233-309; 
Folarin 2010). We have earlier discussed some of the factors that impinge on a state’s 
capacity to play any meaningful role within the international system through its 
foreign policy (see previous chapters). A number of factors collectively project the 
national power status especially of regional powers where such states have devised 
several means to influence the behavior of other actors in order to attract certain 
political or economic benefits or of defending certain goals. According to Holsti 
(1977:165), these goals may include prestige, territory, souls, raw materials, security, 
or alliances. In foreign policy construction, actualizing the national objectives of a 





carefully conceived since the interaction between national goals and the resources for 
attaining them is the perennial subject of statecraft (Crabb 1972; Chiroro 2012). 
According to Holsti (1977:169), “the variety of foreign policy instruments available to 
a nation for influencing others is partly a function of the quantity and quality of 
capabilities”. States thus that have the capability to extend reward, punish, threaten or 
persuade others and take advantage of their power profiles in achieving this. Power in 
this case is seen as a means to achieve a certain goal and not an end in itself.  
As explained in Chapter 2, the capacity and ability of regional powers to prevail in 
conflict situations and to overcome obstacles is conditioned by a number of power 
equations (Deutsch 1988:20) which Holsti argues provide states with the general 
capacity to control the behavior of others in the international system. Traditionally, 
the components that make a state’s power equations include the assessment of its hard 
power. However, the relevance of soft power in contemporary political calculus in 
states interaction has gained much attention in recent years. An examination of both 
concepts is therefore necessary at this point. 
7.2.1 Hard power profiles of Nigeria and South Africa 
As enunciated earlier, the hard power potential and assertion of Nigeria and South 
Africa like most other countries includes fundamentally their military and economic 
components. Other hard power constituents may include size (population), territory, 
and resources among others (McGowan 2002; see table 7.2 and 7.3 respectively). 
However, our focus in this chapter will be on the military and economic component of 
hard power. The national role conception of both countries is to a considerable extent 
conditioned by the effective appropriation and combination of these factors as a 
corollary of its foreign policy. In other words, the military and economic variables of 
states for instance shape “the general kinds of decisions, commitments, ruler, and 
actions suitable to their state, and of the functions their states should perform in a 
variety of geographic and issue settings” (Holsti 1977:130). By implication, the policy 
choices, objectives and options for implementation are predicated upon the 
availability of state resources. Military and economic instruments of a state can 
therefore be deployed as useful foreign policy instruments in achieving, advancing 
political benefits and of projecting state’s influence in the international arena. Of 
course, the distribution of these capabilities among states is not evenly spread as there 





resulting ultimately in a reciprocal degree of dependence and hierarchy of states. The 
military and economic component of Nigeria and South Africa are therefore critical 
elements of their power profiles and therefore require attention.  
7.2.1.1 Economic currency and capabilities of Nigeria and South Africa 
The economic capability of Nigeria and South Africa has increased in remarkable 
proportions particularly in the last decade. For instance, Nigeria although undeniably 
blessed with abundant human and natural resources has paradoxically failed to 
evidently maximize the vast potential of its resources and essentially translate this into 
practical economic growth and prosperity both for the nation and its people. 
Nevertheless, Nigeria’s position as one of the most powerful countries in Africa is 
made possible by reason of its relative economic strength which is on record the 
largest in Africa, second only to South Africa. Aside from being the most populous 
nation on the continent, it is also the largest Black nation in the world, with a 
population of over 160 million people. Unfortunately, the country’s economic 
potential is grossly under-utilized with poorly articulated economic structures, fiscal 
and national development policies with dysfunctional economic sectors that are not 
properly integrated and coordinated. As a result of long years of neglect of proper 
basic infrastructure that is able to support economic vibrancy, the Nigerian lopsided 
economy is indeed a shadow of its true potentials; a situation that has invariably 


















Table 7.1:  A Matrix of Key political-economic statistics for Nigeria  
Nigeria   
National facts Social and gov indicators    rank/total 
Type of government           Federal republic 
Capital     Abuja 
Surface area (thousand sq km)  1,219 
Population (millions)   162.4m  
Main languages   English, Yoruba, 
    Hausa and Igbo 
Main religions    Christian (50.8%) 
    Muslim (48.8%) 
    Others (0.4%) 
Head of State (president)  Goodluck Jonathan 
Head of Government   Goodluck Jonathan 
Monetary unit    Naira (NGN) 
 
Economy                                             
2012   
Economic size               bn USD  % world total 
Nominal GDP                    268                               
Nominal GDP at PPP         448                           
Export value of goods  
and services                         39.6         0.50 
IMF quota (in m SDR)                                                   
Nominal GDP per head 
 at PPP                                2661 
Economic structure          2011           5-yr av.  
Real GDP growth                  7.4                  3.2      
Agriculture (% of GDP)        40%                            
Manufacturing (% of GDP)   15% 
Oil (% of GDP)                     14% 
Services (% of GDP)              30%                         
                          
Human Development Index (rank)    153 
Ease of doing business (rank)    131/185 
Economic freedom index (rank) 120/177 
Press freedom index (rank)         115/178 
Gini index (income distribution)        48.8 
Population below $1.25 per day  
(PPP)            54.4%     
 
Foreign trade                          
2012 
Main exp partners (%)  Main imp 
partners (%) 
US (29.1%)          China (17.3%) 
India (11.6%)            US (9.1%) 
Brazil (7.8%)             India (5.0%)                           
Spain (7.1%)              Netherlands (4.9%) 
France (5.0%)            South Korea (4.7%) 
Netherlands (4.3%) 
                              
Main export products (%)            2011 
Petroleum and petroleum products 95%  
Cocoa, rubber, processed foods etc. 5%                                                                         
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Main import products (%)                     
2011 
Machinery, chemicals, transport 
equipment, Manufactured goods, food 
and live animals 
    Source: Author Compilation, 2013. 
Nigeria at the time of independence was a great producer and exporter of agricultural 
commodities like cocoa, groundnuts and palm oil cocoa, cotton, timber, rubber, hides 
and skin etc. (Adeniji 2005:5; Falae 1992:219) and the discovery of its seemingly 
inexhaustible oil deposits, combined with a huge population presented her as an 
archetypal and quintessential African state worthy of emulation. As a major sector of 
the economy at the time, agriculture provided employment for almost 70% of the 
population while also accounting for about 80% of total government revenue. 
Nigeria’s economy was thus characterized by a huge dependence on the export of raw 
materials largely involving agricultural and mineral products and a heavy reliance on 





this period, Nigeria was the fastest growing economy in sub-Saharan Africa (Salisu 
2001:2). It was at the peak of Nigeria’s economy in 1975 at the time that the 
ECOWAS was formed as a regional body with the then leader of Nigeria Yakubu 
Gowon playing a pivotal role and pledging to finance a third of the funds needed for 
ECOWAS (Adebajo 2000).  
However, in the past couple of decades, Nigeria’s economy has transited from being 
reliant on agriculture to one that is oil dependent and as acknowledged by Adeniji 
(2005:5), “the emergence of the oil sector in the early seventies as a major revenue 
earner for the country drastically altered the face of the Nigerian economy”. Between 
1970 and 1986, the contribution of oil revenue to total exports rose from 57.6% to 
97.2%. Thus, the unexpected oil boom of the 1970s which brought about a buoyant 
economy added an increased impetus to Nigeria's rising continental prominence 
(Africa No.79, March 1978:101). The economic wellbeing enjoyed by the country at 
the time afforded it the platform to pursue a rigorous and active foreign policy 
“clearly manifested in the leading roles that it played in the struggle to secure 
independence for Angola, Guinea Bissau, Zimbabwe and Namibia, not to mention the 
dismantling of apartheid in South Africa” (Adeniji, 2005:5). 
Nigeria is therefore to all intents and purposes endowed with the most crucial 
ingredients needed by any aspirant of national development to succeed and as pointed 
out by Salisu (2002:2): 
[d]uring the oil boom period of the seventies Nigeria made 
headlines with her oil wealth, as the country is richly 
endowed with oil and natural gas resources capable of 
financing a number of important projects to meet basic 
consumption and development needs. 
Nigeria is also the biggest oil exporter in Africa and has the largest reserve of natural 
gas in the continent. With these large reserves of natural resources, Nigeria is able to 
build a prosperous economy and significantly reduce poverty, and provide health, 
education and infrastructure services to its population needs (World Bank 2013). 
At the geo-political realm, Nigeria’s geo-political significance is intrinsically tied to 
its economic superiority and comparative economic advantage which it enjoys among 
the countries within the West African sub-region. According to Uzodike et al (2013: 





region while also not forgetting its sacrosanct responsibility (as enshrined in the 
Nigerian constitution) of a mandate to protect and maintain peace among its 
contiguous states. All these are informed by the country’s strategic economic clout. 
Nigeria today stands as the fastest growing economy in Africa and features 
prominently in the depictions of ‘emerging’ Africa (Enweremadu 2013). Nigeria’s 
economy no doubt has witnessed significant economic boom since more than a 
decade of the restart of democracy in 1999. 
Suffice to say that Nigeria’s economy and economic value is conditioned by revenue 
generated from the exploration and exportation of crude oil. Today, oil exportation 
accounts for over 90% of Nigeria total revenue. As a result of the oil revenue, the 
country is able to assert its influence on the international scale. For instance, through 
its membership of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 
Nigeria has been able influence the currency of international events as a critical actor 
in global economic affairs. 
Again, Nigeria’s economy equally accounts for almost 60% of the West African 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), with an estimated GDP of more than $407.042b 
(Uzodike et al 2013; see table 7.2). This substantial economic prowess gives the 
country the wherewithal to intervene in regional conflicts in order to protect its 
economy both within the sub-region and in Africa. It goes without saying that since 
its attainment of independence in 1960, Nigeria has been able to use its vibrant 
economy to support a dynamic foreign policy which has ultimately contributed 
immensely to the growth and development of the continent (Uzodike et al, 2013). To 
a considerable extent, Nigeria’s diplomatic behavior is rooted in its economic strength 
which affords it the opportunity to provide focus and leadership particularly for the 
African continent as displayed over the years in its commitment to the eradication of 
slavery, colonialism, apartheid and all forms of racial oppression. More so, as a result 
of its economic strength, Nigeria is also able to participate in multilateral institutional 
arrangements like the AU, UN, ECOWAS etc. noticeable for example in its leading 
role in the formation of the defunct OAU; AU; ECOWAS and not to mention the 
prominent role it played in the liberation of many of Southern African states.  
Over the years Nigeria’s economy was dealt mortal blows by continued bad 





regained its economic advancement although it remains to be seen whether or not the 
newly revived economy will percolate to the less privileged. Presently, Nigeria stands 
as a promising economy in Africa. However, it is not the only one in Africa. In the 
aftermath of the 2008 global economic session, African economies have shown 
remarkable resilience (Shaw 2012) and since Nigeria is not offering something novel 
by its economic improvement, the claim to regional leadership will no doubt be 
challenged by this precarious security situation. 
It is thus explicable that Nigeria, whether covertly or overtly, aspires to be Africa’s 
recognized leader armed by the strength of its comparative economic advantage and 
ability to control or set economic agendas in a way that reflects its own preferences. 
This aspiration has been there for decades. One time Nigerian consul to Washington – 
Olu Sanu – was unequivocal in stating that Nigeria has “to be recognized as a regional 
power in West Africa” Magyar and Conteh-Morgan (1998) and quite controversially 
he goes on to say that West Africa is Nigeria’s region and the country “has the right to 
go to war”. He also likened this to the Monroe Doctrine which Shagari cited (see 
Adebajo 2000). 
On the flip side, South Africa in barely two decades since the end of apartheid in 
1994, has been able to remarkably transform itself into unarguably the strongest 
economy in Africa while also being the largest investor on the continent with business 
presence; corporate expansion of multinational corporations and parastatal investment 
into many parts of Africa (see Table below). To be certain, in 2010, South Africa’s 
GDP was $527.5b and ranked 26th largest in the world and the largest in Africa 
(Boulle 2011:135). There is no contesting the superior economic currency and 
dominance of South Africa in Africa as its “superior economic competitiveness offers 
an economic clout and in fact bequeaths significant amounts of diplomatic capital to 
South Africa’s leadership potential” (Zondi 2012:7; Habib; 2010). South Africa today 
accounts for close to a third of Africa’s economic strength and by virtue of this no 
doubt plays a critical role in trade relations within the Southern African Customs 
Union (SACU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the 
African continent in general (Adebajo 2007:213; Chiroro 2012; Makoa 2001).  
South Africa’s economic incursion into Africa in the post-apartheid period is not only 





importantly facilitated by the private sector with a significant number of corporate 
forays of South African businesses into the African markets ranging from retail; food; 
banking; telecommunications; tourism; infrastructure; power; franchise; construction; 
and mining. According to Grobbelaar (2005:30), this has helped to “unlock the 
business potential of the countries that they are involved in”. Suffice to say however 
that this is much limited in francophone countries due partly to the restriction of 
language and different legal systems and business cultures (Hudson 2007; Games 
2004). 
 Table 7.2:  Matrix of key political-economic statistics for South Africa 
South Africa  
National facts Social and gov ind            rank / total 
Type of government          Federal republic 
Capital(s)         Capetown, Pretoria 
         & Bloemfontein 
 
Surface area (1000 sq km)  1,219 
Population (millions)          50.5m 
Main languages                   English, Zulu,  
          Afrikaans  
          (9 local languages) 
 
Main religions       Christian (68%),  
       Traditional African (29%)  
                                        Other (3%) 
 
Head of State (president)  Jacob Zuma 
Head of Government       Jacob Zuma 
Monetary unit                   Rand (ZAR) 
 
Economy                                                        
2011   
Economic size           bn USD % world 
total 
Nominal GDP                          405                0.59 
Nominal GDP at PPP              552                0.70 
Export value of goods and  
services                                     110                0.50 
IMF quota (in m SDR)             1869               0.86 
Nominal GDP per head            8272                          
Nominal GDP per head at PPP 11257                           
Real GDP per head                    6081                          
 
 
Economic structure                           2011    5-yr 
av.  
Real GDP growth                                  3.1        3.2 
Human Development Index (rank) 121/187 
Ease of doing business (rank)            39/185 
Economic freedom index (rank)        74/177 
Press freedom index (rank)                53/178 
Gini index (income distribution)        63.1 
Population below $1.25 per day (PPP) 14% 
 
Foreign trade                      2010 
Main exp partners(%) Main  imp 
partners(%) 
China         13           China                15 
US               9            Germany         12 
Japan           8            US                      8  
Germany     8            Saudi Arabia        6 
Main export products (%)        2011 
Platinum                                 14 
Gold                                               12 
Coal                                                  9 
Cars & other components                 6 
Main import products (%) 
Petrochemicals                                 17 
Equipment components for cars       7 
Motor cars & other components       6 
Petroleum oils and others                  5 
Openness of the economy 
Export value of G&S (% of GDP)      27 
Import value of G&S (% of GDP)     28 





Agriculture (% of GDP)                        2            3 
Industry (% of GDP)                            31           31 
Services (% of GDP)                            66            66 
 
 Source: Author’s Compilation, 2013 
 
Table 7.3: Comparative economic and military indicators for Nigeria and South 
Africa 
Indicator   Nigeria South Africa 
Military Age/Manpower 18 years 18 years 
Manpower 18-49 (26,804,314) 18-49 (10,354,769) 
Expenditure $544.6 million (2004) $3.172 billion (2004) 
Expenditure % of GDP 1.5% 1.7% 
Strength  85, 000 60,000 
Branches Nigerian Armed Forces 
(NAF); Nigerian Navy; 
Nigerian Air Force; Joint 
Task Force (JTF) 
South African National 
Defence Force 
(SANDF); Army, Navy, 





Economic Size of Economy (in 
GDP) 
$369.8 billion (2010 est.) $527.5 billion (2010 est.) 
Foreign Exchange 
Reserve 
$43.36 billion (December 
2010 est.) 
$45.52 billion 
(December 2010 est.) 
Debt – external   $11.02 billion (December 
2010 est.) 
$80.52 billion (30 June 
2010 est.) 
Electricity – production 21.92 billion kWh (2007 est.) 240. 3 billion kWh 
(2007 est.) 
Oil Reserves 34 billion bbl 7.84 million bbl 
Production 2.356 million bbl/day 196,200 bbl/day 
Consumption 275,000 bbl/day 460,000 bbl/day 
GDP Purchasing 
Power  








6.2% (2004 est.) 3.5% (2004 est.) 
Per capita: 
PPP 




Crude oil, natural gas, coal, 
tin, columbite, iron ore, 
limestone, niobium, lead, 
zinc, arable land, palm oil, 
peanuts, cotton, rubber, 
wood, hides and skin, textile, 
cement and other 
construction materials, food 
products, footwear, chemical, 
fertilizer, printing, ceramics, 
steel, small commercial ship 
construction and repair etc. 
Mining, (world’s largest 
producer of platinum, 
gold, chromium), coal, 
iron ore, manganese, 
gem diamonds, copper, 
natural gas, nickel, 
phosphate, tin, uranium, 
automobile assembly, 
metal working, 
machinery, textile, iron 
and steel, chemicals, 
fertilizer, foodstuffs, 
commercial ships repair 
etc. 
Political Membership of key 
multilateral organizations 
UN, AU, ECOWAS, 
Commonwealth, OPEC, 
ADB, IMF, UN, World Bank 
UN, AU, SADC, 
SACU, BRICS, G20, 
BASIC, IBSA, ADB, 
IMF, World Bank 
Contribution to AU 15% 15% 
Factor HDI Ranking 142 out of 169 (2010 est.) 142 out of 169 (2010 
est.) 
 Literacy (total) 68% 86.4% 
 Unemployment rate  4.9% (2007 est.) 23.3% (2010 est.) 
 Population below poverty 
line 
70% (2009 est.) 50% (2000 est.) 
 People living with 
HIV/AIDS 
3.3 million (2009 est.) 5.6 million (2009 est.) 
Source: Author’s compilation (Adapted from Zabadi and Onuoha 2012:390-391 & 
Flemes & Wojczewski (2010). 
South Africa’s Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) has made tremendous 
investment in over 60 projects in 21 African countries. Following from this, South 
Africa enjoys marginal and comparative trade advantage over all of the countries in 
Africa with the exception of Egypt, Nigeria and Tunisia indicating that its balance of 
trade with Africa remains skewed in its favour. Hudsin (2007) attributes South 





of the South African market to absorb its own products coupled with the inability of 
its companies to effectively compete on an international scale beyond Africa. 
Secondly, the international isolation and seclusion of South Africa with a concomitant 
diplomatic and economic sanctions invoked on the country during the apartheid 
period meant that the country had accumulated surplus capital during this period 
which it in turn needed to invest in available markets following the end of apartheid. 
It therefore did not come as a surprise that African markets thus presented a veritable 
destination for this massive flow of capital investment from South Africa.  
On the international political-economic front, South Africa is today the only African 
member of the Group of Twenty (G20) and its inclusion as a member of BRICS is no 
doubt in recognition of its vast economic potentiality and superiority vis-à-vis other 
countries within the African continent. And as the only African member of the BRICS 
economic bloc, this representation comes with many expectations and obligations 
particularly when viewed in the context of South Africa being the gateway to 
investment potentials into the rest of Africa. As a result, South Africa is thus currently 
the European Union’s (EU) largest trading partner in Africa. In 2010, South Africa’s 
exports to the EU were at €17 912 million which presents extensive possibilities for 
the integration of African economies into the global market (Chiroro 2011:9). We 
move on to assess South Africa’s economic superiority in two important contexts of 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and international regional corporate presence. 
(a) Foreign direct investment (Inward and Outward) 
Without reservation, South Africa has in the past couple of years, been able to attract 
enormous Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into its local economy while also 
responsible for the same in many African countries. According to the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), “In absolute terms, the amounts 
invested in African countries [by South Africa] may be small, but they account for a 
significant share of FDI for some African economies (e.g. Mozambique)” (Daniel, 
Naidoo and Naidu 2003). In essence, no other African country has invested more in 
Africa than South Africa. A similar report by the UNCTAD World Investment Report 
(WIR) of 2011 equally shows that “the large share accounted for by FDI projects 
within sub-Saharan Africa suggests that South African investors are playing a large 
role” and (as the table below shows) are having an exceptional propensity to invest 





            Table 7.4: South African outward stock of FDI (US$ mn and %) 
Year  In Africa In World Share in 
Africa 
2000 1768  35276 5.0% 
2001 1631 26899  6.1% 
2002 1353  19286 7.0% 
2011 3017 36 826.0 8.2 
          Sources: Figures derived from EIU, CIA World Factbook, UN, Heritage      
   Foundation, Transparency International, Reporters Without Borders and 
   World Bank. 
According to the report, most of the intra-regional flows of FDI are attributable to 
investment from South Africa into neighboring countries in East and Southern Africa. 
Its share of Africa in its outward FDI stock rose from 8% in 2005 to 22% in 2009. In 
addition to this, South Africa is the third largest investor in Africa behind only United 
Kingdom and United States. For example, investments from South Africa account for 
more than 50 percent of all FDI flows into Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland (Rumney and Pingo 2004; UNCTAD 2006). Besides 
this, South Africa is also the second largest recipient of FDI inflow into the continent 
following after Nigeria.   
(b) International corporate presence of multinational corporations  
Closely connected to the above point of the inflow and outflow of foreign direct 
investment is the post-apartheid trend of northward economic incursion of South 
Africa’s multinational corporations and parastatals into the rest of Africa. As the 
curtain closed on the apartheid system, Davies (1991; 1992; 1993) suggested three 
possibilities that could arise as a result of the new political-economic order that was to 
emerge. According to him, South Africa could begin to pursue a policy of economic 
expansionism where state capital is directed to achieve specific national interest. 
Second would be a policy that enforces a hegemonic ambition and domination for 
South Africa using platforms of regional multilateral frameworks and finally would 
be the strategy to adopt a non-hegemonic posture which emphasizes cooperation and 
integration where its national interest is sacrificed on the altar of continental and 
collective interest. With the benefit of hindsight, it would seem that South Africa 
whether by policy choice or through an unintentional action opted for a mixture of the 
first and third positions where in the first case, it economic expansion particularly into 
Africa was cemented by the investments of South Africa’s businesses into Africa and 





economic and political integration for the continent rather than its own pecuniary 
interest.  
A number of factors account for the northward penetration of South African markets, 
especially in Africa (Daniel, Naidoo and Naidu 2003). For instance, the political 
transition from an apartheid era to a democratic period helped set the country on a 
stage of international respectability which ultimately increased the momentum for 
economic penetration. Scholars have also alluded to the fact that the transition period 
also coincided with the end of the Cold War with “a concomitant demise of the state-
directed commandist economic model and the triumph of its neo-liberal alternative” 
(Daniel, Naidoo and Naidu 2003). Against this background, one of the remarkable 
effects that the post-apartheid period thus brought along with it was the dramatic 
incursion of South Africa’s multinationals and parastatals into Africa. Lutchman and 
Naidu (2004) reports that South African companies have a huge presence in the 
African continent in almost all sectors of the economy (see Table 7.5 below). As a 
result of the political and economic transformation in South Africa since 1994, 
economic relations between the country and the rest of Africa in particular have 
improved exponentially and cemented by the presence of multinational corporations 
in many parts of the continent in what has often been referred to as the “South 














Table 7.5: Sector representation of major South African multinational corporations 
Sector Companies Located 
Aviation &  
airport services 
Airports Company of South Africa (ACSA) Management contracts in 9 countries 
Airlines South African Airways (SAA), SAA has a 49% stakes in Air Tanzania and is negotiating a 30% stake in 
Nigeria’s national carrier, Eagle Airline. In SAA flies to 20 African 
destinations. 
Nationwide Airlines Contracts to provide aircraft for five national airlines (Tanzania, Malawi, 








Stanbic In 18 African countries 
 
Absa In 5 countries 
Stanlib (joint venture between Standard 
Bank and Liberty Life) 
In 9 countries 
First Rand (FNB) and its subsidiary Rand 
Merchant Bank 
Retail operations in 4 countries; corporate operations in 25 countries 
and project financing in 12 countries 
Nedbank  In 7 countries 
Investec Ltd In 4 countries 








DBSA Funding ventures in 7 countries 
IDC Funding ventures in 20 countries 
Construction Murray and Roberts Permanent offices in 3 countries and 13 country 
Contracts 
Group 5  13 country contracts 
Grinaker LTA  9 country contracts 
Concor  9 country contracts 
Energy Sasol 4 country contracts. Planned merger of its liquid fuels sector with 
Malaysia’s Petronas marketing and distribution businesses means it will 
have operations in 14 sub-Saharan African countries 
Manufacturing Nampak  In 10 countries 
SAB Miller 18 beer breweries in 14 countries, 35 sorghum breweries in 5 countries 
Illovo Sugar  In 5 countries 
Barloworld  
 
In 7 southern African countries 
AECI (subsidiaries African Explosives Ltd 
[AEL] & Dulux) 
AEL companies in 7 countries Manufacturing Dulux products in 5 
countries  
Media & broadcasting Multichoice TV and subscriber services in 21 countries 
Mining Anglogold The merger with Ashanti Goldfields and Anglogold gives it a mining 





Randgold Resources  In 3 countries 
Retail trade Shoprite Holdings Ltd  
 
162 outlets in 15 countries with planned expansion into Nigeria in 2004 
Massmart (Makro, Game, Dion, Cash & 
Carry et al.)  
Over 300 outlets in SACU states 
Metcash  In 3 countries 
Wooltru/Woolworths 52 stores in 19 countries 
Truworths Limited Stores in 13 countries  
Famous Brands (Steers, Debonairs, Fish 
Aways, Church’s Chicken, Pouyoukas 
Foods)  
Franchises in 22 countries 
St. Elmo’s  Franchises in 7 countries 
Pepkor Holdings (Pep Stores and 
Ackermans)  
Present in 6 countries 
Ellerine Holdings Ltd. (Ellerines, Town 
Talk Furnishers, Furn City, Rainbow 
Loans, CPI, Foreign,Wetherlys, Osiers, 
Roodefurn)  
94 stores in 5 countries 
JD Group (Abra, Barnetts, BoConcept, 
Bradlows, Electric 





Express, Hi-Fi Corporation, Joshua 
Doore,Morkels, Price and Pride, Russells)  
Research & Development  
 
V&A Waterfront Contracts in Mauritius, Gabon, Nigeria for the development 
construction of waterfront complexes 
CSIR Conducting research projects in 17 countries 
Telecommunications MTN/M-Cell (MTN posted net profits of 
R4.3bn from revenues of R23.9bn from all 
of its African operations in fiscal 2003–04. 
Up 23% on previous year) 
Cellular-fixed line contracts in 5 countries (Uganda 50%, Rwanda 31%, 
Nigeria 94%, Cameroon 100%, Swaziland (a joint venture). Has 9.5 
million African customers. Its non-SA 




11.2 million African customers and contracts in 5 countries but only 
functional in 4: Lesotho, DRC (51%), Tanzania (65%) and 
Mozambique; its Zambian licence has been non-operational for two 
years. In 2003–04 it posted a profit of R3bn from Africa-wide revenue 
of R23.5bn. Attempts to move into Nigeria collapsed in May 2004 
Transtel  
(a division of Transnet)  
 
Runs a telecommunications network in 19 countries with South African 
multinationals including banks, railways, retailers, local telecoms, and 
civil and security networks 
Transport Transnet: 9 divisions (African involvement 
is through divisions such as Spoornet 
International Joint Ventures and 
subsidiaries, Comazar, 
Transwerk and Transtel)  
20 country contracts 







Tourism & leisure service Protea Hotels Resorts in 
10 
countries 
Collectively these hotels operate in 14 countries 
Southern Sun Resorts in 
6 countries 
Sun International  Resorts in 
4 countries 
Imperial Car Rental  110 outlets in 8 Southern African countries 
Utilities Power Eskom Enterprises A presence in 33 African countries (via utility management contracts in 
Malawi, Mali, Uganda and Nigeria, joint venture companies in Morocco, 
Mozambique, Libya and Zambia and contracts in 25 other countries) 
means that Eskom is Africa’s largest power utility. Its biggest initiative is 
the ‘Grand Inga’ project where, together with the national utilities of 
Angola, Botswana, the DRC and Namibia, Eskom has formed a joint 
venture company known as Westcor. The project aims to generate 
enough energy to light up Africa and create excess to export to Europe 
Water Umgeni Water  3 country contracts 
Information technology Arrivia.kom 
(state-owned) 
3 offices in Nigeria, Ghana and Botswana, 1 joint venture with Seven 
Seas Technologies in Kenya Contracts in Namibia, Malawi, Zambia and 
Uganda 
 Mustek  Authorised dealerships in 8 countries 






Without any reservation, there is an undeniable presence of South African companies 
operating in African markets in countries like Nigeria, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda 
Cameroon etc. with business presence in areas ranging from transport, mining, 
financial services, manufacturing, retail, and hoteling to construction, entertainment, 
telecommunication, tourism, utilities etc. For instance, MTN and Vodacom dominate 
the telecommunication market in Nigeria and Ghana respectively. In essence, there is 
hardly a sector of the South African economy that has not a corporate presence in the 
broader African market. 
South Africa is a developing country, albeit being more developed than other African 
countries. Since the apartheid period, it has been able to use its strategic economic and 
military advantage to compel an acceptance of its regional hegemony in such a way 
that makes other countries especially within the Southern African region dependent 
on Pretoria. Among the members of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), 
South Africa enjoys prominence. Landlocked countries like Botswana, Lesotho, 
Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe are heavily reliant on South Africa’s sea ports for 
their export and import needs (Abebajo and Landsberg 2003). Lesotho for instance is 
completely surrounded by South Africa while Swaziland is almost entirely within 
South Africa as well. During apartheid Namibia was a ‘colony’ of South Africa and 
Botswana was also hugely influenced by the apartheid regimes. Granted this historical 
affiliation and the physical size disparity between South Africa and other SACU 
members, it is understandable that South Africa’s place as a de facto leader of SACU 
is assured. However, its leadership in Southern Africa and Africa is debatable. 
Problems of hegemony do not come under particular attention among SACU 
members because the free passage of locally produced goods among SACU members 
has been beneficial to the countries involved (Gibb 2006). This is in contrast to South 
Africa’s position in SADC and Africa. 
South Africa’s relationship with Africa particularly in the post-apartheid era is further 
conditioned and expressed in deliberate public and private economic incursion into 
African markets for the purpose of anything but altruism. What is however obvious is 
that South Africa-Africa trade relations has been undoubtedly beneficial to both 






It is important to consider how South Africa has appropriated its economic and 
material resources either to its advantage in achieving political outcomes or in 
providing public goods for the rest of the continent. South Africa’s reputation in terms 
of economic, technological and military superiority is not in doubt. This is so because 
the country is endowed with countless mineral and as a result of its strategic 
geographic position; it is surrounded by a number of landlocked countries in the 
region which depend on it for coastal transport. These facts have given the South 
Africa an enviable picture. Currently, the influence of South Africa among other 
African countries is only appreciated through it superiority in mineral resources and 
economic advancement. 
7.2.1.2 Military currency and capabilities of Nigeria and South Africa 
In contrast to its neighbors, Nigeria unarguably enjoys substantial military hegemony 
as a result of its overwhelming military strength with reasonably well-equipped armed 
forces capable of defending the country against any likely external threat or internal 
insurgence. The Nigerian military comprises of the Army, Navy, and Air force and 
the Joint Task Force saddled with the responsibility of protecting Nigeria’s territorial 
integrity and national security
54
. As table 7.6 demonstrates, in the 2012 GFP military 
power indicator, Nigeria is ranked 36
th
. 
 Table 7.6: Military indicator of Nigeria  
Military Manpower 
Total Population: 162,470,737 
Available Manpower: 72,319,838 
Fit for Service: 40,707,659 
Reaching Military Age Annually: 
3,455,147 
Active Frontline Personnel: 100,000 
Active Reserve Personnel: 0 
Land system Tanks: 363 
Armored Fighting Vehicles: 1,407 
Self-Propelled Guns: 48 
Towed Artillery Pieces: 680 
Rocket Projectors (MLRS): 0 
Portable Mortal System: 300 
Portable AT Weapon: 120 
Logistical Vehicles: 6,000 
                                                          
54 As outlined in Section 217 of the 1999 Constitution, the protection of the country against all forms 
of internal and external danger/threat or attack is a primary responsibility of government performed 






Total Aircrafts: 294 
Helicopters: 84 
Naval power 
Total Strength: 37 (including auxiliaries) 





Coastal Craft: 16 
Mine Warfare: 2 
Amphibious Assault: 0 
Military Budget (in USD) 
 
Defence Budget: $2,215.000,000 
 Source: Global Fire Power (2013) 
Over the years, the Nigerian military has continued to improve upon its military stock 
of weaponry while equally engaged in numerous military adventures targeted towards 
improving their readiness for battle (Omede 2012). The country is therefore able to 
project its military power without much restraint within the region with a total 
strength of about 200,000 men and an estimated 300,000 paramilitary personnel (IISS 
2007; Omede 2012:293). Interestingly, Nigeria’s military is arguably reputed to be the 
largest, best-equipped and professionally trained in the sub-region (Alli 2012) while 
also being the most sophisticated military power in sub-Saharan Africa behind South 
Africa (Bach 2007:301). To its credit, before the period of the Persian Gulf War 
(1989-1990), Nigeria was the only country in West Africa and Central Africa to 
sponsor and sustain military operations abroad.  
Nigeria’s military industrialization project began in 1964 with the establishment of 
the Defence Industries Corporation (DIC) aimed at building Nigeria’s self-reliance in 
the local production of small arms, ammunition, and the maintenance and repair 
services in order to support its defence, security and strategic foreign policy goals 
with international best standards (DICON 2012; www.countrydata.com). As far back 
as the 1970s, its facilities in Kaduna had produced West German-designed HK G-3 
rifles, BM-59 and PM-12 handguns, and 7.62mm and 9mm parabellum ammunition. 
In many ways and for many years since its independence, Nigeria’s diplomatic 
behavior and national role within the region and beyond has always been defined and 
shaped by its military capabilities. The commitment of the Republic to regional peace, 





remarked by Alli (2012) Nigeria’s “considerable military capabilities bestow on her, 
as it were naturally, the role of a regional hegemon”. In other words, over the years, 
Nigeria’s foreign policy emphasizing regional security has been largely influenced by 
the adequacy of its military. Without doubt, it becomes easy to infer therefore that the 
country’s military plays a significant role in the regional security framework of the 
region which it finds itself.  
Furthermore, perhaps no other country in Africa has contributed to international 
peacekeeping more than Nigeria (The Guardian, May 31, 2009). Since 1960 when it 
became a sovereign state and joined the United Nation as its 99
th
 member, Nigerian 
military has participated in many peacekeeping operations with its first troops 
involved in the UN Peace Mission in Congo barely days after its independence (Isiaq 
2012). Fawole 2003:98) equally notes correctly that “the most visible and prominent 
employment of Nigeria’s armed forces in pursuit of the country’s foreign policy goals 
and objectives was in support of UN peacekeeping operations around the world”. In 
line with its national foreign policy objectives, the country has contributed 
significantly to building sustainable peace particularly within the African region 
demonstrated in a long history of commitment in finance, manpower, leadership and 
involvement in peacekeeping operations across the world under the auspices of UN, 
AU and ECOWAS. As of today, Nigeria has over 17000 peacekeeping military 
personnel contributing to peace-building outside its borders in countries such as 
Angola, Iraq, Kuwait, Liberia, Rwanda, Western Sahara etc. Nigerian troops have 
also previously served in peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, Chad, the Congo, 
India-Pakistan, Lebanon, Mozambique, and Somalia.  
There is no disputing the fact that Nigeria has gained a considerable level of 
respectability and international prestige among the comity of nations as a result of its 
extensive international peacekeeping involvement. There is hardly any major peace-
keeping or peace-enforcement mission carried out under the auspices of the UN, AU 
or ECOWAS that the Nigerian military has not been involved in. However, the 
progressive withdrawal of the military from politics during the transition to the Third 
Republic equally changed the level of involvement of the military in the foreign 





On the other hand, while South Africa cannot be regarded as a global military force, it 
nevertheless can be considered as a regional military power particularly in the 
regional context of Southern Africa on the basis of its impressive military capability 
(Neethling 2003:95; 2004; DoD 2004; 2006). As table 7.7 below shows, according to 
the 2013 Global Firepower (GFP) ‘Power Index’ ranking of military powers, South 
Africa is ranked 34
th
 in the world (GFP 2013) (see table below). Traditionally, and on 
paper, South Africa has remained the military powerhouse of the African continent 
with an unequalled level of military investment, budget and unparalleled capacity 
which supersedes any other country within the continent. This is despite the fact that 
its military expenditure has reduced significantly since the post-apartheid and post-
Cold War eras respectively. Nevertheless, South Africa has always presented an 
image of a formidable military powerhouse in Africa especially.  
As outlined in Chapter 11 of the South African Constitution of 1996, the defence 
force comprising of the army, air force, navy and the military health service and has a 
responsibility to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people 
in accordance with the constitution and the principles of international law regarding 
the use of force.  
The South African Defense Force (SADF) was established in 1957 and was later 
renamed as the South African National Defense Force (SANDF) in 1994 after a 
process of post-apartheid restructuring. Prior to the end of the apartheid era, South 
Africa emerged as a regional power particularly within the Southern African region 
partly as a result of its military capacity economic and dominance which it also used 
to further its apartheid racial policies especially within the Southern African region. 
As a result of many years of military clampdown and ‘total strategy’ targeted at 
squashing communist and anti-apartheid sentiments within the region, South Africa 











  Table 7.7: Military indicator for South Africa 
Military Manpower 
Total Population: 50,586,757 
Available Manpower: 25,913,422 
Fit for Service: 14, 093, 327 
Reaching Military Age Annually: 967,139 
Active Frontline Personnel: 74,000 
Active Reserve Personnel: 0 
Land system Tanks: 250 
Armored Fighting Vehicles: 1,590 
Self-Propelled Guns: 43 
Towed Artillery Pieces: 74 
Rocket Projectors (MLRS): 240 
Portable Mortal Systems: 1,320 
Portable AT Weapons: 1,153 
Logistical Vehicles: 2,220 
Air power 
Total Aircrafts: 235 
Helicopters: 91 
Naval power 
Total Strength: 24 (including auxiliaries) 





Coastal Craft: 6 
Mine Warfare: 4 
Amphibious Assault: 0 
Military Budget (in 
USD) 
 
Defence Budget: $4,827,000,000 
           Source: Global Fire Power (2013) 
As amplified by Mandrup (2008:5), the international role played by the armed forces 
in the current government is somewhat different from the one they played during the 
white minority rule of the apartheid era. In other words, the South African military 
that had hitherto been infamous as a source of conflict can now begin to play a much 
appreciable and benign role of a peace builder. By implication, this military 
superiority has remained intact even since the post-apartheid period as it was 
envisaged in the immediate aftermath of the transition in 1994…that South Africa 
“would be able to play a central part in the resolution of future conflicts in Southern 
Africa” (Mandrup 2008:5). South Africa’s re-acceptance into the international scene 





Pretoria’s foreign policy mandates of promoting global peace and security under 
multilateral frameworks such as the SADC, AU, and the UN (DoD 2005b). 
In relation to foreign policy, the leadership of the country itself acknowledges the  
imperative of the military as a significant instrument in its attempts to bring to reality 
the country’s post-1994 foreign policy ambitions of reform, stability and development 
in Africa (Mandrup 2008:5). As a consequence, the achievement of South Africa 
diplomatic goals of creating peace, stability and development in Africa would almost 
be impossible without the willingness to exert its coercive instrument in furtherance 
of these goals. It is in doing this that the SANDF becomes critical to the foreign 
policy trajectories of South Africa (Zuma 1999). 
Like the case of Nigeria, South Africa’s military is therefore crucially tied to the 
execution of its foreign policy and as rightly noted by DFA (1999:30), “any form of 
participation in peace operations is an extension of South African foreign policy”. As 
a member of the UN, AU, and the SADC, part of South Africa’s major international 
commitments to Africa and of course the rest of the world is collective security in the 
form of Peace Support Operations (PSOs), most notably in Darfur (Sudan), 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Chad, Mozambique to mention but a 
few).  
Another factor that highlights the military strength of South Africa is its functional 
military industrial base capable of supporting its weaponry production set up since 
1940. The Arms Corporation (Armscor) was established in 1977 following the merger 
of the Armaments Production Board and the state-owned Armament Development 
and Production Corporation. As a result, South Africa’s arms industry has grown to 
become one of the largest in the developing world. According to the report of the 
South Africa’s Department of Defence:  
in 1989, South Africa ranked 13th in total world-wide 
military expenditure, 44th in world military spending as a 
percentage of Gross National Product (GNP) and 63rd in 
world military spending as a percentage of total government 
spending. South Africa also ranked 49th in the size of its 
armed forces, but only 103rd in terms of the size of armed 





South Africa has the largest military budget within the Southern African region; 
however, its dwindling defence budget has become a source of concern regarding the 
actual capacity of its armed forces. Statistics show South Africa’s defence budget as a 
percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is indeed one of the lowest in 
Southern Africa. Since 1989, its defence budget had been reduced from 4.4% to 1.2% 
of GDP by 2009 (Parliament 2007; Mandrup 2008:5).  
Nevertheless, to be sure, the available statistics of South Africa’s military capacity 
points us to the potential power superiority of the country in comparison to its 
Southern African neighbors. Like other powerful nations of the earth, the military 
advantage that a state enjoys gives it certain privileges over and above its other 
contemporaries in the international system. South Africa can therefore be in a position 
to effectively use its military superiority complex to achieve its political agenda at the 
international stage. South Africa’s armed forces can therefore play a pivotal role in 
promoting peace and stability as fundamental conditions for development within 
Africa (Mandrup 2008:14) and according to Cornish (2003), “there can be no African 
renaissance without the military”. As Sidiropoulos (2004:59) further mentions, the 
leadership ambitions of South Africa is therefore intricately tied to and dependent on 
its military capabilities. In all, the advent of South Africa in the post-apartheid era has 
renewed expectations in Africa and beyond the continent regarding its potential role 
as a peacekeeper in African conflicts due largely to its military competences 
(Neethling 2003). 
7.2.2 Soft power profiles of Nigeria and South Africa 
Even though the analysis and debate on Nigeria and South Africa’s power is almost 
entirely focused on the economic and military aspects of its rising power, a reasonable 
account of the power portfolios of Nigeria and South Africa would be incomplete 
without an estimation of their soft power capabilities. This is because one of the major 
requirements for a regional power status is the location, presence and deployment of a 
state’s sources of soft power which may vary from culture, political ideology, and 
diplomacy to sporting achievements, foreign policy, tourism, media, language etc. An 
account of Nigeria and South Africa’s soft power status is therefore necessary and 





power assortments of both countries. That there is little discussion on the soft power 
potentials of these countries should not imply that this does not exist.  
7.2.2.1 Nigeria’s soft power profiles  
Does Nigeria have any meaningful soft power potentials that it could wield on an 
international scale? Accounting for the soft power profiles of Nigeria is indeed an 
onerous task as it is incredibly difficult to point to anything that can yield some sense 
of soft power influence for Nigeria in the context that Nye has used the term. 
However, what makes a regional power must necessarily include a state’s soft power 
attributes and Nigeria as a regional power must by default have this conditions like 
every other regional power. It may however prove very difficult to locate soft power 
attributes of Nigeria. Having said this, despite that very little or no literature existing 
on Nigeria’s soft power profiles, we can from hindsight, foresight and insight account 
from some evidences pointing to Nigeria’s soft power profiles which it can wield if 
properly yoked with its hard power capacities. This means therefore that Nigeria 
would most likely gain more influence on the international arena when it begins to 
properly and creatively articulate and mobilize its soft power just like other countries 
such United States, China and South Africa. What are then Nigeria’s soft power 
potentials? To start with, Nigeria’s soft power may potentially be coupled from 
attributes such as its cultural export (Nollywood); its political and iconic personalities; 
sporting accomplishment; international peace keeping role; delivery of public good, 
Afrocentric foreign policy; good neighborliness etc. We shall consider Nigeria’s soft 
power opportunities on the three scales of cultural attraction, political values and 
foreign policy as used by Nye. 
7.2.2.1.1 Nigeria’s soft power of cultural attraction 
In the area of cultural export particularly in terms of media export (the royalties and 
fees earned from the export of goods such as films, music and books) Nigeria’s 
valuable contribution can be propelled to improve its international public image from 
music, art, entertainment, fashion, language, literature. For instance, Nigeria’s 
entertainment industry particularly in the area of film, and music productions 
permeates virtually every nook and cranny of the African continent and beyond. 
Nigeria can boast of international renowned artists who have made their mark in their 





Square, D-Banj, and many others have songs that are aired in virtually every major 
street and public place in the continent. Nigeria’s massive and attractive music and 
entertainment industry is very much the envy and point of attraction for many 
nationalities especially within the continent. These artists have no doubt become 
international celebrities with major music collaborations with international artistes 
across Europe and America.  
Again, the general popularity of Nigeria’s ‘Nollywood’ as Nigeria’s film industry is 
dubbed after America’s Hollywood is also one attribute of soft power potential that 
Nigeria can draw from. This is because Nollywood showcases the beautiful varieties 
of the Nigerian cultural heritage and its people to the point where other nationalities 
begin to admire the rich culture and history of the Nigerian people. Nollywood actors 
and actresses like Stephanie Okereke, Genevieve Nnaji, Patience Ozokwor, Mr. Ibu, 
Osita Iheme (Aki and Pawpaw), Pete Edoche, Omotola Jolade, Mercy Johnson, 
Richard Mofe Damijo, Ike Owo, Funke Akindele and many others are widely popular 
and celebrated among the African people for their animating qualities and can become 
ambassadors for promoting the Nigerian brand and initiative. This can also be 
complimented with popular Nigeria’s soap operas like Jacobs Cross, Tinsel, etc. that 
are widely admired and watched by millions of viewers within the African continent 
courtesy of Dstv. A number of Multichoice/Dstv Africa Magic channels (AME 150, 
AMMov 152, AMM1 153, AMag 154) are dedicated Nollywood channels which 
constantly broadcast Nigerian films and programs which often present the rich culture 
and societal landmarks of the Nigerian people. Little wonder why the first ever Africa 
Magic Viewer’s Choice Awards (AMVCA) was held in Nigeria in 2013.  
The Nigerian government can in fact take advantage of the vast representation of its 
people through these platforms to project a cultural acceptance of its people. No 
doubt, the films, soaps and programs paint an admirable image of the Nigerian 
societal standards, intrigues and moral values. 
Added to the above, is a variety of international legendary icons and popular authors 
of Nigerian origin with landmark literary works spanning across generations. Worthy 
of note among these are late Chinua Achebe whose famous book “Things Fall Apart” 
remains perhaps the most translated and relevant African literature; Wole Soyinka 





Half of a Yellow Sun and Purple Hibiscus) and many more. By implication, Nigeria’s 
international status has improved considerably by virtue of the good representation of 
these personalities.  
Another measure of Nigeria’s soft power would perhaps be its rich multi-ethnic 
identity and ethno-religious diversity which undoubtedly gives it a considerable moral 
platform to champion the cause of conflict resolution efforts on the basis of its own 
historically shared experiences. Nigeria can therefore take advantage of its ethnic and 
religious attributes in presenting itself as a moral authority for conflict resolution 
especially within the African continent. By implication, other countries with similar 
conditions are able to connect with the specific experiences of Nigeria and rely on its 
proposed strategy for resolving these kinds of conflicts. Aside this, Nigeria’s Muslim 
population which is the largest in world outside the Arab world is considerably crucial 
in its soft power capacities as it can use its Muslim identity as a member of the 
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to negotiate international acceptability for 
its foreign policy strategy.  
The same also goes for the rich and vibrant Christian population of Nigeria. Countless 
of elite Nigerian pastors are today renowned internationally for their miracle and 
healing working powers e.g. Pastor Chris Oyakilome, Prophet T.B. Joshua, Bishop 
David Oyedepo etc. Paradoxically so, Nigeria and Nigerians despite widespread 
corruption and poverty, 2010 Gallup global poll ranks the country as happiest and 
most optimistic people in the world respectively. It may be indeed wise for other 
countries to begin to learn from Nigeria the secret combination of happiness and 
spirituality as indices for development.   
Furthermore, Nigeria’s soft power potentials can also be distilled from its rich 
language culture. In South Africa for instance, it is not unusual to find South African 
giving themselves Igbo names like Adaeze (meaning first girl in the family), Chibuzo, 
Femi (meaning love me) etc. in recognition of their admiration of the Nigerian 
language in general. This is not unrelated to their exposure to the Nigerian culture on 
numerous Dstv channels and their fraternization with the Nigerian people who are not 
hard to find in any part of the world. It is also not uncommon to notice many Africans 
attempting to speak with the regular Nigerian pidgin tone using common expressions 





“Please” respectively. In general, the Nigerian Pidgin language is one that is widely 
spoken and admired in many parts of West and Central Africa with an adulterated 
version of it equally spoken in many parts of Southern Africa especially in South 
Africa. And as Nye acknowledges, this can potentially be an important source of 
Nigeria’s soft power as culture has the capacity to attract people and produce soft 
power in conditions where similarities exists rather than differences (see Huang and 
Ding 2006). 
Nigeria’s soft power potential is also highlighted in the reality that it is perhaps in 
Nigeria’s population. Even though this seems to be a hard power profile it can be 
channelled to attract soft power status for a country when used creatively. As 
mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, Nigeria is the largest African country in 
terms of population and also the most populous Black country in the world meaning 
that every six black person and every 4 Africans is a Nigerian. Today, Nigeria is 
arguably the most educated country on the African continent and is among the most 
qualified professionals both in Africa and across the World in general. The health 
service sector in South Africa for instance is practically kept alive by Nigerian 
medical doctors while Nigerian students top the list of foreign African students both 
in the United Kingdom and United States. In general, hardly would you find any 
country today without a mass of Nigerians contributing substantially to the economic 
life of their host country. This educational and professional indispensability can be 
harnessed and transformed into soft power conditions for Nigeria. It is not surprising 
therefore to see also that Mr Aliko Dangote; a Nigerian is also Africa’s richest man 
highlighting the fact that Nigerian are also among the most prosperous people in the 
continent. 
According to Nelson Mandela in one of his speeches, “Sport is probably the most 
effective means of communication in the modern world, bypassing both verbal and 
written communication and reaching directly out to billions of people worldwide” 
(cited in Beck 2004:77). Beck (2004:90) argues that “modern sport represents a major 
political, economic, social and cultural force in today’s world” (Beck 2004:90). 
Sporting laurels and hosting of mega sporting events has the capacity to enhance the 
international prestige of the host nation (Marx 2004:1). Levermore (2004:21) argue 





association is a major signal for the recognition of states by the international 
community. This is particularly true for South Africa during its exclusion from many 
international sports associations as a result of its apartheid policies. By implication, 
there is an enormous measure of soft power potential in the arena of sports as its 
serves a host nation the opportunity to subtly announce itself as an emerging power or 
even signal to the international community its level of development and economic 
progress made so far (Black & Van der Westhuizen 2004). For instance, West 
Germany used the hosting of the Olympic in 1936 to advance its international prestige 
(Roche, 18, 104). These actions can raise international prestige, while at the same 
time yield other potential benefits for the host nation. 
Nigeria’s lofty contribution in sports in both areas of participation, winning medals, 
bidding to host and hosting mega sporting events also presents a viable platform for it 
to increase its international reputation in the eyes of other global stakeholders. During 
the Cold-War period, sports was used by contending states as a political weapon to 
exert influence. Nigeria since independence has performed to an appreciable standard 
particularly in the area of participation and organizing major sporting events, 
particularly football. In this sense, its sporting achievements can therefore be 
converted into soft power potentials for achieving its external strategies. Recently, 
Nigeria emerged African champion after she won the CAF Orange African Cup of 
Nations coincidentally hosted by South Africa in 2013; a feat that it last achieved 
almost 2 decades earlier.  
7.2.2.1.2  Nigeria’s soft power of political values (Ideology) 
As a result of the long years of military rule, Nigeria’s political values were anything 
but ideal or admirable. However, the advent of democracy in 1999 has brought fresh 
perspective into the global identity of the Nigerian state. In examining Nye’s soft 
power attribute of political values in the Nigerian democratic context, we can infer 
that the country promotes such internationally acceptable political ethos of liberal 
democracy; rule of law and fundamental human rights, constitutionalism; respect for 
constitutionally enshrined values of human rights, equality and justice for all people. 
Nigeria’s democratic consolidation efforts since 1999 have therefore presented a 
platform to begin to imbibe these values and principles that were invariably strange or 





Nigeria’s soft power potential in political values can also stream from the political 
goodwill and international status of many of its past and present political leaders and 
iconic characters like Nnamdi Azikiwe, Obafemi Awolowo, Tafawa Balewa, General 
Olusegun Obasanjo (rtd), General Abdulsalami Abubarkar (rtd) etc. Archbishop Peter 
Akinola (former Anglican Primate of the Church of Nigeria) and the current Nigerian 
president Goodluck Jonathan both feature in the 2006 and 2012 Times Magazine 100 
most influential people respectively. Renowned author Chinua Achebe also tops 
Forbes list of 40 most powerful celebrities in Africa accompanied by noble Nigerians 
such as Wole Soyinka (6
th
), Femi Kuti (10
th
















) and Asa (39
th
) (see Forbes 2013). These international iconic 
characters can no doubt attract abundant global public profile which the country can 
in the first instance convert into benefits and in the second place, begin to reduce 
drastically the huge cost of achieving the country’s foreign policy objectives 
(Mustapha 2008:41). I argue in line with Mustapha (2008:52) that the national 
reputation of Nigeria and Nigerians can have tremendous implication for the cost of 
Nigeria’s foreign policy particularly when it is creatively and positively channeled. 
Conversely, a negative national character has a destructive consequence thus making 
foreign policy extremely difficult and frustrating to accomplish. 
Nigeria’s bloodless transition from military to civilian rule also offers a successful 
political recipe for democratic transition and the peaceful resolution of internal 
political conflict and particularly for authoritarian and military states. This has offered 
a remarkable change in the international perception of Nigeria in the international 
system.  
Another possible potential soft power variable for Nigeria would also be its 
population clout as the most populous Black nation in Africa and the world at large. 
Nigeria’s commitment to promoting the values of good neighborliness through 
peaceful resolution of dispute as exemplified for example in the twin cases president 
Obasanjo’s decision to grant asylum to Liberia’s warlord and former president 
Charles Taylor of Nigeria’s and the peaceful resolution of the Bakassi peninsula 
dispute with Cameroon and in 2003 and 2008 respectively. These gestures can no 





where certain global benefits like a UN seat can be attracted. Nigeria’s many decades 
of foreign policy incursions into Africa has been dedicated towards improving the 
quality of lives of its African neighbors especially by often expending its oil wealth, 
military resources as well as human capital for the development of many parts of 
Africa (see chapter 3 for more details). Similarly, Nigeria’s “strong political will and 
financial support has also helped to transform ECOWAS from its trade-based 
foundation to a security-based Economic Community of West African States 
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)” (Uzodike 2013:11). Summarily as Oshuntokun 
(2008:157) remarks, “Nigeria’s relations with its neighbours have largely been 
friendly….” 
As echoed earlier, Nigeria can begin to consolidate upon its progresses in 
development and economic growth offered as a result of a stable democratic space 
aided by the noticeable improvements in its foreign relations since 1999 from an 
almost international bellicose state to one that is accepted as a qualified member of 
the international system thus increasing its international prestige.  
7.2.2.1.3 Nigeria’s soft power of foreign policies  
No country can boast of having a better record in diplomatic engagements in Africa 
other than Nigeria. As discussed in the previous chapters, Nigeria’s robust foreign 
policy particularly in the area of peacekeeping and peacemaking provides a valuable 
platform for advancing its international image and respectability. The country today 
has the highest contribution of troops among West African states and is also the 4
th
 
largest contributing country to the United Nations troops. Without doubt, since its first 
peace-keeping operations baptism in the Congo in 1960; “Nigeria has been at the 
forefront of a number of peace building and conflict resolution initiatives in 
Africa…championing the cause of peace and unity” (Uzodike et al 2013:1). At the 
West African sub-region, Nigeria has played an enviable role bringing solutions to 
many conflicts as shown its intervention and contribution of military, humanitarian, 
diplomatic, financial and material resources in zone of wars like Chad, Guinea Bissau, 
Liberia, Sao-Tome and Principe, Sierra-Leone, Sudan and more recently in Cote d’ 
Ivoire, Mali and Central African Republic. Its involvement in in many of these sub-





benevolent power thus gaining respectable international kudos among its 
contemporaries (Uzodike et al 2013:11). 
As stated earlier, its concern for the wellbeing of its African neighbors has motivated 
an exceptionally benevolent foreign policy posture that prioritizes the progress of the 
African people. Fundamentally, the general principle of Nigeria’s foreign policy on 
the continent and further afield is not one throws its weight around considering its 
power capabilities (Osuntokun 2008:157).   
Related to the above is Nigeria’s extensive record at the decolonization process and 
liberation struggle in many African countries which at the end of the day made huge 
contributions to the independence of African states particularly in the Southern 
African region. Nigeria was at the forefront of a number of decolonization struggles in 
Africa exemplified in its uncompromised support towards several liberationist 
movements in Southern Africa including African National Congress (ANC) in South 
Africa, the South-West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia, the 
Zimbabwe Africa National Union-Patriotic Front, (ZANU-PF) and the Movement for 
the Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA) etc. (see Uzodike et al 2013:2; Chinade 
2013:4-7). 
Nigeria’s afrocentric foreign policy premised on the underlying principles of a total 
commitment towards advancing the spirit of African unity thus meant that Africa will 
receive priority in the foreign policy consideration of Nigeria; a principle which has 
largely remained the same in the annals of the country’s foreign policy over several 
administrations. As a result, Nigeria has unrivalled contribution to the growth and 
development of its African neighbors since its attainment of formal independence in 
1960 (Akinyemi 1989). Nigeria’s has also been able to use the offer numerous 
economic incentives along with numerous bilateral and multilateral treaties and 
commissions for participating countries to attract international benefits.  
Unmistakably outlined in the 1999 constitution are the foreign policy priorities of 
Nigeria and since the return to democracy in 1999 under president Obasanjo, these 
priorities have been used to advocate international respectability and acceptance from 
a pariah that it was particularly during the Babangida and Abacha military 





sovereignty and ultimately regional and continental economic integration are 
gradually beginning to form a cardinal component in the conduct of the country’s 
foreign policy (Osuntokun 2008:157). There is no denying the destructive effect that 
military rule brought to Nigeria’s international image; however Nigeria in the past 
decade and half has made substantial progress towards revitalizing its dwindling 
international image beyond mere official rhetoric. 
The government’s emphasis on the importance of rule based multilateralism has been 
at the fore front of its foreign policy implementation. It has continued to participate 
actively in the reformation and functionality of a number of multilateral initiatives 
such as the creation of the African Union (AU), the New Partnership for Africa’s 
development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). 
Summarily, while acknowledging the difficulty in estimating the soft power potentials 
in concrete terms, we suggest that Nigeria possesses considerable soft power 
potentials many of which are yet to be properly channeled to accrue any meaningful 
the possible benefit for both country and people. A number of impediments pose 
serious threat to the valuable use of these soft power potentials that if addressed may 
reduce the country expenditure and cost on actualizing its foreign policy and the 
heavy reliance on hard power of coercion. Nigeria can therefore no doubt attract great 
public image by focusing first on building a positive international respect for itself 
where every Nigerian begins to “consider him– or herself an ambassador of the 
country. The image of the ‘ugly’ Nigerian’ has become a significant obstacle to good 
relations, not only with Nigeria’s neighbours, but also on the continent and further 
afield” (Osuntokun 2008:158). 
The formal institutions of foreign policy processes are not in themselves sufficient to 
further the cause of Nigeria. There is a huge responsibility on the part of the citizens 
to help build a positive image for the country. 
7.2.2.2  South Africa’s soft power profiles 
In extrapolating the above ‘soft’ power context into South Africa, we need to ask 
whether South Africa indeed possess any meaningful soft power potentials or capacity 
that it could wield on an international scale to attract certain strategic gain. In my 





power potentials, it may prove difficult to be able to locate the effective, calculated 
and empirically measurable translation of this potential into actual influence or 
strategic advantage for the country. On the other hand, South Africa’s soft power 
potentials may in fact be far enormous than its hard power assets. Indeed, South 
Africa’s soft power has incredibly grown in proportion outside the direct diplomatic 
calculation and strategy of Pretoria. It therefore becomes imperative for the country to 
begin to deliberately find means to enhance and optimize its soft power profile 
particularly within the continent in order to maximize its comparative advantage and 
advance its global reputation while equally attracting the necessary accruable benefits. 
South Africa is therefore capable of achieving more and gaining more influence 
through the mobilizing its soft power which in any case is often less expensive and 
controversial to fronting its external strategy. In my account, its soft power potential 
may therefore include such sources as its media export, political freedom, 
constitutionally enshrined values of rule of law, the bill of right etc. its vast array of 
iconic powers and political goodwill, multinational companies, prestigious 
universities, cultural export, sporting attraction, hospitality among many others.  
Without mincing words, South Africa can clearly be seen as a soft power state having 
the soft power attributes to avoid the use of coercion and force in ensuring that the 
attractiveness of its own ideas and preferences is reflected in the choices of other 
states particularly within Africa. This it can do “by taking cognisance of its racial 
past; the richness of its diverse culture; the contradictions in socio-economic 
development; the fight against poverty and inequalities; and adherence to 
constitutionalism and the rule of law in setting the agenda and ensuring that the 
multilateral system can implement policies that are people-centred” (Chiroro 2012:2). 
According to Chiroro, South Africa can confidently exercise it geopolitical influence 
by exercising its “values, culture, policies and institutions and use these effectively in 
attracting other nations to want what South Africa desires for its people; this is the 
ultimate display of soft power” (Chiroro 2012:3). In this way, it is able to gain 
acceptance and voluntary compliance where force is not needed. We shall explore the 







7.2.2.2.1 South Africa’s soft power of cultural attraction  
South Africa possesses enormous cultural exports in the area of music, art, media, 
literature etc. that if properly harnessed are capable of transforming the role it plays in 
its diplomatic engagement with the rest of the international community. For instance, 
South Africa has an attractive music and entertainment industry that is very much the 
envy and point of attraction for many nations especially within the continent. Durban, 
Johannesburg and Cape Town are increasingly becoming the hub for the production 
of several hit music videos and films many of which portray the country in a 
respectable and admirable image. There is also the general popularity of South 
African soap operas like Generations, Isidingo, Rhythm City etc. which often paint a 
pleasant and intriguing scenario of the country’s societal standards and values. These 
can be blended with a number of admirable popular international artists, authors, 
poets, sportsmen, etc. of South African export some of which include Charlize 
Theron, Alan Paton, Antjie Krog, Leon Schuster, Miriam Makeba, Zapiro, John 
Maxwell Coetzee and many more (see Smith 2012:73) that collectively give a good 
image to the ‘South African brand’. As a result, South Africa’s international image 
has improved tremendously through the projection of these serene impressions of the 
country and this can no doubt present a platform potential for international 
acceptability of what it stands for.  
Again, South Africa’s ethnic diversity and multi-racial cultural background gives it an 
extra edge of cultural attraction for other countries within the international system. 
Today, South Africa is one of the most multicultural and multi-racial countries in the 
world. As a result of its racial past and particularly the adoption of non-violent 
transition process towards an all-inclusive democracy, it becomes less difficult for 
other nationalities to identify with the political and ethnic challenges which invariably 
inform preferred recommendations for global solutions on related issues. South 
Africa’s cultural heritage is also one respected aspect. Particularly, the Zulu culture is 
one that generally permeates and dominates many parts of the Southern African 
region. According to Nye, this can potentially be an important source of South 
Africa’s power as “culture is more likely to attract people and produce soft power in 
situations where cultures are somewhat similar rather than widely dissimilar” (see 





word and concept which cuts across ethnic different ethnic groups and political parties 
in South Africa.  
South Africa’s soft power potential is also evidenced in the general continental 
preference for its higher education institutions. Today this educational preference is 
also endorsed by the reality of the fact that South African Universities are represented 
in at least 8 of the top 10 highest ranked Universities in Africa with University of 
Cape Town (UCT) ranked highest (Webometrics 2012). Enrolment figures into South 
African Universities particularly from Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Swaziland and 
even India has increased remarkably since the post-apartheid period as a result of the 
delivery of high level of education. Even though this soft power potential is often 
punctured by incidences of xenophobic attacks within the country, however there is 
little to show that this has deterred the preference for South Africa Universities. While 
it is admissible that this influx of international students into South Africa can be 
attributable to the country's comparatively rich and buoyant economy, its exponential 
increase in total enrolment of foreign students reflects more importantly South 
Africa’s increasing soft power role as a safe haven and centre of cultural attraction for 
the rest of Africa.  
However, it is important to equally consider the impact of South African educational 
institutions on the perceptions of foreign students about their South African host. It 
might be interesting to know whether foreign graduates from South African 
universities become ambassadors for South Africa in projecting its image or are 
repulsive and critical of its system. For instance, literature shows that foreign students 
who end up studying at American universities end up being critical of the American 
capitalist system while the same also applies to the Communist styled system in the 
then USSR.  
Furthermore, South Africa uses soft-power resources of cultural investments to “draw 
others into a system of alliances and institutions” (Nye 2004:2). This is displayed in 
its commitment to the propagation of the cultural heritage of other states in a way that 
promotes its good image and hence its soft power potential. Chief among this list is 
the South Africa-Mali Timbuktu Manuscript project which is an initiative entirely 
bankrolled by the South African government as part of its NEPAD cultural project to 





In the area of sports as a global cultural phenomenon, the transformation of sports 
generally from leisure into a billion dollar industry has created a soft power space for 
any willing nation to tap into. Without doubt, we see powerful states using sports as a 
tool to reinforce and announce their dominance in the international system either 
during the Olympics or at major sporting events across the world. In fact, during the 
apartheid period, international sporting sanctions also became a critical tool of 
coercion of the South African apartheid government. Particularly since its re-
admittance into the international sporting arena following the advent of democracy in 
1994, South Africa has successfully been able to announce its arrival using the sports 
platform translated in its capacity to excellently host major sporting events in line 
with international standards and best practices. The country equally has an impressive 
sports tradition in the area of participation of global sporting events. A typical 
example is South Africa’s hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup held in Africa for the 
first time (see table below). 
     Table 7.9: International Sporting Events hosted by South Africa (1998-2013) 
Year International Sporting event 
2013 CAF Africa Cup of Nations 
2010 FIFA World Cup 
2010 BMX World Championships 
UCI MTB World Cup 
2009 
 
ICC Champions Trophy 
FIFA Confederations Cup 
2009 Indian Premier League 
2007 World Twenty20 Championships 
Since 2006 A1 Grand Prix  
Since 2003 FINA Swimming World Cup  
1999-2008 
 
Red Bull Big Wave Africa (1999-2008) 
Six-star rated surfing events (annual) 
2006 Paralympic Swimming World Champs 
2005-2008 Women's World Cup of Golf 
2003 2003 President's Cup 
Cricket World Cup 
1998 World Cup of Athletics 
1996 World Cup of Golf 
CAF African Nations Cup 
1995 Rugby World Cup 





Also, since 1995 and 1996, when South Africa successful hosted and won the Rugby 
World Cup final and the CAF African Nations Cup respectively on home soil, the 
country has continued to take advantage of the international sporting arena to attract 
international acceptance and gain international prestige.  
The use of sports as a political tool for the accomplishment of certain external strategy 
is therefore increasingly becoming useful for South Africa’s diplomatic engagement. 
For instance, South Africa stepped in to save Mozambique from the embarrassment of 
backing out from hosting the last All Africa Games as a result of paucity of funds. 
However, this did not come without an insistence on the category of sporting events 
to be included in the Games thus serving as a vivid assertion of its capacity to use 
sports for strategic advantage. Nevertheless, perhaps because South Africa has not 
been able to effectively take account and maximize its soft power potential in sports 
in terms of direct policy goals, it often becomes difficult to assess the impact for 
instance of South Africa’s hosting of different sporting events. Whether this sporting 
investment yields any particular dividends is yet to be empirically verified. Analysts 
point to the fact that despite South Africa’s landmark hosting of Africa’s first World 
Cup and Danny Jordaan’s superb role in in bringing this great achievement to past (as 
Chairman of the Local Organizing Committed for the 2010 FIFA World Cup), this did 
little to win him and his country a seat in the CAF Executive Committee following his 
loss to Madagascar's Ahmad (Daily Independent March 11, 2013). It would have been 
imagined that a membership in CAF’s Executive Committee would have been a 
suitable reward for South Africa’s role in football development in Africa also taking 
into account more recently its acceptance to rescue CAF from the humiliation of the 
Libya’s reluctance to host the African Nations Cup in 2013. Added to this blow is 
South Africa’s tendency to always complain when it is at the losing end of these 
processes which invariably further compromises and contradicts any soft power 
benefits it could invoke in the area of sports.   
The South African media also presents a huge potential for the appropriation of soft 
power. The media is able to influence the perception of the international community 
about South Africa and thus improve its image. Like the CNN of United States and 
the BBC of the United Kingdom, Multichoice, SABC 1, 2, 3, Enca/E-tv are some of 





Southern African region and the African continent in general and are therefore able to 
condition the general perception of foreigner about the image of South Africa.  
7.2.2.2.2 South Africa’s soft power of political values (Ideology) 
It has often been argued that South Africa's economic success has presented Africa 
and indeed the developing world with a political recipe for success. In the context of 
Nye’s soft power condition of political values, South Africa’s soft power is distilled in 
a number of factors like its liberal democratic ideals; respect for constitutionalism; 
political goodwill and the international status of its political leaders and iconic 
characters; its transition process and national struggle history; domestic policies; 
constitutionally enshrined values of the Bill of Right, respect for human rights, 
equality of all people and global justice; its international image, its role as a North-
South bridge builder etc. South Africa can use a combination of these soft power 
potentialities to launch its influence in the global arena (Smith 2012:73). 
In the first place, South Africa can deploy the political goodwill and the international 
status of many of its past and present political leaders like Nelson Mandela, Jan 
Smuts, Steve Biko, Albert Luthuli, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Thabo Mbeki, O.R. 
Tambo etc. to highlight its international soft power status. These national super heroes 
are international reputable statesmen who wield a massive international political clout 
by virtue of their contribution to the political development and transformation of the 
South African state. South Africa can therefore climb on the back of the memory of 
these achievements as launch pad for its external strategy. At the same token, there 
are several other international iconic characters beyond the political sphere where 
South Africans enjoy extraordinary international goodwill by reason of their 
achievements for the country in different spheres of society. The international 
reputation of such renowned men and women like Enoch Sontonga (1873-1905), 
composer of the song "Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrika", which went on to become the anthem 
of three countries and generations of Africans; Chris Barnard (1922–2001), the first 
surgeon in the world to perform a human heart transplant in 1967; J.M Coetzee, a 
professor of Literature and author who became the double winner of the Booker prize 






In the same vein, South Africa’s status as a liberal democratic state where the rights of 
the individual and equality of all people under a free market economy are promoted 
within a democratic political system equally affords it the legitimate basis among the 
comity of nations. The South African state thus makes provision for constitutionally 
enshrined values which prescribe certain universal political ideals which are generally 
upheld principles among civilized nations. Similarly, the South African constitution is 
also remarkable for its provision of sacrosanct values such as the Bill of Right, respect 
for human rights and racial equality etc. Aside this, the South African democracy is 
founded on the principle of constitutionalism where the constitution takes precedence 
and serves as a guiding light for political actions and inactions. As a corollary, the 
country is able to champion these principles of fundamental human right, justice and 
racial equality on a global scale across the world and can therefore secure 
international collaboration on the basis that these same norms and ideals are 
inherently and strongly respected within its own political system and structures. South 
Africa’s classification by the Freedom Charter (2008) as a “liberal democracy” adds 
to its political acceptance providing it with “more international legitimacy” much 
more than Nigeria for instance which is categorized as an “electoral democracy” 
(Flemes and Wojczewski 2010:20). 
South Africa can also build upon the transformation of its international image from a 
pariah state to one that is munificent where it shows its commitment not only to the 
concerns of its own people but also that of Africa and the developing world in general 
(Smith 2012:73). Since the post-apartheid period, South Africa’s relationship with the 
rest of the world has not only improved dramatically but also its international prestige 
and popularity has been enhanced greatly particularly under the leadership of Nelson 
Mandela. Smith (2012:73) equally agrees that South Africa’s new international status 
cannot be unconnected to the “high ground held by the then president Nelson 
Mandela…presenting itself to the world as the newest ‘good international citizen’ on 
the block” (see Graham 2008). South Africa’s international image also received a 
boost by virtue of its national struggle history and incredible violent free transition 
process to an all-inclusive democracy. 
South Africa has also sought to play the role as a bridge builder under a unevenly 





North by bringing to fore the plights of the former through its membership of 
multilateral frameworks like BRICS, NAM, G20 etc. to “becoming more sensitive to 
the needs of Africa and the global South by emphasizing cooperation and 
interdependence’ (Chiroro 2012:3). 
7.2.2.2.3 South Africa’s soft power of foreign policies  
As clearly articulated in the 1996 policy document of South Africa, the South African 
government is committed to the ideal of a new global order based on greater peace 
and prosperity for all mankind, working to reform the United Nations (UN) and other 
international institutions to serve as more efficient instruments in the service of such a 
global order (Chiroro 2012). Since the mid-1994s to date, South Africa through its 
foreign policy has moved from total isolation from international organizations to 
countless membership numbers. A direct implication of the entrance of post-apartheid 
South Africa into the international space is its dramatic increase and participation in 
international institutions and organizations. The government has continued to 
emphasize the importance of multilateralism and the urgent need to revitalize and 
reform the UN and international financial institutions by allowing the developing 
world to gain a voice in such Western-dominated institutions. According to Chiroro 
(2012:5), “South Africa has aptly used its relations with countries of the North to put 
issues such as free and fair trade on the international agenda, and used its soft power 
to call for ‘global solidarity’”.  
Keenly aware of the damage caused by the foreign policy radicalism under the 
apartheid period, South Africa has worked extremely hard through official rhetoric 
and diplomatic practice to promote a view of itself as a new kind of regional power; 
one that is not a pariah nor aggressive in nature. It now places emphasis on 
universally recognized norms governing international relations of peaceful settlement 
of disputes through negotiations, mutual beneficial economic contracts etc. South 
Africa’s increased and active participation in regional multilateral frameworks and 
participants in regional security networks such as the SADC, SACU, AU equally 
backed up by a level of compliance with the rules, norms, and goals of these 
institutions is indicative of  cooperative and responsible actor in the international 
system. Borrowing from Johnston’s codification of five major international normative 





determination, and human rights, South Africa perhaps fairs well in average standards 
of presenting a foreign policy that is in conformity to international norms and 
standards. As echoed by Smith (2012:73), “the instrumental role that it played as a 
norm entrepreneur in a number of multilateral initiatives such as the creation of the 
African Union (AU), the New Partnership for Africa’s development (Nepad) and the 
African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)…” are some of South Africa’s 
contribution to building its soft power since 1994. 
By implication, due partly to its rigorous foreign policy, South Africa has been able to 
also exercise effective leadership in “multilateral fora on behalf of its region, Africa, 
and the developing world” (Smith 2012:74). Particularly, South Africa has a foreign 
policy priority that focuses on Africa. 
Understandably, actors are more likely to cooperate out of self-interest; nevertheless, 
the extent of their cooperation is likely to be enhanced depending on the attractiveness 
of South Africa’s soft power strategy in obtaining this cooperation at a lesser cost and 
without much stress. The point here is that the rise of South Africa’s power status is 
not due to just its hard power profiles but more importantly by aggregated efforts to 
optimize its soft power of attraction along with the traditional hard power 
competences. South Africa therefore needs to prioritize the importance of its 
attractiveness abroad by placing more emphasis on its soft power potentialities as 
driving force for this international acceptance. This is because South Africa’s soft 
power is what accounts for its global popularity and acceptance in the international 
system whether as a representative of the Global South and developing world or as 
contending aspirant for an African representation at the UN Security Council. When 
South Africa’s policies lose their legitimacy in the eyes of others, the tendency is that 
doubt increases thus reducing its leverage in international affairs.  
7.3 A comparative assessment of Nigeria and South Africa’s power profiles 
From the above discussion, a number of comparative deductions can be drawn from 
Nigeria and South Africa power equations. Firstly, it is clear that the roles that Nigeria 
and South Africa play at the three concentric circle of regional, continental and global 
scenes are conditioned by their estimation of power potentials and secondly, as a 
result of their capacity to effectively mobilize specific power variables in achieving its 





doubt been able to use their power elements to promote economic and peace 
diplomacy respectively with mixed outcomes. 
Secondly, there is no denying that both Nigeria and South Africa possess an 
appreciable degree of both hard and soft powers in terms of potential and capacity. 
However, while Nigeria’s military power might not be as advanced as South Africa’s 
in terms of sophistication and hardware, it has no doubt been able to achieve more 
through the instrumentality of its military power than South Africa obviously has. 
Nigeria’s peacekeeping efforts in many parts of Africa is testimony to this effect and 
its military experience over the years is one that South Africa can borrow from 
particularly viewed from the recent context of the events in Burundi, DRC and even 
CAR where South Africa has had to abandon its mission in these countries. On the 
contrary, Nigeria on record has never aborted any military operation mid-way and has 
reputably seen through to the end all of its military incursions without backing down. 
On the contrary, South Africa does not have the experience militarily that Nigeria has 
despite the former’s military superiority. In essence, by virtue of the fact of Nigeria’s 
acceptance in the international comity of nations following its independence and 
South Africa’s suspension about the same period, Nigeria has enjoyed more 
international reputation as a result of the greater role its military has played in its 
foreign policy both in West African and Africa vis-à-vis South Africa particularly in 
the periods under study. South Africa on the other hand only became a democratic 
state in 1994. 
Conversely, South Africa’s soft power potentials and capacity seem more enormous 
and attracting huge international respect for the country particularly given its tainted 
apartheid history. As stated above, in many ways, South Africa’s well-articulated soft 
power agenda therefore dwarfens that of Nigeria. South Africa has therefore been able 
to gain more from its strategic soft power disposition through concerted efforts to 
promote its international prestige among the comity of nations. In comparison 
therefore, while Nigeria has benefitted immensely from its military hard power 
capacity, the same cannot be said for its economic component which even though 
appears to be fairly organized; thrives on the informal sector. Nigeria’s almost absent 
soft power potentials is also evident given the country overemphasis on hard power 





foreign policy benefits and more importantly minimizing the cost of foreign policy. 
On the other hand, South Africa’s military and economic capacities appear to be 
sophisticated, advanced and organized as a result of years of heavy investment and 
rich economic endowment. However, I argue that both countries would perhaps 
achieve exponential and better results when they result to consolidating each other’s 
power potentials and capacities for the greater good of Africa. Nigeria and South 
Africa’s enormous power potentials is contradicted by inherent internal contradictions 
and rising domestic problems which both countries are struggling to grapple with 
(Adebajo and Mustapha 2008). This has continuously raised doubt about any possible 
hegemonic ambition which both countries may have in Africa.  
    Table 7.10: Comparison of South Africa’s and Nigeria’s material resources 
South Africa’s Material 
Resources 
 Nigeria’s Material Resources  
Military  Military  
Military expenditure (US$ 
million) 2007 
   4,040 Military expenditure (US$ 
million) 2007 
    825 
Sub-Saharan ranking            1 Sub-Saharan ranking         2 
Total armed forces (thousands) 
2008 
        62 Total armed forces (thousands) 
2008 
      80 
Sub-Saharan ranking           5 Sub-Saharan ranking         4 
Energy  Energy  
Oil production (million 
barrels/day) 2007 
       0.2 Oil production (million 
barrels/day) 2007 
   2.35 
Sub-Saharan ranking           7 Sub-Saharan ranking         1 
Natural gas production (billion 
cm) 2007 
       2.9 Natural gas production (billion 
cm) 2007 
   34.1 
Sub-Saharan ranking           2 Sub-Saharan ranking         1 
Economy    
GDP (US$ billion) 2008    485.5 GDP (US$ billion) 2008     335 
Sub-Saharan ranking           1 Sub-Saharan ranking         2 
Global Competitiveness Index 
Rank 2008 
        45 Global Competitiveness Index 
Rank (2008) 
      94 
Sub-Saharan ranking           1 Sub-Saharan ranking         7 
Demographics/Geography  Demographics/Geography  
Population (million) 2008  43.768 Population (million) 2008  138.2 
Sub-Saharan ranking           4 Sub-Saharan ranking         1 
Land area (thousand sq. km) 1,219.1 Land area (thousand sq. km)  923.8 
Sub-Saharan ranking           6 Sub-Saharan ranking       10 
   Source: Flemes and Wojczewski’s (2010:20-21) 
Another remarkable point of comparison for both countries is in the area of the direct 
correlation of its hard power and economic power in terms of gains and loss. While 
Nigeria’s emphasis has been on using its military power as a foreign policy strategy, it 





thus has yielded very minimal benefits from its military advancement. In the second 
place, the mobilization and appropriation of power by both Nigeria and South Africa 
demands attention. In the case of Nigeria, the country has not shied away from 
mobilizing its hard power especially in military and economic terms particularly for 
the benefits of its African counterparts. South Africa on the other hand has a mixed 
identity of the appropriation of its power component due largely to its staggered 
political history as a result of apartheid (Adebajo 2007:214). According to Adebajo 
(2007:214), “The apartheid era army’s destabilisation of neighbours has left a 
profound distrust of South African military interventionism which remains strong 
today”. Under the apartheid period, South Africa used its military as an instrument of 
destabilization of the South African region.  However, this has changed under the 
post-apartheid administrations as South Africa is more careful with the option of 
military engagement as a result of the suspicion of the previous years, the 
fundamental change in regime type, ideology and political institutional configuration 
as well as the adoption of universal human rights. South Africa therefore has been 
able to use its hard power coefficients to attract economic benefits for itself. 
In all, despite the fact that South Africa accounts for about a third of Africa’s 
economy and is more prosperous than Nigeria, it nevertheless faces extreme military 
challenges and political rivalry particularly from its Southern African sub-region due 
in part to the destabilization policies of the apartheid government.  
Furthermore, there are a number of factors that the power profiles of both countries 
are dependent on. For Nigeria, it is no doubt a heavy reliance on oil along with its 
long years of military rule and in the case of South Africa, one can point to the 
discovery of gold in the country. Both countries have been able to use these resources 
to appropriate and develop their power potential and extend their influence further 
afield. South Africa’s economic and political stature since 1994 has seen it emerge as 
one of the key countries that could drive thinking and influence developments in 
regional and continental structures (Ngwenya 2012:153). This is an irrefutable fact 
buttressed by hard evidence which is traceable in many areas as shown above. 
7.5 Conclusion  
This chapter examines the power profiles of both Nigeria and South Africa in terms of 





comparatively analyzes both countries’ power capacities at the sub-regional and 
continental levels and how this informs the aggressiveness of their foreign policy. Of 
note at this juncture is the fact that the foreign policy trajectories of both countries is 
carved out as a function of power capacities. Again, we conclude that both countries 
would perhaps achieve more when or if they begin to pay more attention to the subtle 
soft elements of their power potentials as this has tremendous capacity to change or 
transform their international image remarkably judging by both countries’ military 
and apartheid past respectively. Soft power is increasingly becoming significant for 
countries who wish to wield significant power in the international system and it 
becomes imperative for these two powerhouses of the African continent to likewise 
begin to make serious soft power investment that would no doubt improve their 
international perception. 
Again,  while South Africa may perhaps be seen on paper as the military stronghold of 
the African continent, Nigeria however, has played more reputable role militarily 
within the continent particularly seen in the context of its many years of peacekeeping 
efforts. This is mainly because Nigeria obtained political independence in 1960 and 
joined the international community immediately thereafter whereas South Africa only 
became a democratic country in 1994 after many years of isolation. We can therefore 
conclude that the possession of military might or hard power does not necessarily 
equate to actual power as what matters is the ability to mobilize and appropriate this 
power to achieve a particular end or benefit.  
In the area of soft power, despite the fact that South Africa seemingly has enormous 
soft power potentials, it does not appear that this was as a result of careful creative 
planning of the government as the soft power potential seems conferred by 
happenstance. In other words, South Africa would achieve more through its soft 
power with concerted efforts to pursue policies to advance its global public image. 
Nigeria and South Africa undoubtedly remain Africa’s economic colossuses (Adedeji 
1999:5), as remarked by Kissinger (2001:208-209), “No state except Nigeria or South 
Africa is in a position to play a major role outside its immediate region....” (cited in 
Adebajo 2007:215). In terms of material resources, Flemes and Wojczewski 
(2010:20-21) for instance classify Nigeria as a secondary power in comparison to 





Both countries have therefore been considered as capable of playing roles that can 
propel the continent towards the path of development. Having outlined the series of 
factors that shape the roles African regional powers play particularly within the 
continent, the ensuing chapter undertakes a critical analysis of the roles that these 
regional powers play as a result of their power profiles and investigates what 
implication this has for the African continent and their leadership aspiration. 
 
Political leadership in the international system has created different theories and 
criteria of leadership. While the United States of America remains an undisputed – 
albeit insufficient – global leader, recognizing regional or middle powers is not easy. 
In Africa, South Africa and Nigeria are looked up to as possible leaders in Africa. 
However, each of these countries comes with a negative history that causes suspicion 
from other African countries. This becomes difficult for these nations to be regarded 
as leaders especially judging from many theories of regional leadership which posits 
that an aspiring leader has to proclaim its leadership intent – and has to receive 
acknowledgement from other states within its region. 
The apartheid history will bother South Africa’s image as a leader of Africa for many 
years to come. Similar to this is Nigeria’s history as a conflict-riddled country which 
has had a lot of coup d’états. Other African states are equally unsure about accepting 
























PROMOTING HEGEMONIC ORDER AND REGIONAL STABILITY IN 
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: A PARADOX FOR NIGERIA AND SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
8.1  Introduction 
All nations aspire to greatness. Political hierarchy and the anarchic nature of the 
international system often necessitate conduits through which states are able to 
navigate and aggregate their power currents in order to advance a self-inspired 
aspiration for greatness. This is true especially for Nigeria and South Africa. In the 
previous chapter, I have examined the variables that (potentially) determine the power 
(or otherwise) of Nigeria and South Africa in the international arena. This chapter 
turns the analysis towards the influence of both countries in Africa particularly since 
the emergence of democratic dispensations in 1999 and 1994 respectively. 
Particularly, the concern is with empirically estimating how the hard and soft power 
elements and capabilities of Nigeria and South Africa have been invoked to fan the 
embers of hegemonic ambitions within the continent. It aims to underscore whether 
there has been a deliberate use of hard and/or soft power to establish regional 
hegemony in Africa. On the other hand, it sets out to interrogate the conditions that 
impact on hegemonic ambition and in essence, questions Nigeria and/or South 
Africa’s (assumed) hegemony in the context of the theory of hegemonic stability. This 
it does by extrapolating and connecting the theory’s prescriptions to empirical 
evidences of both countries’ relations with Africa. 
While scholars and leading opinion holders have attributed Nigeria and South 
Africa’s influence in Africa as typical of a hegemon, this thesis interrogates the 
efficacy and substance of this argument/claim in the context of the nature and pattern 
of both countries’ foreign policy relations in Africa. For Nigeria, our remit is to be 
able to determine whether there is indeed a dwindling influence of the country in 
Africa vis-à-vis South Africa’s rising political-economic capacity. On the flip side, it 
is interesting to also know if this scenario still portrays Nigeria as Africa's undisputed 
hegemonic/leader or a secondary power within the continent. Again, for South Africa, 





essentially guarantees a hegemonic presence in Africa. This thesis equally considers a 
number of conditions that increasingly poke holes on the fabric of Nigeria and South 
Africa’s capacity to play any meaningful hegemonic or leadership role in Africa. In 
doing this, we attempt to assess the inherent internal and constraining external 
conditions that enhance or diminish these claims or credentials for regional hegemony 
or leadership. 
8.2  Interrogating the question of hegemony in Africa: Nigeria and/or South 
 Africa? 
Does Nigeria and/or South Africa harbor any aspiration for regional and continental 
hegemony and do both countries project any clearly articulated continental plan and 
will to manifest or bring to fusion this desire? What is the impact and implication of 
Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign policy strategies for their hegemonic ambitions (if 
any) within the continent? In other words, does South Africa’s increasing economic 
and political clout or superiority coupled with its rising profile as a major regional 
power in Africa and of the developing world enthrone upon it the identity of a 
regional hegemon in Africa? Or can we in fact, lay claim to the presence of two 
regional hegemons (of Nigeria and South Africa) within a particular period of 
hegemonic dispensation? Again, is Nigeria and/or South Africa playing the role of a 
continental leader, partner, power or hegemon or do these four possibilities mean the 
same thing or are mere intellectual jingoism. And does South Africa’s power 
credentials disqualify Nigeria as a major contender of hegemony in Africa? Is there a 
single dominant state capable of articulating and enforcing the rules of interaction 
among most important members within Sub Saharan Africa? How has post-apartheid 
Africa’s political-economic calculus cemented with the ushering in of South Africa 
into the political-economic space configured or reconfigured the dynamics of power 
within the continent?  
In short, these related questions point to our interest in exploring how Nigeria and 
South Africa’s foreign policies particularly in relation to Africa have comprehensively 
evinced evidence of an African hegemony or otherwise. And if the contrary is the 
case, it would be interesting to contemplate what conclusions can be drawn about the 
motive of both countries’ external relations with Africa. In investigating this dilemma, 





constrain the legitimization of hegemonic influence in Africa by both countries given 
the clarity of their ambition. 
Theoretically, we have established the linkage between the hegemonic presence of a 
powerful state and the corollary existence of stability within a specific region (Nye 
2004) and that Africa needs a regional hegemon capable of addressing political, 
economic and security issues bedeviling the continent is not in doubt (Habib and 
Selinyane 2004; Sidiropoulos 2007). This assuredly would have the propensity to 
restore Africa’s respect in the international sphere. Dwelling on the argument that 
African states must take responsibility for their development, regional hegemonic 
powers therefore have the potential to promote hegemonic order and hence regional 
stability within the region where they are located. Particularly, we are concerned to 
know how both countries have perceived and pursued their responsibility towards 
their African neighbours and how these responsibilities have consequently helped to 
advance continental ambition for regional hegemony. It is from this standpoint that 
we move on to investigate how both countries have used their leadership capabilities 
(discussed earlier) to address endemic African issues and challenges. We move on to 
extensively examine the questions raised above. 
There is the general understanding that what makes a regional hegemon or power is 
not necessarily the potential for hard and soft power but more importantly the 
capacity and effectiveness at mobilizing this power coefficient either for its own 
material benefit (of national interest) or for the general advantage of the whole 
(Africa) in the provision of public goods both in the short or long term. The leadership 
role that regional powers play cannot therefore be unconnected to their superior 
military and/or economic strength vis-à-vis other states within the region and as 
Flemes and Wojczewski (2010:8) asserts, “[b]oth material and ideational resources 
have to be taken into account in order to assess whether the regional power possesses 
the necessary resources to make a difference in regional and international bargains”. 
Again, a number of scholars have interrogated the issue of hegemony and leadership 
in different contexts particularly in relation to Africa, identifying hegemonic presence 
at the sub-regional level (Naidoo 2000; Bach 2010); the context of relationship 
between regional hegemonic powers (Amusan 2009; Nieuwkerk 2012); role of 





2008b); regional powers and external influences (Alao 2011); context of regional 
hegemony (Prys 2008); national role conception (Folarin 2010) etc. 
In the African context, at the root of many of these discussions and analysis is the 
focus on Nigeria and South Africa as regional powers. Issues discussed revolve 
around the question of whether either of these two countries by any standards 
qualifies to be called a hegemon or leader armed by the trajectories of the roles they 
play in Africa. Another issue that arises as a result is perhaps the dilemma of 
supplanting the use of hegemony with the appellation of leadership with the argument 
that leadership presence perhaps presents a more subtle reference to the character of 
these two regional powers’ foreign policy influence within the continent.  
Scholars have referred to the pattern of these roles (of Nigeria and South Africa) in 
Africa as hegemonic, leader, pivot, behemoth etc. (Ahwireng-Obeng & McGowan 
2001:55-80; Schoeman 2007:92-104; Nieuwkerk 2012:84-111). Despite these 
extensive and sometimes controversial debates, it has been extremely difficult to 
locate literatures that empirically apply the theory of hegemonic stability (like many 
other theories) at the regional level of analysis. Prys (2008:5) agrees that “theories and 
concepts that are tied to the regional level of analysis are nevertheless in short 
supply… [as] the literature has largely failed to properly incorporate ‘the region’ into 
the concept of hegemony”. It is argued in many quarters that South Africa’s role in 
Africa is construed as an imposition of Pax Pretoriana on the rest of the continent 
suggesting that the future of Africa is intrinsically tied to South Africa (Adebajo and 
Landsberg 2003:172; Landsberg 2000). Of course, there has been a bitter and 
oftentimes heated debate on the role conception of both countries’ within the African 
continent with many post-apartheid literatures (with most origination from South 
Africa) subscribing to a South African regional hegemony in Africa (Tjemolane 2011; 
Prys 2008). In Tjemolane’s (2011:161) view, this ‘conceptual controversy’ about the 
role of South Africa (and Nigeria) in Africa is important to understand whether either 
or both countries reflects the character of a (regional) hegemon and if it does; what 
character of hegemon is demonstrated.  
In essence, it is interesting to know what the reference to regional hegemony implies 
particularly in the African context. To what extent do states categorized as regional 





provision of public goods of order and stability? And what measure of impact (if any) 
do these states have on the behavior of other states in their region (Prys 2008:6). Is 
there an acceptance and followership of the hegemonic influence of these states? 
Hence, in the light of this study, exploring the usefulness and distinction between 
these two concepts of hegemony and leadership from the standpoint of advanced 
theoretical insights becomes critical particularly for the purpose of further analysis.  
At the close of the 20th century, the celebrated re-entry of South Africa into the 
international political landscape accompanied also by regime transformation in 
Nigeria from long years of military rule into an acceptable democratic civilian regime 
impacted on the political-economic realm particularly within the African continent. 
According to Tjemolane (2011:1), for South Africa, “[t]his rapid political change led 
to the perception of South Africa as a leading economic, political and military 
influence on the continent and around the world. Since South Africa is conceived to 
be a “leader”, it is also expected to demonstrate its leadership capacity on the 
continent”. In Africa, South Africa undoubtedly enjoys international recognition as a 
regional leader. It shares this recognition alongside Nigeria, a country which has one 
of Africa’s fastest growing economies. Both countries are thus shouldered with the 
responsibility of helping Africa “to chart its own alternative developmental course” 
(Cheru and Obi 2010:1).  
Black (2003) avers that if African self-sufficiency – as intended by the African 
Renaissance - is to materialize, “the emergence of relatively secure, democratic, and 
continentally committed political economies in Nigeria and South Africa will be a 
necessary though not sufficient condition”. In 1999 the ANC awaited Nigeria’s return 
to democracy declaring that  “[t]his is important both for the people of the largest 
country on our Continent as well as the Continent itself, given the contribution that 
democratic Nigeria will make to the common project of Africa's renewal”. Nigeria as 
well as South Africa are thus regarded as the economic and political powerhouses of 
Sub- Saharan Africa, and within their respective sub-regions. Shehu Shagari declared 
that Nigeria and Africa should be gifted with the latitude to attend to their matters 
uninhibited by external forces. This was tantamount to what President Monroe had 
meant when he inveighed against Europe’s incursion in the Americas (Shagari 1981). 
This stance by Shagari attests to the fact that the newly revived cry for regional 





hope for Africa’s economic and political improvement, Nigeria and South Africa are 
the linchpins. However: 
[t]hey are also potential rivals for continental leadership, and 
the leading claimants to any future permanent African seat 
on the UN Security Council. It is therefore both ironic and 
fitting that one of the first major foreign policy challenges 
faced by the ‘new’ (post-1994) South Africa was how to deal 
with the profoundly rights-abusive and anti-democratic 
Nigerian military regime of General Sani Abacha (Black 
2003:36). 
Within Africa, there seems to be an unwillingness to accept Nigeria and South 
Africa’s ‘claim’ to regional leadership. This has also led both countries to recoil from 
overtly claiming leadership and resorting to multilateral frameworks to advance their 
interests. Thus, in interrogating the question of hegemony in Africa, we bring to fore 
the confusion about whether or not the influence of Nigeria and/or South Africa 
permeates a hegemonic boundary that cuts through the entire Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Fundamentally, it would be important to examine the degree to which Nigeria and 
South Africa (as regional powers) succeeds in influencing to their advantage the 
processes, structures and institutions of the international system in relation to Africa? 
We apply our understanding of hegemonic stability theory to these questions 
particularly in order to gain a grasp of the character and feature of the leadership role 
that both countries play in Africa. This analysis would be insightful when viewed 
within the purview of the dimension of both countries’ influence beyond their 
immediate West and Southern African sub-region respectively.  
This thesis recognizes and submits the position that (overtly or covertly) inherent 
within the foreign policy articulation of Nigeria and South Africa is a manifest 
ambition for hegemonic influence in Africa. It is this continental ambition that serves 
the motivation of foreign policy priority in Africa. Already, in the previous chapter, 
we have sufficiently articulated two major internal contexts of economic and military 
capacities in examining the argument of regional hegemonic status for both countries. 
However, any meaningful evaluation of hegemonic influence must begin with a clear 
estimation of the conditions that impact on the ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ hegemonic 
claim by both countries. This we shall do by looking at the internal and external 





8.2.1 Nigeria in Africa: Secondary or continental power? 
Post-colonial Nigeria has always perceived itself as a major actor in international 
politics. It is this strong awareness as a formidable global player that has inspired its 
active involvement in Africa through its foreign policy in important international 
issues (Osuntokun 2008). Wright (1998:133) admits that: 
successive administrations built a diplomatic case for Nigeria 
to fulfil its own 'manifest destiny' and be considered the 
'champion' of Africa . . . The term champion used but rarely 
defined, implied that Nigeria was a country that the Western 
powers would listen to, and that could champion causes that 
other nations were too weak to defend (cited in Bach 
2007:303). 
As discussed later, Nigeria has had to grapple with stymieing complex conflicts 
within its borders (IPA 2003:1). Resources like oil, large population and diverse 
identities have produced polarizing effects and consequently have been the gain and 
bane of Nigeria’s ambition for continental hegemony. Based on its credentials, would 
it be appropriate to refer to Nigeria as a secondary power or continental hegemon? 
Flemes and Wojczewski (2010:20) argue that in terms of material resources, Nigeria 
can be categorized as a secondary power in Sub-Saharan Africa as it “cannot compete 
with South Africa’s economic leadership in the long term”. Additionally, Kappel 
(2011) discounts Nigeria as a regional power because it does not meet all the criteria 
that according to him typify regional powers. Despite its huge population, Nigeria 
does not fit Kappel’s benchmarks probably because of its physical size and other 
economic-political factors. 
Going from the above discussion, it therefore becomes problematic to allude to 
Nigeria hegemonic status in Africa. In essence while its hegemonic ambition and 
willingness may not be in doubt as evidenced in many of its foreign policy forays in 
Africa (see chapter four), it is hard to concede that the country (Nigeria) commands 
any outstanding capacity to effectively carry out hegemonic roles within Africa given 
obvious internal and external constraints. By implication, even though Nigeria may 
not particularly be tagged a secondary power to its South African rival (as we would 
later show), it cannot also be seen as a regional hegemon. To be sure, we shall 
examine a number of factors that advance or constrain Nigeria’s contention for 





public image and reputation, foreign policy articulation, legality of population, the 
question of ‘followership’ and acceptance of leadership and finally its membership 
and leadership of multilateral framework. 
(a) Texture of polity 
One of the major detractions to Nigeria’s ambition as a regional hegemon in Africa is 
the rough texture of its polity right from the first six years of its independence. To 
begin with, the intermittent insurgencies that beset Nigeria created a history of 
sustained instability which kicked off with the military overthrow of Balewa’s regime 
eventually culminating in the Biafran Civil War in 1967. Till today, the Biafran War 
remains an indelible scar on the annals of Nigerian political history. Discomfited by 
series of military interregnums, inter-ethnic discord and violence, “the predominately 
Igbo-speaking region of south-eastern Nigeria attempted to secede, declaring the 
independent state of Biafra” (Smith 2005:30). The Civil War thus became at the time 
a climax of social tensions, political upheaval and ethnic disillusionment which had 
been simmering for a long time aggravated by the 1966 coup (Egya 2012:425). 
Today, ‘Biafra’ conjures the grotesque imagery of starved people, mostly children. 
The war and the instability it created was enough to disentangle the modest strides 
that post-colonial Nigeria was making. The Biafran War was understandably taken as 
a presage of what would be the condition of postcolonial African states. Identity 
politics in Nigeria configured by religion, region, ethnicity, native-settler question 
continuously threaten national peace and stability and its capacity to exert influence 
beyond its borders. 
Because of this sensitive situation, security in Nigeria remains volatile, at best. Paden 
(1971) explains that interethnic violence, which is traceable even today, was rife in 
Kano – northern Nigeria. What happened in this indigenously Hausa area is 
instructive in understanding contemporary Nigeria and "are relevant for understanding 
how collective memories about Biafra impinge on and are recreated in the context of 
contemporary political events" (Smith 2005:36). The fact that many Igbo speaking 
individuals are Christian while the many Hausa speaking people are Muslim has been 
a notorious accelerant of internal conflict. The insistency of Igbo to retain their social 
life and to maintain close affinity with their tribesmen even in alien land (Smith 2005) 
has often been construed as ethnic arrogance; this, needless to say has excited the 





authentically integrated society but rather a faulty colonial fabrication. Perhaps it is 
this ignoble character of the Nigeria state that continued to mold and configure the 
limits of its foreign policy. For a country that has been tipped as a prospective 
regional leader, it is obvious to note why episodes like the Biafran one stamp a 
negative impression on this honour. 
The gruesome murder of its first (and only) Prime Minister – Abubakar Tafawa 
Balewa in January 1966 followed by another gory coup in July of the same year 
presented Nigeria as a ‘violent giant’ of African politics and a bad example to 
prospective independent states. During the last decade of the twentieth century, 
Nigeria was yet again faced with undignified military rule which was intolerant to the 
universal tenets of democracy. The military takeover by General Buhari on New 
Year’s Eve in 1983 was viciously detrimental to Nigeria’s image in West Africa and 
beyond. Nigeria barred its borders with other countries in its ECOWAS region which 
ultimately disrupted the flow and exchange of economic interaction among the 
nations within the region. Worst still, the 1985 forceful and unnecessary deportation 
of foreign nationals from Nigeria presented the country as an intolerant host to people 
of different nationalities and exuded  deep resentment especially from the affected 
quarters (Adeniji 2005:5). 
Also, the injurious effects of military rule were most profoundly felt by ECOWAS 
states that share physical geographical proximity with Nigeria. Inasmuch as the 
country still retained the biggest military force in the region, the military profile of its 
regime at the time seriously tainted the country’s image. General Ibrahim Babangida 
tried to salvage some good reputation for Nigeria by managing to convince Africa and 
the world that Nigeria could once again be counted as a reliable political and 
economic ally. However, he (Babangida) was politically dishonest and was not one to 
honour his promise. His empty promise to return Nigeria to civilian rule was clouded 
in endless procrastination. Many Nigerians became restive and other countries grew 
suspicious of his regime sincerity to hand over power to a democratically elected 
civilian regime. This trepidation was confirmed by Babangida’s invalidation of the 
1993 elections which were supposed to usher the country into its first democratic 





After Babangida ceded the presidency to Ernest Shonekan – a civilian leader - in 
August 1993, this obnoxious spell did not last three months before Sani Abancha 
wrested the reins of power leading to another round military regime for five years. 
Abacha’s half a decade military despotic rule was yet another stain on the already 
compromised fabric of Nigeria's integrity. Unarguably, Abacha was reputed to have 
led one of Africa’s most corrupt governments. The incessant abuse of human rights 
was a further knock on the reputation of Nigerian. Particularly, the hanging of Ken 
Saro-Wiwa and other members of the oppressed Ogoni tribe of the Niger Delta 
attracted a barrage of world criticism resulting in Nigeria’s expulsion from the 
Commonwealth for three years. Other allies of Nigeria severed their ties with the 
country and Nigeria resorted to broker alliances with non-European and mostly 
Islamic countries. All these factors aggregated to form an ominous picture of Nigeria 
in the international arena and from the foregoing, it is difficult to argue that Nigeria is 
deserving of regional leader. Despite being a country of great promise, it flounders on 
many grounds. From the time of independence, the country has been subjected to 
military rule for most of its postcolonial existence. 
The ascendancy of President Obasanjo to power in 1999 undoubtedly elevated 
Nigeria’s image and his extensive trips abroad was in a bid to salvage what was left of 
Nigeria’s pariah status. Pogoson (2009:67) remarked that: 
[a]lthough many of such trips have been criticized as 
unnecessary and wasteful it no doubt underscores the fact 
that the horizon of Nigeria’s foreign policy under Obasanjo 
was broadened by the desire to achieve national or domestic 
industrial development as a necessary tool for consolidating 
Nigeria’s strategic position in the region of Africa and west 
African sub region. 
In essence, despite wide local criticism, Obasanjo’s anti-corruption and the 
establishment of the anti-corruption commissions (Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission - EFCC and the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related 
Offences Commission - ICPC) further enhanced the country’s image in its 
commitment to fighting corruption. However, as remarked by Bach (2010:1), “[t]he 
end of military dictatorships has not helped calm the internal tensions intrinsic to the 
operation of a federal system explicitly based on highlighting and codifying geo-





Recently, Nigeria is yet again confronted with having to contend almost on a daily 
basis with a strong and violent sect of Islamic insurgency known as Boko Haram. 
Boko Haram is an extremist Muslim group, which has increasingly been wreaking 
havoc in contemporary Nigeria and presents a big challenge to Nigerian security 
(Bagali et al 2012:34). Using terrorism as a means to sabotage the federal and secular 
Republic of Nigeria, the sect aims to foist Islamist rule on the country. Boko Haram 
vehemently and violently opposes all manner of Western infiltration by seeking to 
entrench Sharia law in Nigeria. This group brings a form of militancy that is 
reminiscent of the Maitatsine sectarian group which - in 1981 - had also flirted with 
the idea of bending Nigeria towards religious rule (Abimbola and Adesote 2012:16). 
With the passage of time, the carnage wrought by Boko Haram has become so 
destructive that it cannot be ignored. On 17 February 2011, the Nigerian National 
Assembly adopted the Anti-terrorism Act which was almost tailor-made to curtail 
Boko Haram terrorism. 
The augmented violence and sabotage of Boko Haram raised the question of Nigeria’s 
capacity to resolve its own internal conflict. The country has struggled to contain 
domestic violence and so it begs the question whether or not it has the muscle to 
subdue more complicated and broad based conflict (Bagali et al 2012:34). Another 
side effect of Boko Haram is that it has resurrected the old cries of a possible 
separation of Nigeria. The status of a united Nigeria is receiving serious possible 
reviews from non-Muslims (Bagaji et al 2012:33). Boko Haram is arguably a 
consequence of poor governance; and its continued acts of terror are a portent of poor 
security in Nigeria. The absence of sustained internal cohesion evidenced in continued 
strife continuously stifles Nigeria’s contention as an African leader and hegemon 
(Adebajo and Landsberg 2003). 
However, to local citizens, the responsibilities that come with regional leadership i.e. 
international charity in the provision of public goods and conflict transformation 
could be an exercise in wastefulness. Many contend that the nation has enough 
domestic crises to cope with. Adebajo (2000) noted that “the reactions of ordinary 
Nigerians” to Nigeria’s foreign policy, especially military intervention “ranged from 
lukewarm to hostile” (Adebajo 2000:196). It has to maintain its current democracy if 
it is to prescribe good governance to other countries. This will be an improvement 





people away from it. If led by a responsible government, Nigeria has boundless 
potential to be a regional leader. It has a wealth of intellectual and academic talent 
scattered all over the world. However, political and economic leadership demands 
more than academic intrigue. The internal threats to Nigerian security are real and 
have bearing on its claim to regional leadership. The unstinting corruption committed 
by leaders has precipitated despondency among local people. This has provoked the 
proliferation of anarchic and violent groups which imperil individual, national and 
regional security (Obi 2009). Bolstering insecurity and foiling corruption have been 
the hallmarks of successive governments after the discovery of oil (Egbo et al 
2012:599). It is thus off-putting that crime continues to elude the grasp of what the 
government throws to it; corruption has also continued unrelentingly, with 
government officials being the main players. By failing to address and arrest internal 
violence and conflict by bringing perpetrators to book, it is unlikely that African 
nations would accept a leader whose house is in turmoil and whose center is failing to 
hold all the contending forces of statecraft together. 
(b)  International public image and reputation 
How does the ‘Nigerian image’ and international reputation impact on the country’s 
hegemonic credentials? To use more communicative terms, what ‘tone’ does 
Nigeria’s reputation ‘dial’ in connecting through the ‘signal’ of its international 
profile? In international politics, one of the factors that determine the level of 
influence and relevance that a nation commands in the international system is a 
positive image and reputation. According to Ajayi (2005:51): 
[f]avorable image ensures a level of credibility and respect 
for a nation in the comity of nations and [c]ontrarily, bad 
image and suffering of integrity and credibility crisis deny a 
nation the required respect by other states, and portrays the 
concerned nation as a pariah, which does not deserve to be 
respected and honored by other civilized states. 
The global perception of states in the international arena is often bolstered by the 
consistency of a state’s behavior and that of its people towards other states (Ajayi 
2005). North Korea for examples is regarded as a pariah state because of its constant 
disregard for international norms and principles. Nigeria’s international image took its 
root at the launch of its emergence as a sovereign state and of course deepened 





image posed far-reaching implications for the country’s foreign policy profile. In 
short, Nigeria’s global reputation impacts on the cost of its foreign policy and 
consequently its hegemonic ambition within the continent. The fundamental questions 
to ask at this point are: what are the positive and negative charges of Nigeria’s global 
reputation that give spark or clout to its international status and how do these sources 
impact on the country’s potential for hegemonic influence? 
At independence, Nigeria made clear its intention on how it intends to relate with the 
rest of the world (see chapter 3 and 4) and as concluded by Ajayi (2005:52), 
“Balewa’s pioneering efforts at foreign policy-making and implementation laid the 
foundation of Nigeria’s role and influence in international politics, and inadvertently, 
in casting a niche and credible image for the country in the comity of nations”. This 
foreign policy standpoint has been complemented and reinforced by successive 
regimes evidenced in Nigeria’s condemnation and fight against  colonialism, racism 
and apartheid rule as crime against humanity; its active involvement as a front runner 
in the establishment and transformation of the of OAU (now AU) in 1963 and 2000 
respectively and ECOWAS in 1975. Overall, Nigeria’s international image as a major 
contributor to global peace and stability over the years has been positively projected 
and advanced through these efforts. To date, (as shown in table 8.1 and 8.2 below) 
Nigeria’s sustained involvement in peace-keeping initiatives and the promotion of 
democratic governance among troubled neighbours like Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and recently in Mali is notable. Nigeria’s credentials at 
international peace-keeping force exceed that of any developing world having 
contributed over 200,000 troops to the United Nations peacekeeping operations 
(Obayuwana 1999:40). 
In 1990, at the instance of Nigeria, members of ECOWAS converged in Banjul, 
Gambia to form the military conglomeration of ECOWAS (ECOMOG) in response to 
the conflict that engulfed Liberia from 1989-1996 (Alli 2012:8). Nigeria was 
particularly leading in this initiative through human and financial sponsorship (Shaw 
et al 1996:31). Analysts claim that ECOMOG would be an impotent international 
army without the support of “a leading nation like Nigeria” (Dokubo and Joseph 
2011:575). This responsibility is commensurate with Nigeria’s status as “the richest 
country in the sub-region” (West Africa) (Alli 2012:9) and has consequently 





 Table 8.1: Nigeria’s participation in global peace missions, 1960 – 2011 
Area/Country Acronym Operation Start date End date 
Congo ONUC United Nations Operation in  
the  Congo 
July 1960 June 1964 
Guinea UNSF United Nations Security  




India-Pakistan UNIPOM United Nations India-Pakistan




Lebanon UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force 
in Lebanon 
March 1978 Present 
Iran-Iraq UNIIMOG United Nations Iran-Iraq  
Military August 1988 
 February 
  Observer Group  1991 
Namibia UNTAG United Nations Transition  
Assistance Group 
April 1989 March 1990 
Angola UNAVEM I United Nations Angola  









Angola UNAVEM  
II 
United Nations Angola  
Verification Mission II 
June 1991 February  
1995 
Cambodia UNTAC United Nations Transitional  
Authority in Cambodia 
March 1992 September  
1993 






Sierra-Leone  Bilateral Special Protection  
Force in Sierra Leone 
1991 1997 
Chad  Nigerian Neutral Force, Chad 
(Bilateral) 
1979  
Chad  OAU Peacekeeping Force,  
Chad 
1981 1982 
Somalia UNOSOM I United Nations Operation in 
Somalia I 
April 1992 March 1993 
Somalia UNOSOM  
II 
United Nations Operation in 
Somalia II 
March 1993 March 1995 
Liberia UNOMIL United Nations Observer  





Angola UNAVEM  
III 
United Nations Angola  




Ouzo strip UNASOG United Nations Aouzou Strip 
Observer Group 
May 1994 June 1994 
Rwanda UNAMIR United Nations Assistance  




Sierra Leone  ECOMOG Task Force in  
Sierra Leone, 
1997 1999 






Liberia ECOMIL LIBERIA 2003  






  November 1999   
  in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo 
  





Sudan AMIS African Mission in Darfur 2004- 2008 
Sudan UNAMID African Union-United Nations
Hybrid Operation in Darfur 
July 2007 Present 
Sudan UNMIS United Nations Mission in the
Sudan 
March 2005 July 2011 
Chad MINURCAT United Nations Mission in the






South Sudan UNMISS United Nations Mission in the
Republic of South Sudan 
July 2011  
Source: Compiled by the Author with references from the list of the United   
Nations Peace Keeping Operations from 1942-2012.   
Similarly, table 8.2 below shows how Nigeria has taken control of the leadership of 
these missions in a bid to reinforce its leadership and intention within the continent.  
  Table 8.2: Nigeria's contribution of Peace Commanders and Chief Military      
 Observers, 1960 – 2009 






1.  Maj. Gen. J.T.U  
Aguiyi-Ironsi 
UN ONUC 1960-1964 Congo 
2.  Brig. Gen Ademulegun Bilateral  1964 Tanganyika  
(Tanzania) 
3.  Col. J. Dongoyaro Bilateral HARMONY
I 
1979 Chad 
4.  Col. M. Magoro Bilateral HARMONY
I 
1979 Chad 
5.  Maj. Gen. G. Ejiga OAU HARMONY
II 
1981-1982 Chad 
6.  Maj. Gen. E. Unimna* UN UNAVEM I 1991 Angola 
7.  Maj. Gen. Chris Garba*
* 
UN UNAVEM  
II & III 
1992-1995 Angola 
8.  Maj. Gen. E. Opaleye UN UNAMIR 1993 Rwanda 
9.  Maj. Gen. J. Dogonyaro ECOWAS ECOMOG 1990-1991 Liberia 
10.  Maj. Gen. R. Kupolati ECOWAS ECOMOG 1992 Liberia 





12.  Maj. Gen. A. Olurin ECOWAS ECOMOG 1994 Liberia 
13.  Maj. Gen. J. Inienger ECOWAS ECOMOG 1995 Liberia 
14.  Maj. Gen. S. Malu ECOWAS ECOMOG 1996-1997 Liberia 
15.  Maj. Gen. T. Shelpidi ECOWAS ECOMOG 1998-1999 Liberia 
16.  Maj. Gen. G. Mujakpero ECOWAS ECOMOG 1999 Liberia 
17.  Maj. Gen. G. Kpambe ECOWAS ECOMOG 1999-2000 Liberia 
18.  Maj. Gen. S. Iliya UN UNMONUC 2003-2005 Congo  
(Zaire) 
19.  Maj. Gen. J.O. Owonibi UN UNMIL 2003-2005 Liberia 
20.  Maj. Gen. F. Okonkwo AU AMIS 2005-2006 Sudan 
21.  Maj. Gen. C. Ihekire AU AMIS 2006-2007 Sudan 
22.  Maj. Gen. C. Obiakor UN UNMIL 2006-2009 Liberia 
23.  Maj. Gen. M.L. Agwai UN/AU UNAMIS 2007-2009 Sudan 
Source: Compiled by the Author. 
* Chief Military Observer  
**  Chief Military Observer and later Force Commander 
In both military and civilian regimes, Nigeria continued to remain a prominent player 
in peacekeeping initiatives both at the international, continental and sub-regional 
levels.  Nigeria has never shied away from an active engagement in the affairs of the 
continent and it is this foreign policy character that ceded to her the treatment as a 
regional power and a pivotal state for West Africa (Bach 2007). Particularly, 
Nigeria’s vital role and record at peacekeeping and conflict resolution in the 
ECOWAS sub region is a model and signature of many sub-regional peacekeeping 
efforts and has therefore accentuated the country’s status as a regional power and 
pivotal actor in the political equations within the continent in general. 
However, the country’s foreign policy is often faced with the challenge of 
overcoming the travails of an image crisis. Even though Nigeria is widely regarded as 
the most populous Black country in the world, the respect that its popularity deserves 
does not trickle down to advancing the reputation of the country. Arguing from this 
perspective, Nolte points out that even though Nigeria could be called a deserving 
power because of its populous army but it can never be called a leader because of its 
questionable and controversial moral and political reputation. The respect that 
Nigerians earn in the international arena is in suspect. Its international dignity in 
recent years has dwindled remarkably partly as a result of years of military rule which 





Nigeria’s global identity as a country notable for cybercrimes, poor human rights 
record, massive corruption, institutional and infrastructures decay, drug trafficking 
and until recently incessant regime change imposes additional and unnecessary costs 
on the realization of formal foreign policy objectives. 
As explained earlier, the successive military regimes of Buhari, Babangida and 
Abacha elevated bribery and corruption to a level of state policy and cultural practice 
thus denting Nigeria’s image as a corrupt country (Ajayi 2005). In every sense, the 
country lost its international respect and prestige particularly under the military 
regimes. Nigeria's punctured reputation thus makes difficult the realization of any 
possible ambition for hegemonic influence. In many ways, its international dignity 
and profile during the military era was bedeviled by non-conformity to international 
legal principles and standards for international behavior among civilized nations 
earning Nigeria the label of a pariah state. 
However, much of the redemption of Nigeria’s international prestige comes from the 
turnaround of its regime type from military to civilian administration which has 
thankfully been consistent since 1999. President Obasanjo had in 1999 inherited a 
nation battered by long years of international disrepute and through his shuttle 
diplomacy across many parts of the world, attempted to remedy what was left of the 
country’s ailing diplomatic status. Through his ‘ajala’ diplomacy, Nigeria was 
consequently readmitted to the Commonwealth in 1999 and successfully hosted 
CHOGM in 2003. However, the poor sense of articulation and lack of assertion of 
foreign policy goals in the last two administrations since the departure of Obasanjo 
has no doubt reduced Nigeria’s force as an African mouth piece in the global scene 
coupled evidenced with an African substitute in South Africa whose domestic 
credentials dwarves that of Nigeria. 
On the other hand, Nigeria has featured on the global spotlight persistently since its 
independence in 1960. Apart from the economic boost it enjoyed during the decade 
following independence, Nigeria is currently known more for its notoriety than 
positive commentary. According to Salisu (2000:2), “[t]he succession of dictatorial 
regimes, disregard of human rights, political instability and economic 





discussed previously, in the recent past Nigeria has had to grapple with Boko Haram 
terrorism, which is taken as part of a global network of Islamic fundamentalism. 
Apart from civil war and other side effects of military leadership, corruption is 
another negative feature for which Nigeria accedes to its notorious reputation as one 
of the most corrupt countries in the world. Corruption has stymied growth and the 
likelihood of development. These perceptions indicate alarming levels of corruption 
in Nigeria that no doubt deflate Nigeria’s international ego and accompanying such 
depressing perceptions is the likelihood that ordinary people are extorted for illicit 
payments in exchange for basic services like health and education (CPI 2012). It 
should be mentioned, however, that Nigerians are apprised of how grand corruption 
has affected the country’s reputation. No wonder why most times, Nigerians do better 
in diaspora than they do living within their country (Mazrui 2006). 
After returning to civil rule in 1999, Olusegun Obasanjo took up the fight against 
corruption in order to salvage some good review from the international community. 
The Presidency called on all ‘Nigerians to collectively support the Federal 
Government's efforts to stem corruption and redeem Nigeria's image with the 
international community’ (Agence France-Presse, October 27, 1999). 
Digressing a bit here, it fits well to argue that Nigeria fits into the paradigm of Sachs 
and Warner (1995) who infer that resource-rich countries are likely to succumb to 
corruption. In Nigeria, oil has been the main lubricant and accelerator of corruption. 
In the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone, many of the conflicts 
crippling these countries have been stoked by the exploitation of minerals. These 
examples lend credence to the linkage between minerals, bad governance and 
resultant conflict (Ikelegbe 2005). Adebajo (2008:2) also decries the 
overconcentration on crude oil. This was going to be understandable if this lack of 
diversification was beneficial to the country as a whole. Sadly, most of the dividends 
earned from oil have benefitted the powers that be, while ordinary citizens continue to 
wallow in unremitting penury. The selfishness portrayed by the elite of Nigerian 
politics has also provoked a storm of resistance, open and violent rebellion from 
people of the oil rich Niger-delta region. The local people have argued that they do 
not benefit from their oil deposits. The Niger-delta conflict has caught the attention of 





and abductions of international visitors in order to extort ransoms. This shows the 
extent to which Nigeria is characteristic of state failure in parts of the region.  
Nigerians are all too aware of how much money has been embezzled by government 
officials in recent decades. The systemic emptying of government coffers has left 
Nigerians unbelieving of any claim of honest loss of public resources. It is 
understandable then, that people were unbelieving of the $4billion that was reportedly 
lost through individuals who punctured oil pipelines. Adebajo (2008:12) deepens the 
doubt by arguing that the government of Obasanjo failed in a lot of other respects. 
Electricity, which has been a major problem for Nigeria, still continues to plague the 
country even to this day. How can a country laying claim to hegemonic ambition not 
able to provide electricity for its own people? 
(c) Foreign policy articulation 
Taking a cursory look at the national role conception of Nigeria’s foreign policy 
priorities, one common thread over successive military and civilian administrations 
has been a sustained and consistent emphasis on Africa as the centre piece of its 
foreign policy albeit with different measures of alacrity. Very clearly articulated in 
Nigeria’s foreign policy trajectories since independence, is the messianic allusions to 
a natural Nigerian leadership in the affairs of the African continent (Bach 2007). A 
number of deductions can be made from this fact. First, as demonstrated in chapter 
four, Nigeria’s hegemonic ambition is facilitated by its long years of a charity of 
foreign policy diplomacy across Africa. The country’s dedication to the cause of 
ensuring that its role as Africa’s ‘spokes-state’ remain unfettered and continue to 
command and maintain the respect of African countries. For instance, in Babangida’s 
inaugural speech as Head of State; he noted that “African problems and their solutions 
should constitute the premise of our foreign policy” (Babangida, August 27, 1985:3). 
This undoubtedly demonstrates a clear premise of moral suasion upon which 
successive regimes had conceived national roles for Nigeria to assume in the 
continent cemented in its continuity in an Afrocentric signature of its foreign policy 
since the Balewa era (Folarin 2010:255). In other words, the international perception 
of successive administrations is in most cases synchronized with the ambition and 






Secondly, Nigeria has demonstrated clarity in its foreign policy articulation by a 
successfully constructed and implemented foreign policy priority of Nigeria over the 
years in areas such as the eradication of apartheid, advocacy for debt relief and 
reparation for Africa, decolonisation in Africa, and the reformation and 
transformation of the OAU into the AU, the establishment of the ECOWAS as a sub-
regional multilateral framework through which it is able to launch an ambitious 
hegemonic ambition among many others. For instance, in the 1960s and 1970s, 
Nigeria through its proactive policies and actions played an unforgettable and central 
role in the liberation struggles in Angola, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe and 
against de-colonialism of Angola and later, Zimbabwe. To a large extent, the 
independence and total liberation of these countries would (probably) never have been 
possible without the aid and assistance from Nigeria (Folarin 2010:268). Osuntokun 
(2008:142) puts it better by asserting that “…without Lagos steady support for the 
forces of liberation, the entire southern African region – including South Africa – 
might have spent longer years battling the forces of colonialism, settlerism and racist 
oppression”. In other words, particularly under the successive military regimes 
Nigeria pursued a foreign policy whose raison d'être was aggressively concentrated on 
African and thus earned her universal acknowledgement and approval (Pogoson 
2009:60).  
Foreign policy over the years has therefore been explicitly accentuated to advance 
Nigeria’s place in the centre-stage of the African politics and thus was able to 
transform its potential for continental leadership into substance (Otubanjo 1989: 240–
244). After 15 years of unbroken military rule and an unstable political landscape, 
Nigeria’s Afrocentric foreign policy moniker was strengthened with the advent of 
democracy in 1999. In fact the general expectation at the time was that the liberation 
of the democratic space would further deepen Nigeria’s commitment to the cause for 
Africa (Pogoson 2009:63). 
By implication therefore, clearly inscribed in the foreign policy mind-set of Nigeria’s 
leadership has been the prescription of the country as Africa’s ‘anointed and special 
one’ to proffer solutions to resolve the plethora of Africa’s socio-economic and 
political problems and its manifest destiny to lead the continent to the promise-land 





Nigerian leaderships. By corollary, for Nigeria to do nothing would imply the 
desolation of the ‘dark’ continent (Bach 2010). 
In the third place, the fusion between policy and practice in the foreign policy 
articulation and implementation of Nigeria (and in most cases at the expense of its 
own people) adequately reflects the huge inestimable sacrifices the country has made 
in its dedication to the entirety of the continent. 
On the flip side of the coin, leadership ineptitude has characterized Nigeria’s political 
scene and constituted a let off for the country’s quest for hegemonic status. For 
instance, much of the good works of Babangida in the international arena were 
subsequently marred by his annulment of the June 12 Presidential election widely 
acclaimed till date as the freest and fairest in Nigeria election history. Also, 
considering the military regime of General Abacha which marked probably the lowest 
moment in Nigeria’s foreign policy history, his despotic rule and gross disregard for 
human rights of the Nigerian people banished the country into international isolation 
which further dwindled its international image for many years. This is not to say that 
the regime did not further the Afrocentric orientation of Nigeria’s foreign policy as 
his administration’s roles in the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and towards the resolution of on-
going conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone were remarkable (Akinterinwa 2006). 
Initially, the Nigeria military was less inclined to be involved politically. Its services 
were largely consigned to public ceremonies and protection of the country’s territorial 
sovereignty. The military was exemplary in its discipline, a trait which it inherited 
from the rigour of colonial instruction. This was to change six years after 
independence (Janowitz 1971). With hindsight, the military has been a strong political 
component of Nigeria. Starting from the first six years of independence, the Nigerian 
military has occasionally seized governing power altogether. The first time the 
military took explicit control of the country was in 1966 when it ‘claimed to end the 
misrule, ineptness and corruption of the preceding five years of the civil rule’ (Osoba, 
1996). The government which was ousted was that of civil leader Abubakar Tafawa 
Balewa who was gruesomely murdered on January 15, 1966. Over the coming years, 
the military would disrupt civil leadership on the same pretext of correcting 





al 2012:45). For the fifty three years that Nigeria has been independent, the military 
has governed for approximately thirty years out of these. This suggests that, thus far, 
Nigeria is more inured to military rule than civil leadership (George et al 2012:45). 
If there is anything that compromised the illustrious fame that Nigeria enjoyed after 
independence, it was military rule. Despite their arguments to the contrary, military 
personnel in Nigeria amassed unbelievable amounts of wealth and even after the 
current hiatus in military rule, which started in 1999, military persons still wield 
influence in their political forums. Sani Abacha has often been used as the prototype 
of how personal cupidity in a leader can besmirch the image of a country. After his 
demise, the government of Nigeria managed to wrest $700 million dollars from 
Abacha’s assets which were allegedly state funds commandeered by Abacha. This 
amount was reportedly a fraction of the total $3billion which Abacha had taken as 
private property (Guest 2004:121). Apart from the wealth that Abacha accumulated, 
he also showed an impatience for opposition. He liquidated his opponents in a violent 
way, necessitating Nigeria’s isolation from its traditional trade partners in North 
America and Europe. 
As echoed earlier, despite his rule being littered with political controversy and 
violence, Abacha’s tenure came to international limelight for bad reasons including 
his decision to execute the Ogoni activist Ken Saro-Wiwa along with eight others. 
The execution was in defiance of all pleas made by the international community and 
to accentuate the arrogance of this act, it coincided with the eve of the 
Commonwealth meeting in Auckland, New Zealand (Gervisser 2007; Okonta 2008). 
With this crude way of governance, it is understandable that other African leaders 
show suspicion of Nigeria’s credentials for regional leadership. A meeting was 
convened in the aftermath of Saro-Wiwa’s and his colleagues’ execution and Nigeria 
was duly suspended from the commonwealth. According to Ekineh (1997), the 
hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa sent the most gruesome shockwaves of Nigeria to the 
world. The Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group was galvanized to expressly 
monitor how Nigerian leaders would comport themselves in their expected objective 
to return to the Commonwealth fold. For the rest of Abacha’s leadership, human 






(d) Legality of population 
What is in a population that conveys regional power credence to a state? The 
argument put forward here is that there is a connection between the population of a 
country and its capacity to play any meaningful role and achieve international prestige 
and power in the international arena (Kegley and Wittkopf 2001). Nigeria is an 
important and highly endowed Anglophone African country. Its power is even more 
reinforced by the fact that it is surrounded by relatively weak and poor Francophone 
countries. A major reason why Nigeria is referred to as the giant of Africa is its 
demography. Population measured in terms of size, age distribution, health and 
education are critical ingredients for the assertion of power. There is thus a strong 
correlation between a large, youthful, healthy and well-educated population and a 
state's capacity to project power in the international arena.  
To all intents and purposes, Nigeria’s population size, quality and position present 
considerable legal qualification and moral suction to represent the rest of Africa. The 
country’s demography has since independence invoked on its leadership a historic 
sense of responsibility and an equal perception by other states of Nigeria as an 
inspiration for development within the continent. To put Nigeria’s population in 
perspective, Ethiopia’s population of about 70 million is second in Africa and barely 
half of Nigeria's estimated population. As at 2012, Nigeria’s population of 166.2 
million people from 45.2 million in 1960 represented a 268% percent increase in the 
last 50 years (Nigeria National Bureau of Statistics). Numerically, Nigeria’s 
population also equals that of United Kingdom, Spain and Italy put together. It also 
accounts for 47% of West Africa’s population and approximately one sixth of 
Africa’s population or one fifth of Sub-Saharan African population. The population of 
Nigeria also represents 2.35% of the world’s total population which arguably implies 
that one of every 43 people on earth is a Nigerian (Trading Economics 2013).  
Aregbeshola (2013:2) however makes a controversial point that it is for the reason of 
Nigeria’s massive and intimidating population that it enjoys the nickname ‘giant of 
Africa’ and not so much because of its economic potential. In any case, the ascription 
to Nigeria as ‘giant’ of Africa is rooted in its large population relative to the other 
African countries and of course this has implication for large market for goods and 






Nigeria's permanent representative to the UN, Ambassador Humphrey Ojiakor 
alluded to Nigeria as "the real face of Africa" (Interview). According to him, it is only 
in Nigeria you would find over a 170 million Africans living in one geographical 
space called Nigeria. It is this numeric awareness that "qualifies Nigeria to (actually) 
to be the face of the African continent in the United Nations system" (Interview, Amb 
Ojiakor). Nigeria's overwhelming population has triggered hegemonic ambitions 
within the continent and as already expounded in chapter one, Nigeria derives its 
legality from being the most populous country in Africa. Nigeria has over 30% of 
Africa’s entire population and equally possesses a  large population size relative to its 
large territorial size which has invariably trickled down into its large military service, 
economic workforce and intellectually (academic capacity). 
Again, Nigeria’s proportionate Christian and Muslim demographic mix affects its 
power base because it “serves as a unique model for interreligious political 
accommodation and as a bridging actor in global politics between the West and the 
Muslim world” (Paden 2008). Asides this, its Muslim population of over 80 million 
(2005 est.) exceeds that of any Arab country and the Black world including Egypt 
(Mazrui 2006). In the entire Middle-East and Arab world, Nigeria's Muslim 
population is second only to Indonesia. Nigeria can therefore use the religious mix of 
its population as launch pads to project its hegemony. It is projected that by 2030, 
Nigeria’s population would be the 3rd largest in the world behind only India and 
China. Nigeria’s population currently is the 7th highest in the world and its population 
growth rate between 1990 and 2010 at 62.4% is also the highest in the world (World 
Bank 2013). From Cairo to Pretoria, the dominance of Nigeria’s population is not in 
doubt.  
The preponderance of Nigerians and Nigerian languages by their host countries also 
suggest this point. However, whether this translates to hegemony remains to be seen. 
Much that could be accounted for remains the potentialities of Nigeria's population as 
a powerful source of national power. The material possession and economic 
shrewdness of Nigerians in diaspora which sometimes exceeds the indigenous people 
often make them targets of xenophobic attacks, an envy and threat to local 
communities. The international migration of Nigerians all over the world has also 
deepened their ethnic hegemony and made them susceptible to racialization. 





for migrants from Nigeria with 62.3% of emigrants living in the continent (UNDP 
2009; Aregbesola 2011). Stimulated by Nigerians in diaspora across Africa, Nigeria’s 
demographic weight makes it a point of attraction to neighbouring economies (Bach 
2010).   
There is also the internationalization of Nigerian languages specifically Igbo, Yoruba 
and Hausa and Pidgin English. Yoruba for instance is spoken in Benin Republic while 
locals from many parts of Africa and indeed the world often try to gimmick the 
various language nuances of the Nigerian people. For instance, in many parts of 
Africa, it is often not surprising to notice traces of the Igbo dictum like ‘Igwe’, 
‘Chineke’ in public conversations or even religious gatherings among people. 
It goes without saying that no nation can afford to ignore Nigeria and Nigerians, if for 
nothing else its high nuisance value is worthy of attention. Nigeria’s population 
presents a huge market for business to thrive and its people are perhaps one of the 
most vibrant people on earth with a capacity to rebound from challenges. The 
Nigerian state has overcome some of the most devastating crisis in its lifetime without 
significant upheaval. Some other countries that have experienced similar political 
crisis have exhibited more serious dislocation and fissures than Nigeria has gone 
through. That in itself indicates the indomitable spirit of the Nigerian to conquer and 
overcome all kinds of strains and stress. In essence, Nigeria’s population is a latent 
force that once effectively unleashed is capable of bringing the country in concert 
with nations that drive political-economy processes on a global scale.  
However, while Nigeria’s population has been a blessing in inspiring a form of 
legitimization, claim and power base to project its influence, it has nevertheless also 
served as the bane of Nigeria's capacity to play a pivotal role in Africa. In essence, 
acknowledging that Nigeria may be ceded in terms of size and perhaps quality of its 
population (to a certain extent), its people and government however remain un-ceded 
in many respects. For instance, Nigeria's sprawling population makes it increasingly 
difficult for its government to effectively cater for everyone and hence the massive 
exodus of Nigeria. The enormous pressure mounted on scarcely available resources 
by its population creates unpleasant discomfort for the people thereby leading to a 
disconnect between the people and its government. The reality of this is a cascading 





country. To say the least, the pride and honour in being a Nigeria is dissipated through 
long years of neglect of the priority of the Nigerian people. The dignity of carrying 
the Nigeria's passport has over the years been increasingly extinguished through long 
years the unscrupulous activities associated both with the people and government of 
Nigeria. A typical Nigerian traveler is exposed to the ridicule of extensive 
immigration search and treated like a possible suspect. The emphasis here is that the 
population of a country only makes sense only where the country is able to translate 
the positive gains of its population into valuable assets for exerting power and clearly 
Nigeria has not been able to feature in thus realm. 
(e) Membership and leadership of multilateral framework: ECOWAS, OPEC, 
AU, UN etc. 
Nigeria has always demonstrated its preference for cooperation rather than 
confrontation in recognition of its foreign policy principle of respect for the territorial 
integrity and sovereignty of all states. It is important to examine how Nigeria has been 
able to project its influence through its membership of these multilateral institutional 
frameworks. Is Nigeria able to use these institutions to project its national power? 
There is a strong believe over the years of Nigeria’s confidence in multilateral 
frameworks which have also provided a platform for Abuja to subtly launch its 
hegemonic ambition. Nigeria’s reintegration into the international system on the 
backdrop of President Obasanjo’s shuttle diplomacy, manifested in its reacceptance 
into the Commonwealth in 1999 and being given the hosting rights and Chairmanship 
of the Commonwealth Heads of Governments Meeting (CHOGM) in 2003 as well as 
the Chairmanship of the G-77 in 2000. Obasanjo sought to use these multilateral 
platforms to rekindle Nigeria’s interest within Africa and of course the Global-South. 
It also had the course to represent Africa on four occasions
55
 in 1966/67, 1978/79, 
1994/95 and 2010/11 as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council which 
ultimately puts it in strong contention for one of the two slots for Africa in the 
proposed enlarged permanent membership of the UN Security Council (Saliu, 2006b: 
243-262).  
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 Aside being the one of the first country to represent African at the UNSC in a non-permanent 
capacity, Nigeria’s four time representation is also the highest by any African nation. Although Ghana 
and Côte d'Ivoire served at the UNSC in 1962/63 and 1964/65 respectively, both representations were 
based on their membership of the Commonwealth. On the other hand, Egypt’s membership in 1946 





In recognition of Nigeria’s effort towards ensuring peaceful coexistence within the 
African and on the strength its previous record at the UN, Nigeria was elected 
unopposed with total vote of 186 out of a possible 193 to secure a fourth tenure at the 
UNSC. According to the presidency, this is “glowing expression of support and 
encouragement for Nigeria’s active participation in the promotion of peace, security 
and political stability in Africa and other parts of the world” (Channels Tv; October 
17, 2013). Remarkably so, this election makes it the second time under Jonathan’s 
presidency that Nigeria would be elected as a non-permanent member of the Council 
(2010-2011 and 2014-2015). 
In the area of continental multilateralism, Nigeria played a quintessential role (along 
with South Africa) in the transformation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
to the African Union and establishing the New Partnership for African’s Development 
(NEPAD) as part of an African initiative to find African solutions to African 
problems (Pogoson 2009:68). Nigeria was also instrumental to the introduction of the 
African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and was among the first countries to 
subject itself to peer review in 2007. 
Nigeria has equally successfully elevated ECOWAS (whose origin dates back to the 
Lagos Charter of 1975) to the status of a celebrated, recognized and perhaps the most 
active sub-regional organization in Africa (Bach 2004:69-92). Through the ECOWAS 
framework, Nigeria has also been able to successfully use the sub-regional body’s 
Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) as an instrument to perpetuate its power 
politics within the sub-region particularly in conflicts in Côte D’Ivoire (2003–2004), 
Guinea Bissau (1998–1999), Liberia (1990–1998 and 2003) and Sierra Leone (1997–
2000). Nigeria used the ECOMOG “to stamp its authority in West Africa, fester its 
national security and defence nests, and promote the political whims of the Nigerian 
military cabal, thus undermining the real object of regional peacekeeping” (Howe 
1997:65 cited in Folarin 2010:271). Tavares 2011:166) already demonstrated how 
“national and individual interests (of Nigeria), rather than any institutional principle, 
served as the basis for the interventions”. According to him, Nigeria’s interest was 
primarily with demonstrating or enhancing its status as “meaningful players in the 
broader community and achieved this goal by pursuing regional hegemonic strategies. 
To say the least, Nigeria in its sub-hegemonic capacity has capitalized on its 





cases, it becomes incredibly difficult to engage in any military intervention without 
the support from Nigeria given particularly the extensive material and financial 
challenges involved (Taveres 2011).  
Again, examining the case of Nigeria intervention in Liberia in Sierra Leone, Taveres 
(2011:155) notes correctly that “Nigeria aspired to accentuate its Africanist policy and 
its role as hegemonic power. Since the country’s national interests are intertwined 
with the interests of its neighbors, and also since the seismic waves of the conflict 
would inevitably hit Nigeria hard in terms of refugee flux and economic recession. 
According to the ECOMOG’s Nigerian Chief of Staff in Sierra Leone, General One 
Mohammed, “we had to put out the fire in order to stop it from extending to our own 
houses” (cited in Adebajo 2002:92). Taveres (2011) equally avers that Nigeria’s 
involvement in these crises was perhaps borne out of the need to resuscitate its 
battered international image establish its domestic democratic credentials while also 
strengthening its international credibility and silence his critics, in particular after the 
(see Francis 2006). In all, Nigeria’s involvement through ECOMOG has been 
conjectured  to as a weapon “for managing power in the face of a threat to its 
interests” (Taveres 2011:152). 
Olusegun Obasanjo today is feted in many African countries as a mediator between 
conflict-riven polities and also as an election observer. He played a big role in the 
formation of the NEPAD, and when the OAU was transmuted into the AU, Obasanjo 
served as the first Chairperson of the Union. These roles gave Nigeria a somewhat 
leadership role in Africa. Apart from its role in international forums, Nigeria 
influences African politics, economics and academics through its human resource and 
intellectuals of international renown. 
However, by virtue of its membership of these international organizations, Nigeria is 
also handicapped by its inability to effectively play any dominant role without key 
external actors. It is thus forced to resort to negotiating through its own agendas 
within the broader framework of the collective goals of the organizations it belongs 
to.  
(f) The question of followership and acceptance of leadership 
Adebajo (2000) affirms that ‘[s]ince its independence from Britain in 1960, Nigeria 





manifest destiny in its sub region’ (Adebajo 2000:186). He further argues that for 
Nigeria to deepen its claim of regional leadership, it has to be seen to match or 
preferably surpass French intervention in West Africa’s security concerns. To this 
day, France seems to be a major force in attempts to quell West Africa’s conflicts and 
wither Nigeria’s influence within the sub-region. With the shifting global world order, 
less dependency on Western intervention has been touted as a conspicuous way of 
showing the West that different regions have internal powers capable of solving 
regional problems without recourse to traditional helpers. Nigeria’s military 
intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone showed Nigeria’s capability and willingness 
to rise to the challenge of leadership (Adebajo 2000). Despite Nigeria laying claim to 
natural hegemon of West Africa, the country has to contend with the francophone 
countries that maintain amity with France and consider Nigeria a regional bully 
(Adebajo 2000). This reluctance on the part of African countries to accept a fellow 
African nation as leader is balanced by the fact that Nigerian leaders of all respects 
are influential in African politics. 
For instance, even though West African countries are loath to accept it, Nigeria 
remains a major power in the region with the most sophisticated military and the 
largest population. What stands in the way of Nigeria’s ambition is how a hegemon or 
regional leader can be defined. In terms of military preponderance and economic 
stature, Nigeria would easily pass for a regional leader. The country’s military is 
obviously limited in its capabilities if it was to be deployed in all West African 
warring countries, but it is still incomparably better than other countries in the sub-
region. Secondly, Adebajo (2000) claims that Nigeria had the opportunity, at the turn 
of the twenty-first century, to  project itself as a regional leader because its stumbling 
block - France - was receding in its political interventions of its erstwhile colonies. By 
his own admission, Adebajo points out that this chance was inauspicious because it 
came at a time when Nigeria’s economy was under severe strain, unlike the early 
1970s when the country’s economy was flourishing. Apart from this, however, France 
today continues to be a major power in resolving West African crises. Through 
NATO, and sometimes individually, France has maintained its role in West Africa, a 
region replete with its former colonies. The recent French intervention in Mali is a 






The most political thing that Nigeria can do to win the cooperation of francophone 
West Africa and Africa at large is to show evidence of bilateral and multilateral 
political ambition. French influence still lingers in West Africa, and so Nigeria has to 
make no pretensions of being a lone achiever. It should support French interventions, 
especially when it is politically defensible to do so. The worst that could ever happen 
is if Nigeria is aiding and abetting odious regimes. Additionally, Nigeria should be 
careful not to be hypocritical in its foreign policy. 
8.2.2  South Africa in Africa: Bulldog without teeth? 
Reference to South Africa as the peripheral centre of African politics is wide in post-
apartheid literatures with much of these arguments underscoring Pretoria’s economic 
and military dominance in Africa as credentials that elevate her to a status of regional 
hegemony in Africa capable of influencing international agendas to its favour. In fact, 
Habib (2009:144) and Adebajo (2003) were emphatic on their prescription of South 
Africa as a regional power and hegemon in Africa on the supposition that Pretoria’s 
comparative and aggregate advantage in economic, diplomatic and military capacities 
in the continent uplifts her to this prominence by default. Again, there is the 
contention that international acceptability of South Africa in recent years noticeable 
with the mass influx of Africans into the country who perceive South Africa as a safe 
haven from the notoriety of devastating conflict within their own countries. In other 
words, South Africa’s projected material, structural and ideational power in Africa is 
considered to be unparalleled and can be equated with the dominance of the United 
States in global politics. 
Within SADC, South Africa is considered as the 'celebrated' regional leader and as a 
result, the rest of the world have “an anticipation of South Africa’s role in resolving 
and addressing regional disputes” (Habib 2009:155; See also Seymour 1996:1; 
Siridipoulos 2007:1). Of course South Africa’s influence is more conspicuous within 
the Southern African sub-region and specifically among the SADC and SACU 
member countries with Pretoria holding economic sway for well over a century 
(Alden and le Pere 2004:284). By 2000, South Africa was generating over 80% of 
Southern African Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Kariithi 2000:45; Flemes 2007:18) 
and until recently, its economic and technological gradation was much higher than 





as the most developed and industrialized state on the African continent (Solomons 
n:d:1; Flemes 2007:18). 
However, Alfred Nzo, the first Minister of Foreign Affairs in post-apartheid South 
Africa was quick to deny the smudge of regional power over other African states 
stating that the devotion to human rights was to be the cynosure of South Africa’s 
foreign policy and the Rainbow nation would not hesitate to preach the same to all 
corners of the world (Landsberg 2000:108). To reinforce this position, Nelson 
Mandela on assumption of office in 1994 was also unwilling to make a claim of South 
Africa’s leadership in Africa pointing rather to the imperative of Africa to South 
Africa’s foreign policy agenda. He instead emphasized that the foreign policies of 
Pretoria in Africa have to reflect the objectives and aspirations of other African 
countries (Flemes 2007:19). According to him, this is not only due to South Africa’s 
geographic position but that African countries had particularly played a crucial role in 
supporting the anti-apartheid struggle at the time when the ANC was proscribed in 
South Africa. E.g. Countries like Zambia where these banned parties ensconced 
themselves became occasional target of the brute force of the apartheid regime 
(Siridipoulos 2007:2).  
Schoeman (2003:359) holds that South Africa’s strength in Africa is alluded to but 
not directly stated for fear of rejection by other African countries (see Flemes 
2007:20). South Africa’s identity as a regional hegemon is consequently still a subject 
of contention, hence, any explicit claims to hegemony or even leadership may be 
interpreted as a another brand of colonialism. Any claim to regional leadership may 
cause consternation especially among the frontline states that had first-hand 
experience of apartheid (Adebajo and Landsberg 2003). South Africa thus recoils 
from calling itself a leader lest it incurs the cynosure of regional rejection (Flemes 
2007:20). Siridpoulos (2007:2) adding to this point reiterates that South Africa’s 
obvious leadership spot is a source of apprehension both to the ANC ruling party and 
countries like Angola and Nigeria who see themselves as having the power sufficient 
to rival that of South Africa’s. It is for this reason that Pretoria is disenchanted about 
using material power to prove its strength and rather opts for conversational means 
and multilateral frameworks to approach African challenges (Flemes 2007:7). 
However, the inevitability of belonging to a wider African consensus should not 





Its mineral reserves and political history offer something incomparably unique from 
other African states. The infrastructure that the country boasts of is clearly also the 
best in the continent. Hence, South Africa’s "aggregate capabilities in terms of 
economic, diplomatic and military capacities, in relation to other African nations, 
automatically define it, at least for now, as a regional power or hegemon" (Habib 
2009:144). 
From a conceptual position, South Africa in the Strategic Plan 2006-2009, “defines 
itself as democratic developmental state” (cited in Bischoff and Serrao 2009:373). 
Nevertheless, scholars have referred to South Africa as a regional power, regional 
hegemon, emerging economy or anchor state, depending on the attributes and 
perspective the observer choses to concentrate on. Bischoff and Serra (2009:365) for 
instance prefer to classify South Africa as an “emergent democratic middle power” 
even though, as will be shown later, it has not been quick to promote internal 
sovereignty in other countries. Nel, Taylor and van der Westhuizen (2001:16) on the 
other hand, submit that South Africa can be deemed an “emerging middle power”. 
Jordaan (2003) agrees with this view by certifying South Africa – along with 
Malaysia and Argentina – as emerging middle powers in contrasts with Australia, 
Canada and Norway that are traditionally accepted as middle powers. Kagwanja 
(2009:2) also contends that “South Africa’s regional power is hardly in doubt” while 
Nel and Nolte joins Kagwanja (2009) in conceding to South Africa’s status as a 
regional power but disagrees that it is an emerging power, partner or donor. His view 
is in tandem with the opinion that South Africa is more ambitious in its 
intercontinental aspirations, and hence does not partner more with fellow African 
countries. However, Sidiropoulos (2008:110) disagrees with this position by arguing 
that through the African Renaissance Fund established in 2000 for instance, South 
Africa was making modest financial aid to fellow African countries. 
South Africa’s main leverage on the rest of the SADC region is its imposing economy 
(Kagwanja 2009:2) and as Chiroro (2012:1) remarks, the country can use its “soft 
power” leverage to influence Southern Africa, Africa and the shifting world order. 
Pretoria’s global involvement has therefore been qualified by its representation and 
membership in the G20 and BRICS as the only African member-nation belonging to 
both groups (Chiroro 2012:2). It is interesting to also note that even during the reign 





Governor (from 1965-1979) of Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), repeatedly alluded to 
South Africa as the “Persian Gulf of strategic minerals of this earth” (Smith 
2001:271). This might as well be true given the fact that South Africa tops the world 
in gold, manganese and platinum reserves (CSS Analysis 2011:2). Smith was equally 
bold in his assertion that South Africa was the richest African nation and the ultimate 
goal of communist encroachment during the prominence of African nationalism. 
In terms of military sophistication and status, South Africa is second to none in the 
African continent. Nigeria – another contested powerhouse of Africa – and Angola 
are the only other African states that come close to matching the South African 
Defense architecture. Despite the challenges that confront South African troops, the 
more than 60,000-strong army is of substantial importance on the continent (CSS 
Analysis 2011:2). Proportionate to its military prowess, South African sentries have 
been conspicuously present in conflict-riddled countries that are torn apart with 
violence like Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, and (recently) in 
Central African Republic (CAR). Although these military interventions have 
produced mixed and sometimes humiliating results as evidenced in the CAR case, 
they are however testimony to the broad range of South Africa’s military presence in 
warring nations. Its leading role against tortuous African conflicts is in tandem with 
the country’s clarion call that international bodies acknowledge (South) Africa’s 
ability to defuse African conflicts. What is not in doubt is that, South Africa wants 
more responsibility on African peacekeeping missions to be taken up by regional 
bodies within Africa (Bischoff and Serrao 2009: 365). As many theorists advocates, 
South Africa fits more appropriately the portrait of a regional power and leader since 
the concept of a hegemon, when taken in the sense of a hectoring state, hardly fits 
South Africa’s description. 
A fundamental question must be addressed however. Does South Africa’s material 
and ideational superiority translate into regional hegemonic presence within the 
continent? This thesis argues that by critically exploring the multiple factors that 
enhance or deflate South Africa’s hegemonic claim or ambition, a useful assessment 
can be made about South Africa’s capacity as a regional hegemon in Africa. In 
understanding South Africa’s hegemonic identity, (as in the case of Nigeria), we 
move on to examine a number  of facilitating and de-facilitating conditions that either 





its texture of polity, international public image and reputation, foreign policy 
articulation, economic and material preponderance, legality of population, the 
question of followership and acceptance of leadership and finally its membership and 
leadership of multilateral framework. 
(a) Texture of polity 
How does the texture of South Africa’s internal polity positively or negatively impact 
on its willingness and capacity or capability to play a hegemonic role in Africa? In 
reflecting on this, Nieuwkerk (2012:102) remarks that, South Africa’s domestic base 
is hampered by such constraints as “poverty and unemployment, the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic, a fragile racial reconciliation, and (more recently) the impact of the global 
financial crisis”, not to mention a culture of violence and (police) brutality. This is not 
to say there are no internal political dynamics in South Africa that enables a 
hegemonic claim. For instance, in 1994, the unanticipated mode with which South 
Africa conquered decades of racial conflict was expected to be used as a conflict 
resolution template for many other African countries that are stricken by violence, 
divided by identity conflicts and other forms of social discord (Sidiropoulos 2007:2). 
Post-apartheid South Africa thus became not only a mineral but also a moral giant 
overnight. The expectation of South Africa’s influence grew more insistent driven by 
this moral authority which the country had come to be associated with (Prys 2010:2). 
As a result, the anti-apartheid struggle which incubated national heroes turned the 
attention of the world to South Africa, and after the triumph over White minority rule, 
it was only natural that the same temerity could be applied in solving the many 
problems confronting Africa. The persistence with which anti-apartheid movements 
fought against human rights abuses during White minority rule was expected to be the 
beacon of the new dispensation to spread the tentacles of democratic norms and 
human rights to every nook and crannies of Africa (Pfister 200:3; Bischoff and Serrao 
2009:364; Waldheimer and Holman 1994:1). Remarkably, at the time when many 
people had expected an inevitable violent onslaught, South Africa’s peaceful political 
transition from apartheid to liberal democracy was surprisingly smooth. According to 
Sidiropoulos (2008:108) and Kagwanja (2009:1), it was this ‘miraculous’ political 
transformation that sowed the seed for South Africa’s moral authority and of utmost 
importance to South Africa’s democratic sustenance was the efficacy of internal 





2007:2). The general expectation was therefore that the Rainbow nation would be able 
to export its conflict-resolution model emphasizing both negotiation and 
reconciliation into conflict regions such as Zimbabwe, Angola, DRC etc. 
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was applauded as a crucial step in 
the long process of healing emotional and psychological injuries that had been bred 
for a long time. The TRC showed South Africa’s unswerving resolve to account for 
the abuse of human rights under the apartheid era. In all, South Africa’s 
internationally acclaimed constitutional democracy and admirable human rights 
record which have remained largely consistent through the post-apartheid years are 
conditions that no doubt advance positively its hegemonic status in the international 
arena. It is these features that promote the status of Pretoria as a country that places a 
high premium on advancing international norms of democratic stability, peaceful 
coexistence and respect for fundamental human rights. 
Invariably, the relatively stable texture of South Africa’s polity further facilitated by a 
consistent leadership in the ANC and a relatively buoyant economy (until recently) 
thus makes it not much of a surprise that many Africans, especially those fleeing from 
political and economic upheaval, choose South Africa as a safe haven. Even without 
fleeing from political hardship or persecution, many Africans are attracted to South 
Africa for the promise of a better future that it holds with various reasons for 
immigrating to South Africa ranging from political respite, better academic option to 
economic ambition (New African, July 2013). If there is any anxiety about South 
Africa’s coveted status in Africa, perhaps the gravitation of many Africans into the 
country should clear any possible doubt. 
However, South Africa’s post-apartheid democratic dispensation incubated 
unwittingly so the transformation of the ANC from a liberation movement to a 
dominant political party with a totally new orientation and seemingly more powerful 
than national leaders. However, this unfettered power has seen party politics spill into 
a messy national arena with devastating implication. For instance, the ‘Arms Deal’ of 
1999 blighted the ANC government’s image and will remain indelible for many years 
to come. While it was justified that South African arms were obsolete due to the effect 
of the arms embargo against apartheid, the 1999 Arms Deal invoked one of deepest 





in South Africa’s political discourse. Furthermore, the deal was fraught with 
inconsistencies and allegations of bribery with Jacob Zuma, who was then deputy 
president, accused of receiving bribes from arms dealers. The ANC incriminated itself 
by moving promptly to foil all investigations into the matter. The most documented 
evidence that the party was awash with corruption came from Andrew Feinstein. 
Feinstein’s book titled After the Party (2007) divulged inside information of the Arms 
Deal giving details of how much corruption had infiltrated the ANC. There were 
allegations according to Feinstein that the Arms Deal contracts were awarded to 
companies that had funded the ANC’s campaign. 
On another hand, the May 2008 spate of xenophobic attacks on non-South African 
nationals derogatorily referred to as ‘Kwerekwere’
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 could not have come at the worst 
time. These dastardly and barbaric events happened during the reign of Thabo Mbeki, 
an unabashed pan-Africanist and champion of South-South relationships (New 
African, 2013:18). The development thus dented South Africa’s role as a regional 
leader and evinced a stark contrast to Thabo Mbeki’s benign foreign policy. 
Mosselson (2010:641) argues that the despicable way of treating foreign nationals 
“has been established first and foremost by the state, through the entrenchment of 
extra-legal and, in some cases, overtly illegal ways of dealing with foreign nationals”. 
Clearly, the violence meted out to foreign nationals undermined South Africa’s 
stability in “social integration, which is a critical factor in learning to operate 
globally” (Amoako 2005:2). In South Africa, illegal foreign nationals are treated with 
more disdain than local convicted criminals with the Immigration Act which avows 
that illegal immigrants be held in different cells from other convicted individuals 
often disregarded. Foreign nationals are usually held for more than the legal thirty 
days prescribed by the law (Mosselson 2010). Mosselson argues that the ‘state of 
exception’ which the ANC government has nurtured has presented foreign nationals 
as not belonging to the political community of the country. In this case, local South 
Africans, seeking political recognition and better service delivery, have resorted to 
inflicting brutality on foreign nationals. Hence, xenophobic attack becomes another 
platform for local and disenchanted citizens to assert themselves as belonging to the 
new South Africa. 
                                                          
56





If this theory has any validity, then xenophobia will continue to loom large for many 
years to come because the majority of South Africans still live in poverty. Perhaps 
what gives more credence to this theory was another wave of xenophobic attacks 
which broke out in early 2013. Once again, shops of foreign nationals were looted 
across the country with the government broaching a cover up story that these attacks 
were driven by criminality and not xenophobia. If true, was it mere coincidence that 
South African shops were not raided and that only shops belonging to foreign 
nationals were burgled? Many foreigners have been accused of taking over jobs meant 
for South Africans. A counter argument to this is that many foreign nationals are 
enterprising individuals who, through their businesses, actually offer employment to 
South Africans. Xenophobic violence is a tortuous subject in South Africa; apart from 
allegations of usurping job opportunities and selling cheaper retail goods (hence 
elbowing local businesses into inexistence), foreign nationals are also accused of 
taking South African women (Morris 1998). The fact that only black Africans were 
attacked sends an equally undesirable signal especially when viewed in the light that 
the ANC depended heavily on African countries for its strategic survival during the 
period of under apartheid (New African 2013). For a country that should be held in 
high regard, the attacks of 2008 give a very repulsive and negative picture of South 
Africa thus poking holes on its international image. 
South Africa capacity to play any meaningful hegemonic role must be tied to its 
ability to quickly address endemic social problems that it is confronted with. As 
rightly confirmed by Marthoz (2012:8), Pretoria’s international ambition will no 
doubt hamper economic development, divert scarce resources and ultimately “distract 
attention away from pressing social problems”.  
(b) International public image and reputation 
While no country is expected to be a paragon of social, political and economic utopia, 
there are nevertheless critical factors that accentuate a state’s character and thus 
conflate to aggregate the perception of such state in the international community. The 
focus of this section is to examine the general international perception of South Africa 
and its citizens across the world to see how a positive or negative outlook of the 
country imposes additional cost or benefits on the possibility of a hegemonic identity. 






To begin with and as explained earlier, in a sense, South Africa’s international image 
is located not only in its economic and military credentials but more importantly in its 
soft power assets. South Africa is generally held in high esteem because of the 
manner in which it conquered its historical apartheid past. As Habib (2009:148) 
points out, South Africa transcended “from an isolated, politically belligerent, 
regionally militaristic, globally defensive agenda to one that is supportive of 
multilateralism and involved political partnership, regional leadership, and global 
engagement”. It was this political transition that birthed many of its iconic leaders like 
Nelson Mandela, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Oliver Tambo, Steve Biko etc. who 
today are celebrated and heroes and distinguished world leaders. In fact, South Africa 
alone has in total 6 Nobel laureate (4 in Peace and another 2 in literature; see Table 
2.2 in chapter 2) as well as 3 statemen in The Elders
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. While in prison, Nelson 
Mandela took on a mythical status as the embodiment of the struggle against 
apartheid and the attention that the world gave to Oliver Tambo as he strode the globe 
to peddle the anti-apartheid campaign was also testimony to how the world 
sympathized with the plight of many South Africans at the time. It is equally 
important to remember that Nelson Mandela, as an icon of African leadership hosted 
over 60 heads of states during his half-decade rule (Gervisser 2007). For a country 
that was hitherto ostracized as a pariah, this achievement was no mean feat. His 
interaction with the many Heads of State who came to South Africa bolstered South 
Africa’s status on the global scene. If Mandela showed the world how South Africa 
had changed its political makeup since apartheid, it was his successor – Thabo Mbeki 
- who wanted to show the world how Africa had changed after apartheid and the Cold 
War. 
Secondly, South Africa’s stable democracy, strong and advanced financial sector, 
diversified economy infrastructural development and services sector coupled with it 
choice as tourism destination, economic hub and a gateway to Africa presents a 
pleasant international image for the country. South Africa thus scores a valuable point 
in its position as the most developed country in Africa. Aside this, in other 
development and social measurement indices, South Africa ranks fairly well within 
the African continent.  
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Jihan El-Tahri’s commentary about the ANC titled Behind the Rainbow (2009) 
documents the political history of the ANC from the time it was a liberation 
movement to its current status as ruling national party. He poses the question whether 
the clamour for political power will consume the dream of a new South Africa. The 
documentary concludes with the affirmation that notwithstanding the current status of 
the ANC, the organization has lost its ‘moral innocence’. Cases of corruption and 
general misconduct among members of the ANC has relegated the movement to the 
class of many other once promising politics organization in Africa that have been 
overtaken by grand corruption and ruthless ambition for power and its retention. The 
ANC was so linked to morality that it has been variously called a Church (Asmal 
2010; Feinstein 2007). The controversy roused by joining BRICS, coupled with the 
soft peddling mediation in Zimbabwe and internal political misbehavior have 
combined to compromise the ANC. From an impartial perspective, the party is no 
longer a fervent sponsor of democracy and human rights. The main intent of the ANC 
and hence government seems to be economic improvement at all costs. For the ANC 
and South Africa, the shift from moral leadership to realist ambition is traceable. The 
party was not always what it currently is. It is imperative that the ANC corrects its 
current state. Being the most powerful organization leading the most developed 
country in the continent reveals the fact that whatever the ANC does has international 
implications. 
(c)  Foreign policy articulation 
Upon the release of political prisoners and the cessation of apartheid, it was only 
natural that the South African liberation movement turned ruling party (ANC) would 
want to show some gratitude to the frontline states, to Africa and the rest of the 
sympathetic world. This perhaps illustrates why, even before his ascension to power, 
Mandela reiterated how South Africa’s destiny is inescapably bound with that of 
Southern Africa and other African nations (Black 2003:38; Kagwanja 2009:3). And as 
Carlsnaes and Nel (2006:18) concedes, “[t]he outstanding feature – and main strength 
– of South African foreign policy in the post-apartheid era has been its identification 
and engagement with the rest of Africa, and with issues important to the continent’s 
leaders and citizens”. Again, in December 1993, on the twilight of the new Rainbow 
nation, Nelson Mandela was unequivocal in his insistence that the future and destiny 





Africa in particular (Mandela 1993). This foreign policy attitude was a deliberate 
assertion and indication of a strategic ‘u-turn’ against the diplomatic posture of 
erstwhile South African leaders who saw the country as some form of Western 
country located in Africa. 
At the 84th anniversary of the ANC on 8th January 1996, Mandela made the point 
that South Africa’s “prosperity is not possible in a world afflicted by poverty and 
economic depression”. The new government thus set out to promote regional trade 
and participate in multilateral organizations (Alden and le Pere 2006:52). Mandela 
further claimed that South Africa had a role to play in entrenching the emerging world 
order which was to be characterized by ‘democracy, peace, prosperity and equality 
among nations’ (in Westhuizen 1998:435). He quickly cautioned that in its vigour to 
contribute to the new world order South Africa had to be careful to avoid arrogating 
power to itself and shouldering unrealistic responsibilities. Mandela’s profound 
address was made with the understanding that Africa and indeed the world in general 
had lofty expectations of South Africa and long after Mandela’s rule, South Africa’s 
foreign policy as inscribed in the Strategic Plan 2006-2009 continue to echo this same 
sentiment. The DFA (2006) agrees that the future of South Africa is inextricably 
linked to that of Africa and the South and the consolidation of the African Agenda 
therefore serves as a point of departure in its engagements with the international 
community. 
In assessing the foreign policy trajectories of South Africa in almost two decades, 
what is clear is that there has been a deliberate commitment by Pretoria in form of 
material, economic and human resources towards addressing many of the problems 
confronting the African continent. Habib (2009:148) submits that the nationalistic 
impulse of the ANC’s leadership has inspired a prioritization of Africa in four realms 
of; diplomatic and military energy, partnership with continental institutional security 
arrangement, promoting African Agenda at the global arena and of course massive 
corporate investment in the continent. In its almost 20 years of post-apartheid foreign 
policy, South Africa has demonstrated its commitment to Africa and its resolve 
towards furthering democracy and human rights within the continent. This it does 
through its role as a peace-builder in the “promotion of longer-term inclusive political 
solutions” to conflicts in Angola, Burundi, CAR, Comoros, Cote d’Ivoire, DRC, 





(Carlsnaes and Nel 2006:18; Habib 2009:148). As Habib (2009) acknowledges, while 
some of these initiatives have ended in undesirable outcomes with South Africa often 
overstretching its valuable resources (as exemplified in the cases Cote’ d’Ivoire, 
Lesotho and CAR), a good number however have resulted in positive payoffs both for 
South Africa as well as the recipient states. South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign 
policy has therefore consistently demonstrated an African identity in what some 
scholars call an Africanisation of South African foreign policy emphasizing a show of 
concern and interest on the continent of Africa (Carlsnaes and Nel 2006:19). 
However, contrary to the argument of some scholars (Daniels et al 2003; Schoeman 
and Alden 2003), one can point to a good number of black spots in South Africa 
foreign policy articulation. A major challenge of South Africa’s foreign policy 
articulation has been its failure to effectively and strategically understand, interpret, 
and analyze continental politics in what Vines (2010) attributes to its long years of 
international isolation. South Africa’s foreign policy projections in the post-apartheid 
era have therefore been confronted with an ideological confusion with straddles in-
between realism, idealism, liberalism and even Marxism (Habib 2009). 
South Africa has no doubt taken many ill-advised and wobbled steps in its foreign 
policy diplomacy as a result of naivety, poor foreign policy articulation and gross 
inexperience at diplomacy. While we cannot discuss all the foreign policy hiccups of 
South Africa in the post-apartheid era, we shall attempt to bring to fore the ones that 
are considered critical in deepening our analysis. For instance, shortly after the 
democratic elections of 1994, South Africa was confronted by the political changes 
taking place in other African countries. Of note was the modus operandi that South 
Africa employed in dealing with the Nigerian government under General Sani Abacha 
during the trial of author and activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and his co-accused Ogoni 
activists. Mandela led the opposition against Abacha at the Conference of 
Commonwealth Heads of Government in 1995 (Habib 2009:148). South Africa was 
seen as acting in isolation and without input from other African countries. To make 
matters worse, Mandela was floored with his unsuccessful attempt to halt the 
judgment passed on the Ogoni activists. 
Provoked by the needless execution of the activists, South Africa’s Mandela led the 





suggestion for a boycott against the Abacha regime was deprecated by the OAU as 
alien to African idiosyncrasies of continental solidarity (Venter 1997). South Africa 
was thus deemed a foreign stooge in its idea of corrective politics. Mandela was noted 
to have regretted the manner in which South Africa turned out to be seemingly the 
only country attempting to dissuade Abacha from executing the condemned activists.  
Mandela’s failure to talk Abacha out of this quagmire punctured South Africa’s 
reputation as a norm entrepreneur and promoter of human rights (Amusan 2007; 
Kagwanja 2009:5). For South Africa, the case against Nigeria was multipronged. It 
was both the fight for justice, democracy and many other tenets of good governance 
which the Abacha regime had clearly ignored (Black 2003:36; Habib 2006:148) and 
to lose on this diplomatic score was parallel to dropping behind in its self-imposed 
mandate to promote democracy and human rights particularly in the continent which 
represents the hallmarks of ANC’s ascension to power. South Africa was thus 
exposed as a naïve player in international politics and unfortunately, it is this 
experience that has set an insalubrious tone for South Africa’s engagement with 
Nigeria particularly under the post-apartheid era (See Amusan 2007). 
Another episode that heightened doubt about South Africa’s capability as an African 
regional leader was the Zairian imbroglio between Laurent Kabila and Mobutu Sese 
Seko. While the rest of the continent supported Kabila, South Africa’s stance was far 
from clear. The meeting in 1997 which South Africa held with the belligerents on its 
warship was largely shrouded in mystery leaving many to wonder whether or not 
South Africa was aligning itself with the US-backed Mobutu (Habib 2009; Vale and 
Maseko 1998). South Africa once again initiated a unilateral effort towards peace 
building leaving many African countries on the side-lines and bewildered and askance 
at Pretoria’s plagued identity. 
South Africa’s already battered foreign policy reputation took another knock with the 
incidence of the controversial invasion of Lesotho in 1998. The South African 
Defence Force invaded Lesotho on 22 September, 1998 to defend the controversially 
elected NB first write in full LCD which won 79 out of 80 seats of parliament. The 
mandate was to support the victory of LCD elected under questionable circumstances. 
This aggressive display was condemned as an abuse of South Africa’s stature as a 
military hegemon and perceived by many as a continuation and relic of apartheid’s 





There is also widespread opinion that South Africa does not offer a clear picture of 
where its loyalty lies (Shaw 2012). A good example is the irresolute mode or ‘silent 
diplomacy’ (Kagwanja 2009:3) with which Pretoria tackled the Zimbabwean crisis. 
The perpetual abuse of power and disregard for human rights in Zimbabwe forced 
untold numbers of Zimbabweans to flee the country, with majority seeking entry into 
South Africa (Siridipoulos 2008:110). Also, the failure to deal with Zimbabwe in a 
way that many people would prefer could be interpreted as a way of the ANC 
dominating national agendas. To the UN and the AU, South Africa is expected to be 
unequivocal in denouncing Mugabe’s regime for its human rights abuses (Bischoff 
and Serrao 2009:368). Contrarily, South Africa’s silence has be interpreted as 
weakness or worse still as acquiescence. This is not surprising considering that during 
the proscribed years; the ANC had forged close ties with Mugabe and was even closer 
to Joshua Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) than Mugabe’s 
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) before the latter came into power as 
Prime Minister (Gervisser 2007). With the shift in fortunes in Mugabe’s favour, the 
ANC swiftly sought amity with the new leader of Zimbabwe. In this case, the method 
used by the South African government to bring about political order in Zimbabwe is 
considered impotent because of the ruling party’s indebtedness to Zimbabwe. If the 
South African government could rise above the influence of the ruling party, the 
country could arguably do something more decisive in Zimbabwe. 
Aside that these multiple foreign policy convulsion (cited above) displayed the 
immaturity and inexperience of South Africa’s foreign policy diplomacy, it has also 
brought to fore the imperative for South Africa to work in concert with other African 
countries if it does not want to isolate itself like in the days of the apartheid regime 
(Black 2003:35). Again, and in tandem with the last point, the experiences has 
cemented South Africa’s realization of the efficacy of multilateral action in Africa as 
even though the country was an anticipated leader, it had to enlist the support and 
approval of other continental players. 
In the above contexts, South Africa seemed to have found it somewhat difficult to 
sustain the moral fountain and reputation of its foreign policy initiated by Mandela on 
many fronts. Pretoria found itself confronted with the reality of the international 
system and having to relinquish its idealist principle in favour of pragmatism. As 





increasingly driven by realpolitik considerations justified for instance by its blind eye 
towards Zimbabwe. Knowing what course of action it should have taken on the basis 
of its foreign policy principle; it rather opted to play a silent role, amid large scale 
human rights abuse in Zimbabwe. Bischoff and Serrao (2009:367) explain that South 
Africa has not aggressively addressed the Zimbabwe problem because of its “radical 
foreign policy model [which] prioritizes achieving international economic reform 
over and above democratization” – a remarkable shift from Mandela’s espoused 
moralist and idealist foci. For instance, as articulated above, the silent diplomacy over 
Zimbabwe has exposed South Africa’s hypocrisy and concern about its image in the 
eyes of its regional counterparts.  
Its merger with BRICS and romance with China has also shown the priority it has 
given to economic advancement and a shift from an emphasis on orthodox democracy 
and the promotion of human rights. When South Africa was formally co-opted into 
BRICS in 2010, it was affirmed as one of the emerging middle powers. Joining 
BRICS was seen by critics as a step that betrays a realist streak of the current South 
African foreign policy intentions. South Africa is seen to be increasingly stooping low 
and succumbing to pressure from its trade allies (Bohler-Muller 2012:6). With Thabo 
Mbeki rule coinciding with the rise of Chinese investment in Africa, China has been 
accused of neocolonial tendencies and aiding and abetting Africa’s odious regimes in 
exchange for consumer goods. By supporting Sudan and Zimbabwe, China had 
incurred vitriolic attacks on many fronts with shared concerns from the Western 
countries that China may foist communism on its beneficiaries and trade partners. 
Additionally, China’s foreign policy of non-interference is (un)fairly understood as 
condoning the perpetuation of human rights abuse in countries where they are rife. As 
China biggest trade partners in Africa, this relationship is thus a case of dinning with 
the devil. If China’s increasing forays into Africa are to benefit the latter, then it is 
incumbent on regional leader aspirants like South Africa and Nigeria to negotiate 
terms that will be beneficial to Africans.  
This complication puts South Africa in a Catch-22 situation because it had to embark 
on economic recovery while still confronted with the dilemma of pontificating about 
good governance. In order for the new government to address its economic problem, 
some argued that South Africa had to adopt a realist foreign policy; that is, through 





this decision, South Africa was implicitly placing a premium on economic and job 
creation as more crucial than an insistence on human rights and democracy (Black 
2003).   
It remains to be seen how BRICS will affect South Africa’s conduct in future, 
especially in relation to the promotion of human rights and democracy in South 
Africa. Thus, it is possible to argue that South Africa’s involvement in African 
conflicts is driven not necessarily by its contempt for human rights abuses but also for 
pragmatic reasons; the anxiety over the possibility of foreign instabilities seeping into 
South Africa (Kagwanja 2009:3) and the imperative to boaster the country’s 
economic fortune as well as an undeniable fate to participate in curbing African 
conflicts because of its strategic geographic position. 
These shortcomings taint South Africa’s African hegemonic status. The moral 
premise and promise with which the new South Africa came to power in 1994 has 
been on a gradual attrition, largely as a result of the reasons articulated above. If it 
was to be a hegemon in Africa, its foreign policy had to show assertion and 
consistencies of political morality with or without the concurrence of other states 
within the region. South Africa, much as it is justifiably regarded as a more advanced 
country on the African continent, has had its international profile dissipated by the 
questionable choices of its foreign relations with its autocratic BRICS partners like 
China and Russia. This is not to say that principles have totally been cast out of South 
African policies. Its stance on international racial antagonism has won the country 
much applause. Through Thabo Mbeki’s ceaseless fight against the skewed nature of 
the international system, South African has also exuded its leadership role as a more 
compelling voice for the poor nations of the South (Siridipoulos 2007:1). 
(d) Legality of population 
In examining the issue of legitimacy of population in the case of South Africa, we 
attempt to substantivize South Africa’s population mix and quality in making our 
assessment with the main objective to be able to protect whether South Africa's 
demography is representative of the rest of Africa and presents any credible reference 
for legitimate acceptance of hegemony. In essence, how does South Africa’s 
demography in terms of quality, size and racial spread present valuable credentials for 





existence of a wide range of people with multiple racial backgrounds. Particularly, 
South Africa is the only country in Africa with the highest population of Europeans 
outside Europe while also reckoned as perhaps the most civilized and industrialized 
country in Africa. Surely, these credentials beckon on South Africa a hegemonizing 
status on the rest of the continent. 
South Africa and South Africans often feel a sense of pride and superiority which 
flows from an awareness that they are the most advanced and sophisticated people 
within the dark continent of Africa and have a mandate to rescue the continent from 
the shackles of underdevelopment. This view is further echoed in Marthoz (2012:8) 
argument that xenophobic attacks which occurred in 2008 highlights the “the 
perception that the country is not yet completely “African” and that, even among its 
black population, it continues to consider itself, even after the collapse of the 
apartheid state, to be “different”, i.e. more advanced than the rest of the continent”. In 
many ways, it is this deep sense of consciousness that has provoked its government to 
be more involved and assertive in the issues concerning Africa. There is a point in this 
argument in that South Africa is able to use its development, technological and 
infrastructural experiences as a stencil to improve the quality of development and 
progress in many deprived parts of Africa.  
Nevertheless, beyond this, there is very little that South Africa can boast of in terms 
of its population credentials for hegemony. In fact, South Africa’s population of 
barely 50 million people is scarcely enough to neither validate any demand nor claim 
for regional hegemonic status. Its population growth rate is also one of the lowest in 
Africa. On the other hand, while it is true that South Africa's population is indeed 
comparatively better off than its other African counterparts, the country’s staggering 
statistics in a number of social-health statistics is a cause for concern. For instance, 
South Africa is plagued with the world’s highest rates of global pandemic diseases 
such as HIV/Aids. In the area of Math and Science education competences, the 
recently released World Economic Forum (WEF) Global Information Technology 
Report 2013 ranks South Africa as second worst in the world, only ahead of Yemen 
while the quality of its education system is ranked 140 of 144 countries. Social 
inequality record of widening gap between the rich and the poor is also record high in 





of the most deeply divided with more than half of its population still unemployed 
(Adebajo and Landsberg 2003:192). 
(e) Membership and leadership of multilateral framework; SADC, G20, BRICS, 
AU, UN etc. 
The involvement of South Africa in many multilateral initiatives is testimony to the 
country’s commitment to be the epitome of good governance and a dependable player 
in the African agenda. South Africa has also expressed interest in being co-opted as 
one of the permanent members of the United Nations. The country has had a two 
tenure stint as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council in 
2007/08 and 2011/12 respectively. As a non-permanent member of the UNSC, South 
Africa has been instrumental in promotion the African Agenda on a global platform. 
This was exemplified in the undisputed espousal of Resolution 2033 broached by 
South Africa with the main objective to reinforce collaboration between the United 
Nations and the African Union (Bohler-Muller 2012:8). Through this Resolution, it is 
hoped that UNSC and the AU Peace and Security Council will work closely together 
in promoting international peace. If this Resolution gains more currency, it will 
illustrate South Africa’s fierce commitment to promoting regionalism. 
Moving further, the country has played noticeable roles in debates on climate change 
particularly through its hosting of the Copenhagen Summit (Cop 17) in 2011. Cop 17 
shows that South Africa has secured its place in the annals of global discussions 
principally on issues relating to the environment. The European Commission has 
equally expressed interest in striking strategic partnerships with South Africa. In 
summarizing Thabo Mbeki and his quest to involve South Africa in continental and 
global geopolitics Elizabeth Siridipoulos (2008:111) submits that “overall, Mbeki’s 
foreign policy was expansive and ambitious. It secured a place for South Africa at the 
highest table, though not always without its detractors in Africa”. 
At the global front, South Africa has been dignified with enormous international 
recognition through its membership as the fifth member of BRICS and of the G20 and 
of course the only African member of both groups. Arguably, this enviable feat is in 
acknowledgment of South Africa’s growing influence and leadership in the 
international arena which paradoxically has been more accentuated and appreciated at 





Africa’s leadership has met more admission at a broader platform than within the 
African region it is located. The ascension to BRICS membership indicates the rising 
influence of South Africa as a gateway to Africa and ranking among emerging powers 
like Brazil, Canada, China, India etc. South Africa has continuously used the BRICS 
platform advocate for a change in the ‘global governance architecture’ especially the 
United Nations and Bretton Woods ideologies with the conviction that unless the 
international system goes through a process of inclusive reformation, poor countries 
will always be at the fringe and hence remain voiceless even about their purpose 
(Siridipoulos 2008:112). President Zuma echoed this same position recently at the 
United Nations General Assembly in 2013 arguing that the UN Security Council was 
undemocratic and has failed to represent the interest of developing nations in its over 
70 years of its existence. According to him, “there has been too much talk about 
reform with little action….[t]he UN Security Council still remains undemocratic, 
unrepresentative and unfair to developing nations and small states” (Zuma Speech at 
UNGA).  
In the Strategic Plan 2006-2009, South Africa in expressing its alignment with Africa 
and states of the South, against a Western-led international order declared that it 
would “conduct(s) its foreign policy within a global order that is characterised by 
political and economic marginalisation of Africa and the South in general” 
(Department of Foreign Affairs, 2006). Although written a few years before joining 
BRICS, this statement shows that South Africa could not pass the buck of the 
responsibility to collaborate with other states of the South. 
Along with its participation in BRICS, South Africa is also involved in other 
intercontinental pacts with the same countries e.g. Brazil, South Africa, India and 
China (BASIC) and India Brazil South Africa (IBSA) (Shaw 2012:838). The 
ascension to IBSA and BRICS has further enhanced South Africa’s status in the 
global community but this has also been greeted ambivalently by other African states 
(Shaw 2012). There is the lingering concern amid much rhetoric that South-South 
relations should be enhanced. South Africa trades more with traditional partners i.e. 
Europe and the United States of America - and currently it trades more with other 
IBSA and BRICS members than with fellow African countries (Shaw 2012). The 
prominence that South Africa enjoys has thus not directly benefitted other African 





policies in global forums should also benefit other African states. The rise of China 
gives South Africa the opportunity to show how much it can stand up to its trade 
partners to broker more beneficial terms for the rest of Africa. South Africa ought to 
galvanize all African countries into making a concerted strategy with which to deal 
with China and other non-African trade partners. China has a policy specifically 
tailored to address its interactions with Africa; but African countries seem to make 
private deals with China, with some being more detrimental to African states. The 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) needs to be supplemented with a 
broader forum which is exclusively African. The point is South Africa, naturally, 
ought to show more leadership in promoting such a forum. 
Another forum which South Africa used to promote South-South economic cohesion 
is the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The NAM gives countries that are not aligned 
with the power bloc a context in which they can nurture international trade coalitions. 
In 2006 in Havana (Cuba) at the convention of NAM, Thabo Mbeki who was then 
incumbent leader of the Group 77 averred that reinforcing trade relations within the 
South axis has given the previously neglected countries a more forceful voice on 
world politics. This increase in influence can force the UN to yield to some reforms 
being suggested by smaller nations (Flemes 2007:19). 
The country has proved apt to the task of regional and continental power in its 
participation in many mediatory tasks through these multilateral frameworks (Habib 
2009). To date, former South African President Thabo Mbeki still mediates in 
discussions between Sudan and South Sudan. South Africa also played a part in 
instituting semblances of peace in Burundi and DRC (Kagwanja 2005:1). Even 
though the political situation in these countries remains fragile, without the 
intervention of South Africa, these conflicts in these countries would have escalated 
into full-scale war (Sidiropoulos 2008:110). Within Southern Africa, the country is 
leading the observation and intervention of the Zimbabwean political stalemate. 
Although this mission has produced ambivalent results, the selection of South Africa 
as the negotiator proves that the country is held in high regard in the area of peace 
building. 
South Africa, along with Nigeria and Senegal played a prominent role vital in the 





2001 and the transformation of the OAU into the AU in 2002 as well as the African 
Peer review Mechanism (APRM) as new continental political and economic 
frameworks (Landsberg and Kondlo 2007:2; Dokubo and Joseph 2011:565; Flemes 
2007:19; Habib 2009:148). In demonstration of its leadership resolve, in 2004, South 
Africa agreed to host the AU Pan African Parliament (PAP) and provide official 
residence for the president of the PAP all at South Africa's expense. Pretoria at the 
same time extended diplomatic privileges and immunities to all staff and 
Parliamentarians of the PAP (Department of Public Works 2004). 
Conversely, apart from the influence that South Africa radiates by joining BRICS, this 
move has attracted a number of misgivings from observers and analysts. South Africa 
has formed pacts with countries whose human rights records are far from exemplary. 
South Africa has been more concerned with finding an alternative to the Western-
imposed international system that it has had to combine with China and Russia, not 
paying attention to their political values. In this case the country has failed to correct 
political misbehavior within the continent. As articulated earlier, this explains why 
South Africa was indecisive on 
Furthermore, with the insistence on human rights which had endeared the ANC to the 
world, it was expected that South Africa would give a more forceful voice against 
states that are considered inimical to the promotion of human rights. It was thus very 
disappointing – to human rights activist - that South Africa did not use its temporary 
presences in the Security Council to condemn Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Myanmar, 
examples of countries where human rights are often disregarded. Its stance on these 
countries was at variance with what the ANC had stood for prior to becoming a 
governing body in 1994 (Habib 2009; Neuer 2007). Its behavior at the Security 
Council was a manifestation of the realist slant to which South Africa was moving 
after the reign of Mandela. Political expediency and power were gradually 
supplanting insistency on human rights and democracy. Apart from its mineral 
endowments and strategic positioning, the struggle for democracy and equal human 
rights helped substantially in catapulting South Africa to global prominence. Less 
insistency on these matters, as shown by the current South African international 
interactions, is likely to diminish the rectitude for which South Africa and the ANC 






In all these cases, South Africa has been able to play a leadership role in Africa by 
using these multilateral frameworks to “persuade others to subscribe to its vision on 
the one hand and being pulled by pragmatic factors and becoming only one among 
many regional actors on the other” (Habib and Selinyane 2006:182). As Habib and 
Selinyane (2006) suggests, this is evident of Pretoria’s reluctance to lead and a lack of 
dominance but resorting rather to multilateralism. However, Bohler-Muller (2012:5) 
argues that South Africa’s over-indulgence in many multilateral forums can 
overstretch the country putting it at the risk of indecisiveness – or deep contradictions 
as regards its foreign policy articulation (Taylor 2011:1239). This makes it hard for 
South Africa to manoeuver through the tidal waves of several multilateral and 
bilateral commitments and its own domestic priority that often times are at odds with 
each other. 
(f)  The question of followership and acceptance of leadership 
The question of followership of any leader raises fundamental issues for instance 
around the acceptance of the leader to lead. Adebajo and Landsberg (2003:172) also 
raised this concern of whether South Africa has the confidence of majority of African 
states and the ability to convince them to entrust Pretoria with a leadership role in 
Africa. They raise concern also about the possibility of states that are resentful and 
envious of South Africa to undermine its attempts to act as a regional hegemon. 
Pointing to the importance and necessity of regional powers in conflict resolution, 
Lehmann and Steinhilber (2006:2) also cautioned that proximity can sterilize 
regionalism because of ‘historical baggage’ - the solidarity shared over history by 
regional states. When taken on face value, this status is indubitable. A major problem 
that South Africa encounters as a ‘regional hegemon/power’ is that there is no known 
documented evidence of the endorsement or acceptance of South Africa’s leadership 
by other members either within the Sothern African sub-region or the African region 
(Nolte 2007:15).  
Furthermore, a regional leader ought to demonstrate not only covert but also overt 
willingness of its aspiration to wield regional leadership and mobilize its power 
resources on behalf of its region. Even though South Africa does not explicitly claim 
its regional leadership, this status is substantially inferred in the number of 
international forums to which South Africa subscribes to and the many global 





Africa’s becoming “part of the African community was, of course, beyond doubt; 
what was at issue was both the sequence of events by which this would happen and 
the conditionalities attached to its happening” (Vale and Maseko 1998:271). Also, 
because of its economic superiority, South Africa was bound to be seen as a new 
comer who takes over everything. It had to tread carefully, for it to be integrated and 
accepted into to the African community without being seen to be imperious. 
The new South Africa identifies with the new Zimbabwe from the days that both were 
agitating against White minority rule. In this vein, the country did not want to be 
perceived as a stooge of the West and neither did it want to be considered a bully in 
the Southern African region (Siridipoulos 2008:111). Another perspective from which 
to analyze South Africa’s dithering over Zimbabwe is that, to confront Robert 
Mugabe who was and is still perceived as a titan of the struggle against colonialism, 
would be choosing Western domination over Africa solidarity. Calling him to order at 
the behest of Western countries would be akin to fraternizing with an erstwhile 
oppressor over a comrade. Lloyd Sachikonye (2005:569-585) denies South Africa the 
status of hegemon, basing his argument on the impotence of South Africa’s tactic 
towards the Zimbabwe crisis. According to him, a regional power should be assertive 
and unequivocal in its denunciation of intolerable governance like the one in 
Zimbabwe. It can therefore be concluded that although South Africa wants a global 
democracy, however, it is constrained by individual brands of leadership within 
countries which of course should not be meddled with by unsolicited external pressure 
(Bischoff and Serrao 2009:368).  
South Africa describes itself as a democratic emerging power though, as shown, it has 
not convincingly promoted individual democracy in other countries. Furthermore, its 
status as a de facto African leader has been compromised by its internal identity crisis. 
According to Bischoff and Serrao (2009) and Alden and le Pere (2004:284), South 
Africa remains profoundly divided. Apart from internal debilitating divisions, other 
African countries look askance at South Africa. Naturally, these are distrustful of 
South Africa’s leadership ambitions. According to some theories enunciated in this 
study, a regional power has to state clearly that it accepts responsibility of leadership. 





The question of identity presents a further obstacle in South Africa’s suitability as a 
regional leader. Compared to other African countries, especially in the SACU and 
SADC regions, South Africa is conspicuously more developed. However, there is 
debate as to whether South Africa is a developed country among developing countries 
(Gibb 2006). Allan Boesak, once an ANC chairman of the Western Cape, wrote that 
South Africa was anxious to dispel the allusions of being a European province on the 
African continent (Boesak 2009). This was a reaction to the perception that the 
economy, infrastructure and general makeup of South Africa give it a somewhat non-
African appeal. South Africa, at least in its rhetoric, seeks integration and not 
dominance among other states. 
The incidences described here purport to suggest that South Africa has not been able 
to confidently assert a hegemonic influence and by implication has lost its moral 
lustre.  
8.3 Conclusion 
This thesis postulates that it is almost an impossible intellectual exercise to empiricize 
and extrapolate the theoretical prescriptions of the hegemonic stability theory 
particularly within the (African) regional level of analysis. A number of reasons 
account for this. First is because the regional power asserted to be a hegemon is 
confronted with externally superior contexts outside of its regional jurisdiction that is 
able to manipulate or wither the influence of any possible regional hegemon. 
Secondly, the enormous internal contradictions and challenges that daily confronts 
such state from projecting its influence at the continental realm are overwhelming. 
Thirdly, the mere fact of the preponderance of conflict and instability in Africa is 
suggestive of an absence of a credible hegemon(s). In the fourth place, is the nature of 
the African states especially Nigeria and South Africa that have yet to untangle the 
cords that bind them with diverse external and international contexts which ultimately 
define and conjecture the foreign policy of both states to the extent that it becomes 
extremely difficult to carefully implement an independent foreign policy that reflects 
essentially its own priorities.  
Finally and regrettably, the fact that the African terrain makes it extremely difficult to 
obtain relevant data to make valuable empirical judgments about certain related issues 





Schoeman (2007) have advanced the argument that South Africa (as well as Nigeria) 
cannot be regarded as a ‘complete’ hegemon since it does not possess the exclusivity 
of influence within the continent. Hence, even though both countries have displayed 
hegemonic aspirations involvement in Africa through multilateral political leadership 
and economic superiority and a degree of soft power profile, it has nevertheless 
demonstrated a willingness to partner with willing nations in finding common 
solutions to common African problems (Landsberg 2008). 
The main thesis advanced here is that it may be empirically negligent and dis-
illusional to infer that the use of ‘hegemon’ or the added qualification of ‘regional 
hegemony’ is applicable or explicable within the African regional political-economic 
context. Particularly, the nature of the post-colonial state in Africa especially makes 
incredibly difficult any valuable application of universal theories of international 
relations to an African regional context (Oral Interview; Godwin 2013). The point 
here is that the nature of foreign policy incursion of regional powers in Africa is 
perhaps typical of leadership influence within the continent rather than hegemony as 
evidenced in the willingness of both countries to be at the forefront of issues 
confronting the continent whether for mutual or particular self-seeking goals. There is 
also an official unwillingness of both countries to acknowledge or deliberately use the 
term ‘hegemon’ but rather a preference for ‘leader’ as appropriately representing its 
mandate and manifest destiny towards Africa.  
Moreover, Nigeria and South Africa substantively lack the capacity to independently 
influence the direction of outcomes within the region. They must work in concert with 
other actors to obtain any outcome to their advantages. Both countries can in essence 
be likened to pivotal states more than their reference as regional hegemons. Nigeria 
and South Africa on their own cannot unilaterally do this without the cooperation of 
other actors within the region. The emphasis of both countries for cooperatively 
fashioning out credible solutions to African problems further suggests an acceptance 
of the indispensability of the other in the political-economic affairs of the continent. 
As already articulated, hegemony in this case is sometimes attributed to a 
commanding and derogatory display of power but not necessarily leadership which at 
the same time comes with its own disadvantages. With leadership comes an 





Clearly, a hegemon does not require acquiescence to its power. In testing the 
empirical correlates of hegemonic presence within the continent, we examine the 
validity of this ‘subtle’ official and unofficial claim by scholars, practitioners and 
students of foreign policy and international relations from both countries. To support 
this position, we advance the argument that the absence of relative stability within 
Africa is generally attributable to the non-existence of a specific hegemon at the 
regional level (Africa) capable of constructing hegemonic attributes of public good 
and inspiring regional stability within the continent. To say the least, the economic 
and military pre-eminence of South Africa are not sufficient conditions and sources of 









































SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
9.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents an aggregation of the assessments and analysis following from 
the first chapter up to chapter eight. It puts forward the findings arising from the study 
and also makes tangible recommendations and suggestions for future research. The 
preoccupation of the thesis has been mainly with examining the argument of a 
Nigerian and/or South African regional hegemony within sub-Saharan Africa by using 
Hegemonic Stability Theory as a framework for analysis. The study tests whether the 
different degrees of hegemony in Africa's sub-regions correlate with different degrees 
of stability in an attempt to apply the theory at a regional level of analysis. 
9.2 Summary of the findings  
Fundamentally, the thesis attempts to understand whether (and how) Nigeria and 
South Africa have demonstrated and consistently mobilized their power resources 
through the instrumentality of their foreign policy to drum up hegemonic ambitions 
for themselves within the African sphere of influence. Understanding the rhethoric 
that Africa’s posterity is intrinsically tied to the contribution and leadership of Nigeria 
and South Africa, the study questions whether this leadership ‘anointing’ invariably 
translates into hegemonic influence for either country within the continent. Or do both 
countries’ powers influence transpose into an exaggeration of a possible twin 
hegemonic regime particularly given the internal and external forces that they face? 
These questions have fundamentally been addressed in the preceding chapters.  
While Chapter One laid the groundwork for the conceptualization of the study, the 
concern of Chapter Two was with establishing and connecting the study within 
current and existing literatures while also foregrounding the study within a 
theoretically nuanced framework with particular reference to the hegemonic stability 
theory. The Third Chapter explores the fundamental determinants and principles that 
guide and shape Nigeria’s foreign policy. This is followed by Chapter Four which 
reviews Nigeria’s foreign policy initiative towards Africa since her independence in 





foreign policy and argues further that in many ways, a number of domestic and 
external conditions ultimately served to give Nigeria’s foreign policy the hegemonic 
contours it currently has today. In doing this, the chapter evaluates the roles, 
contribution and the leadership that Nigeria has offered in Africa through its foreign 
policy. To a large extent, the thesis posits that Nigeria’s foreign policy trajectories 
have been influenced by the character of the regime at different times as well as the 
external conditions that transpired during various regime dispensations.  
I argue further that Nigeria’s foreign policy towards Africa has over the years 
remained constant to a large degree and has been reinforced by a subtle hegemonic 
ambition thrust upon it by the vastness of its resources and the overall expectation of 
the African people and cemented by the national consciousness of its ruling and 
political elites right from independence. There are certain undeniable reoccurring 
decimals that can be isolated as informing Nigeria’s foreign policy implementation, 
beginning from the Tafawa Balewa administration to-date. Coming from the 
background of its colonial history, clearly Nigeria’s political sovereignty and 
economic independence has always been fairly at the centre of its national policies 
and foreign policies generally. This is further reflected in the active nationalist 
orientation of Abuja’s policy up until the period of the Murtala’s administration where 
clearly it was stated that Africa would remain the centre piece of Nigeria’s foreign 
policy. A major remit ascribed to that policy position is that Nigeria would not rest 
until the last vestige of colonialism had been wiped off.  
Fundamentally, the basic issues of which Nigeria has focused on since 1960 may have 
changed but essentially, what has not changed is its commitment to Africa. The fight 
against colonial rule and the dismantling of apartheid are simple manifestations of 
Nigeria’s focus on Africa as a major country in the continent since the 1960 up to the 
early 1990s. It is also in recognition of Nigeria as being the largest concentration of 
black people. Thus, Nigeria and Nigerians have always been very mindful of the fact 
that their country has a sort of historic responsibility towards the continent where its 
people make up the largest concentration of black people. Hence, very visible has 
always been Nigeria’s commitment in de-colonization, anti-apartheid, economic 
regionalism, peace and security, activism in African unity and integration etc. The 
unfortunate absence of South Africa in the African political scene between 1960 and 





leadership for the continent. Nigeria has always been in the forefront in terms of its 
commitment to what is often refered to as the philosophical and ideological 
foundation of its African foreign policy. In retrospect, while policy may have changed 
depending on prevailing issues and situations, however, the principles behind its 
commitment has remained largely unchanged since 1960. Thus, the thesis submits 
that Nigeria’s foreign policy has largely remained consistent solidified by shared 
feelings and assumption by its leaders about the fate of Africa tied to Nigeria. 
In essence, various governments have found means to articulate an African oriented 
foreign policy and engrained in the foreign policy conduct of Nigeria since 
independence is thus, the reference to Nigeria as the natural leader and messiah of the 
African continent (Bach 2007). In line with Folarin’s (2010) argument, I submit that 
Nigeria’s continental hegemonic ambition in its Afrocentric policy has mostly been 
borne of an altruist motive and sympathy for the problems faced by the continent. 
This explains why it is in many cases unwilling to derive any direct material benefits 
from its contributions towards the progress of the continent at the chargrin of its own 
people. Nigeria has often being criticized of having a foreign policy that places 
Nigerians at the background and highlights the advancement of Black Africa. With 
the assurances that it is able to tackle Africa’s problems through its enormous human 
and material resources, wealth and strong military, the implication had been that 
Nigeria’s role conception in Africa is triggered by a genuine moral persuasion. Again, 
Nigeria’s hegemonic role in Africa is accentuated by its reason to be actively involved 
in Africa through the commitment of resources to the continent (Amusan 2007:7).  
Again, clearly inscribed in the speeches of Nigeria’s early nationalists (Chief Remi 
Fanni Kayode, Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Chief Anthony Enahoro) even 
before independence, is the allusion to a focus on Africa; African unity, African 
development, African progress and progress for the black race. This suggests that it 
was not as though Nigeria conceptualized an African leadership for itself but rather 
saw itself within the context of the continent of Africa and its overall development. It 
is this same Afrocentric view that Nigerian leaders have subscribed to through 
successive leadership over the years that Africa is our home land and we have a 
bounding duty to ensure independence for all African countries. Nigeria perceived 
itself as having an obligation to defeat racism on the African continent, manifested in 





the global stage. Its participation in all the processes that led to the formation of 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) and its transformation into the A.U adequately 
captures this reality (Fawole Oral Interview). 
From a theoretical position, Nigeria's involvement as a 'big brother' in Africa and as a 
‘spokes-state’ for Africa is cemented in two major arguments carved in an idealist 
orientation of seeking the greater good for the rest of Africa and a realist argument of 
furthering its national interest. This theoretical dilemma makes it even difficult to 
make any valuable conclusion about the motive underlying Nigeria’s engagement 
with Africa. This thesis however aligns itself with the idealist paradigm that Nigeria’s 
interest in Africa is not necessarily borne out of any ulterior motive or selfish 
ambition concerning its policies in Africa contrary to the proposition of many realist 
scholars. Nigeria’s commitment in Africa has always being to the black race and 
much more specifically to the African continent.  
To an extent, Nigeria’s foreign policy as far as Africa is concerned does not fit 
properly with the mold of Western Realist school of International Relations, which 
argues that a state must have two hands; one for giving and the other for grabbing 
back or that every action of a state must be based on national interest. Nigeria failed 
to subscribe to the Western realist notion that any policy that is not based on the 
national interest is useless. As a matter of fact, Nigeria did not originally define its 
national interest in any narrow perspective; it has always being tied up with the rest of 
Africa since whatever happens to one black man happens to Nigeria. Apartheid in 
South Africa was seen by Nigerians as a stain upon the integrity of the black man and 
so confronting apartheid was an article of fate. Even though Nigerian did not directly 
suffer from apartheid, it considered that whoever was suffering it in Africa, Nigerian 
was also affected by this inhibition. President Balewa also made it clear that it was 
Nigeria’s duty, to help all other non-independent African countries to come to a 
position of responsible independence. Thus, the feeling was that Nigeria could not 
properly enjoy its own independence and freedom when all other African 
alumnus/countries are still shackled by colonial rule, by apartheid and racism, etc. To 
all intents and purposes, Nigeria’s national interest was woven into Africa‘s interest.  
On the basis of the above analysis, it seems safe to argue that Nigeria did not stumble 





evidenced in the speeches of its foremost nationalists. To support this view, Dr Aja 
Wachukwu, who later became Nigeria’s first foreign affairs minister as far back as the 
1950s stressed that the reason Nigeria was asking for independence was that the entire 
black race was waiting for us to become independent in order to liberate them 
(Fawole, Oral Interview 2013). Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe also in the 1950’s propounded 
the theory of Nigeria’s manifest destiny to provide leadership on the African 
continent. Perhaps the dilemma is whether Nigeria leadership in Africa implies 
dominance or hegemony and more importantly how much of this dominance has 
dwindled since the re-mergence of South Africa in 1994. Is Nigeria willing to play a 
dominating role in Africa? And what are the costs that Nigeria is likely to incure if it 
goes on to play this role?  
The thesis argues that Nigeria foreign policy trajectories portrays no evidence of a 
country willing to play a dominant or hegemonic role in Africa but rather wants to 
provide leadership armed by the capacity of its vast resources relative to other Africa 
states. This is contrary to Amusan’s (2006:283) thesis that Nigeria has always 
“wanted to play the role of a hegemon in Africa”. Rather, Nigeria perceives itself as a 
country uniquely placed to offer leadership in Africa in concert with other states that 
share similar objectives. Perhaps, its capacity to play a hegemonic role in hampered 
by its economic inferiority to South Africa as well as many internal and external 
challenges highlighted previously (see chapter 8). In many ways, Nigeria is suitably 
placed to provide this. Hence, it would have being a disservice if it fails to do this. 
Fawole (2013) makes an analogy of Nigeria fate in Africa likened to ten men in a 
room and there is a taller and stronger man than everyone else amongst them. If they 
were to lift any big object, obviously without the support of the taller man, this task 
would be almost impossible. Hence, the offer of support by the taller person is not 
because he wants to dominate but rather because he is the only one in a situation to do 
so. It would be a disservice to the group if God gives him (Nigeria) this huge stature 
and the muscular agility to lift the object and then he fails to acknolwged this. It 
would be a different situation when he uses that physical prominence to compel 
everyone around him into obedience. That would be a hegemon; a dominant power or 
a power that wants to dominate/control. In the case of Nigeria, it is a power that is 





So for Nigeria, when countries are under attack, they expect her (Nigeria) to be at the 
forefront and for the latter to remain slient and do nothing would imply a disservice. It 
is in this context lies the acceptance of Nigeria’s leadership role in Africa; 
demonstrating a willingness to assume this role on one hand and the acknolwdgment 
of this responsibility by other states on the other hand. In spite of Nigeria’s huge 
position, countries that it helps still disagree with it, disobey it and sometimes even 
vote against it without any repercussions. Very few states could attempt this on the 
US hegemony without repercussions or consequences. 
Nigeria has never attempted to be a (regional) hegemon. A hegemon would be a 
country that wants to have its way by whatever means; by influence, power, military 
muscle, intimidation, persuasion etc. such that at the end its preference woud always 
prevail. Taking a cursory look at political maneouvers in the contient, it is difficult to 
conclude that Nigeria has always had its way. Two examples illustrate this point. In 
West Africa for example, despite its long years of military rule, Nigeria has never 
used force to get its way even though it has more military might, than all the other 
West African countries put together. Rather, Nigeria has often resorted to providing 
pragmatic leadership. At the formation of ECOWAS, Nigeria undertook from 
inception that (being the brain behind ECOWAS and the largest contributing country 
to the ECOWAS fund and being the largest economy in the sub-region), it would not 
contest for the position of ECOWAS Executive Secretary. A hegemon would want to 
control the organization where it puts in all the money. Even at the AU for example, 
Nigeria has always respected the unwritten gentleman’s agreement, that the major 
funders of OAU (AU) would not contest the position of the Secretary 
General/Chairperson. In 1983, when the position was vacant and Nigeria‘s 
Ambassador Peter Onu, who was then Acting Assistant Secretary General was 
nominated by Tanzania to take up the post, Nigeria did not support the nomination on 
the honour of its commitment not to contest this position (Fawole 2013; Oral 
Interview).  
Secondly, at the establishment of ECOMOG when Liberia combusted and ECOWAS 
decided to intervene, all of West African countries knew that no other country had the 
number of troops, the equipment and fund to bankroll such an operation, except 
Nigeria. At the time, more than half of West African countries had armed forces that 





soldiers under arms and with considerable experience in UN Peacekeeping operations 
around the world. But when ECOMOG was constituted, in spite of the fact that 
Nigeria contributed the bulk of the troop, it conceded the leadership to Ghana. The 
initial first commander of ECOMOG was General Onoid Kaimu from Ghana. It was 
after the operation was failing with the attack and killing of President Samuel Doe at 
the ECOMOG headquarters that things changed. On the contrary, the US would 
display its hegemony by ensuring that its troops are never under the command of 
other nations. Other West African countries realize that there is no other country that 
has all it takes to undertake this operation; nonetheless Nigeria did not impose its will. 
Its eventual command of the operations was a product of circumstances not a product 
of original intention. From that perspective, it is clear that Nigeria is not a hegemon. 
As in the cases of Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan in recent times, the Americans have 
always been on top. 
Geographically, Nigeria is well placed as a coastal state unlike many other countries. 
Even though it is not geographically or spatially the largest country, it however is the 
most populous country and the most ethnically diverse. The next most populous 
country in Africa is exactly half of Nigeria’s population and that would be Ethiopia 
followed of course by Egypt (which is not a black country). This shows the extent of 
Nigeria‘s manifest destiny. Nigeria‘s population is almost 52% of the entire West 
African sub-region of 16 independent states and hence, this awareness makes Nigeria 
uniquely placed to offer leadership. Added to its human resource, Nigeria has always 
being richly blessed and this awareness is apparent in the sense that it could have been 
for fun that God has enriched this country so much if not to provide leadership to 
Africans and that Nigeria is in a position to do so. Thus, Nigeria did not stumble unto 
leadership by an accident of history. Neither was it also an ambition but more 




The oil boom in the 1970s and long years of military rule added to the quality of 
diplomatic experiences of its leadership are features that informed a robust foreign 
                                                          
58
 Contrary to many opinions, Nigeria’s activism in Africa predates the discovery of oil. Nigeria has 
always being richly blessed even in the days it did not have oil; cocoa, groundnut, cotton, palm oil, 
rubber etc. were major currency earners for Nigeria. It was with these that universities, stadia and 






policy commitment in Africa wherein Nigeria was able to transform itself into a 
regional and pivotal power. In the early years of Nigeria’s independence, its 
leadership influence was accentuated by the concentration of its foreign policy 
posture towards the eradication of apartheid, colonialism and racism in Africa.  
Another trigger of Nigeria’s hegemonic ambition in Africa has also been found by the 
study to be rooted in the military political history of the country. The point here is that 
foreign policy trajectories under the military years have been more rigorous and 
activist in promoting the African course. The reverse has been the case since the post-
military dispensation with Nigeria’s foreign policy seemingly taking backslides and 
turnaround in its priorities to one that places emphasis on domestic concerns of the 
state.  
Nigeria recognizes the expectation by other weaker countries in Africa, for it to take a 
leadership role in addressing many of the developmental and political issues that have 
engulfed the continent. Clearly, its intention is not necessarily based on a desire to 
play a hegemonic role. In distinguishing between hegemony and leadership, we 
already pointed out that both concepts even though may appear similar semantically 
but however mean different things. One can play a leadership role without being 
hegemonic. In other words one can exercise power in an acceptable manner without 
being a bully. From empirical evidences, it is difficult to thus equate Nigeria’s role in 
Africa with that of a hegemon alhough other countries perceive this as hegemonic 
role. The crux is, Nigeria’s objective is not to play a hegemonic role but rather to play 
a leadership role, especially with the protection of the national interest of the country 
and the interest of other weaker black African countries and black in Diaspora.  
Nigeria has prided itself in playing a leadership role in terms of seeing itself as a 
leader but not imposing itself on continental or African politics or the West African 
sub-region where it is more influential. It definitely perceives itself as a leader and 
even in the sub-region of West Africa it has played a ‘hegemonic’ role in the positive 
leadership sense but not imposing itself. I also submit that as a result of Nigeria’s role 
in Africa in the first three decades of its independence translated into a hegemonic 
ambition which ultimately had been a product of coincidence and not a clearly 
thought out intention of its leaders. In short, to a large extent, Nigeria has been able to 





perpetuate not a hegemonic ambition in Africa but recognition of itself as Africa’s 
credible leader 
Like Chapters Three and Four, the succeeding Chapters of Five and Six equally 
articulates the fundamental principles and determinants influencing South Africa’s 
foreign policy and traces the development of South Africa’s foreign policy towards 
Africa under the apartheid and post-apartheid eras. The submission here is that South 
Africa during the apartheid period was denied any meaningful role in the international 
community due to its international isolation as a result of wide range of international 
sanctions imposed on it. Thus, its foreign policy during this period was invoked at 
destabilizing the Southern African sub-region and minimizing the harmful effect of its 
isolation. Conversely, in the post-apartheid period, South Africa’s foreign policy has 
been configured by an inspiration to play a greater role particularly in Africa with the 
conviction that its destiny is intrinsically tied to the continent. Clearly inscribed in the 
foreign policy trajectories of South Africa is the understanding that Pretoria’s fate is 
intrinsicly tied to that of the continent. As a result of its apartheid past, South Africa 
finds itself caught between the rock and a hard place and consequently restrained in 
portraying a hegemonic ambition for the continent.  
Incidentally, Nigeria’s dwindling leadership influence in Africa coincided with South 
Africa rising prominence in global affairs. Abuja’s foreign policy orientation has 
weakened remarkably since the post-apartheid era with the inclusion of South Africa 
as a major actor in Africa. The thesis finds problematique the assumption in many 
quarters that South Africa’s military, material and economic preponderance in Africa 
ultimately guarantees its hegemonic status within the continent. Cox (1996:99) 
already points out that “economic and military pre-eminence of a given state within a 
region are an insufficient source of coercive power to ensure localized acceptance of 
hegemony” (see also Alden and le Pere 2009:2). It is doubtful whether South Africa’s 
increasing economic and military superiority has in any way translated into specific 
political advantage except in very few cases outlined above. In short, its economic 
advantage as a result of its reacceptance into the international comity of nations 
following years in isolation conveys an unarguable status of a regional hegemon in 
Africa. The point is that while South Africa no doubt is the economic and military 





payoffs or benefits and hence actual regional hegemonic influence is still very much 
lacking. 
While South Africa has consistently emphasised its unwillingness to play a 
hegemonic role in its relations with Africa, its actions within the continent however 
shows otherwise. In many cases, South Africa have infact acted as a hegemon in its 
attempt to bully other countries into accepting its position or having to forcefully 
supplant itself into key positions of power within the African Union. Many African 
countries share a mutual suspicion and are resentful about South Africa’s increasing 
economic and political dominance in Africa. For instance, its attempt to mediate in the 
crisis in Cote d’ Ivoire was seen by Nigeria as meddling with Abuja’s West African 
sphere of influence. This is also aside the several accusations of South African 
companies of undermining local industries in particularly in poorer African countries 
Marthoz (2012).  
In all, this thesis argues that contrary to the rhetoric of its officials and in confirmation 
of the arguments of a number of South African scholars, South Africa has 
unambiguously harboured and evinced a clear ambition to play an increasing 
leadership role in Africa, on the strength of it economic and military preponderance 
and acknowledged internationally political clout. Its contribution to the restructuring 
of the continental political and econominc architectutre is testament to this fact (Alden 
and le Pere (2009). Nevertheless, while South Africa appears to fulfill all traditional 
conditions to be a regional hegemon in Africa, it however fails to fulfill this 
requirement of hegemony. Even within its sub-region, its influence and the 
acceptance of its leadership is still contested. To say the least, President Mugabe still 
enjoys a greater level of international clout and acceptance than his South African 
counterpart.   
South Africa has undoubtedly the most imposing economy in Africa. For this reason, 
South Africa is taken as a natural regional leader. However, the country itself is slow 
to come out in the open and state its ambition. Manifestations of South Africa’s global 
interest have been exhibited through its affiliation to IBSA and BRICS. The campaign 
to have a seat at the United Nations Security Council is also an indirect way of South 
claiming military superiority over other African countries. This campaign received a 





member of the UN Security Council. South Africa’s inclusion in the rotational 
position gave the view that the Security Council was becoming more inclusive to 
Africa. 
Since post-apartheid era, South Africa has come to establish itself as an influential 
player particularly within Africa armed principally by its economic and militaty 
superiority. As submitted by Geldenhuys, South Africa has been able to combine its 
hard and soft power assets to achieve its African agenda. The general expectation of 
South Africa to play a hegemonic role on the basis of its moral standing aas well as 
economic and military resources does not necessarily translate into capacity to play 
this role within the continent. Even though its military strength can be rivaled in 
recent time particularly by countries like Angola, its economic superiority however 
gives it an advantage to increasingly play a greater role at the continental level.  
Chapter Seven unpacks the elements of national power of both countries in a bid to 
account for the motivation for hegemonic ambition within Africa. The chapter 
submits that while both countries have relatively sufficient hard power capacity to 
exert a hegemonic influence in Africa, it is the country with the greater level of soft 
power that would most likely be acknowledged as the regional hegemon. The study 
sees the imperative to stretch further the debate on the use of hard and soft power by 
African regional powers if any meaningful ranking or assessment of power relations is 
to be made. For instance, how much influences can Nigeria or South Africa wield 
from its use of soft power particularly under democratic dispensations?  
Chapter Eight on the other hand takes this analysis further by examining in detail the 
substance and subtle claim of hegemony by both countries. As already echoed earlier, 
the argument of the chapter is that both Nigeria and South Africa cannot effectively 
exercise hegemonic influence within the continent despite the fact of their hegemonic 
ambition. Since neither can effectively demonstrate control over the other either in 
economic or political or ideational terms nor have the capacity to unquestionably 
bully its way throughout the continent, it is doubtful whether the hegemonic stability 
theory can therefore be extrapolated at the African regional context. In looking at the 
factors that facilitate or constraint Nigeria and South Africa’s hegemonic ambition in 
Africa, the study submits that conditions such as the legality of population, foreign 





hegemonic influence. More importantly, Nigeria and South Africa capacity to play 
any meaningful hegemonic role in Africa cannot be unconnected to its capacity to 
resolve endemic domestic problems of acute levels of poverty, inequality, crime, 
violence etc.  
This raises fundamental questions about the dilemma of applying international 
relations theories at a universal level since these theories has no empirical relevance 
to Africa. The study finds that Nigeria and South Africa have deliberately pursued a 
foreign policy that even though reflects a hegemonic ambition but is nevertheless an 
acknowledgment of a leadership role within the continent. This has invariably led to 
combustive and conflictual relationship between both countries. South Africa’s re-
emergence into the political scene in Africa in 1994 was perceived as a threat to 
Nigeria’s erstwhile dominance and hegemonic ambition in Africa. With a superiority 
of economy, South Africa’s entry has reconfigured the power equilibrium in Africa 
deepened by Nigeria’s dwindling economy and long years of despotic military rule. In 
essence, the hegemonic/leadership ambition of both countries has continued to shape 
and configure its interaction with each other particularly since the post-apartheid era. 
9.2.1 Effective Hegemonic influence in Africa: A comparative analysis of 
Nigeria and  South Africa’s ‘hegemonic’ positions in Sub-Saharan Africa 
From the above analysis, a number of deductions can be made about the hegemonic 
attributes of both Nigeria and South Africa. First, we argue that while there is no 
confusion about Nigeria and South Africa’s desire for continental regional hegemony, 
it remains to be seen whether both countries command sufficient hegemonic influence 
that transcend beyond their West African and Southern African sub-regions 
respectively. No doubt, clearly inscribed in the foreign policy culture of both 
countries is this subtle ambition and expectation to be at the forefront of African 
issues. As pointed out by Adesola (2012), Nigeria has had to bear the brunt and 
burden of leadership expected of hegemonies in its quest of sustaining peace and 
stability. Though both countries might possess the will to actualize this ambition, it is 
doubtful whether there is a clearly thought out plan and strategy as to how they intend 
to actualize this enthusiasm. From a realist perspective, Nigeria and South Africa’s 
foreign policy strategies over the years have conveniently demonstrated a calculated 





triggered bitter rivalry between both countries (Amusan 2007; Zabadi and Onuoha 
2012). This explains the consistent pattern of conflictual relationship between both 
countries particularly since the post-apartheid era. 
As a logical corollary, to therefore lay claim to the presence of two hegemonic powers 
at the African regional level is not only over ambitious but also erroneous. More 
importantly, the internal and external constraints that confront both countries impose 
serious restrictions on its capacity to effectively trigger any sign of hegemonic 
influence transcending its West African and Southern African backyards. From the 
above analysis, it can be assumed that the foreign policy and national role conception 
of both countries in Africa is demonstrated perhaps in its capacity to provide 
continental leadership and not necessarily hegemony. By resorting to partnership, 
Nigeria and South Africa acknowledges that they both lacked the political and 
economic thump to act independently of other states and assert conformity to self-
inspired norms and standards. In practical terms, Africa therefore lacks the presence 
of a single and dominant hegemon capable of articulating and enforcing the rules of 
interaction among most important members within sub-Saharan Africa in the true 
sense of the description of a hegemon by the theory of hegemonic stability.  
The mere fact that international conflicts are still preponderant in the African regional 
space is enough testaments that the empirical correlates of hegemonic stability theory 
are missing at the African regional level. To say the least, nothing from the above 
analysis, points to the disqualification of Nigeria’s hegemonic ambition on the basis 
of South Africa’s rising economic power credentials. The post-apartheid Africa’s 
political-economic calculus cemented with South Africa’s reacceptance into the 
international community has reconfigured the political-economic landscape of the 
continent, however, this effect has failed to trickle down to commensurate political 
and economic influence for South Africa enough to command hegemonic influence. 
Moreover the recent deterioration of South Africa’s economy following the global 
recession has implied a dwindling stature in its economic advantage. 
Therefore, in exploring the foreign policy trajectories of both Nigeria and South 
Africa particularly since their re-emergence in the international space in 1999 and 
1994 respectively, the thesis argues that even though both countries nurse a 





significant restrict this legitimate ambition. As the Head of the Botswana Mission to 
Nigeria acknowledges, it is extremely difficult to identify a true leader in Africa “as 
there are so many demographics today that really cannot make a particular nation to 
stand out as the leader” (Harold, Oral Interview). Nigeria today still suffers from 
certain debilitating weaknesses and still battles with the challenge of overcoming very 
elementary issues for instance of epileptic power supply, disjointed microeconomic 
indices, lack of credible democratic credentials etc. that any nation aspiring to a 
hegemonic status ought to have conquered long ago. As an aspiring hegemon, it 
cannot afford to be in combat with these issues if it is to effectively project its power, 
represent the interest of the region and intervene effectively in significant sectors in a 
way that also reflects its own preferences.  
Nigeria in spite of its enormous human and material resources still depends essentially 
on foreign aid and has not been able to marshal its resources and leverage on this to 
mobilize other states in the region making it possible for states like France to 
penetrate and balkanize the efforts of regional integration. These no doubt are 
significant limitations that can be ascribed to distinct political-economic 
characteristics of Nigeria that questions its hegemonic credentials. For post-apartheid 
South Africa as well, the same strands of argument can be isolated for the country. 
South Africa still contends with massive domestic issues that equally wither its 
capacity to project hegemonic influence beyond its region. Given these realities, it 
becomes impracticable to speak of a regional hegemonic order in an African context.  
From a conceptual position, any effort to apply the hegemonic theory to Africa would 
inevitably require a fine-tuning to fit the peculiarity and nuances of the African 
context. Such conceptualization of (regional) hegemony in Africa should be one that 
acknowledges the distinctive political-economic characteristics of the post-colonial 
African state and one that is dependent-capitalist in nature. The need to introduce the 
elements of structural dependency which undeniably characterizes post-colonial 
African states into the application of the concept of hegemony in an attempt to explain 
foreign policy positions of African regional powers becomes necessary. This is so 
because the state which is actually the driving force and engine room for political and 
economic processes in itself functions in a way that brings it into a subordinate 
position with international capital. What is therefore important is a refocusing of the 





South Africa interphases with some of the distinct realities that may be applied to the 
hegemonic theory.  
If anything, hegemony in Africa must operate clearly within a dependent system that 
still relies significantly on an international sector. For instance, applying the 
understanding of the hegemonic theory to the scenario of food security (that addresses 
critical issues of food production, distribution, marketing etc.) as an essential 
component of national power etc. paints a dismal picture for Africa essentially. Africa 
today remains indisputably the only continent that has been suffering a per-capital 
food and agricultural decline over the past four decades and remains the only 
continent that significantly depend on the international market for its food security. 
That in itself is indicative of a very vulnerable power position for any state in Africa 
aspiring toward hegemony because once you lack the capacity to even feed your 
population, then any kind hegemonic influence is suspect. The agricultural sector in 
Africa is been saturated in the most insidious of ways by transnational agro businesses 
and once the dimension of international capital is introduced into this critical sectors 
and calculation of hegemonic theory, the fundamental and elementary index of 
elements of power which every hegemon should have effectively addressed are 
flawed.  
These limitations effectively imply that the theory requires significant modification to 
rejig it to introduce the reality of the dependent-capitalist system that Africa operates 
in. In examining the arena of capital accumulation and the nature, character and 
politics of the state, what is clear is that the trajectories of development is influenced 
by other centers of power to which so called hegemons must effectively contend with 
from a subordinate position. Thus, the Nigerian and South African states does not 
adequately fit the realist prescription of hegemonic theory.  
Again, while it is difficult to measure hegemonic influence in quantitative terms or 
even any measure of power relations worst still in Africa, it is possible to make 
inferences based on the capacity and potential of Nigeria and South Africa in building 
any substantial argument of the presence of a regional hegemon. Adebajo (1999) 
argues that South Africa is also another power which can boost Nigeria’s Africa 





could jointly present a potent force in developing Africa and initiating peaceful 
politics. 
However, the influence of Nigeria in African political-economy is also marginal. 
Although, the country remains the most populous in Africa and its many citizens 
continue to maintain a presence in many other African and non-African countries, the 
notoriety attached to Nigerian governance, which eclipses the incomputable good 
things that Nigerian intellectuals continue to all over the world, does not help the 
argument that Nigeria is an ideal regional leader. Oddly, the preponderance of 
Nigerian academics in diaspora is not only attributable to the talent of the country but 
to its lackluster governance. Academics have a penchant for questioning orthodox 
thought. But in a ‘rentier state’ (Egbo et al 2012:598) like Nigeria, rent is the preserve 
of a few individuals and they brook no dissonance from any quarter. Egbo et al (2012) 
also argue that overdependence on oil is largely to blame for unaccountability in 
Nigeria’s governance.   
In terms of economic stature, however, South Africa will continue to dominate the 
rest of Africa, at least for some time. Through its multinational corporations South 
Africa is Africa’s biggest investor in fellow African countries (Gibb 2006:432). Many 
other African countries are understandably ambivalent about South Africa’s economy. 
They are slow to take pride in it because the economy still remains largely driven by 
white people. In 1997 when Walter Ofonagoro wrote that Mandela was a black 
president in a white country, implying the magnitude of how capital in South Africa 
favoured the white minority populace; the economy has not been totally de-racialized 
sixteen years on. To accept such an economy as representative of Africa is thus an 
indirect way of maintaining the obsolete white dominance in Africa. For this reason, 
South Africa’s economic identity poses a challenge to how well the country can 
represent African interests. 
To take another perspective, South Africa’s quandary over international approaches, 
especially Zimbabwe, is understandable. Many people who use South Africa’s stance 
over Zimbabwe as the yardstick to discount South Africa’s leadership credentials lack 
historical depth of post-apartheid South Africa’s policy. Because of this dearth of 
understanding, silent diplomacy on Zimbabwe is the only blemish that people see on 





to 1995 when South Africa called for aggressive sanctions on Nigeria after the 
Abacha regime hanged nine Ogoni activists. Cyril Ramaphosa, then Secretary General 
of the ANC, issued a scathing verbal attack on the Nigerian junta and Shell, a major 
oil company operating in Nigeria. Even Nelson Mandela, who prior to the hanging 
advocated a silent approach to the Nigerian crisis, was in the forefront advocating for 
Nigeria’s suspension from the commonwealth (Black 2003:41). South Africa was 
accused of using non-African means of discipline (Vale and Maseko 1998). With this 
historical background, South African could be soft peddling its role in Zimbabwe in 
order to avert the opprobrium that it excited in 1995. Additionally, the country is 
concerned with being called an aggressor if it takes a radical step in Zimbabwe. To 
justify this stance, one only needs to look at Iraq and the devastating effects that 
external intervention left in that country (Gervisser 2007). 
Just like Nigeria, South Africa has the main – but not all – requirements needed for it 
to be called a regional leader. Its mineral wealth which bests many countries 
worldwide will continue to lure investment interests from all around the world. Its 
economy is way beyond its fellow African countries. The economy within South 
Africa is similarly not equally balanced; the country has outstripped Brazil in 
becoming the most polarized economy in the world. This state of economic inequality 
with South Africa and Africa portends what would happen if integration in Africa was 
enhanced more than it currently is; South Africa would grow more in strength, 
disproportionate to other African countries, consistent with the traditional customs 
theory (Robson 1980). 
The ANC’s moral credentials were as important as political ones in promoting South 
Africa’s reputation in 1994. With the passage of time, however, South Africa has 
taken a more realist or pragmatist stance in its international agenda. Of more 
importance to South Africa seems to be the need for economic advancement. 
Concerns of human rights and promotion of democracy have been relegated into the 
background. However, even South Africa’s economy is more obvious on the 
international arena; it does not percolate to ordinary South Africans who continue to 
live in abject penury.  The yawning fissures between the rich and the poor have 
provoked and sustained crises like crime and xenophobia. Added to this is corruption 
and cronyism. Black Economic Empowerment has tended to benefit a few 





poverty. Because of the history of exile and apartheid, many ANC members have 
used the ties forged among ‘comrades’ during the struggle to gain unfair advantage in 
terms of government contracts.  
This degradation in political morality will engender doubt in the international 
community that held Mandela and the ANC in high moral regard (Van der 
Westhuizen1998). If South Africa today will be regarded as a regional leader, it will 
certainly not be because of its moral appeal, human rights activism and democratic 
agency. It will certainly be because of its economic stamina and the attention that this 
brings from other continents. A fundamental question is whether or not African 
countries will accept South Africa as a leader based only on this. It is still yet another 
question whether aspirant or displaced leaders like Nigeria and – recently – Angola 
will cede allegiance to another power. 
Ukaegbu (2005), though, argues that, Nigeria despite “an immense human and 
material resource, coupled with significant scientific infrastructure, has not yet been 
able to manage the all-important…leap forward” (Ukaegbu 2005:1385). As 
articulated above, a number of factors impinge on Nigeria’s suitability for regional 
leadership. Aside the history of treacherous and violent leadership that has worn out 
the lustre with which Nigeria once shone, the economic downturn currently facing the 
country are a far cry from the 1973-1976 oil boom when revenues from this resource 
rose to an astronomical 350%. While Nigeria is referred to as a hegemon or a 
‘military giant’ (Adebajo 2000:196) of Africa, Osaghae gives it the moniker of a 
crippled giant (1998:1). Adebajo (2008) pejoratively refers to Nigeria as a giant with 
rickety feet, rendered thus by the country’s bad governance and chronic dependency 
on oil which has stifled growth in the country. Military rule, civil strife, graft and 
ethnic and religious intolerance have greatly influenced the stature of Nigeria in the 
international system. 
9.3 Conclusion 
The study of regional hegemonic order and stability in Africa with reference to 
Nigeria and South Africa has shown that the hegemonic stability theory has no direct 
empirical correlation in Africa due largely to the absence of an uncontested and 
recognized hegemon within the region. While the hegemonic influence of both 





evidence to suggest that the leadership roles both countries play in Africa is indicative 
of hegemonic influence. No doubt Nigeria has always displayed a leadership role in 
Africa conceived on the premise that Africa would continue to play a central role in 
its foreign policy interest, its power coefficient vis-à-vis South Africa since the post-
apartheid era makes this claim ambiguous. On the other hand, South Africa’s claim to 
continental hegemony though ‘subtle’ and unannounced can be challenged in many 
fronts. However, Nigeria (as well as South Africa) faces what Bach (2007) calls a 
‘conversion problem’ of transmuting its regional policy of hegemonic ambition and 
interests into practical terms by its increasing constraint and failure to address the 
factors that put a strain on its ambition or a consideration as to whether to share 
hegemonic power with South Africa.  
Again, in recent years, the increasing tension between Nigeria and South Africa is 
often explained in both countries’ unwillingness to share hegemonic control in Africa. 
I argue that hegemonic stability theory can only be applicable to Africa when both 
countries resort to cooperation rather than conflict in its relations with each other. In 
other words, a bi-polar regional security arrangement with Nigeria and South Africa 
as equal partners in progress is capable of inspiring increasing levels of peace within 
Africa to the advantage of both countries. 
Expectedly, this thesis has provoked a deeper realm of national consciousness not 
only for Nigeria but also towards South Africa; a search for answers to many 
developmental problems and misplaced values and priority of Africa and its 
government. Why have we refused to be developed despite decades of colonial 
vestiges? Other colonized states particularly in South Asia have made giant strides 
towards development but Africa has refused to 'grow up'? Perhaps, our development 
lies in genuine joint collaborative efforts of both Nigeria and South Africa in an 
atmosphere of positive competition to improve the lot of the continent. The case of 
both countries' hegemonic claim in Africa is perhaps a reminder of story where the 
one eyed man is king in the land of the blind; only that in this case there are 'two' one 
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Questions for Indepth One-on-One Interviews 
 
Cluster One: Scholar Analysts/Academics from both Nigeria and South Africa  
Central Questions: 
Q1: What pattern would you say Nigeria/South Africa’s foreign policy has taken 
particularly since the end of apartheid? 
Q2: Has there been a radical change in Nigeria/South Africa’s foreign policy sequel to a 
democratic dispensation and now? 
Q3: What factors would you say account for this change (if any)? 
Q4: How have the foreign policy perspectives of South Africa/Nigeria been shaped? 
Q.5. Has Nigeria/South Africa’s foreign policy changed significantly since the new 
democratic dispensation in 1999/1994? 
Q6: What in your own view accounts for this change? 
Q7: To the best of your knowledge, what would you say is largely responsible for 
Nigeria/South Africa foreign policy in Africa as it is today?  
Q8: What factors do you think influence the behaviour of Nigeria/South Africa in 
Africa? 
Additional Questions:  
Q1: To the best of your knowledge, would you argue that Nigeria/South Africa have 
hegemonic or leadership ambitions in Africa? 
Q2: In what way(s) have Nigeria/South Africa inspired regional or continental stability in 
Africa? 
Q3: In your opinion, how have Nigeria/South Africa directed their power resources to 
the benefit of Africa?  
Q4: In your view, would you conclude that Nigeria and South Africa’s involvement in 





Q5: How has South Africa’s apartheid past configured or constrained its leadership 
ambition for the rest of Africa? 
Q6: To the best of your knowledge, what challenges have both countries faced in the 
course of addressing these issues? 
Q7: How is Nigeria perceived among its neighbours given the fact that it is surrounded 
by French speaking countries? 
Q8: What would you say have been the implication of Nigeria being surrounded by 
French speaking countries? 
Q9: How is South Africa generally perceived among its neighbours given these hostile 
experiences of the past? 
Q10: What, in your opinion, is/are the general perception of South Africa and Nigeria’s 
neighbours to their position as continental leaders? 
Q11: In your view, are there any direct implications of the absence of a verifiable 
dominant regional power for the continent at large given South Africa and Nigeria’s 
arguable position? 
Q12: What roles does your agency play in the process of foreign policy making in 
Nigeria/South Africa? 
 
Cluster Two: Diplomats/Bureaucrats/Officials/Policy Makers/Politicians of the 
government of Nigeria and South Africa 
Central Questions: 
 
Q1: What do you consider to be the fundamental and core interest of Nigeria/South 
Africa in Africa? 
 
Q2: In your own opinion, what are the specific foreign policy directives that guide 
Nigeria/South Africa’s relations with Africa? 
 
Q3: How have these general guidelines inspired Nigeria/South Africa’s participation in 
the African international arena? 
 
Q4: How has Nigeria/South Africa related with its neighbours in terms of these 
principles of its foreign relations? 
 
Q5: Has there been any meaningful change in Nigeria (post-military)/South Africa’s (pre 
and post apartheid) foreign policy with Africa? 
 
Q6: Are there vital interests that motivate and inspire Nigeria/South Africa’s foreign 







Q7: What role(s) has Nigeria/South Africa played towards continental transformation 
and regional integration in Africa since 1994? 
 
Q8: Would you conclude that Nigeria/South Africa has effectively asserted its powers 




Q1: Are there any specific interest that inspire or account for Nigeria/South Africa’s 
inroads into Africa? 
 
Q2: In your opinion, how would you consider Nigeria/South Africa’s leadership interest 
in Africa? 
 
Q3: Would you assert that Nigeria/South Africa indeed has hegemonic aspiration in 
Africa? 
 
Q4: Is Nigeria/South Africa well equipped to play leadership role in Africa? 
 
Q5: What internal or external factors have enabled or restrained Nigeria/South Africa 
from taking effective hegemonic/leadership responsibility within the African continent? 
 
Q6: How have these domestic and/or foreign factor inspired or contributed to the 
attitude Nigeria/South Africa has displayed in the past years? 
 
Q7: From what you have said, would you consider Nigeria/South Africa to be a 
hegemon or leader capable of inspiring leadership in Africa? 
 
Q8: How would you assess Nigeria/South Africa’s interest in Africa? 
 
Q9: What roles has Nigeria/South Africa played towards continental transformation and 
regional integration in Africa? 
 
Q10: What roles does your agency play in the process of foreign policy making in 
Nigeria/South Africa? 
 





Q1: What pattern would you say Nigeria/South Africa’s foreign policy has taken 
particularly since the end of apartheid? 
Q2: How have the foreign policy perspectives of Nigeria/South Africa been shaped? 
Q3: Has Nigeria/South Africa’s foreign policy changed significantly since the new 
democratic dispensation in 1999/1994? 





Q.5. To the best of your knowledge, what would you say is largely responsible for 
Nigeria/South Africa’s position in Africa as it is today? 
Q.8. What factors do you think influence the behaviour of Nigeria/South Africa in 
Africa? 
Additional Questions: 
Q1: How effective has been Nigeria/South Africa’s foreign policy posture in inspiring 
continental and regional renewal within Africa? 
Q2: How is Nigeria perceived among its neighbours given the fact that it is surrounded 
by French speaking countries? 
Q3: What would you say have been the implication of Nigeria being surrounded by 
French speaking countries? 
Q4: How has South Africa’s apartheid past configured or constrained its leadership 
ambition for the rest of Africa? 
Q5: How is South Africa generally perceived among its neighbours given these hostile 
experiences of the past? 
Q6: To the best of your knowledge, would you argue that Nigeria/South Africa have 
hegemonic or leadership ambitions in Africa? 
Q7: In what way(s) have Nigeria/South Africa inspired regional or continental stability in 
Africa? 
Q8: To the best of your knowledge, what challenges have both countries faced in the 
course of addressing these issues? 
Q9: What, in your opinion, is/are the general perception of South Africa and Nigeria’s 
neighbours to its position as continental leaders? 
Q10: In your view, are there any direct implications of the absence of a verifiable 
dominant regional power for the continent at large given South Africa and Nigeria’s 
arguable position? 
Cluster Four: Diplomats/Envoys/Officials of the Africa Union, ECOWAS and 
SADC etc.  
Central Questions: 
Q1: How has Nigeria/South Africa related with its neighbours in terms of the principles 
of its foreign relations? 
Q.1: What meaningful contribution has Nigeria/South Africa made towards the progress 





Q.2: How has Nigeria/South Africa’s foreign policy position been reflected on the 
African continent? 
Q5: How has Nigeria/South Africa presented its positions of issues affecting Africa? 
Q.1. Are there vital interests that motivate and inspire Nigeria/South Africa’s foreign 
policy relations towards Africa? 
Q.4: Would you assert that Nigeria/South Africa indeed has hegemonic aspiration in 
Africa? 
Q.1: What internal or external factors have enabled or restrained Nigeria/South Africa 
from taking effective leadership responsibility within the African continent? 
Q.3. Can we still refer to an African hegemony given these constraining factors to both 
countries leadership status in Africa? 
Q.2: How have these domestic and/or foreign factor inspired or contributed to the 
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